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Preface  
 
  
The 55th ESReDA seminar held in Bucharest the 9th and 10th of October 2018, was organized 
by the European Safety and Reliability Data Association and the Romanian Railway 
Investigating Agency – AGIFER, to invite participants to exchange ideas on “Accident 
Investigation and Learning to Improve Safety Management in Complex System: Remaining 
Challenges”.  
The seminar goal was to discuss results in specific areas, and to share and explore the 
experiences of using other paradigms, approaches, methods, databases, implementation of 
safety systems across various industries, through a forum for exploring these challenges and 
questions mentioned above. 
More than 80 participants from 15 countries with some outside of Europe (Brazil, Israel, 
France, Germany, Lithuania, Norway, Portugal, Italy, The Netherlands, Finland, Czech 
Republic, Belgium, Sweden, United Kingdom, and Romania) contributed through their 
presentations, discussions and expertise in reviewing the state-of-the-art in the field, trying to 
answer which are the remaining challenges in accident investigation and learning.  Useful 
information was given to the participants, to improve their scientific knowledge and expert 
activities with a possible conclusion that “a greater consideration of the historical dimension 
and of the cultural aspects in complex sociotechnical systems seems to be one of the recurring 
challenges for accident investigation”. 
Indeed, the process of globalization and the state of continuous movement in which we are, 
challenges our abilities to analyse, design and control complex sociotechnical systems. We 
need more and more information and more analysis to interpret them. The quest for 
continuous improvement in performance often implies that the “deadline” for our actions is 
always “yesterday”. The current needs of people (workers, managers, regulators, customers, 
citizens), imposed by the faster (rapid) technological and economic development of the 
human society, can be sustained only in harmony with safety. But how safe is the transport 
which we use? How reliable is the information which we found? How sustainable is the 
source which produces the energy for us? Have the system’s designers created enough 
barriers to prevent an accident? What are the practices and real performance of safety 
management?  
Unfortunately, in most cases, we answer these questions only after an accident occurred, 
through a safety accident investigation. Safety accident investigation is a fundamental process 
in safety management, involving technical, human, but also organizational, cultural and 
societal dimensions. This activity is concerned by a number of challenges that limit its 
effectiveness and by a number of opportunities for improvement. In addition, many 
organizations and actors are proactive, through updates in risk analysis and learn from 
opportunities such as near-misses. 
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In order to address these issues, the technical programme committee invited three keynote 
lectures from: 
❖ Raed Arafat, Internal Affairs Ministry, Bucharest, Romania 
❖ Teodor Grădinariu, International Union of Railways, Paris, France 
❖ Dan Șerbănescu, Academy of Science, Bucharest, Romania 
 
In addition, participants had the opportunity to listen to 22 presentations (with their papers in 
these proceedings) within 7 sessions: “Past, present, future”; “Organizations and human 
aspects”; “Methodological aspects”; “Lessons learned and historical perspectives”; 
“Methods”; “Case studies” and “Going across sectors”, made by stakeholders from research 
centres, universities, industry, government and safety authorities. 
As regards the organization of accident investigation, the papers have highlighted issues 
related to the different functioning of the investigating bodies, the advantage and 
disadvantages to have a multimodal board but also the necessity for an effective exchange of 
information between investigating agencies from different countries, in the context of a 
globalising system. “An incident with a freight train in the Port of Rotterdam that originated 
on the Black Sea could require the involvement of many parties all over Europe”, was one of 
the examples to support this statement. 
How to manage communication after a civil aviation accident occurred on January 20, 2014 in 
Romania, by the investigating authority was a good example to explain why such an action 
has positive aspects even during the investigation. “We should always keep in mind that the 
lack of communication could result in media speculation, with negative effects for the safety 
investigation activities” was one of the conclusions. 
Methodological aspects of accident investigation are trans-sectoral, they can be applied 
whatever the industrial sector. In this respect, the presentation of SAfety FRactal ANalysis 
(SAFRAN) investigation method, a “method that is developed to guide investigators to 
identify where interventions might have the greatest impact for improving global system 
safety” in a railway accident investigation, and “how the ESReDA Cube model may be used to 
construct more reasonable and better targeted recommendations” through investigations 
from three different sectors: a train derailment from Romania, an explosion at BP Texas in 
2005 and an explosion at a company that makes aerosol products from Finland in 2018. How 
to use the method of the Accident Investigation Board of Norway was explained by a railway 
investigation after a train derailment occurred in Romania. 
When competent investigators (in technical, human and organizational factors) are given 
enough resources (means to collect data, to conduct forensic analysis, to conduct interviews, 
time to analyse data with relevant methods), they are generally able to identify the direct 
causes, but also the contributing factors and root causes.  Are we sure the accident 
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investigation established the relevant “root causes”? Or did they miss some “deeper causes”? 
The answer of this question could be found in an analysis made through a method called 
“Organisational Analysis of Safety”, “which tackles three dimensions intending to cover the 
whole scope of the situation: “the historical dimension”; the “organisational network”, and 
“work relationships channels”. Another strategy relies on applying Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (AHP), which “allows analyst to derive relative importance for the set of parameters 
through pairwise comparison”, explained by using the database of nuclear power plants 
related events. 
Lesson learned from accidents and incidents as one of the fundamental processes in safety 
management is very important but at the same time, very challenging. These lessons should 
be identified by the accident investigations as a “rational aim”, but they should be understood 
by those involved. One of the issues concerning this understanding, is the non-reporting of 
some safety events, by field experts. An analysis of this aspect was made by using semi-
structured interviews with Air Traffic Controllers and their managers, who were asked about 
safety, risks, lessons learned. A cause of some losses of opportunities to learn could be 
“organisations don’t look good (and deep) enough to find that there are also organisational 
causes for the accidents and incidents they are investigating”. The paper presents the 
necessity for the organisations to look “for their own dysfunctions as possible precursors for 
accidents”. 
“Are structural weaknesses limiting the capacity to learn from incidents?”, started from the 
implication made in the call for papers, that developing, identifying and sharing “good 
practices” could happen to a greater extent than at present. By “capacity to learn from 
incidents”, the authors referred “particularly to the practices of investigating and learning 
from incidents”. 
“Do not repeat old mistakes in learning from accidents: It’s better to prevent a runaway than 
be ready for it” is one of the titles, but also could be the conclusions from the papers which 
approached some case studies, to demonstrate the advantages of using these “to promote an 
active way of learning from past incidents without repeating the costly mistakes” or to 
describe “in detail the processes, the interactions, the management tools to support the use of 
knowledge of accidents in practice”, in different industries. 
 The nuclear industry (sector) had a good representation by presenting a systemic method “for 
assessing the systemic management of emergency management in case of nuclear accidents” 
which started with a brief description of the Romanian National Emergency Situation 
Management System. The connection with railway industry was highlighted by analysing 
some aspects of the probabilistic versus risk evaluations of railways events, the result being an 
“important new view on the interpretation and use of the existing railway event information 
in order to improve operation and decision-making process” and also by analysing the impact 
of railway events that occurred in the proximity of Nuclear Power Plants and which should be 
included in their evaluation of the potential risks. 
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To increase the time available for expert debate, which is the essence of ESReDA community, 
the technical program committee organized within the framework of an ESReDA seminar, a 
workshop for one hour at the end of first day. The participants were divided (by the TPC) into 
8 groups (4 in English language, 4 in Romanian language) and they were invited to identify 
problems and solutions regarding the four phases of accident investigation (organizational 
issues, fact-finding, analysis/recommendations, follow up). The results and ideas were 
presented within a reflection session to all participants the second day and are found also in 
this book. 
The editorial work for this volume was supported by the Joint Research Centre of the 
European Commission in the frame of JRC support to ESReDA activities. A special thanks is 
due to A. Liessens (JRC) for the editorial work.
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Welcome speech 
 
 
Vasile BELIBOU 
General Manager  
Romanian Railway Investigation Agency – AGIFER 
No.393, Calea Griviței  
Bucharest, ROMANIA 
 
 
 
Dear guests, 
 
First of all, we’d like to wish you welcome in Bucharest, in Romania, and thank you for 
trusting us with the organization of the 55th ESReDA, the 9th-10th October 2019.  
AGIFER became ESReDA member, within the 50th ESReDA seminar, in the spring of 2016, 
when AGIFER delegation expressed his interest in the works presented and informed about 
our wish to find out many information about ESReDA activities. Taking into account that 
ESReDA organizes yearly two seminars and one of its working groups issued works specific 
to the investigations, AGIFER management decided to propose the organization of a seminar 
in Bucharest, this proposal being accepted by ESReDA BoD, in the autumn of 2017, within 
Ispra seminar.  
AGIFER chose for the organization of the seminar the Convention Centre of the hotel 
Ramada Plaza Bucharest, that we hope to be good location for all the participants.  
During the 8th October 2019, the day before the seminar, the members of the working group, 
in charge with the technical issues of the seminar, organized a training together with AGIFER 
investigators, when they shared many and varied information. We are sure that all this 
information, put together with the information got following the meetings of AGIFER with 
other European NIBs, will help Romanian investigators to perform investigations that 
contribute to the railway safety improvement.  
Through the intended purpose and area, this seminar got the interest and participation of 
representatives from some important European and Romanian institutions. We mention here 
the colleagues from ESReDA, and representatives of other European institutions, that joined 
and helped us in the organization of this seminar, as follows: UIC, ERA, Romanian Academy, 
institutions from Romanian nuclear field, AGIFER homologous body from Romanian air 
field, that is Authority for Investigations and Analysis of the Civil Air Safety (AIAS), and so 
on. 
The seminar will bring together 22 papers, some of the members of the working group 
Foresight in Safety, responsible for the Committee of Technical Program, but also of 
specialists from fields of interests for the investigators, that is the transport safety, both 
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railway and air ones, and human factor, from Europe and South America (Brazil). Among the 
presentations there will also be papers of our colleagues, investigators, drafted only by them 
or they collaborated at other papers, two papers of colleagues from air field and 4 from the 
nuclear field.  
At the end of the first day, the Technical Committee of the Seminar prepared a workshop, 
firstly within an ESReDA seminar, where the participants will be invited to debate the 
problems met and the solutions corresponding to those 4 phases of an investigation.  
The seminar will bring together 92 persons, from 15 countries, speakers and ESReDA 
members, AGIFER technical staff and technical staff from Romanian railway field, AGIFER 
wishing to let the cooperators know the most recent approaches and tendencies in the safety 
investigations and connected fields.  
In order to have a good understanding of the papers presented and to have some constructive 
debates between participants, the simultaneous translation from and to English was assured. 
At Worldwide and European level, the railway transports had in the last time a quick 
development, increasing the speed and comfort performances, but also through the decrease 
of the pollution. All of these could not have been possible without improving the traffic 
safety, finding some technical solutions as safety as possible, analyzing carefully all the 
possible risks, identifying some effective safety measures that prevent the occurrence of 
accidents. An investigation, performed with high responsibility, can explain why an accident 
happened, but in the same time, can contribute to the prevention of some accidents similar to 
the investigated one, issuing some safety recommendations.   
We are sure that the seminar proceedings shall contribute to the improvement of the railway 
safety conditions, through a better understanding of the way to perform the investigation and 
through an understanding of the importance of its role. We also hope in a very effective 
cooperation between the actors involved in the safety of Romanian and European Union 
transports.  
 
 Accident Investigation and Learning to Improve Safety Management in Complex System:  
Remaining Challenges 
7 
 
Romanian Railway Investigation Agency – AGIFER,  
past and future 
 
 
Eugen ISPAS 
 
Deputy General Manager 
 
Romanian Railway Investigation Agency – AGIFER 
No.393, Calea Griviței  
 Bucharest, ROMANIA 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Romanian Railway Investigation Agency - AGIFER, hereinafter referred to as AGIFER, that 
was set up on the 4th September 2015, resulting from the reorganization of Romanian 
Railway Authority - AFER and by the outsourcing of the investigation activity, being an 
independent body organized like legal public institution, completely financed from own funds. 
AGIFER main tasks are:   
a) investigation of serious railway accidents;  
b) investigation of the incidents happened in the train running, coordinated by an 
investigator in charge, appointed from AGIFER;  
c) investigation of those accidents and incidents that in slightly different conditions could 
have led to serious accidents, including the technical failures of the structural 
subsystems or of the interoperability constituents of European railway high speed and 
conventional system; 
d) other tasks specific to its field of activity, put under its authority through legal papers. 
 AGIFER has no tasks in the investigation of tram accidents and cable car accidents. 
The Government Decision 117 /2010 classifies the railway accidents and establishes the 
investigation procedure. Besides it, the decision stipulates the obligation for all railway 
actors in the market to report the accidents and incidents and establishes their tasks at the 
accident site. 
Investigation of accidents and incidents is a process performed for their prevention, that 
includes gathering and analysis of information, settlement of conclusions, including the 
setting up of causes and, if case, issuing of some safety recommendations, for the 
improvement of railway and metro safety and for the prevention of accidents and incidents.   
The main objective of AGIFER is the improvement of the railway safety and the prevention of 
the accidents, it being met through the issuing of safety recommendations in the reports for 
the investigations of the railway accidents and incidents and through a good relationship with 
the railway safety authority as well as with involved authorities. 
AGIFER, in terms of organization, operation and decision making, is independent from 
Romanian Railway Safety Agency - ASFR, part of Romanian Railway Authority - AFER, of 
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any infrastructure managers, railway undertaking, charging body, allocation body, notified 
body, as well as of any entity whose interests could come in conflict with AGIFER tasks. 
AGIFER has investigators responsible for the territorial structures, having offices and 
endowments, situated in Bucharest and in other 7 cities. 
All the territorial offices have staff that assure the round-o’clock service. In 6 from those 7 
territorial structures, the investigators have cars for the operative travel to the accident site 
Both the Directive 2004/49/EC and Romanian legislation stipulates that the investigation is 
performed independently of any legal inquiry and does not aim to establish the guilty or the 
responsibility.    
In order to be able to carry out its tasks at the accident site, AGIFER concluded cooperation 
protocols both with the police and with the prosecutors. 
AGIFER is part of NIB network within European Union Agency for Railways, network that 
performs its activity with the support of the Safety Unit of the same European agency. 
In cooperation with European Union Agency for Railways, AGIFER organized meetings for 
the investigator training. 
AGIFER cooperates for the investigation of some accidents and incidents with other 
investigation bodies of the member states, in the conditions established by the Railway Safety 
Directive 2004/49/EC, as well as in the organization of meetings for sharing the good 
investigation practices. 
Starting with 2016, AGIFER also cooperates with European Safety, Reliability & Data 
Association. 
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Operational analysis and projections in the prevention and management of 
emergencies 
 
 
Raed ARAFAT 
Ministry of Internal Affairs 
Address - 1A Piata Revolutiei, district 1, 
Bucharest, ROMANIA 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The presentation will begin with a summary  presentation of the Emergency Interventions 
Department – DSU, part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs – MAI, and of its tasks, 
respectively the coordination, permanently, at national level, of the prevention and 
management of emergency interventions, assuring and coordinating the human, material, 
financial and other resources, necessary to restore the normality. 
A part of Romanian critical infrastructure is the metro network in Bucharest – METROREX, 
consisting in 4 main lines with a total length of 69,25 km, double-track line and 51 stations. 
The emergency interventions within this network can be generated by earthquakes, floods, 
failures of different afferent equipment’s, fires either in the train sets or in the tunnels, errors 
of the human factors and, not least, the terrorist attacks that are one of the world threats.  
The presentation will illustrate the legal and organization measures taken for the 
improvement of the emergency interventions, through a good cooperation between the 
institutions involved, the achievements and the future plans. 
The presentation will end with the operational analysis performed by DSU on the national 
situation of railway tunnels and bridges, in terms of the management of the emergency 
interventions and the need to draft some cooperation protocols. 
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On a possible approach for the multi criteria event analysis  
in complex systems events 
 
Dan ȘERBĂNESCU 
Division of Logic, Models in Science, Romanian Academy 
Drumul Taberei 35A 
061358, Bucharest, Romania 
 
 
Abstract 
It is recognized that there are similitudes and the interconnections in the accidents 
investigation and learning processes, during various lifecycle phases and for various socio 
political environments for systems, which are using different and diverse technologies. 
However, the use of systematic approaches for such evaluations would be an example of very 
useful application of multi, trans and inter disciplinaraty methods for complex systems. A new 
approach is proposed for the evaluation of accidents by using multiple criteria. The approach 
is based on an analogy with some existing results and on the use of the topological 
description for systems and models. 
 
 
Key words: accident analysis, complex systems, topological modelling 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The paper presents a systematic method and its results for the evaluation of the existing 
similitudes and the interconnections in the investigation and learning processes for major 
accidents in complex systems, for different technologies; the various lifecycle phases and 
socio-political environments during which such accidents take place are also considered. 
Figure 1 illustrates the aspects under evaluation for such analyses in complex systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The goals of the review of various complex systems 
 
The goal of the evaluation is to:  
 
• Highlight the role of global approaches (crossing conventionally set limits in usual 
practices) on issues related to the evaluation of accidents and the learning process 
• Consider impact of cross ties between various  
• lifecycle phases  
• socio political environments  
• diverse technologies 
• Highlight the specifics of such cross dependencies for extensive implementation of 
results available in accident analysis of technical systems, as available in 
• The series of activities and publications under ESREDA 
• Various technical areas at national and international level 
• Consider remarks as potential input for future activities of the safety and reliability 
think tanks, on topics like critical infrastructures and systems resilience  
 
The ideas on the above topics are presented in the context and with direct reference to two 
specific technical domains (railways and nuclear) for a specific country (Romania). The 
proposed approach addresses some important practical questions, which are considered of 
interest in defining the accident analysis framework, methods for a given technical system by 
using also the experience from another system and / or environment (national or international) 
for any type of complex systems. 
 
2. METHOD DESCRIPTION 
The following four type of methods were identified as a quadrant of the general approach in 
the identification of the causes of accidents in any complex systems: 
• Status of the organizational aspects potentially leading to a high contribution to 
occurrence and recurrence of accidents 
• Detailed analyses using engineering methods on the causes of the accidents 
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• Existence of specially designed systems to derive conclusions on the accidents from 
the analyses  
• Use of lessons learnt from own or similar installations 
 
Details on each of the type of methods are in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Quadrant of the types of methods for the accident evaluations – as considered in the paper 
In order to reach the goal of evaluating similitudes and differences for various types of 
complex systems a scale was used to represent the compliance with the best / recommended 
practice of an accident evaluation system (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Compliance Scale with best / recommended practice of an accident evaluation system 
The characteristics considered of interest in defining topics and strategies for accident 
analysis for a complex system are (Table 1) are as follows: 
• Similitude (S)   
• Accuracy in the evaluation of an accident (E) 
• Usefulness of the implementation of the lessons learnt (L) 
• Impact of the system lifecycle (C) 
• Impact of socio political environment (P) 
• Interference with other technologies (T) 
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Table 1. The characteristics considered of interest in defining topics and strategies for accident analysis for a 
complex system 
 
These characteristics define a matrix of evaluation of various options/situations, which might 
be encountered. The options in matrix format might be represented in geometrical format as 
nodes and facets of polyhedral, as shown in previous papers [3; 4]  
In this paper the approach is used in order to identify specific features and compare two cases 
(two specific technical domains R=railways and N=nuclear), for a specific country (Romania) 
In Table 2 there is a more detailed representation of the common and different features, which 
have an impact (in the situation evaluated in the paper) on the comparison criteria from Table 
1.  
Table 1.Features that are common and features different for two industries 
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The sources of evaluations in table 2 are as follows: 
• For the Nuclear area – the papers containing information to support the expert 
evaluations from and summarized in previous work ([1];[3];[4]): 
o Evaluation of the impact of using risk driving evaluation criteria 
o Presentation of an example of event review and OPEX  
o Evaluation of a case study on cross industries impact (from R to N) 
o Presentation of emergency organizational structures at national and industry (N) 
level 
o Presentation of some specific safety evaluation techniques (N) 
• For the Railway area – the information available from [2]. 
In order to describe the interdependencies between various features / criteria specifics in cases 
N and R, used to develop the interdependence matrix the evaluation considered the existing 
results mentioned in papers listed before on the topic.  
However, it was considered that the evaluation of interdependencies could be performed 
based on the same input by using three types of approaches (three approaches used in the 
literature in similar cases and one new proposed in this paper).   
 
The main common idea of all types of approaches used will be however that the volume 
of admissible zones, as designated by specific tools of each approach, will indicate the set 
of optimal solutions. 
• Type A - An approach as per the series of activities and publications 
under    ESREDA , with a particular case, CUBE 
• Type B  - Analytical – parametric modelling – function of a variable and 
one    or two parameters 
• Type C - The s- curve accident analysis 
• Type D   Topological analysis based on Interdependence Matrix for 
defining   criteria 
 
Type A of approach- Multicriterial analysis by using specialized tools as the ESREDA 
CUBE 
Type A is in accordance with the series of activities and publications under ESREDA -
Dynamic Learning from Accidents Bridging the gap between accident investigations and 
learning [5;6]. 
Each node is defined by intersection of three facets, which are common areas of fulfilling any 
two out of three criteria.   
The resultant geometrical form is of cube type, as presented in Figure 4. The nodes and the 
facets may be described in an Interdependence Matrix of the 3 criteria. 
This principle is valid for any number of criteria. However, the resultant geometrical form is 
of more complex polyhedral type, as it will be shown under the type D of approaches. 
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Figure 4. The facets of the multicriteria evaluations 
 
The ESREDA CUBE is, from this perspective, a particular case of geometrical representation 
of the space of acceptable solutions for the optimization based on 3 criteria (Figure 5).  
As mentioned in the introduction the evaluation needs to consider more than 3 criteria (in the 
R-N comparison case 6 criteria were considered).  
For this case a new approach is needed and/or a generalization of the CUBE approach, based 
on mathematical modelling. 
 
 
Figure 5. Use of ESREDA CUBE to evaluate optimal solutions in safety/reliability optimization based on 3 
criteria 
However, if there will be more than 3 criteria, then the acceptable space od optimal solutions 
will be described by a more complex type of poliedra, as the Type C of evaluation will 
illustrate (and which is symbolically illustrated in the right side of the Figure 5). 
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Type B of approaches – Analytical evaluations of the space (volumes of acceptable 
optimal solutions), i.e. a parametric modelling – function of one variable and one parameter 
This type of approaches is based on the evaluation of the dependencies of the optimal space 
(in a two-dimensional representation) for each criteria defined in Table 1. This results in a set 
of acceptable spaces (as illustrated in Figure 6) for each criterion. The resultant acceptable 
space will be considered as an envelope of all spaces for a given situation (R or N for instance 
in this paper).  
 
 
Figure 6. Evaluation of cross dependencies for extensive implementation in accident analysis of technical 
systems 
Type C approaches – Use of the technological (s- curve)  
In this type of approaches, the technological curve (the so-called s- curve) is used in order to 
perform the evaluation of acceptable solutions. The curve is studied by comparing the “ideal 
s-curve” with the real one (as resulted after as derived from the accident analysis (as 
illustrated in Figure 7 and it is presented in detail in [2]; [3]]). As shown in Figure 7, each 
major accident in N type of installations lead to a re-evaluation of the acceptable space of 
optimal solutions (they became smaller and with more limitations and driven by various 
systematic biases called safety paradigms). 
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Figure 7. Type C approach event review for nuclear acse [3] 
Evaluation of cross dependencies for extensive implementation in accident analysis of 
technical systems is similar for various technologies (In Figure 6 a nuclear NPP case is 
represented, while in Figures 8 and 9 a railway technology is shown) ([3]). 
 
 
Figure 8. Type C approach event review for railway case [2] (1) 
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Figure 9.  Type C approach event review for railway case [2] (2) 
 
Type D Use of topological spaces for the evaluation cases with more than three criteria 
A new approach is proposed for the case when there are more than three criteria for the 
evaluation of an optimal space of solutions for the risk management in a complex system. The 
method, called the method of the topological spaces, was used in previous tasks [3;4] and it 
is described in detail with examples of use in previous works [3;4]. 
The set of solutions of acceptable optimal choices in a complex system with multicriterial set 
of challenges is defined for various areas of the Interdependence matrix as per formulas (1) to 
(3). The acceptable space of solutions is defined as per formula (4) 
 
s = s1 (e→l→c→p)  s2 (e→t→p)      (1) 
Where x→y =  x is a function of y 
 w = w1 (e→p)  w2 (l→p)]  w3 (e→c→p) w3 (e→c→p)]  (2) 
 tot = s  w          (3) 
tot =     (4) 
 
The solutions of the topological approach for the evaluation of the spaces of optimal results 
for a multi criteria decision in a complex system are represented by the matrix in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10. Interdependence matrix for evaluating criteria (in table 1) leading to acceptable spaces as defined by 
polyhedral type 
In general, a multiple set of evaluations for an increased number of criteria leads to a set of 
solutions, which are in matrix format as per the Figure 10. However, there is a connection 
shown in [3] between the matrix format a geometrical representation, illustrated also in Figure 
11. 
 
Figure 11.  The polyhedral representation of the matrix of multi criteria decision for a complex system [3] 
Practically for a set of criteria and the type of systems defined in tables 1 and 2 a set of results 
as represented in Tables 3-5 is obtained.  
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Table 2.Sample representation of the connections between various features for a randomly chosen case study (1) 
Strong INDIRECT connections 
Evaluation  Learning Cycle 
Political 
Environment 
Evaluation  Technologies 
Political 
Environment 
  
 
Table 3.Sample representation of the connections between various features for a randomly chosen case study (2) 
Very Strong DIRECT 
connections 
Similitude 
Evaluation 
Learning 
Cycle 
Political Env 
Technologies 
 
Table 5. Sample representation of the connections between various features for a randomly chosen case study 
(3) 
 
 
For the particular case of four criteria (of which the three criteria case of the CUBE is a 
particular situation) the results are in the polyhedral format of a tesseract (Figure 12). 
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Figure 12. Set of results for a 4 criteria case (a first generalization of the three criteria CUBE case) 
 
In general, for a complex system with more than 4 criteria the space of optimal results are 
represented as a series of polyhedral forms (Figures 13 and 14) [3;4]. 
 
 
Figure 13. Solutions of the acceptable spaces in the polyhedral form [3] (1) 
 
The maximum possible space for a given complex system is a hypersphere [3] (Figure 14) 
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Figure 14. Solutions of the acceptable spaces in the polyhedral form [3] (2) 
 
3. RESULTS  
Based on the method described in the previous paragraph a set of cases were defined and 
evaluated for the optimization method as defined in the introduction and in Tables 1 and 2. 
The following calculation cases were considered: 
Case 1  Weak interactions between all criteria 
Case 2  Strong technical interaction between criteria and weak interaction with socio 
  political ones 
Case 3  Weak interaction between technical aspects and strong political dependencies 
Case 4  Weak interaction between all criteria and low similitude with other        
technologies 
Case 5  High similitude with other technologies/systems but no evidence of applicable 
   common criteria 
 
The Interdependence matrices and the determinants are defined in the Figures (15) - (19). 
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Figure 15. Case I weak interactions between all criteria 
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Figure 16. Case 2 Strong technical interaction between criteria and weak interaction with socio political ones 
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Figure 17. Case 3 Weak interaction between technical aspects and strong political dependencies 
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Figure 18. Case 4 Weak interaction between all criteria and low similitude with other technologies 
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Figure 19. Case 5 High similitude with other technologies/systems but no evidence of applicable common 
criteria 
 
The results of the space of acceptable solutions (defined for those cases by the determinants) 
are represented in Figure 20. The Case 2 is the case with the best optimal space of acceptable 
solutions. 
 
 
Figure 20. Comparison of the acceptable spaces of solutions for cases 1 to 5 (Green the best, yellow medium 
cases and red worst case) 
For the comparison of R and N systems in the special case mentioned in the paper the results 
indicate that, for a R type of system the evaluation methods need improvement. 
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MAINLY 
• From the perspective of being better connected with the learning process  
• best team training,  
• use of databases and  
• detailed root cause procedures 
• Adapted to the degree of obsolesce of the infrastructure and 
• By increasing the independence on political factors  
• better structure at national level,  
• more resources and  
• administrative independence to the review organizations 
 
SECONDLY  
• By eliminating any direct interference of the political factors in the evaluation process 
•  Improving feedback to operation and learning process by taking actions to force the 
operators of transportation means to implement the learned lessons 
This result is represented in Figures 21 and 22. 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Results of acceptable spaces and actions to improve evaluations of R versus N (1) 
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Figure 22. Results of acceptable spaces and actions to improve evaluations of R versus N (2) 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The comparison of the methods considered for the inter technological comparison of systems 
optimized based on multiple criteria illustrate that, by defining in a systematic manner the 
strategy of the evaluation it is possible to:  
➢ Identify better and in a systematic manner of the best fit of a recommended practice to 
a new domain and  
➢ Improve the n – dimensional criteria evaluation of accidents for a given domain.  
➢ Consider extending the evaluation strategies and methods to aspects like  
• critical infrastructures or  
• systems resilience  
 might be a possible approach for researches in safety and reliability, including a topic 
for the Safety and Reliability Think Tanks.  
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Abstract 
For nearly two centuries railway accident investigation has been first and foremost a national 
affair. There were some standards of interoperability but safety and its supporting technology 
was local, national at best. All this is changing rapidly. The EU has formulated 
comprehensive interoperability standards touching every part of the railway system. Safety is 
going to become standardised in the EU with the expansion of ERTMS, the system of 
standards for management and interoperation of signalling for railways. Add to that the 
Chinese policy to develop the Silk Route and it is clear that rail safety is rapidly progressing 
from national to continental and soon intercontinental level.  
 
The paper does not show existing research. What it aims to do instead is to identify 
deficiencies in the present system of railway accident investigation: safeguarding of 
knowledge and the exchange of experiences. An incident with a freight train in the Port of 
Rotterdam that originated on the Black Sea could require the involvement of many parties all 
over Europe. European high-speed trains are operating in Asia and America. Japanese 
technology is exported to the UK.  
 
Responsibilities for investigation also differ from country to country. Some countries have 
independent safety boards, others see accident investigation as part of supervision by railway 
inspectorates or by the department of public prosecution. In some countries this responsibility 
is shared by railway inspectors and separate accident investigators all using different 
procedures, methodologies and approaches.  
 
Is there a transcontinental or even intercontinental necessity for basic accident investigation 
standards, methodologies and the way reports are communicated? 
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Most findings are reported in the national language, making it very difficult for others to read 
them and learn from them unless they are written in one of the major languages. 
 
 Some countries are forerunners in the use of certain technologies and operational systems. 
Others are experiencing similar problems later on. How can we avoid a repetition of failures 
when we don’t speak the same language, using a similar investigation approach and basic 
methodology?  
 
That poses those in charge of railway systems for a major challenge, similar to the one that 
was observed in the airline industry post WWII. Accident investigation is not a goal in itself. 
It is a means to identify necessary fields of improvement, to learn from failure. Accident 
investigation in the airline industry has moved from national to global level but not without 
difficulties. It is inevitable that the railway sector most follow given the globalisation of 
railway technology.  
 
1. Introduction 
For nearly two centuries railway accident investigation has been first and foremost a national 
affair. There were some standards of interoperability but safety and its supporting technology 
was local, national at best. All this is changing rapidly. The EU has formulated 
comprehensive interoperability standards touching many parts of the railway system. Safety is 
going to become standardised in the EU with the expansion of ERTMS, the system of 
standards for management and interoperation of signalling for railways, and the transfer of a 
number of responsibilities from the National Safety Authorities to the European Railway 
Agency. Add to that the Asiatic markets which are increasingly expanding towards Europe, 
exemplified by Chinese policy to develop the Silk Route, and it is clear that rail safety is 
rapidly progressing from national to continental and soon intercontinental level.  
 
2. Railways in the Netherlands increasingly international 
For many years the Netherlands has been the North-western gateway to continental Europe. 
The Port of Rotterdam has developed into the largest port in Europe1, generating a large 
volume of (international) freight transport by inland shipping, road and rail. Freight trains 
originating from Rotterdam extend to destinations all over Europe, including the Baltic, 
Mediterranean and Black sea. Rotterdam is one of the major docking ports for the very large 
Post Panamax container vessels.  
 
Much of this cargo is transported by inland shipping or by road transport. However, rail 
transport plays a major part as well, with destinations in Germany, Italy and further away, 
such as the Black Sea and the Baltic region. Each 5 – 10 minutes a freight train arrives at or 
departs from the major Rotterdam marshalling yard at Kijfhoek. Many freight operators are 
international companies, the largest of them being DB Cargo, also the largest in Europe. 
There are workshops in Rotterdam which carry out maintenance, overhaul and repairs to locos 
and other rolling stock, often originating from countries far and away. The Dutch transport 
inspectorate has several inspectors permanently assigned to Rotterdam. 
 
 
1 In 2017 Rotterdam processed 467.3 mln tons and around 13.7 mln TEU. 29,646 sea-going vessels called at 
Rotterdam plus 105,000 inland vessels. It was larger than the next five European ports put together. Source: Port 
of Rotterdam Authority 
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Passenger transport shows a similar picture, although most of this is concentrated within the 
Netherlands itself. Nevertheless, the Dutch Government has proposed to make medium 
distance international rail transport more competitive with air traffic. This year a direct 
Eurostar connection has been opened between London and Amsterdam via Rotterdam. Other 
major international trains are the Thalys to Brussels and Paris, the ICE to Cologne and 
Frankfurt and the IC to Hannover and Berlin. Increasingly cross border services are being 
developed or enhanced, such as the Benelux between Amsterdam/The Hague, Antwerp and 
Brussels and the Aachen-Heerlen-Maastricht-Liege regional service. There is a strong wish to 
develop and intercity service between Eindhoven and Cologne.  
 
All this is possible as a result of an increasingly standardised European railway system 
coupled with technological developments facilitating easier interoperability where systems 
differ such as the overhead power supply2. This is reflected in the increasingly important role 
of the European Railway Agency ERA. It is a matter of time before passenger rail transport 
follows developments in the freight market. National railway companies will be replaced by 
international firms, specialising in regional operations or intercity/long distance transport. 
Next to national intercity routes the Netherlands sees a number of international routes, a 
market that will be expanded over the coming years, see above. High speed railway operation 
is leading here, with German/Dutch ICE’s operating to Frankfurt, French/Belgium Thalys to 
Paris and Eurostar to London. 
 
The complexity of a modern railway system is illustrated by a recent incident, in which a 
NS/Dutch Railways intercity broke down on the Dutch high-speed railway. The train was a 
standard push/pull configuration. The coaches were Dutch Railways ICR type. The pulling 
loco was a Bombardier Traxx, leased as a freight loco from Belgium but adapted for 
passenger use by Dutch Railways. The pushing loco was also a Bombardier Traxx, again 
leased as a freight loco, this time from Germany and also adapted for passenger use by Dutch 
Railways. One train, three countries involved! 
 
3. Railway accident investigation still national 
Although railways are developing into an increasingly continental system, railway accident 
investigation is still looked at from a national point of view. There is no agreed European 
standard regarding format, process and methodology of such an investigation. There is no 
obligation to publish the results in a mutually agreed language, if only as a summary of the 
outcome and recommendations. There is no agreed central register of such investigations. It is 
all left to national initiatives. Only the NSA’s have to report to the ERA.  
 
Another challenge is that in some country’s accident investigation is the sole responsibility of 
an independent transport safety board, such as in the UK. In other countries accident 
investigation is done by the national safety authority (NSA). This NSA is sometimes an 
independent government body, in other cases it still is part of the state-owned national rail 
operator. In the Netherlands we have a mixture of both. Major (fatal) accidents are usually 
investigated by the Dutch Safety Investigation Board (OvV), which is an independent body 
based on a separate Act. All the other investigations are the responsibility of the railway 
inspectorate section of the NSA (ILT), a government body.  
 
 
2 Standard power supply on the Dutch overhead is 1500/1800 V DC. The Betuweroute freight railway and the 
High-Speed railway have 25 kV AC. Germany uses 15 kV AC. Belgium has 3kV DC and 25 kV AC.  
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There is a fundamental difference between investigations executed by a safety board and 
those done by an NSA. The former looks at the accident from a systems point of view. The 
purpose of the investigation is first and foremost to learn from failure. The outcome is usually 
published followed by a set of recommendations. Investigations carried out by an NSA tend to 
focus on violations of the law: who is to blame? In some cases, NSA investigation reports are 
used as a basis for judicial prosecution. The outcome is published, followed by a set of 
offences that have been found, plus shortcomings and warnings/signals. The offences can 
result in a (temporary) loss of a licence to operate.  
 
The danger of stopping the investigation once a ‘culprit’ has been found is, that the corporate 
role of the system in which the accident occurred is not fully understood. Every train driver 
knows he/she should stop at a signal at danger. Yet each year nearly 100 signals passed at 
danger (SPAD) occur in the Netherlands alone. Why? How? What were the circumstances? 
How was the sighting of the signals? Was there expectation of a positive aspect involved? 
Which preventive actions have been taken by the management? Was there pressure because of 
company penalties for running late? Was it because of concessions with impossible 
requirements from the safety point of view? All these questions need to be answered, instead 
of simply fining the train driver sometimes with hefty fines. And yes, if there is a case of 
gross negligence, of willingly taking risks, then there is every reason for severe action.  
 
A weak point in railway accident investigations is the absence of agreed standards and 
methodology, even at a national level. In general, these reports describe sometimes in minute 
detail how an accident happened. In many cases they also explain why it happened, although 
the level of detail varies. Less obvious is what can be learned from what happened after the 
crash. Is it inevitable that given a frontal collision between two trains, passengers and staff get 
killed? How well did the rolling stock behave or did it show an unexpected failure mode? 
How effective were the emergency services? How well did the hospitals cope with the 
unexpected influx of casualties? How can we learn if we fail to investigate these aspects? 
 
Dutch railway experts have an advantage that they are capable of reading foreign 
investigation reports written in German, English and French. That is, if they have become 
aware of the existence of such reports. However, equally important reports from Italy or 
former Eastern Europe are outside the reach of Dutch experts. In return there could be lessons 
to be learned by others from Dutch investigation reports which are now often ignored, simply 
because either the report as such is not known outside our country or the contents (in Dutch) 
is incomprehensible to foreigners.  
 
Is there a transcontinental or even intercontinental necessity for basic accident investigation 
standards, methodologies and the way reports are communicated? Most findings are reported 
in the national language, making it very difficult for others to read them and learn from them 
unless they are written in one of the major languages. Some countries are forerunners in the 
use of certain technologies and operational systems. Others are experiencing similar problems 
later on. How can we avoid a repetition of failures when we don’t speak the same language, 
using a similar investigation approach and basic methodology?  
 
Still very fresh is the recent bridge disaster in Genua, Italy, August 13, 2018. Although this 
was a road bridge, the outcome of the investigation could affect the design and maintenance 
of railway bridges as well. Apart from that, the Genua bridge crossed a major railway line. It 
would be useful if the investigation reports were available to others outside Italy in a language 
they can understand.  
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4. Lessons learned 
An interesting example of a national investigation with international implications is the 
investigation into the Amsterdam (2012) train collision. Although at first sight it looks like a 
Dutch problem, the recommendations show some interesting points that could also apply to 
other railway systems outside the Netherlands.  
 
Saturday April 21, 2012 due to maintenance work on part of the local railway system, some 
tracks between Amsterdam Central and Amsterdam Sloterdijk west of Amsterdam were not 
available. This resulted in planned single line working over a 2 km long section in part of this 
important railway corridor. NS as operator and ProRail as infra manger did not deem it 
necessary to down-scale the normal (frequent) operation over this section. The corridor 
consists of three double track lines next to each other: from left to right to/from Haarlem, 
to/from Zaandam and to/from Schiphol, each seeing eight trains per hour in each direction, in 
total 16 trains per hour per line. The line in question was the centre line of the bundle, leading 
to and from Zaandam, see figure 1.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Schematic diagram of the accident location. Source: OvV Report, 2013 
 
Every signal in the Netherlands is equipped with automatic train protection (ATB-EG), which 
was originally developed in the USA. After WW II it was supplied to the Netherlands under 
the Marshall Aid and further developed by Dutch Railways. It is not used elsewhere in 
Europe. It works very well but it has one fundamental shortcoming: it does not stop a train 
after a signal passed at danger (SPAD) when it is travelling below 40 km/h. After a series of 
low speed collisions an improved version was developed beginning of this century called 
ATB-Vv, using extra beacons to safeguard an effective braking curve at lower speeds. Since 
then many signals at risk have been equipped with ATB-Vv. This effectively closes the 40 
km/h gap in ATB-EG.  
 
In the Amsterdam case no extra, preventive measures were taken to prevent signals passed at 
danger from happening3, despite the fact that single line workings have been known to be 
amongst the most dangerous situations on railway systems, both in the Netherlands and 
 
3 Many signals have been equipped with additional ATB-Vv (ATP) beacons, which prevent SPAD’s. The 
Singelgracht signals were not considered to be at high risk in normal operational conditions: double track 
operation with full separation of up and down trains. 
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abroad. After all it was only a temporary situation that occurred that weekend and would be 
over by next Monday.  
 
Early in the evening of Saturday April 21, 2012 an NS/Dutch Railways Sprinter service 
consisting of a recently built SLT-type six car electric multiple unit (EMU) left Amsterdam 
Central for its destination Alkmaar. Due to the single line working it was forced to stop at the 
entrance to the single line section west of Singelgracht railway bridge West of Amsterdam 
Central.  
 
An NS/Dutch Railways Intercity made up of VIRM-type electric double deck stock with six 
coaches on its way from Alkmaar to Amsterdam, was approaching from the opposite 
direction. A route had been set by the automatic route setting system for the intercity to pass 
from the left to the right track seen in the direction of Amsterdam Central. The driver of the 
Sprinter was distracted by a safety problem with another train on an adjacent track, which had 
failed tail lights. She didn’t see signal 494 at danger ahead of here train. She travelled at 40 
km/h, thus ATB did not act to stop her train when she passed signal 494 at danger at 
Singelgracht railway bridge, followed by a frontal collision with the approaching Intercity 
some 300 metres beyond, see figure 2.  
 
 
Fig. 2 Frontal collision between a Sprinter coming from Amsterdam Central and an Intercity coming from 
Zaandam. Source: OvV Report, 2013 The yellow line indicates the track that was out of operation because of 
maintenance works. Signal 494 at Singelgracht bridge was ignored by the Sprinter. Local line speed was 60 
km/h. 
 
The combined speed of the two trains was approximately 100 km/h. Just over 200 passengers 
and staff were injured, including both drivers and a trainee driver in the intercity who were 
lucky to escape alive. One of the passengers later died in hospital because of fatal internal 
injuries as a result of a collision with a sharp table in the Intercity. Material damage was 
substantial: the 6-car VIRM type double deck intercity was damaged beyond repair because of 
the buckling of all six cars in the train (which absorbed much of the collision energy as it was 
designed to do), see figure 3. 
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Fig. 3: The buckling action of the coaches of the VIRM-type intercity absorbed much kinetic 
energy. Picture by W.R. Beukenkamp 
 
 
Fig. 4: The front of the SLT type Sprinter. The crash buffers have been pushed aside by the 
front of the VIRM type intercity. Picture by W.R. Beukenkamp 
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The almost new 6-car SLT-type sprinter needed partial rebuilding, although the cage in which 
the driver was sitting, survived the crash remarkably well. Also, remarkable: neither of the 
two trains had become derailed. Damage to the infrastructure was limited to some track 
movement and a damaged set of split points. There was no damage to the overhead. 
Disruption of train traffic west of Amsterdam Central lasted that whole weekend. By Monday 
normal traffic could be resumed.  
 
Noticeable with the SLT EMU was that the collision fenders had failed to work (see figure 4), 
because they were not compatible to the central Scharfenberg coupler of the approaching 
intercity. Thus, what should have been an elastic collision on the part of the SLT Sprinter 
became an inelastic collision setting its passengers flying through the train and causing much 
bodily harm. The safety cage in which the driver of the Sprinter was sitting, functioned well 
as can be seen from figure 4.  
 
The Dutch safety investigation board (OvV) recommended4 amongst other things, that more 
attention should be payed to the interior design. The interior of trains should be made more 
crashworthy or crash friendly, such as thicker tables with soft edges, properly locked ceiling 
panels et cetera. Also, problems with the evacuation of casualties were identified, which were 
not covered by modern regulations such as the TSI’s (technical specifications of 
interoperability). These recommendations are now standard requirements for Dutch train 
operators when ordering new or refurbished passenger rolling stock. As far as is known it is 
not a general requirement on a European scale. Thus, important lessons in railway safety 
learned at Amsterdam have been lost outside the Netherlands.  
5. Globalisation of railway systems 
The EU has formulated comprehensive interoperability standards touching every part of the 
railway system. Safety is going to become standardised in the EU with the expansion of the 
European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS), the system of standards for 
management and interoperation of signalling for railways. National railway networks are 
increasingly being operated by international train operating companies.  
 
Rolling stock is no longer a market dominated by European suppliers such as Siemens and 
Alstom or the European division of Bombardier; Japanese suppliers are also active such as 
Hitachi. Others from Korea and China have expressed an interest in entering the European 
market as well. On the other hand, European manufacturers have supplied trains to Asia and 
America. The same can be said of signalling systems and components. Dutch railways use an 
automatic train protection system supplied by Alstom, which interacts with a train detection 
system supplied under the Marshall Aid by a subsidiary of General Electric. Add to that the 
Chinese policy to develop the Silk Route as an overland transport corridor in competition with 
sea trade and it is clear that rail safety is rapidly progressing from national to continental and 
soon intercontinental level.  
 
It is quite possible that in the not too distant future an accident investigation involving trains 
in the Port of Rotterdam could extend to Shanghai or Seoul. The implications from this 
accident investigation (lessons learned) could be important for railways along the Silk Route. 
How do we safeguard some minimal standards of quality and comprehensiveness of the 
investigation plus accessibility to international interested partners?   
 
4 OVV Report ‘Treinbotsing Amsterdam Westerpark’ d.d. 26-3-2013 
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6. Follow the ICAO example? 
The present situation poses those in charge of railway systems for a major challenge, similar 
to the one that was observed in the airline industry post WWII. Accident investigation is not a 
goal in itself. It is a means to identify necessary fields of improvement, to learn from failure. 
Accident investigation in the airline industry has moved from national to global level but not 
without difficulties. It is inevitable that the railway sector most follow given the globalisation 
of railway technology.  
 
Perhaps the airline industry can show us the road ahead. Following the globalisation of air 
traffic after WW II the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), a United Nations 
specialised agency, was founded with international agreed rules. One of them regarding 
accident investigation is covered by Annex 13 Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation. 
This annex covers: 
• monitoring developments in accident investigation techniques and practices as well as 
accident prevention matters;  
• monitoring developments in system safety concepts and practices, contributing to the 
ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan and the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit 
Programme (USOAP);  
• managing safety recommendations addressed to ICAO;  
• conducting and participating in seminars on aircraft accident investigation and 
prevention. 
ICAO has a specialised Accident Investigation Section responsible for developing and 
updating Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for inclusion in Annex 13. ICAO 
operates in close cooperation with national air accident investigation organisations.  
7. Discussion 
Following this paper, a number of subjects can be identified that need clarification: 
• Need to establish an Annex similar to ICAO Annex 13 to the European railway 
interoperability directive relating to railway accidents and incident investigation, 
supported by a special section of the European Railway Agency responsible for 
developing and updating standards and recommended practices for inclusion in this 
Annex?  
• Need to establish independent investigation boards relating to railway accidents? 
• Need to report in a mutually agreed language? 
• Need to upload investigation reports to a central public register, possibly supported by 
the ERA? 
One thing is clear: although railways are now over 200 years old, we can still learn much 
from railway accidents, at home and abroad. It is the language and the methods that separates 
us, not the subject. It is important that this learning process is supported as much as possible 
and extends as far as possible.   
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Abstract 
During history, several large accidents have been followed by investigation or – often in 
modern times – by the setup of an ad-hoc investigation commission, e.g. after the earth-quake 
in Lisbon in 1775, the Titanic shipwreck in 1912, and the explosion in the harbour of Halifax 
in 1917. These early kinds of investigations have some characteristics in common, such as: 
they were initiated ad-hoc, shortly after a specific accident, resulted in a report with 
recommendations, and were dissolved after the task had been fulfilled.  
 
Later – sometimes and somewhere – maybe in parallel, certain permanent commissions were 
established within a specific sector, often within the air transport sector, to investigate all 
relevant and serious accidents or incidents as well.  
 
The third phase was characterized by the need to emphasise the independence of such 
commissions as well as the necessity of splitting the police and the civil investigations. 
 
A fourth phase may be identified as the development of broader, independent accident 
investigation commissions, such as the US National Transportation Safety Board, which was 
set up in 1967, and was responsible for investigating all transport accident in aviation, 
shipping, railways, road and pipelines. Partly based on the NTSB’s experiences, Sweden and 
Finland came to include even broader sectors than transport in their mandate for a national 
accident investigation board. Denmark and Norway have had a similar development, but on a 
more narrow scale.  
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In the paper, the developments in the Nordic countries will be described and discussed. The 
description will also include examples from The Netherlands (The Dutch Transport Safety 
Board), from the US (US National Transportation Safety Board) and from the EU approach. 
The role of international cooperation, such as The International Transportation Safety 
Association, will be evaluated. The discussion will include basic dimensions such as 
independence, non-blame, multimodal organisations, recommendations and follow-up. 
 
Keywords: Accident, investigation, commission, board, independence, multimodal. 
1. A global view – basic patterns, some developments and trends 
After every major accident in human history, people have always asked the question: why? 
Both in earlies times and even today, some people answer the question with a religious 
interpretation: it is the will of God. Such accidents could be either natural catastrophes such as 
earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, wild fires, landslides, heat or cold waves, tsunamis, sand and 
dust storms or severe disasters damaging houses and even towns, shipwrecks, pest, hunger, 
pandemics etc. In order to influence the god(s) will and prevent disasters, many people turned 
to different kind of sacrifices, such as offerings, prayer or penances. Later, due to the 
technological development, new risks for other types of major accidents become more 
threatening, as accidents connected to aviation, rail and road, to nuclear power plants, to 
offshore installations, to industrial productions etc. Examples of new, emerging risks are 
climate change (global warming with droughts, storms, floods), biotechnology, nano-
technology, artificial intelligence.   
 
Gradually, a competing or parallel type of explanation developed, based on a secular and 
sometimes scientific attitude: accidents and incidents are mostly man-made, they can be 
investigated by systematic, rational methods, causes can be identified, and preventive 
measures be proposed. 
 
In many sectors, investigation of accidents was for many decades done within the affected 
firm or institution or branch. Sometimes the company used an ad hoc-solution for each 
accident. Within a few sectors, typically the railways, the monopolistic situation included the 
responsibility to investigate all kind of accidents involving passenger transport on tracks. So, 
the international picture is rather complex and complicated.  
 
In a historic perspective, the roots of modern accident investigations by a permanent, public 
commission can be traced to 1915, when a military aviation commission was established 
under “The Royal Flying Corps”, Accident Investigation Branch (AIB), in Great Britain, later 
(1922) expanded to include also civilian accidents. This invention was later followed by the 
establishment of similar commissions in other countries, first in the aviation sector, followed 
by the maritime and railway sectors, while the use of permanent commissions was not 
common in the road sector until recently.   
 
It is obvious that an AIB cannot investigate all type of accidents and incidents. Several criteria 
may be used for deciding whether or not they should be used in a certain case. Common 
limitations are the nature of the event, e.g.:  
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• The seriousness of the accident or incident (e.g. only accidents with more than x 
fatalities and/or which include economic losses of a certain magnitude are investigated 
etc.),  
• The probability that such event(s) will recur, 
• The potential of the consequences of an event, 
• The learning potential of an investigation, 
• The societal interest or priority, 
• The resources and competence of the actual AIB. 
 
In addition, security events, clearly such as a criminal act and terrorism, and sometimes also 
natural disasters, will often be omitted. By tradition, some sectors in society are also omitted 
from AIB-investigations, usually the defence sector, working environment and the health 
sector. However, a few AIB include arenas as defence and health services, as the Dutch 
Safety Board (established 2005, when the board replaced the former Dutch Transport Safety 
Board). In fact, DSB has a very broad scope. Its mandate includes aviation, shipping, rail 
transport, road transport, pipelines, defence, industry and trade, crisis management and aid 
provision, healthcare, and nature and environment.5 The Dutch Transport Safety Board has 
been an international role model in promoting the need for independent accident 
investigation6. 
  
In some sectors, international organisations have issued common procedures for 
investigations of accidents, such as: 
–  ICAO: Annex 13 (Aircraft Accident & Incident Investigation) to International Civil 
Aviation Convention 
–  IMO - International Maritime Organisation – has issued several resolutions to adopt 
code of international standards and recommended practices, guidelines to assist investigators 
and to harmonise reports.  
 
EU has through the latest decades (since 1980) issued several regulations and directives to 
promote harmonised performances within the EU on a sectorial basis. Many commissions 
have been established, and the setup of European networks contribute to enhance safety. 
 
ESReDA has also published (June 2009) a common, international guideline for safety 
investigation of accidents.7 In addition, ESReDA has published a book “Shaping public safety 
investigations of accidents in Europe”, which has a broad description and discussion of many 
aspects of the historical and the recent development of AIB, including a chapter about 
challenges of investigation.8 
 
 
5 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aviation_accidents_and_incidents 
6 Van Vollenhoven, P. (2003) “Independent accident investigation: every citizen’s right, society’s duty”. 
Elaborated Version of Third European Safety Transport Safety Lecture. European Transport Safety Council, 
Brussels, 23 January 2001. 
7 https://esreda.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ESReDA_GLSIA_Final_June_2009_For_Download.pdf 
8 Roed-Larsen, S., Stoop, J. and Funnemark, E. (2005) “Shaping public safety investigations of accidents in 
Europe”, ESReDA Safety Series, Oslo: DNV Publishers. 
 Accident Investigation and Learning to Improve Safety Management in Complex System:  
Remaining Challenges 
47 
 
In addition to the sector-based cooperation within established organisations (ICAO, IMO), a 
new kind of cooperation between independent commissions in the transportation sector were 
founded 25 years ago: 
ITSA – International Transportation Safety Association - is an international network of 
heads of independent safety investigation authorities (SIA). ITSA covers all modes of 
transportation, including aviation, marine, railways, road transport, pipelines and underground 
infrastructure. 
 
In 1993, the independent safety investigation authorities (SIA) of 4 countries met and 
agreed to form the International Transportation Safety Association. ITSA was founded on the 
notion that independent non-judicial investigations of transportation accidents and serious 
incidents contribute significantly to the safety of the traveling public. Furthermore, that an 
international network, which brings together the safety investigation agencies from many 
nations, would be a mutually beneficial forum to share safety information. 
Today, ITSA is composed of independent safety investigation authorities from 16 countries, 
including Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
The mission of ITSA is to improve transport safety in each member country by learning from 
the experiences of others.9 
 
2. The developments of AIB in Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, Sweden) 
 
2.1 Denmark 
The main accident investigation board (AIB) investigates accidents and incidents within the 
Danish aviation sector (Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands) and within the Danish 
railway sector. In 1917, AIB published 43 reports. The former “Aircraft Accident 
Investigation Board for Civilian Aviation” was set up 1 January 1979, while railway accidents 
were investigated by a special commission from 1 December 1971 til 31 July 1996, organised 
as a part of the Danish State Railways. 
 
Two other AIBs supplement in the investigation of accidents: The Danish Maritime Accident 
Investigation Board - DMAIB – (scope: merchant and fishing ships, ships in Danish and 
Greenlandic territorial waters, commercial diving operations), and the Danish Road Traffic 
Accident Investigation Board - DRTAIB. The DMAIB investigates about 140 accidents each 
year, and the DRTAIB publishes about 25 – 30 thematic accident reports each year. 
 
Concerning main resources – the number of employees and the budget - the AIB has 9 
employees and an annual budget of 14 million DKK. The DMAIB has 4 employees and 
investigates about 140 accidents annually. DRTAIB has a budget of 4,5 million DKK (about 
Euro 500 000).  
 
2.2  Finland 
The Safety Investigation Authority (SIA) conducts safety investigations through examining 
the course of events related to accidents or incidents, their causes and consequences, and the 
search and rescue actions as well as the actions taken by the authorities.10  
 
 
9 https://itsasafety.com/about/ 
10 http://www.turvallisuustutkinta.fi 
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The legal basis is the act on investigation of accidents (373/1985) and the regulation 1996/79. 
The Safety Investigation Act of 525/2011 defines the task and the mandate of the Safety 
Investigation Authority. The task is to investigate all major accidents and serious incidents 
regardless of type, as well as aviation, rail traffic, and maritime traffic accidents and events. 
The mandate includes organisation, training, preparedness, international cooperation, and 
issuing safety recommendations and monitoring their implementation. 
  
2.3  Iceland 
Iceland has organised a separate Icelandic Transportation Safety Board which cover maritime, 
air and road accidents. The Board was established in 2013. However, all information is 
written in Icelandic language.11 
 
2.4  Norway 
The Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) covers all accidents and incidents that 
occur in the transport field (aviation, railway, road, marine), The AIBN started as a separate, 
permanent commission for major aviation events in 1989 and has expanded its scope and 
mandate through successive extensions: via including rail accidents (2002), later road 
accidents (2005) and lastly maritime accidents (2008). Today, the AIBN has an organisation 
with about 51 full-time employees (2017) and a budget in 2017 of 77 million NOK (about 
Euro 7,7 million). The organization chart shows that, in addition to the General Director, 
administration and advisory staff, there is a separate department for each transport sector: 
Aviation (7 inspectors), railway (5), Marine (12), and road (8). The AIBN published 39 
reports in 2017 and had 49 current and 46 new investigations. The number of yearly safety 
recommendations is about 30 – 40. 
 
Since the mandate of AIBN is limited to the transport field, other safety investigation 
commissions are supplementing the societal need: e.g. the Defence Accident Investigation 
Commission (FHK) was established in 201412, although accidents and events had been 
investigated according to regulations issued in 1995.  
 
2.5  Sweden 
In Sweden, the Swedish Accident Investigation Authority (SHK) was established as early as 
1st July 1978. The area of investigation was from the start limited to civil and military aviation 
activities but extended in 1982 to include aviation accidents and incidents. The main change 
was done 1 July 1990. SHK was from that date responsible for investigating all type of 
accidents and incidents, based on the law 1990:712 about investigation of accidents. This was 
one of the first transformation of an AIB from focusing on a single sector to become a 
multimodal AIB. 
 
3. Some important trends  
A few trends13 can be observed: 
 
• The ad hoc-approach has in many countries gradually been replaced by permanent, 
public commissions, but public ad hoc-commissions can still in certain cases be 
established in connection with single major accidents, either by a Ministry or 
Parliament 
 
11 http://msa.is/ 
12 Prop. 150 L (2015-2016) to the Parliament, page 9. 
13 See also: Roed-Larsen, S and Stoop, J (2006), “Major accidents – dealing with consequences”, in Int. J. 
Emergency Management, vol. 3, nos. 2/3, 2006, pp. 168 – 177. 
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• The responsibility to invest major accidents/incidents has been expanded from the 
single firm/institution to a broader holistic, public AIB, maintaining the traditional 
responsibility for companies etc., but including every level of the socio-technical 
system 
• A gradual shift from the single-approach tradition to a broader approach, covering 
major accidents in the same branch or sector (typically aviation or railway) 
• A development where national and international guidelines (as ICAO and IMO) and 
regulations was partly harmonized 
• A clear tendency in the mandate of AIBs to focus on certain values, such as 
independence, impartial and objectivity 
• AIBs shall not allocate legal liability or apportion blame (no-punishment approach). 
The police have therefore now usually not its own representative in the commission. 
• In connection with major accidents, the issues of victim care and family assistance 
have developed, particularly in the US and in Europe. 
 
4.  Multimodal AIBs – some problems 
Several dilemmas are connected to the establishment and work of AIBs. Some of them can be 
summarized as: 
 
• The mandate of the AIB (The Scope, sectorial, multimodal) 
• The institutional connection (Ministry, Directorate) 
• The leadership commitment 
• The power to allocate resources and make priorities (man-power and budget) 
• The composition of personnel (education, experience, competence, further education 
etc) 
• The systematic use of scientific methods  
• The vulnerability of core values, such as independence, integrity, competence, 
transparency, objectivity 
• The ability to formulate and follow up recommendations 
• The ability to gain necessary legitimacy from all parties involved in order to prevent a 
2nd or even a 3rd investigation of the same accident  
• The relations to important stakeholders and international organisations 
 
These and other dilemmas connected to the investigation of accident are at present being 
debated both internally and externally, within AIBs as well as among politicians and 
researchers. There are no simple answers.14 
 
5. Proposals for improvements 
  Some proposals for improvements could include15: 
• More use of cross-sectorial or multi-modal commissions. Since accident mechanisms, 
investigation methodologies and preventive measures have so many conditions in 
common, many countries would benefit from the synergy effects of broader 
investigation commissions.  
 
14 Røed-Larsen, S (2004), «From ragnarok til Rocknes – storulykker og ulykkesgranskning», pages 183 – 199. 
(Major accidents and accident investigations), i Stian Lydersen: «Fra flis i fingeren til ragnarok – tyve historier 
om sikkerhet», Trondheim: Tapir akademiske forlag 
15 Røed-Larsen, S., (2006) Public safety investigations of accidents – development, problems and dilemmas. 
Paper to the International Sociological Association’s XVI World Conference. Durban.  
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• A new and enlarged scope. Partly as an extension from technological accidents to 
natural disasters, and at least to include all kinds of NATECH disasters. Such a wide 
scope of investigation seems to be especially relevant for small countries - for large 
countries, a close contact- and cooperation-model may be more appropriate. 
• Implementation of proposed preventive measures. Today, each report from an accident 
investigation commission is concluded with a list of proposed measure which should 
prevent similar accidents to occur and improve safety management. The 
implementation of these proposals should be more persistent and systematic follow up 
in order to measure that the study has had a certain positive effect on the risk level. 
• More safety studies. A classic accident investigation has the aim of preventing a 
similar accident to happen. In a very rapidly changing world with many technological 
innovations, the likelihood of such a similar event in the future is rather small. 
Therefore, systematic studies of a group of accidents with many homogeneous features 
may be a more efficient approach. 
• More focus on accident prevention. Very often, a critical situation is handled in such a 
way that the potential accident is averted. Systematic studies of how such situations 
are managed by main, involved actors, may add valuable information to the preventive 
work done by public authorities and enterprises. 
• Higher priority to competence building. The reputation and impact of accident 
investigation commissions, represented by reports and personnel, are depending on a 
high level of professional competence among investigators. Proposed preventive 
measures should reflect frontline knowledge, recent research results and modern 
methodology. 
• More cross-national exchange of data and cooperation. In spite of the existence of 
valuable databases, as The Emergency Disasters Data Base in Belgium, and necessary 
contact systems, as the Natural and Environmental Disaster Exchange System in EU, 
much more resources should be allocated to sharing accident and near-misses’ data 
and to exchange information on lessons learned. In the transport sector - organisations 
as The International Transport Safety Association (ITSA) and the European Transport 
Safety Council (ETSC) – play important roles but are too small regarding resources 
and power.  
 
In more general terms16: 
Major accidents have major consequences – whether it concerns a single event with large 
number of casualties and a major societal impact, or an accumulation of large numbers of 
small accidents, in which not only the victims themselves, but their social environment and 
life expectancy are seriously affected. Over the years, the focus has shifted from a direct and 
physical emphasis on prevention to also include the indirect and long-term effects with 
psychological and social components. The conduct of rescue and emergency has become a 
performance indicator of a system, open to scrutiny, criticism and investigation. In such an 
integral system perspective, accidents are not a by-product, but are being redefined as an issue 
of national healthcare or consumer protection. The need for independent investigation, 
advocated with strength by Van Vollenhoven, The Netherlands (Independent Investigation is 
a Citizen’s Right and Society’s Duty), and the necessity of including victims themselves as 
primary actors in the system, are recent and necessary acknowledgements.  
 
 
 
16 See end note 9 
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Learning from organisational dysfunctionalities, a Work in 
Progress 
 
Frank VERSCHUEREN,  
 
Process Safety Inspector17 
Ministry of Labor 
 BELGIUM 
 
Abstract 
 
The investigations of many past major accidents still show that organisational factors have to 
be considered and not dismissed as an important part of the factors causing accidents. We see 
unfortunately that those organisational factors are in a lot of cases not treated seriously.  
Especially when an organisation dysfunction (or becomes dysfunctional) the risk of having 
accidents increases. When an organisation dysfunction, some of the organisational factors 
with a potential negative impact become latent causes for accidents. These latent causes are 
dormant and lie hidden inside the organisation until a disturbance or deviation in the process 
“wakes up” the latent cause and the latent cause becomes a contributing cause, contributing 
in the causal sequence leading to an accident.  
Unfortunately, the past has also proved that most organisations are very bad in detecting 
when and where their functioning becomes dysfunctional and, in this way, potentially very 
harmful. That is among other things because in investigations of accidents or incidents for 
several reasons’ organisations don’t look good (and deep) enough to find that there are also 
organisational causes for the accidents and incidents they are investigating. Which causes the 
loss of opportunities to learn.  
So, all together it is no surprise that even now not much organisations are looking for their 
own dysfunctions as possible precursors for accidents. What is a serious deficiency. They miss 
a lot of early warning signs and learning opportunities.  
So, in fact the purpose is improved learning from incidents, especially on management level 
learning and on organizational factors.  
 
 Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0) 
 
17 Some of the insights here presented are founded on my experiences as Inspector, but the majority of the 
insights are based on study work and international meetings within the ESReDA – “Foresight in Safety” – 
project. As such the content does not reflect the opinion of my employer (Belgian COMAH Seveso Labour 
Inspection) 
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An organisation can dysfunction in many aspects and on several levels. To get a grip on this 
variety a generic functional analysis was made of an organisation with its structural and 
strategic factors as purposes, means, resources and their assignment, the policy deployment, 
roles and responsibilities regarding safety but also safety culture and learning culture.  
This model leads to a list of symptoms. Together with their intra-relations a list of early 
warning signs can be deduced. These early warning signs should be used to detect if and 
where an organisation drifts away from a normal functioning to a dysfunctioning modus. 
Detecting this drift and acting upon it will prevent accidents and major accidents from 
happening, which is the initial step in Disaster Management. 
Keywords: organisational factors, EWS Early warning signs, latent causes for major 
accidents, dysfunctional organisations, investigations of accidents or incidents, learning 
culture, organisational governance 
1. Introduction:  Learning from Organizational Dysfunctionalities   a 
Work in Progress 
This article is generated from the presentation given at the AGAFIR Conference, 55th 
ESReDA Seminar “Accident Investigation and Learning to Improve Safety Management in 
Complex System: Remaining Challenges “in Bucharest, Romania dd.  9 – 10 October 2018. 
The article and presentation describe the Work in Progress of a chapter inside the framework 
“Foresight in Safety”, a working group of ESReDA (European Safety and Reliability and 
Data Association).  
2. From Organizational constituents to Organizational Factors 
To characterize an organization relevant organizational constituent were chosen. Every 
organization consists of the following components: 
- The Governance Functions        made up by the triad [Strategy – Structure – Policy] 
- Management Systems 
- Workforce inclusive Management 
- Processes and Technology 
- Culture  
At the other hand in safety context, we can distinguish 3 types of Causal Factors influencing 
Safety in an Organisation: Technical Causal Factors, Human Causal Factors and 
Organisational Causal Factors. 
First, Technical Causal Factors are Causal Factors related to Technical elements: Processes 
used in the industrial organisation and the technology: Technical components (equipment, 
apparatus and installations) used in these processes.  
 
Secondly, Human Causal Factors are Causal Factors related to all humans involved in the 
organisation. And there should be no difference in which function or level.” All the humans 
involved in the organisation” means:  operational people (operators, planners), people of all 
supporting services (maintenance, designers, research, logistics, procurement). Moreover, in 
every of these functional categories the decision makers on all levels are involved from front-
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line operators and front-line technicians, the supervisors, the managers, every senior manager 
up to the CEO and the Board of Directors.  
 
The last (third) category of Causal Factors are the Organisational Causal Factors.  
In this category of organizational causal factors, we distinguish management system failures 
from organizational dysfunctionalities. In the frame of this article we limit us to internal 
Organisational Causal Factors. (External Organisational Causal Factors could be regulation 
dysfunctionalities) 
The focus of the safety efforts companies deploy should be well balanced between these three 
factors. Nevertheless, we observe that the focus of some industrial operators it is still mostly 
or even uniquely directed to the technical factors in strong disadvantage of the two others and 
especially neglecting organizational factors. 
These three categories of Causal Factors can be linked to the former listed organizational 
components with following results: 
 
The Technical Factors can be linked to Processes and Technologies 
The Human Factors can be linked to Workforce inclusive Management  
The Organizational Factors can be linked to two organizational components: 
- The Governance Functions        made up by the triad [Strategy – Structure – 
Policy] 
- Management Systems 
Culture is somewhat more difficult, some authors or safety experts consider it belonging to 
the organizational factors. Other choose rather to categorize it under Human Factors. 
 
3. Hidden latent causes and organizational Factors 
If we divide organizational Factors in two subsets being Management Systems and 
Governance, we consider under Organizational Causal Factors two subsets:  
- Failures of Management Systems 
- Failure of Governance leading to a    dysfunctional   organization 
 
The relationship between organizational causal factors and latent causes is depicted in figure 1 
below 
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Simple   INCIDENT – ACCIDENT MODEL
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Figure 1: relationships in a simple accident model situating latent causes 
 
Investigation of Incidents and accidents learn that Organizational Causal Factors, being 
Failure of Governance leading to Organizational Dysfunctionalities or being Failures of 
Management Systems when they are not the root cause they are very often contributory 
causes. (“Bovendien”) (What is more) They are hidden causal factors as they are dormant or 
latent present in the organization. 
 
Another difference between the Organizational Dysfunctionalities (failures of Governance) 
and Failure of Management Systems and the Human or Technical Factors is how deep one has 
to dig (e.g. in an investigation of an Accident) to detect the Causal factor linked with an event 
of fact. 
 
If we consider the following findings in an investigation: 
(sequence of findings is produced by consequently continuing asking “why?”): 
 
 
 
 
That means that one can easily get stuck in the “Human Factor” by limiting one-self to 
“scratching the surface”: and finding ONLY a very direct and easily found cause “off course 
the operator is to blame as he made a mistake.” 
          First was found that (1) the operator made a mistake 
 Why? (2)  The procedure he used turned out to be faulty 
 Why? (3)  The person (function) who used to check the procedures was not 
there anymore 
 Why? (4)  There had been a reduction in staff because of cost cutting 
 Why? (5)  This had been a corporate strategically decision/policy 
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If one looks a little bit deeper (“just below the surface”) one gets to the failures of the 
management system:  a faulty procedure and a non-existing independent (from the procedure 
producer/writer) check: being the “shallow” organizational factors as they are still near to the 
surface 
It is only if one digs even deeper that one gets to the “deeper hidden” organizational factors: 
the organizational dysfunctionalities, staff reduction as induced by a strategy/policy of cost 
cutting. 
 
The same sequence [operator mistake - … - policy of cost cutting] can show us how that 
sequence escalates in a as shown in figure 2 below 
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Figure 2 
 
The great added value of digging deeper and finding organizational dysfunctionalities is that 
not only the probability of operator error gets larger when getting deeper but also the 
coverage. 
 
This coverage is the positive impact if we reverse the situation once we take a measure on the 
appropriate level. When one stops with staff reduction with negative impact, a larger 
reduction in error probability is achieved then when one would only correct the procedure. 
 
A first set of conclusions is:  
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This recognition is increasingly supported by gradually observing signs, signals or early 
warning signals. 
 
First observations are deviations, change of characteristics, abnormalities, unexpected or less 
expected events. These are observed signs. 
 
When those observed signs can be related to a certain danger or risk they become signals. 
This is realized after adequate interpretation in their context of safety: e.g. they are present in 
a scenario which (can) lead to an incident or an accident.  
 
If the risk potential of this scenario (severity and probability) is realistically estimated, it can 
be judged if this signal can act as an early warning signal. Those are the signals which should 
be detected and treated early enough to prevent the incident or worse accident from 
happening. 
 
4. Failing Governance or Organizations becoming dysfunctional 
To have a good functioning organization each of the three elements [strategy – structure – 
policy] in the triangle of Governance by the top of the Organization has to function 
adequately. If one of the three elements are failing, the Organization doesn’t function any 
more as it should and is “dysfunctioning”. 
 
As illustrative example the failing of the structure is chosen: 
 
To meet the objectives of an organization, an effective and efficient execution of all 
tasks and activities is needed. This creates a need for coordination which is realized 
by building a STRUCTURE inside the organization. 
This structure fulfills several primary purposes: 
 
 - the structure defines all needed roles or functions in the organization 
 - the structure defines all internal relationships (e.g. the hierarchical structure) 
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And by creating the structure with its roles, functions and internal relationships, the 
organization 
 
 -  will assign authority to each role/function  
-  will assign responsibility to each role/function  
 -  should provide checks and balances between the roles and functions 
 
5. Signs of failing Organizational Structure as illustration of the WiP 
 
Related to a failing structure a first set of phenomena (1 to 3) can be observed:  
these first three phenomena    all lead to [decisions being deficient or taken too slowly]  
causing risks, incidents and accidents. 
 
 
- Phenomenon 1:  
When an incomplete or insufficient structure leaves  
no room for delegating 
Which can lead to  
▪ Decision makers having overload  
 
- Phenomenon 2 
When the structure is overcomplicated to complex because 
of  
too many levels in the structure 
Which can lead to  
▪ Obscurity 
▪ Conflicts 
▪ Bureaucracy and related rigidity 
    
- Phenomenon 3 
When the structure poses a too large spread 
between decision makers 
Which can lead to  
▪ Insufficient coordination 
Essential information reaches too late the decision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risks, incidents  
and accidents 
Decisions  
Deficient  
Or 
Too slow 
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A second set of phenomena (4 to 7) observed with a failing structure lead to  
[a diminished responsibility] also causing risks, incidents and accidents. 
 
- Phenomenon 4:  
 
When the roles and or functions are unclear, incomplete, vague or ambiguous 
 
Which can lead to  
▪ “micro-management” where managers perform tasks  
of their subordinates (on a lower level) 
▪ Too few or Nobody takes responsibility 
• Confusion and stress 
 
- Phenomenon 5 
 
When the distribution of roles/functions is inadequate  
or imbalanced  
Which can lead to  
▪ Gap:  where the responsibility is not assigned to a role 
• Nobody “is” responsible 
▪ Overlap: where the same responsibility is assigned 
to two or more roles      
• Confusion                     
• “Nobody    takes” responsibility   
   
- Phenomenon 6 
 
When roles assigned to one person are conflicting  
Which can lead to  
• Work overload 
• One responsibility goes at the expense of the other 
 
- Phenomenon 7 
 
When a role is incompatible to the person (values, expectations) 
 
Each of the items described under the 7 phenomena can act as a sign. Depending on the safety 
context and on further information this sign can evolve to an early warning signal as described 
in the definitions of signal and early warning signal.  
6. Texas City Refinery case as illustration of a failed structure 
If we take the well know Texas City Refinery case (see CSB (Chemical Safety Board) report 
341pages). 
(www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/CSBFinalReportBP.pdf   we find one of the most investigated and 
commented recent industrial calamities with many examples of organizational  causal factors 
both  
- system failures  
Diminished 
responsibilit
y 
Risks, incidents  
and accidents 
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and  
- organisational dysfunctionalities  
 
If one looks at the investigation and focuses on the results related to the former section 5. 
Failing Organizational Structure one can see the Texas City case as a clear example of Failing 
Organizational Structure, 
because of the presence of 
 
- the Complexity of the organization  
- Frequent re-organizations  
with continually changing roles and responsibilities  
 
This caused confusion about roles and responsibilities with as most sever consequence that 
 
No one felt responsible for essential decisions concerning process safety  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When GOVERNANCE (STRATEGY, POLICY   or    
STRUCTURE) 
of an Organization fails, 
the Organization will DYSFUNCTION 
 
These ORGANISATIONAL DYSFUNCTIONALITIES have 
already caused many MAJOR ACCIDENTS 
 
BUT (on the positive side!) 
 
ORGANISATIONAL DYSFUNCTIONALITIES 
Can be detected because they show SIGNS 
which when interpreted correctly can act 
as EARLY WARNING SIGNALS 
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Effective Communication During and After an Aviation Accident 
 
Simona WIST 
Civil Aviation Safety Investigation and Analysis Authority 
38 Dinicu Golescu Blvd. 
010873, Bucharest, ROMANIA 
Abstract 
Accidents are unforeseen and unintentional occurrences that result in material or human 
losses, deterioration of transport infrastructure, bottlenecks in transport routes, reduction of 
transport capacities, all of which lead to an increase in the operating costs, less efficiency, 
and other long-term negative effects. Accidents also have a considerable impact in the media, 
and may affect the public image of state authorities, and at international level may even affect 
the State's image. We should always keep in mind that the lack of communication could result 
in media speculation, with negative effects for the safety investigation activities.  
Therefore, as soon as possible after an aviation accident, a representative of the safety 
investigation authority should give a press statement, communicating the preliminary data 
that can be made public (e.g. date and hour of the accident, location, aircraft type, 
dead/wounded, etc.) and the timing of the next updates on the information provided, so as not 
to leave room for speculation in the media that may affect investigation activities and which 
may increase the pressure on the public institutions involved in the  investigation. 
Keywords: communication, aviation, accident, safety investigation 
1. What to expect in the days immediately following an aviation accident 
and how can the communication team be better prepared for coping 
with the public pressure and media requests?  
Let’s take a practical example. How we managed the communication during and after the civil 
aviation accident occurred on January 20, 2014, near Horea village, Alba county in Romania, 
crushing in the mountains during winter, with 7 people on board (a medical team a pilot and a 
co-pilot), considering that, as a consequence of this accident, the aircraft was destroyed, and 
two persons on board died (the pilot – a public person in Romania – and a young student girl 
of the medical team)? 
During the first hours after this occurrence, the exact location of the accident was unknown. 
Meanwhile, news agencies broadcasted live information about this accident. On TVs, this was 
a breaking news and media interest was extremely high.  
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2. Massive pressure from both internal and external factors 
The number of unvalidated and incomplete information was very large, internal pressure was 
very intense, and there were many personal and divergent views from the authorities with 
attributions in the field.  
In this context, the Romanian Ministry of Transport requested to not disclose any information 
without prior approval. But survivors and family victims desperately wanted to quickly find 
answers to their questions and concerns. Also, the media interest was growing, resulting in a 
large number of requests for information and a lot of speculation, in the absence of coherent 
information. 
The wreckage of the aircraft was located after almost 5 hours from receiving the notification 
about the accident. But for the pilot and for the young student girl it was too late... 
3. What we did immediately and after the accident?  
First of all, the General Director of the Romanian civil aviation safety investigation authority 
informed the minister of transport about this civil aviation occurrence. Also, he made, at 
internal level, all necessary due diligence to inform the persons directly involved, as 
completely as possible, on aspects of the accident that occurred and arisen from the questions 
asked by journalists, in order to be able to give an official response within the limits of 
competence. 
Immediately after being notified about this accident, the investigation team went toward the 
accident site, even if they did not know exactly where to go. On the road, the go-team was 
permanently in touch with the representatives of the local Emergency Situations Inspectorate. 
And, the most important, the investigator-in-charge made a press statement directly from the 
accident site, communicating factual information about the accident and the next steps of the 
safety investigation. He followed the rule of thumb that anything that could have been said the 
day before the accident can be said the day of the accident and afterwards. The outcome was 
positive, as the press was satisfied and the crisis was eased. 
In the meantime, the spokesperson assured the journalists that further information and an 
official point of view about this accident will be presented as soon as possible, disseminated 
press releases and responded to media enquiries.  
4. How high was the public interest?  
As you can see from Figure 1, on the third day after the accident (January 23, 2014), the 
website of the Romanian Civil Aviation Safety Investigation and Analysis Authority18 
(www.cias.gov.ro) was visited by 571 users, which represented a top of the audience for 
January 2014, in which a total of 1,561 users were registered. Basically, the number of 
visitors on the third day after the accident accounted for about 36.5% of the total number of 
visitors in January 2014. Also, on February 21, 2014 (one month after the accident 
 
18 Former Civil Aviation Safety Investigation and Analysis Center, renamed as the Civil Aviation Safety 
Investigation and Analysis Authority, according to Romanian Government Ordinance no. 17/2018 
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occurrence), following the press release dissemination, there were registered 232 users on the 
website, representing 20,5% of the total number of users in February 2014. The most visited 
website pages were the homepage (in Romanian and English) and those related to the 
investigation reports, list of civil aviation occurrences and press releases, accounting for about 
50% of the total visited web pages during January 1, 2014 – February 28, 2014. 
Public interest was therefore a huge one, materialized in numerous requests for information 
on the causes of the accident or the safety investigation activities carried out for this aviation 
accident. These requests came from the victims' families, from the Ministry of Transport, 
other state authorities and the media, putting a lot of pressure on the communication team and 
also on the investigation commission. 
 
Figure 2. www.cias.gov.ro website traffic data between January 1, 2014 and February 28, 2014  
(Source: Google Analytics) 
 
One year after the accident, when the Romanian Civil Aviation Safety Investigation and 
Analysis Authority issued the preliminary report, the public interest was also high. As you can 
see from Figure 2, on January 19, 2015, there were registered 327 users on the website, 
representing 33,7% of the total number of website users in January 2015.  
 
 
Figure 3. www.cias.gov.ro website traffic data between January 1, 2015 and January 31, 2015  
(Source: Google Analytics) 
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However, public interest culminated with the dissemination of the final investigation report on 
October 19, 201519. On that day, a press conference was also held, in which the Romanian 
Civil Aviation Safety Investigation and Analysis Authority presented the findings of the 
investigation commission, the causes of the accident and the safety recommendations issued 
following the aviation accident occurred on January 20, 2014. As it can be seen in the Figure 
3, 661 users visited the website on October 19, 2015, representing 44,6% of the total number 
of users registered in October 2015. 
 
 
Figure 4. www.cias.gov.ro website traffic data between October 1, 2015 and October 31, 2015  
(Source: Google Analytics) 
After four years from the occurrence of this aviation accident, the public interest is still high, 
as it can be seen from Figure 4, showing some interesting insights following the publication 
of an anniversary article on the Facebook page of the Romanian Civil Aviation Safety 
Investigation and Analysis Authority. The article was reached by 6,305 people and received 
also 154 reactions, comments and shares. 
 
 
Figure 5. Facebook insights for the 4th anniversary article published on January 20, 2018  
(Source: Google Analytics) 
5. Lessons learned. The most important lesson learned, from the 
communication point of view 
The very first lesson learned was that expectations of different audiences (Ministry of 
Transport and other authorities, media, accident victims and their relatives etc.) are also 
different and we have to ensure coherence and consistency in communication.  
 
19 The safety investigation final report is published on the Romanian Civil Aviation Safety Investigation and 
Analysis Authority’s website: http://www.cias.gov.ro/images/rapoarte/2015.10.16%20Final%20Report%20-
eng.pdf  
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We have also understood that breaking news of an aviation accident will usually appear first 
in social media, even before being officially notified, so we have to be prepared to respond 
within minutes! 
And – very important – crisis situations require crisis management plans, as crisis can also be 
caused or amplified by the poor communication with the media or victims/relatives. As we 
can’t control the release of information but we can control the release of our information, we 
should always remember that refusal or failure to communicate information to the press can 
affect the image of the safety investigation authority, management reputation, can boost 
media speculation and even put at risk the investigation activities. And spokesperson’s 
statements, especially in public environment, are the official point of view of the institution. 
But the most important lesson learned, from the communication point of view, was that as 
soon as possible after an aviation accident, a representative of the safety investigation 
authority should give a press statement, communicating the preliminary data that can be made 
public (e.g. date and hour of the accident, location, aircraft type, dead/wounded, etc.) and the 
timing of the next updates on the information provided, so as not to leave room for 
speculation in the media that may affect investigation activities and which may increase the 
pressure on the public institutions involved in the  investigation. 
 
 
 Accident Investigation and Learning to Improve Safety Management in Complex System:  
Remaining Challenges 
67 
 
 
Issues with lessons learned, as seen by field experts and managers,  
and synergy between experience reporting and experience sharing 
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15 rue Marcet 
44100 Nantes, FRANCE 
 
 
Abstract  
 
Lessons learned present some issues, especially the non-reporting of some safety events by 
field experts. Are the reasons given for that absence of reporting the same when managers or 
field experts are asked? This paper will show the similarities and differences between these 
two populations in Air Traffic Control.  
This double perspective on non-reporting may help us to understand the different roots of this 
issue, and to determine relevant solutions that could be implemented to improve the safety of 
the system. For instance, this analysis will show the synergy between experience reporting 
and experience sharing, as well as Human Factors training for analysts and organisations.  
Keywords: Lessons learned, non-report, field experts, managers, experience sharing 
1. Study 
1.1 Introduction 
The reporting system has flaws: while some are known, others are not. The events that are 
non-reported may put the system at risk, because their risks are not revealed. These flaws can 
come from some discrepancy in the ways field experts and managers approach lessons 
learned. 
 
 Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) 
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Experience as an air traffic controller, and as a Human Factor facilitator training Air Traffic 
Controllers, as well as experience in attending meetings with ATC managers, especially 
safety report meetings, led me to perceive discrepancies between these two populations, 
especially on reporting. The non-report of these safety events can sometimes be measured: in 
some areas, there is some automatic report by the computer system, which gives an 
exhaustive view of the safety events. Some other means, such as maintenance reporting, Air 
Safety Reports (ASR) by pilots, or on-board automatic systems, may also reveal possible lack 
of reporting from the field experts.  
The fact that some safety events are not reported is a real issue, because this reporting, 
however mandatory, cannot be forced. If it were forced, safety events would be hidden, 
concealed to avoid blame or sanction, and the safety of the whole system would decrease.  
So during my Degree in Cognitive Engineering and Human Factors, I conducted a study to 
confirm or infirm the discrepancy felt between managers and field experts on the reporting 
and the causes of non-reporting seen by these populations, as well as other safety topics. 
Would they give the same reasons for non-reporting? How might reporting be improved? 
Could experience sharing and experience reporting complement one another?  
Of course, the aim of this study is not at all to stack these groups against each other. On the 
contrary, it is rather to deeply understand how their representations complement each other, to 
enrich the perceptions, the knowledge of the constraints and resources of these groups, in 
order to achieve the ultimate goal of a more complete and more systemic vision of the 
organisation. This could lead, in the long term, to decreasing misunderstandings and tensions, 
and to developing curiosity and therefore knowledge and safety.  
1.2 Methodology 
This study involved semi-structured interviews with twelve air traffic controllers and 
managers, who were asked what they thought about safety, risks, rules, communication and 
lessons learned. The interviews were recorded and transcribed and the transcripts were 
analysed regarding different topics, which were counted by two people. The main limit of this 
study is that its sample is not scientifically representative. Therefore, the aim of this 
presentation is not to claim any absolute truth, but rather to give food for thought: how are 
safety and risks addressed in one’s own organisation? Do the perceptions from managers 
differ from those of the field experts? What can be improved?  
1.3 Results 
The results are given in percentage of all verbatim on the topic of lessons learned.  
Some reasons for non-reporting are given exclusively by field experts:  
• 10%: the event is not deemed a safety event 
• 6%: they prefer experience sharing 
• 10%: the previous replies to reports were judgmental 
Some reasons are given exclusively by managers:  
• 4%: the local culture 
• 10%: the feeling of responsibility of the field expert involved in the event. 
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Some reasons are given by both field experts and managers:  
• The duplication with another means of reporting: 10% in total: 4% for field experts 
and 6% for managers. 
• The non-availability of field experts and the workload: 18% in total: 10% for field 
experts and 8% for managers.  
• The uselessness of reporting and the fact that reporting does not help the system to 
improve safety: total 32%: 16% for field experts, 16% for managers.  
1.4 Verbatim 
1.4.1 Field experts only 
For field experts, sometimes, the safety event is not labelled as “risky”: “it started to flash, but 
it was managed, you see”, or “it was just, you know, during take-off, if he crosses and there’s 
no traffic”, “there was no risk somehow, it was just a deer crossing the runway without any 
plane in the control area”. In these examples, field experts estimate that as soon as the event is 
detected, managed, and there’s no consequences for safety, there is no reason to report it.  
Sometimes they prefer to share their experience rather than to report it. “It is merely to share 
our experience, on the corner of the table, or behind the position”. “What is reassuring is that 
we often have the same analysis”, or “a second opinion is better than one, it was good too, to 
talk about that with the handover colleagues: ‘what would you have done?’ ”. The need to 
receive feedback from their peers is more important than from the hierarchy, and is more 
reassuring to them.  
Basically, the feedback given by their hierarchy is regularly not the one expected: the answer 
given is a judgement about their work. And these judgements are not positive: “we got hit 
back”, “in reality, there’s judgement anyway”, “we won’t hand them the sticks with which to 
beat us”. As a result, they limit reporting for fear of that stick.  
1.4.2 Managers only 
Managers are concerned with the local culture of the field experts: “clearly, the reporting 
culture is not the same on every field!”, as they see different fields and can compare them.  
They think about the feeling of responsibility of the field expert involved in the event: “I 
don’t know if it is conscious or unconscious, ‘I am implicated, I think it’s gonna come back to 
hit me, so I prefer keeping quiet’ ”. “ ‘Oh, sh… I am involved. Sh… I didn’t put enough 
distance between aircrafts, so, do I file a report??’ so is this conscious, unconscious, there we 
go, that’s what it’s like to be human”.  
1.4.3 Managers and field experts 
Both managers and field experts know that there can be redundancy with another means of 
reporting, or with other actors:  maintenance, pilots. “Here, we’re analysing a radar event, 
which was not directly reported by the controllers, but which was reported to maintenance. 
So, we found it in the maintenance minutes”.  
Both know that controllers are not always available to write the report: “you also got a traffic 
peak on approach, you got a huge workload, you are sick to the back teeth, you don’t feel like 
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filing paperwork on top of that”. “it’s because of the lack of time, the workload, you’re having 
a hectic day, you can’t stop in the middle to report, so you wait a bit, you get the change of 
shift, you’re worn out, you don’t feel like filing the report right away, then it’s the end of the 
shift”. Reporting then becomes secondary to workload and rest.  
The most important reason for both managers and field experts is the uselessness of some 
reporting. Reporting does not always help: “see here, I did it twice, there’s no answer, I get 
the reply that it’s closed”, “archived”, “archived for statistical purposes”. “No answer after 4 
months: closed. It didn’t answer our questions, so you just stop reporting when that’s the 
case”, “answers are sometimes off track”. The answers are sometimes turned down flat and do 
not lead to improvements: “at the beginning we started reporting, then we were told ‘anyway, 
it’s not gonna change anything’, so we don’t report any more”. “When there’s no result, at the 
end, they stop reporting, because it’s useless!” For managers, another point is the time it takes 
to solve problems: “we feel that they are weary to report (…), because they see, they have the 
feeling that it’s not gonna change anything. But the problem is difficult to solve”. Field 
experts, who are used to quick responses to their actions, are sometimes fed up with this delay 
that gives them the feeling that their reporting is useless and does not have any impact.  
2. Discussion 
In the previous section we touched on points that call for more in-depth analysis: preference 
for sharing experience, deeming events not risky, or safe, judgmental feedback, differences 
between the reasons given by managers and field experts, and the perceived uselessness of 
reporting.  
In this next part, we offer hypotheses related to the verbatim of both field experts and 
managers, to understand the issue in depth, then we analyse its root causes, and finally, we 
suggest ways to improve reporting and safety.  
2.1 Competition between experience reporting and experience sharing or synergy?  
Despite regulatory requirements, some field experts tend to oppose experience reporting and 
experience sharing, and prefer experience sharing. There are different reasons for that: 
reporting requires time in addition to controlling traffic, time that may encroach on what some 
consider break time. It also takes additional time later, because field experts sometimes need 
to meet with analysts, and answer their questions. Then it takes time to wait for answers “we 
expect it to be processed quite quickly, reporting, it’s true that it can take time…”  
In experience sharing, on the contrary, peers give their feedback immediately, which 
contributes to reassuring the controller who asks himself a question or who is confronted with 
some specific event. Often, experience sharing is done with a peer who witnessed the event 
and does not need to be told the whole story again. No need to make an appointment or bother 
anybody in the office, who’s already working on something else.  
Therefore, field experts often prefer experience sharing, which holds more advantages for 
them: non-judgmental fast feedback from peers. They tend to disregard experience reporting 
which is more inconvenient: mid- to long-term feedback, often useless, by managers 
sometimes judgmental and not deemed legitimate. It could thus be interesting to develop 
methods to answer their reports in ways that could be more appealing to them. Nonetheless, 
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some rare field experts spend a year in the safety analysis department, to assist with events 
analysis, and nearly all analysts used to work as field experts.  
To improve experience reporting in this context, several steps/measures could be taken. One 
of them involves redefining experience sharing. First of all, experience sharing is not only 
about talking informally at the coffee machine, or behind a working position. It is every 
experience shared but not recorded or traced with formal minutes. It can therefore take the 
shape of debriefings, meetings without minutes, and be institutionalised in CRM or HF 
training (Company Resource Management, Human Factors). Actually, these trainings include 
many debates linked with operational issues, Human Factors, safety and efficiency. They 
allow field experts to gain some hindsight to analyse their daily work, its limits and strengths. 
They develop metacognition and reflexive activity, both of which are important cognitive 
activities to improve adaptation to unforeseen events, and hindsight on difficult and stressful 
situations. Experience sharing can then support safety by developing safety culture 
(communication, debating and debriefing are important elements of safety culture), but also 
efficiency by multiplying views on a situation and analysis, and also quality of working life 
by sharing values among peers, having contradictory debates, breaking taboos, collectively 
finding solutions, and getting out of the isolated feeling encountered when facing issues. 
Instead of being opposed to experience reporting, experience sharing can then feed it, and 
give field experts the willingness to report issues to their hierarchy, for them to find solutions 
on recurrent problems. Experience reporting can also feed experience sharing through 
debriefings on specific safety events, case analysis, or positive safety. This synergy and 
complementarity between these two systems can only improve safety, efficiency and quality 
of working life for these field experts.  
There are several ways to defuse the inconvenients of experience reporting. It can be 
interesting to increase one’s knowledge of the other group: just as some field experts spend 
time in the safety analysis department, analysts too may accompany experts on the field, in 
order to gain a better understanding of all aspects of their work. Knowledge of cognitive 
processes could also be developed: the fact that safety analysts in Air Traffic Control have no 
real training in Human Factors, in cognitive decision-making processes for instance, has a 
deleterious effect not only on their understanding of field experts’ decision-making, but also 
on their own decision-making in analysis. Reporting could also be centred on experience, 
operational needs and constraints in field experts’ messy real life, instead of only focusing on 
regulatory requirements. Cross-checking work-as-done, work-as-prescribed and work-as-
imagined could greatly improve the safety of the whole organisation. Safety events 
debriefings based on these multiple points-of-view may then help to ensure safety on a high 
level, in a complex system with dynamic and messy situations.  
The legitimacy of the analysts comes from their operational background, but it is not 
sufficient, according to field experts. It is often called into question, as soon as they leave the 
field and appear to have forgotten everything about operational constraints. The field expert 
saying is quite revealing: when they leave the field, they “join the obscure side of the force”. 
This legitimacy could be increased by implementing “activity sharing spaces” (Thellier & 
Falzon, 2016). Working groups focus exclusively on technical goals, and these activity 
sharing spaces between field experts and managers could help understand and redefine the 
other group’s priorities, as well as address non-technical subjects, such as issues with 
regulation, risk perception by different jobs and different hierarchy levels.  
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2.2 Risk estimation of safety events  
Some safety events are not deemed risky by field experts. Are they risky? Or are they deemed 
risky by analysts, with cognitive biases linked to post facto analysis?  
Here are some of these cognitive biases:  
• Hindsight bias (or retrospective bias): it implies after the fact reconstruction. “We are 
tempted to assign the operator a rational mindset, with attention to everything, and to 
judge him on the basis of what has been discovered in the analysis, including a past of 
foreshadowing incidents that should have alerted him. But in most cases, the operator 
was following a routine, was not aware of the past warning signs, and did not imagine 
he could find himself in dramatic conditions because of his decisions. All deviation 
from an ideal standard following of regulation is seen, a posteriori, as an error or a 
violation, although these deviations are justified in the reality of the context of the 
instant (workload management, anticipation, external interruption…)” (Amalberti, 
2013) 
• The “excessive attribution of the accident cause to the first line operator” bias: The 
analysts tend to attribute the cause of the accident excessively to the field experts: “the 
issue is, on the contrary, to consider the model of the dynamic coupling of all parts of 
the system” (Amalberti, 2013) and therefore, to consider the system globally instead of 
just what is visible and accessible.  
• The “lack of imagination” bias: analysts often limit their considerations to a universe 
of known and identified causes, which makes them “unable to see the non-standard as 
soon as a known cause is catchable” (Amalberti, 2013) 
• The confusion between error and accident: “too often we forget that making errors 
(routine errors especially) is a price to pay to work quickly, that is, to reach a certain 
social and economic efficacy. Wanting to control everything and avoid every error 
generally ends up slowing down execution so much that the most important risk is 
transferred on to ‘not doing any work at all’ ”. (Amalberti, 2013).  
Like other people, field experts have many cognitive biases, in decision-making, judgment, 
risk estimation; for instance:  
• The error immunity bias: tendency to not see one’s own errors, 
• Selective perception bias: selective interpretation of information, depending on one’s 
own experience, 
• Hypothesis confirmation bias: tendency to prefer elements that confirm the hypothesis 
rather than elements that infirm it. 
So, do analysts’ biases prevail over field experts’ biases? These two groups are experts, and 
are therefore subject to expert bias (Lannoy & Procaccia, 2001), in addition to all the other 
biases.  
Are the specific events truly risky or not? Only the final outcome can tell. Sometimes. 
Because, in addition to Organisational and Human Factors, sometimes there is a chance 
factor, which can be the timing, or other contextual factors, which are often disregarded. 
Moreover, the specific topic of risk perception has not been taught to any of these groups. 
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Knowing how much this area is rich and complex, lack of training in this crucial subject can 
harm realistic risk estimations at different levels and different times of the organisation.  
Analysts, managers, field experts can have cognitive biases that can distort their vision of 
reality, and of causes of safety events. This is intrinsic in human cognitive operating, but it 
can also be favoured by silo operating, where representations about others representations are 
not shared, where confrontations between work-as-imagined, work-as-prescribed and work-
as-done are rare, and where the hierarchy vision is mostly normative, based on a safety vision 
nearly only regulated, omitting the adaptive safety, as the global results of the study show 
(Jégoux, 2017).  
Risk perception is an area that is not often studied, although it is at the basis of our 
understanding, our representations, and our decision-making process. Our understanding of 
risks depends on our perception, on its estimation, that we tend to think of it as real, as a 
rational evaluation, although every cognitive or group bias, every personal experience and 
emotion may distort it (Jégoux, 2017). We take our perceptions, our impressions too much for 
granted, although they are biased.  
Though these numerous cognitive biases need to be known, knowing them is not enough to 
suppress them. Despite that, training on cognitive bias linked to safety events analysis 
(Hindsight bias, error-accident confusion, excessive attribution of the accident cause to the 
first line operator bias) could help analysts and managers to analyse these events in greater 
depth and identify more decisive root causes in safety events genesis. That could help to 
improve both the relationship with field experts, and the solutions that are implemented after 
these analyses.  
Silo operating may also be improved by transversal analysis and actions, and a better 
knowledge and recognition of these actions. Projects can be implemented with some 
constraints of transversal participation, to improve meta-cognition and meta-competencies. 
Safety day’s events can help to break down the barriers between silos, and improve 
conviviality, togetherness (Morel, 2018), which definitely improves safety. Activities sharing 
spaces may help to confront work-as-imagine with work-as-prescribed and work-as-done, as 
well as exchanges in operational conditions. These two options can make it possible to take 
one’s distance with a normative and frozen view of safety in order to better grasp adaptive 
safety. Training on risk perception could improve the quality of evaluations, and extract them 
from a rigid frame of certainty that can hinder safety.  
2.3 Judgmental feedback  
Judgmental feedback from managers to field experts is one of the topics that penalise 
reporting the most: they do not want to hand them the stick to beat them with. This expression 
comes up often when talking about reporting. Field experts have the feeling that they are 
judged like children who are given approval or disapproval by external people who do not 
know their work. Nonetheless, it all depends on how analysts approach feedback: “before, it 
was like we were put on trial, so reporting stopped, then, when X arrived, it started to increase 
again”. Analyst selection and training on benevolent listening and constructive criticism 
therefore shows much room for improvement.  
Anonymity is somehow relative, whether the feedback comes from peers, or from 
management, whether it is implicit or explicit. In this organisation, anonymity is a feature of 
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the system, but analysts need to contact the field experts affected to analyse safety events 
better. If needed, after they are studied by managers, events are analysed during a local safety 
committee, with managers from different services, the controllers affected, and their 
representatives. And, if necessary, the event is analysed on a national level, with a 
representative of the local analysts. Along this process, anonymity is relatively respected, but, 
locally, peers witness the event, and rumours are the same wherever you work.  
Judgmental feedback can have different causes, for instance culture. Analysts are nearly 
always former controllers who passed very selective and competitive exams, and are used 
their performance’s being judged harshly, sometimes very harshly. Initial training can leave 
marks on them: unreasonable performance demands, or a belief that perfect performance is 
possible. The tendency is then to judge others in the same way they have been judged by 
authority (family authority, school teachers, instructors, and then managers). The cultural 
differences between organisations or countries are then particularly relevant: hierarchy 
distance has been thoroughly studied (Hofstede, 2010).  
The analyst position is indeed highly sensitive. It requires some delicate diplomacy, in 
listening, debriefing, pulling back into line when needed, at risk of counter-productive actions 
that trigger defence mechanisms from the field experts. It is indeed essential to both supports, 
understand and provide constructive criticism, set limits, in order to foster a genuine just 
culture within the safety culture. This delicate position, as many jobs based on human 
relationships, requires debriefings between peers affected by similar issues. Actually, when 
professionals from other sectors encounter interpersonal risks that can affect their work, they 
receive practise analysis, debriefings, supervision, to get hindsight and insight into their work, 
to analyse it better and in greater depth, and to adjust the way they work to people, situations 
and issues. In some sectors, this kind of specific training is even mandatory.  
Additionally, in this organisation, analyst training focuses exclusively on technical skills, and 
not at all on non-technical skills or knowledge. The safety events analysis therefore lacks this 
knowledge. Understanding elements of the operational constraints like cognitive trade-offs 
that happen in real life are rarely taken into account in the analysis. As they are not known by 
analysts, they are hardly conceptualised, and mostly put aside, to the benefit of the technical 
elements of the analysis and of an old conception of the individual “human error”. Analysis 
misses’ elements about work organisation and systemic vision, which would permit a shift 
away from an antiquated vision of safety centred on the “human error” of the first line 
operator.  
Another point about this incomplete analysis is the level analysed. It is only the first line 
level, the field expert level, not the intermediary or high levels of the organisation that are 
analysed on their decision-making process. This is resented as unfair by the field experts: 
because they have to find solutions to all problems that have not been anticipated and 
managed by the hierarchy, this system shows some disequilibrium between decision-making 
process on the field and on the high spheres, that they have to endure and compensate for. It 
also ends up with putting all the weight of safety on their shoulders: if they are the only ones 
who provoke safety events, are they the only ones responsible for safety? In this case, going a 
little further in the reasoning: what is management worth? And still a little bit further, what 
are the rules, norms, and regulations enacted by management worth?  
So, to limit the judgments felt by the field experts, different steps may be taken:  
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- Training aimed at analysts and focusing on Organisational and Human Factors, such as 
cognitive operating in the real world, cognitive trade-offs, better understanding and 
managing of violations,  
- training about non-judgment, active listening, and benevolent listening, non-violent 
communication, would improve analysis, as well as constructive criticism and 
assertive communication, taking into account the person, his-her operating modes, and 
reactions. They have to “connect before correct”. Analysts would benefit from a better 
understanding of resistance and protection mechanisms when they question field 
experts, mechanisms that play a role during analysis and interviews: denial, passive 
aggressiveness, sidesteps, evasion, banalisation, aggressive projecting, lies…  
- Debriefings or practise analysis may help analysts to analyse their own practise, and to 
lighten the burden of evaluating the work of their colleagues, to give 
recommendations, without assuming an omnipotent position over the others, which 
can sometimes be counter-productive in reporting. Helping field experts to reflect on 
their practise instead of judging it can bring more individual and collective 
intelligence.  
- Analyst recruiting could be improved by taking into account these soft skills.  
- In-depth training on safety culture and on Organisational and Human Factors could 
also improve analysis by taking into account systemic and contextual factors. Field 
experts would then understand that the safety committee is not there to judge them, but 
to judge safety events. In addition, safety actions would therefore be more relevant.  
To help field experts who are nonetheless the second victims of safety events, as stated in 
health systems, it would be interested to know what they would prefer when bad events 
happen. When there is an unwanted event, peers and managers do not know how to behave 
with the field experts affected. Should they talk about it, should they talk about other common 
subjects, should they say nothing? Or just ask them how they feel? Or what do they prefer? In 
these very sensitive times for all those affected, it is important to favor collective intelligence.  
Of course, offering specific support to them when bad things happen is essential, for the 
safety as well as the efficiency of the system. The Critical Incident Stress Management is an 
important tool to implement in units, to enable field experts to recover with no after-effect for 
them and for their work.  
2.4 Self-centred vision  
Some reasons given by managers and controllers are similar, others differ. Let us see what lies 
behind the divergence. 
Field experts’ answers are the non-risky situation in safety events, the preference for 
experience sharing instead of experience reporting and the feeling of being judged by 
hierarchy. So, they mostly imply an issue with the managers. On the other hand, managers’ 
answers are about field experts: the culture of the field or the feeling of responsibility of the 
controller.  
This double transfer on the other group may reveal some bias, especially the self-serving bias: 
the tendency to see others’ flaws without seeing one’s own. It can also be linked to the feeling 
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of belonging in one’s group, which limits the ability to call it into question and develop group 
protection mechanisms. May it be the former or the latter, leaving our own perceptions and 
thoughts behind to be able to considerate the situation with the point of view of someone else 
is difficult. In most of our cultures, it is a reflex to think and act according to one’s interests. 
No training time is devoted to developing empathy or broadening our points of view. Working 
groups on different technical topics exist, but nothing is done to limit or decrease the ego 
game, or to develop high reliability decision-making process (Morel, 2018) and collective 
intelligence. Regularly, some people do not feel heard and stick to their ground, defending 
their positions and views. The organisational waste and mess are colossal.  
The fact that managers promptly attribute non-reporting to field experts and field experts 
attribute it to managers could be improved by introducing empathy training, and other 
techniques like constructive or Non-Violent Communication, which help to get used to having 
a representation of another’s point-of-view, his-her constraints, habits, priorities. The activity 
sharing spaces could then play their role in full, combined with scientific methods to develop 
collective intelligence and high reliability decision-making process.  
2.5 The perceived uselessness of experience report  
The most important point of this study is this feeling of uselessness, noted by field experts as 
well as managers. It is the most important cause of non-reporting, and it is perceived as the 
most important one by both populations. It calls into question the very principle of reporting. 
If reporting is of no use, if it does not bring about any progress, or even dissuades field 
experts from reporting, what is the point? What is the use of this system which is heavy, 
complex, costs a lot, regarding this perceived uselessness?  
What are the real aims of reporting system? Statement, analysis, to put a figure on problems, 
to find solutions and improvement actions? It is evident that if solutions are targeted, the 
result is not there: “we decide on beautiful actions, but often, they are not implemented in the 
long term”.  
Managers are often unable to provide practical answers to field experts on the questions they 
ask, be they technical or regulatory. It is then tempting to rely on easy answers that do not go 
deep, that do not truly consider the messy reality and complexity of the field. “Easy-to-find 
answers”, easy to implement, easy to put a figure on, by “easy-to-find” indicators, but the 
results of our study are that these easy-to-find solutions are not enough. Is the “lack of 
imagination” bias also hitting the search for solutions? Or are relevant solutions difficult to 
implement and to put a figure on?  
The actual structure of the reporting system, centred only on field experts’ activity, shows its 
very limits. To systemic complex, deep, ancient and often non predictable problems, we look 
for, and find, simple, rapid, easy-to-find, easy to evaluate, local (or even sometimes centred 
on the first line activity). This simply doesn’t add up. The verbatim and results prove it. This 
doesn’t add up or lead to good results, at least not to enough consistently good results, both 
groups agree on that.  
Solutions should match the types of problems encountered; they too should therefore be 
complex, impact the system and its interactions, take time to be implemented, be difficult to 
put a figure on, and difficult to evaluate. They should also look for the light side of the force, 
and not only the dark side: if reporting is so denigrated by field experts, it is because of its 
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limits and its limited view. Reporting only looks for “safety events”, but these are not real 
“safety events”, but incidents and accidents, that is to say: what goes wrong. This view has 
been called Safety 1 by Erick Hollnagel and it is deeply rooted in ‘safety’ events analysis. The 
way “not-safe” events are called ‘safety’ events is a positivist distortion that denies reality and 
limits the possibility of envisioning another kind of safety, truly positive this time. Field 
experts have integrated this distortion and are puzzled when we ask them about real safety 
events: events that reveal the strengths of the system, of the team, of the individual. For them, 
those events are just their everyday job, there is nothing special to say about them. Yet, better 
understanding of daily operations could help to improve the system and increase its strength 
instead of always concentrating on flaws.  
Reporting system is centred exclusively on safety, completely missing efficiency. Airlines 
companies have started another kind of reporting system a few years ago: “Service quality Air 
safety Report”. Then they ask Air Traffic Control Organisation explanations about service 
quality, unexplained delays, elements that can hinder their efficiency. Efficiency reports could 
therefore enable organisations to analyse daily problems, where field experts do their best to 
find solutions, with their constraints and the resources they have on hand. This kind of 
reporting would help to understand the detrimental aspects of the system and the high 
cognitive costs aspects. This kind of reporting would help to identify the priorities on which 
management should act and find solutions or adjustments.  
In addition, the reporting system has some very inherent limits: it has been conceived only for 
bottom-up information reporting. For a few years, field experts who filed reports have 
received feedback, and usually did not appreciated it: the feedback comes late, and does not 
often provide any valuable information. Conceiving a reporting system that would be used 
both in bottom up and in top down ways could now become a priority.  
Another part of the uselessness of the reporting system is linked to the normative constraints 
and their inflation, which is not always justified (Morel, 2018, Jégoux, 2017). Some non-
practicable rules cannot be changed by managers, who often tell as much to field experts 
while also telling them to comply for conformity’s sake. There should be a reporting system 
for regulation makers as well, and some obligation for them to provide interpretation of the 
rules, and their non-practicability when relevant. 
So, these causes of the perceived uselessness of reporting will be linked to solutions that have 
to take into account complexity. They will have to bring the organisation to a systemic and 
cindynic (science of the dangers) approach, to set aside the illusion that situations can be 
controlled by simple and quantifiable indicators. This culture of quantifiable indicators does 
not lead to good concrete results for field experts, and getting out of this culture may be an 
important step towards improving safety and reporting, and not only managers’ feeling of 
safety. The reporting should be enough to contribute to changing non-practicable rules, 
regulations, administrative communications, procedures, orders and instructions. By taking 
into account the issues reported by those who apply any kind of rules, and by “law of rules” 
(Morel, 2018), the system would limit its normative issues.  
Redefining reporting on Safety 2 principles (Hollnagel, 2014) can also improve safety, by 
analysing and developing real safety events, not only flaws, to help improve the strength of 
the organisations, of the teams, of the individuals, to improve safety in a more creative way.  
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A kind of reporting system based on efficiency and not exclusively on safety could help to 
understand better the trade-offs that are made between safety and performance, and the 
importance of the means of enforcing safety in action. In this comprehensive view of 
reporting, what could be improved as well is some reporting for support services. In many 
organisations, administrative services, IT department, logistics, do not have any formal 
reporting system, although their work may also have an impact on safety, or on health and 
safety issues, and security.  
A global reporting system taking into account these aspects may improve both the safety and 
efficiency of the organisation. With bottom up information and top down information, all 
actors of the organisations could contribute and see what happens with their contribution to 
safety. This can be done on a vertical axis, to enforce an Organisational Resource 
Management (ORM) (Jégoux, 2018): both on bottom up and top down directions. This could 
improve field experts’ opinion of their reports’ usefulness.  
3. Conclusion 
The reporting system could benefit from various tools routinely used to understand 
individuals, teams, and organisations, from formal training on human and organisational 
factors, with specific attention drawn to general cognitive bias and analysts’ bias, on such 
topics as violations management, and work-as-done. Synergy between reporting experience 
and sharing experience is yet to be implemented for a cross-fertilisation to improve safety.  
Nonetheless, if we wish field experts to report as well as share their experience, it is important 
to ensure that reporting ends up providing solutions to the issues they bring forward. 
Reporting systems still need to be improved, especially in the efficiency of safety events 
analysis, as both groups noticed. Safety as a whole would therefore be enhanced.  
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Abstract 
The role of accident investigations and, more generally, of event investigations, is to identify 
causes that have led to their occurrence in order to eliminate them by implementing 
corrective measures and thus improve the system. Unfortunately, according to the Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board, “[M]any accident investigations do not go far enough”. The 
CAIB statement shows, among other things, that event analysis methods must be improved in 
order to address the real issues that led to the failure. In the paper we will present a method 
called “Organisational Analysis of Safety” which tackles three dimensions intending to cover 
the whole scope of the situation: “the historical dimension”; the “organisational network”, 
and “work relationships channels” (interactions between the different strata of the 
organisation). Furthermore, we will also argue that, for a method to be effective, as relevant 
as it is, analysts as well as decision-makers must demonstrate a certain mindset, a certain 
open-mindedness. 
Keywords: Event Analysis Methods, Deep Causes, Organisation, Mindset. 
1. Introduction 
Industrial safety is mainly based on two principal pillars. The first is risk analysis, the role of 
which is to foresee negative outcomes, and the scenarios leading to them, in order to design 
and implement preventive safety measures (such as safety equipment, backup systems, and 
procedures, etc.). Unfortunately, real life thwarts designers' expectations by “proposing” 
unplanned or ill-defined situations which lead to unwanted results such as failures, incidents, 
or even accidents. Each (negative) event is analysed in order to figure out its causes. This kind 
of analysis, that is mandatory in some at-risk industries, is the lessons to be learned 
process20, which is the second pillar of safety. It aims to eliminate causes of occurrence by 
implementing corrective measures and so improve the safety (and reliability) of the system. 
 Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) 
 
20 Concept of lessons to be learned process is developed by Dr John Kingston (personal communication). 
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Surprisingly, despite substantial efforts and resources put in the lessons to be learned process, 
“the same human errors, or series of similar technical breakdowns, seem to reoccur” (Dien & 
Llory, 2004, p. 36). Have the lessons of previous events been learned poorly? According to 
the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), “Many accident investigations do not go 
far enough. They identify the technical cause of the accident, and then connect it to a variant 
of “operator error” […]. But this is seldom the entire issue. When the determinations of the 
causal chain are limited to the technical flaw and individual failure, typically the actions 
taken to prevent a similar event in the future are also limited” (CAIB, 2003, p. 97). This 
statement marks an epistemological breakthrough for accident investigations which remain 
strongly influenced by the “human error” paradigm. 
This means that issue of the analysis / investigation method is not yet totally settled. 
On the other hand, if the analysis is weak, then the corrective measures put in place will be 
inappropriate for solving the problems. In view of this situation, the CAIB added that “putting 
these corrections in place leads to another mistake – the belief that the problem is solved21” 
(CAIB, 2003, p. 97). 
Furthermore, event investigation is a whole process, from event occurrence to improvement 
actions implementation, without forgetting analysis itself and definition of correctives 
measures. Some researchers [e.g. Llory (1996)] and some accident investigations [e.g. CAIB 
(2003)] have stressed the importance of decision-making processes in the genesis of 
accidents. These decisions are usually made (or not made) by managers responsible for the 
strategy and / or operations of the company. Are managers “self-reflexive” enough to accept 
that the results of the investigation question their (previous) actions / decisions? Are decision 
makers ready to take account of recommendations which could be at odds to their own current 
“ideology” regarding safety? This implies that those who define and implement corrective 
measures will be open to analysis of events that is suitably broad and incisive. 
In the next section we will explain the “Organisational Analysis of Safety” method (Dien, 
2006; Llory & Montmayeul, 2010) using an example from a real investigation22. Then we will 
show how stakeholders in the event investigation process must be prepared to consider 
weaknesses in operational feedback; weaknesses that are symptomatic of organisation’s 
failure either to question themselves or to put in place the needed corrective measures. 
2. Organisational Analysis of Safety 
The factual data in this section are drawn from the reports released by the enquiry commission 
chaired by Lord Cullen (2000) and from Martin et al. (2007). 
Synopsis of the Accident 
On 5 October 1999, at Ladbroke Grove Junction, about 2 miles west of Paddington station in 
London, a Turbo train, operated by Thames Trains, passed a signal at red (signal SN 109 on 
gantry #8) at 08:08:25. The train which was travelling at 41 mph increased its speed. It was 
directed towards a line on which a High-Speed Train (HST), operated by First Great Western, 
was travelling in the opposite direction at about 80 mph.  
 
21 Emphasis added. 
22 Trains crash at Ladbroke Grove (England). 
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Signallers at the Integrated Electronic Control Centre (IECC) at Slough, who were in charge 
of monitoring trains traffic, did not react properly, and when they took action in putting a 
signal back to red right before HST approached the gantry, it was too late. Train drivers 
braked, but it had no significant effect. Furthermore, it is not certain that signallers contacted 
the Turbo train driver to warn him that he had passed the signal at red (see § 0). 
Thirty-three seconds after the Turbo had passed SN109 at red, the two trains collided head-on. 
The accident killed 31 people (including both train drivers) and injured a further four hundred. 
We should note that it could have been worse but for the efficiency of the rescue teams. 
Neither train was equipped with an Automatic Train Protection System (ATP) which ensures 
compliance with signals and speed limits. ATP monitors the status of signals and applies the 
brakes in the event of an unsafe situation23. The two trains were equipped with an Automatic 
Warning System which “only” alerts the driver when approaching a signal (and when 
approaching some speed restrictions). 
Understanding / Analysing the Event 
Direct Cause(s) 
The case seems simple. We face a double human error: an error made by the Turbo driver 
who passed a signal at danger, and an error made by signallers who did not react as 
planned/expected in the situation. 
Turbo Train Driver “Error” 
First of all, it is certain that the SPAD24 was not due to the driver of the Turbo train being 
rendered incapable by an acute medical problem, such as fainting, or a heart attack. Indeed, 
the driver accelerated after passing signal SN109 and (attempted) to brake just before the 
crash. 
Secondly, we can discount that driver acted in a malicious manner [“There is no suggestion 
that the driver, Hodder, deliberately ignored what was shown by that signal” (Cullen, 2000, 
p. 77)] or that he committed suicide: according to his colleagues, he was always in a good 
mood, always smiling “and that morning was no different”25. Furthermore, when he would 
have returned home, he would have celebrated the seventh birthday of his son26. 
The reasons why Turbo train driver passed SN 109 at red could be linked to the track 
infrastructure in the Ladbroke Grove area. In order to increase service frequencies, it was 
decided in 1989 to upgrade infrastructure between Paddington Station and Ladbroke Grove. 
This modernisation led to the construction of six parallel bi-directional running lines, with 
connections between them, which were intended to be used at high speeds and in both 
directions. As consequence, the signalling layout on gantry #8 was one of the most 
complicated in the United Kingdom, and due to the unusual layout of signals27, their legibility 
was very poor. It was even worse because drivers’ view of the signals was obstructed by the 
 
23 A cost / benefit analysis concluded that equipping trains with ATP was not justified as the costs outweighed 
the benefits!!! 
24 SPAD: Signal Passed at Danger, i.e. train does not stop despite the traffic light at red. 
25 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1397112.stm, retrieved on May, 16, 2018. 
26 https://www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/oct/09/ladbrokegrove.transport2, retrieved on May, 16, 2018. 
27 Thus, the positions of the lights on the signals on gantry # 8 were reversed comparing to the usual signals. 
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underside of a road bridge (above the rail tracks). Indeed, signals on the gantry could be seen 
for only 8 seconds while approaching, during which the train driver must be wholly focussed 
checking the “appropriate” signal and not distracted by any other duties. 
Furthermore, as the sun was bright and at a low angle at the time in question, the driver may 
have perceived the signal to be at a proceed aspect28. 
Signaller “Error” 
The role of a control centre is to monitor the operation of the system, i.e. to monitor progress 
of the trains and to intervene when necessary. The only efficient and safe action for avoiding 
crash was to call the Turbo train driver and tell him to stop the train29. 
Depending on the dynamics of the situation, the signaller had only few seconds in which to 
react: to realise that a SPAD had occurred; to detect where and which train; to check how to 
contact the train driver, and finally; to contact him.  
The type of communication systems between IECC at Slough and train drivers depended on 
the operating companies30. For some companies, such as First Great Western and Virgin 
trains, the communication system did not provide a direct means of communication between 
the IECC and the train driver. For those services, messages had to be passed to, and relayed 
by, an Integrated Control Centre located at Swindon (the Centre in charge, among other 
activities, of management of the infrastructure across the Western route of Network Rail). For 
others, as Heathrow Express and Thames Trains, the system enabled direct communication 
between the IECC and the train driver. 
Within 10 seconds after the SPAD an audible alarm sounded three times in the IECC31. The 
only action we can be sure of (see § 0) is that the signaller put signal SN120 back to red in 
face of the HST while it approached the signal. This took effect at 08:08:50, i.e. 25 seconds 
after SN 109 was passed at danger and 8 seconds before the impact. 
It may be noted that the day of the crash was the seventh successive day on which the 
signaller in charge had worked a 12-hour shift. Indeed, in accordance with one of the 
recommendations made ten years earlier after the Clapham Rail Crash (Dept of Transport, 
1989), a railway Group Standard specifies that a signaller should not work for more than 72 
hours in a week. 
Lessons to Be Learned from An Analysis oriented to “Direct Causes”  
This type of analysis, focusing on direct and immediate causes, is the more common analysis 
in industry: it can be labelled “conventional” analysis and belongs to the “human error” 
paradigm. 
Many lessons can be learned, and improvements can be made and implemented in the system. 
For example: 
• Improvement of signals ergonomics; 
 
28 Illumination conditions led, “that the effect of direct sunlight on SN109 was to cause its image to be less easy 
for a driver to read” (Cullen, 1999, p. 70). [Aspect = the visual indication displayed by a signal.] 
29 The diversion of the train to another track led to a risk of derailment. 
30 The same for every control centre and every operating company. 
31 “It may be noted that this audible alarm also served to give warning of a number of types of malfunction […]. The signaller had to consult the alarm screen to see the 
reason for it, and the position to which it referred.” (Cullen, 2000, p. 85) 
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• Other/New directives or injunctions to train drivers such as to remind that a train must 
be stopped when the signal is at red (!!); 
• Improvement of communication tools between signallers and train drivers; 
• Improvement of signallers’ control room, especially the alarm systems; 
• Complementary training to signallers; 
• Improvement of fatigue prevention policy; 
• … 
Nevertheless, it is open to question whether these kinds of analysis cover the whole scope of 
an event. Do not they forget some of its features? To put another way, could we go beyond 
the “human error” paradigm to gain a more global vision of the situation and a wider 
explanation of the event? More specifically, should not the organisation be part of the 
analysis? 
Deep Causes 
Deep or Root Causes 
We prefer to use the concept of “deep causes” instead of the widely used concept of “root 
causes”. Too often, root cause analyses stop at those organisational layers that fall within the 
“human error” paradigm, such as competence or team relationships.  However, the study of 
numerous industrial events (accidents, incidents, and crises) has shown that “any event is 
generated by direct or immediate causes (technical failure and/or ‘human error’) 
nevertheless its occurrence and/or its development is considered to be induced, facilitated or 
accelerated by underlying organisational conditions (complex factors)” (Dien, 2006 p.148). 
According to James Reason’s model (1997) an event analysis starts with the analysis of direct 
causes and goes all the way down to figure out the organisational factors. That is why an 
event analysis has to take account of the thickness and depth of the organisation: it is what we 
intend to do with the next sections. 
Recruitment and Training of the Turbo Train Driver 
In 1994, British Rail, the state-owned, sole British operating company was privatised and split 
into a hundred different companies. 
New private companies, established after the privatisation, hired former British Rail drivers 
for their trains. After a while this recruitment pool dried up. Companies “came back” to a 
more conventional recruitment process: they hired persons who had no previous experience as 
train drivers32. 
The Turbo train driver obtained his licence on 22 September 1999. The day of the accident 
was his 9th day of work. During his work period he made twenty trips outside the Ladbroke 
Grove area, i.e. he had no previous encounter with gantry #8. 
Furthermore, the Cullen inquiry found that the Turbo train driver was poorly trained (from 
both the theoretical and practical points of view). Among the shortcomings, were: 
• Training had departed from the standards provided by British Rail at the time of the 
privatization of the British railway system. This “new” training was neither assessed 
nor validated; 
 
32 As was true of the Turbo train driver involved in the accident who was recruited in February 1999. 
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• Trainees' characteristics – that is, their experience or inexperience – were not taken 
into account. They received the usual training designed for “internal” recruitment; 
• Training sessions were not upgraded (e.g. some maps and signal plans used for 
training were not up-to-date with track modifications33); 
• “There was concern about the length of the course, its content and its disjointed 
nature (Cullen, 2000, p. 59); 
•  No specific training about “risky signals” and SPADs 
 “It must be concluded therefore that [the Turbo train driver’s] training was not adequate for 
the task for which he was being prepared” (Cullen, 2000, p. 60): “there were significant 
shortcomings in [Turbo train driver’s] training” (Cullen, 2000, p. 2). It has to be noted that 
these training weaknesses concerned all train operating companies. It led to the conclusion 
that “the safety culture in regard to training was slack and less than adequate.” (Cullen, 
2000, p. 4) 
Operating Companies Safety Management 
There were significant failures in communication between organisations and within each 
organisation. For instance, train drivers made many complaints to their (company) 
management about signal sighting, but these companies did not forward them to Railtrack, the 
company in charge of rail infrastructure. 
Several working groups were set up in order to deal with the SPAD issue. They worked in 
parallel and none succeeded. The “proliferation” of working groups added to the confusion. 
There was never a comprehensive approach to this problem. The few solutions provided were 
always specific, individual, reactive and non-proactive, that is, in response to specific events, 
and with poor follow-up of any decisions made. This behaviour “betrays a culture of apathy 
and lack of will to follow up promised actions” (Cullen, 2000, p. 113). 
Furthermore, during the years preceding the accident, a number of proposals and 
recommendations were made for carrying out a risk assessment of the signalling in the 
Paddington area. “However, none of them was carried into effect” (Cullen, 2000, p. 113). 
“There was also a persistent failure to carry out risk assessment by whatever method was 
available” (Cullen, 2000, p. 3). There was a reluctance to carry out risk assessments, and a 
deep-seated laissez faire culture within the Zone (Cullen, 2000, p. 137). This is all the more 
striking given the emphasis placed on risk assessment by the Health and Safety Executive 
since 1993. For example, the 1994 Railways Regulations required notification of any risk 
assessment which has been carried out.  
The “shortage, and […] high turnover, of driver […] of managers” (Cullen, 2000, p. 158) 
may be behind this shortcoming and lack of commitment34. 
In conclusion, there seemed to be no learning from previous SPADs. 
Operational Feedback Related to SN 109 
From 2 August 1993 to 22 August 1998, signal SN 109 was ‘passed at danger’ eight times35. 
Based on these actual data, a statistical study showed that there was a likelihood of 0.86 (an 
 
33 “Signalling maps and plans are available for some routes but these have not been updated with essential 
information such as high risk (eg multi-SPADed) signals etc” (Cullen, 2000, p. 58). 
34 We have to note that this situation is similar for Railtrack. 
35 First SPAD occurred 7 months after the new tracks and signal system were put into service. 
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86% chance) to witness at least one SPAD at SN 109 in a given year. A SPAD does 
“automatically” lead to a train collision. Regarding collision, there was a 7.2% chance of a 
collision in any given year, which means one collision every 14 years. 
“One could say SN109 was a black spot. At the time of the crash, SN109 was one of the 22 
signals on the Railtrack network at which the greatest number of SPADs had occurred” 
(Cullen, 2000, p. 56). 
In spite of this situation, no significant action was taken to correct this defect before the 
disaster. 
The Signallers 
As it was previously said (see § 0), the only safe action was to contact the Turbo train driver. 
It is quite difficult to know whether it was done or not. Indeed, signallers made inconsistent 
and contradictory testimonies about it. Furthermore, the recorded data were not recovered 
even though, as recalled by Lord Cullen, this was specified some years earlier by 
recommendation 13 of the formal inquiry into the accident at Royal Oak on 10 November 
1995. In any case, “it is unsafe to determine whether [a stop message] was received before the 
collision, let alone how long before it” (Cullen, 2000, p. 92). 
Signallers have also to cope with numerous and complex instructions and regulations for 
managing and mitigating the effects of a signal passed at danger (e.g. “Regulation 47 of the 
Signalling General Instructions”, “Regulation 4.1.1 of the Track Circuit Block Regulations”, 
“Regulation 4.3 of the Track Circuit Block Regulations”, “Regulation 6 of the Track Circuit 
Block Regulations”, “Sections 1 & 2 of the “The Instructions to Signallers at Slough New”). 
Nevertheless, “despite all the written instructions, SPADs were regarded by signallers as a 
matter of driver error. That showed not only a dangerous complacency but a lack of 
collaboration in the management of safety” (Cullen, 2000, p. 98). Silo-thinking and a lack of a 
co-operative spirit between train drivers and signallers is illustrated by an excerpt from an 
interview. This shows that the general feeling amongst signallers is that “the driver is 
supposed to stop at a red signal”: 
“Q36: Was that the overall feeling? If a SPAD happens, that is essentially a driver problem? 
A: Well how can it not be? If a person at a traffic light goes through a red light, is it not his fault? 
Q: What about the problems that there had been in the Paddington area of drivers going through, 
not just SN109 but other signals, on a number of occasions when they were red against them? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Was it still felt that the problem was exclusively the driver’s? 
A: Well, if a driver fails to stop at a red signal, he is at fault”. (Cullen, 2000, pp. 94-95) 
It seems that regarding SPADs management, signallers were in “a wait and see situation”. 
They did not see themselves as a line of defence against SPADs. 
Railtrack Safety Management 
The culture of safety and responsibility were damaged at Railtrack. Taking account of risks, 
through their evaluation and operational feedback, was very deficient with respect to the 
design of signalling and the circulation of the tracks (i.e. choice of bi-directional lines). 
Furthermore, this malaise extended to the provision of training and information to both train 
drivers and signallers. 
 
36 Q = Question by Cullen Commission; A = Answer by Signaller. 
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Forty-six “SPADs” occurred in the Slough IECC zone from 1993 to 1999. Some managers 
were members of the working groups dealing with SPADs, but there was no structured 
operational feedback regarding SPADs: neither mandatory analysis nor debriefing. Moreover, 
real improvement of the infrastructure was impossible because “there was a reluctance to 
consider solution which might impact on capacity and performance, and there were a number 
of management deficiencies” (Cullen, 2000, p. 137). “Cost, delay and interference with the 
performance objectives underlay that resistance” (Cullen, 2000, p. 107). 
A Whistle-Blower 
A train by operated by the company, First Great Western, passed SN 109 at red on 4 February 
1998. Six months later, on 6 August 1998, a train by operated by the company, Thames 
Trains, also passed SN 109 at red.  
These galvanised the Operations and Safety Director of First Great Western to write a letter to 
the Chairman of a recently set up Working Group dealing with SPADs. The Chairman, 
incidentally, was employed by Railtrack. In her letter of 26 August 1998, the director asked 
the chairman about the actions envisaged “to mitigate against this high risk signal” (Cullen, 
2000, p. 117). She was told that a study will be launched and that the output (report) “will 
ensure that effective solutions are identified for early implementation” (Cullen, 2000, p. 117). 
The report was never released, and the Chairman left the “Paddington Zone”. 
On 22 December 1998, the same director wrote another letter to the Railtrack Operations 
Manager, informing him of her concerns about the timescales of the future Working Group he 
was setting up. She was afraid that they would not be “sufficient to mitigate against the very 
obvious risks” (Cullen, 2000, p. 117). Two months later, she received a letter telling her that a 
consulting company had been commissioned to review the signalling system in the 
“Paddington Zone”. No review was ever commissioned, and the Operations Manager left the 
“Paddington Zone”!! 
On 9 June 1999 she wrote a third letter, this time to another Railtrack Operations Manager 
who was the new Chairman of the Working Group. She wrote: “It is almost 12 months since 
FGW37 had a SPAD of an ECS train leaving Paddington following which Railtrack Zone 
promised a major review of the signalling in the 0-4 mile post area. I    remain seriously 
concerned that after all this time (a number of meetings to discuss SPAD mitigation methods) 
that I am being asked to consider a solution to a problem in isolation and as a result of an 
event(s). If we carry on in this way we will continue to solve one problem but its solution will 
create another hazard. This is clearly not the manner in which to manage risk and an 
approach to which I am strongly opposed. Therefore, I suggest that an holistic approach is 
taken to SPAD management in the Paddington area and all changes to infrastructure or 
methods of working are properly risk assessed” (Cullen, 2000, p. 118). She did not receive 
any reply. 
In spite of her efforts to sound the alarm, no serious action was taken or decisions made. The 
accident occurred four months after her last mail. We should also note that employees of her 
company were not relaying her concerns/requests within the different working groups they 
were members of. 
 
37 First Great Western. 
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Some Conclusions about Investigation Method 
Analysis of the deep causes underlying the event reveals that the “management” of the 
Paddington Zone was “adrift over many years” (Cullen p. 4) and was drifting to failure. 
The approach used for determining deep causes, which can be called an organisational 
approach, allows on the one hand to “question” the commonly accepted (direct and 
immediate) causes of the event and, on the other hand, to propose improvement measures that 
go beyond conventional enhancement measures taken after an event, such as training, 
improvement of the human-machine interface. The intention of the organisational approach is 
to go beyond a logic that proposes necessary improvements, to reach one that proposes a raft 
of change sufficient to prevent future accidents38. 
The Organisational Analysis of Safety method is designed to go as far upstream as possible in 
the history of the event in order to shed light on the circumstances that may have led to the 
occurrence of the immediate cause (s) of the event. It is designed to highlight the decisions (or 
lack of decision) that more-or-less directly influenced the event. Finally, it focuses on 
relationships between the different entities involved in the event. Organisational Analysis of 
Safety is a means to describe the dynamics of the event. 
The organisational approach, by widening the field of research of the causes of occurrence of 
an event, allows other types of corrective measures. In this sense, Organisational Analysis of 
Safety is complementary to the usual causal analyses. 
The organisational approach is based on three dimensions which define an “analysis space” 
(Dien, 2005; Dien et al., 2004; Llory & Montmayeul, 2010): 
• The historical dimension: An event does not start with the beginning of the event 
sequence. It is the outcome of a process in which the safety level degrades over time. 
To go upstream in the history of the organisation helps to figure out the significant 
dysfunctions, that are symptoms of a regression of the safety level. The analysis of the 
historical dimension is done while examining, in parallel, contextual variables so as to 
better understand the effects on the evolution of safety. This dimension allows the 
analysts to “dive” into the “incubation period” (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997) of the event. 
In this way, the analysis can correct for investigative hindsight bias. Hindsight makes 
the accident look inevitable, and the decision-makers vividly culpable. Correction 
recognises that those people assessed the medium and long-term consequences of their 
decisions and actions without knowing the “end of the story” (the accident) or the 
“scenario course” that led to it. Correction can be achieved by historically re-
contextualising the decisions and actions of the people involved.  
• The organisational network: Before the event, organisational entities39 
communicated with each other, exchanged data, collaborated to ensure the required 
safety levels, and so forth. It is important to establish the organisational network of the 
entities concerned (i.e. actual “living” operational relations between entities). This 
network does not strictly correspond to a formal, prescribed, rigid structure (as 
organisation charts or contractual relations between entities). The network should be 
seen as a convenient way to visualize the complex and numerous interactions that have 
occurred. 
 
38 CAIB statements, § 1. 
39 Entities could be part of the same company or of different companies. 
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• The work relationships channels or the hierarchical relations (and reporting) in 
the organisation. We must keep in mind something which is often forgotten: 
organisations are hierarchical systems with relations of dependence between people. 
This dimension pays attention to: 
− the modes of relationship (mode and type of cooperation); 
− communication (e.g. freedom of speech, and he capacity to listen) 
− decision making processes; 
− information flow (top-down and bottom-up) between the different categories of 
staff. 
Analyses of accidents usually reveal degradation of these modes between managers 
and/or experts and/or field staff (which could include front line manager). Taking this 
dimension into account makes it possible to focus not only on the field staff, but also 
to include the ‘off-stage’ decision-makers when searching for cause(s) of the event 
occurrence. 
Carrying out an Organisational Analysis is to go as far as possible along each dimension 
taking account of relevant contextual data and identifying Pathogenic Organisational Factors. 
POFs are factors or phenomena that have a negative influence on the safety of the system 
(Dien, 2005). For example, if production culture has displaced safety culture, the analysis 
would construe production pressures as a POF. For example, Railtrack was reluctant to 
undertake any infrastructure improvement work that could interfere with performance. A POF 
could also be weaknesses of operational feedback that might alert management to failing 
processes. The treatment of SPADs by operating companies and by Railtrack is an example of 
this. 
The organisational analysis, also tries to detect and to highlight phenomena which are often 
seen as marginal or incidental, such as “whistleblowing”. Whistle-blowers are persons who 
commit themselves to warning of poorly managed threats to safety; for example, the 
Operations and Safety Director of FWG. 
Mainstream investigations do at least try to identify direct and immediate causes, but usually 
end there. These are the gateway for accessing deep organisational causes [see Reason’s 
Model (1997)]. 
3. Mindset 
It is clear that in numerous companies, event analyses “do not go far enough”. They are 
limited to finding out immediate and direct causes, such as technical failures and “human 
errors”. Restricting the causal frame of event occurrence leads to a limitation of the scope of 
corrective measures, as CAIB (2003) states. 
We will see from a few examples that this state of mind remains present in some, not to say, 
many companies. 
Accident at Texas City BP Refinery 
On March 23, 2005, an explosion at the Texas City BP Refinery followed by several fires 
resulted in 15 fatalities and 180 casualties, including 60 who were seriously injured. The 
accident occurred during the start-up of an isomerisation unit, after a scheduled shut-down for 
maintenance. The immediate cause of the event was an overfilling of a raffinate splitter tower 
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(height, 50m) leading to release in the atmosphere of flammable volatile products, which met 
an ignition source. The start-up procedure requested that the level of products in the splitter 
remains around 2m. The automatic control of valves was designed to maintain the fluid at the 
required level. Yet, the operators had intentionally put the valves under manual control in 
order to keep the level at around 2.75m. As the valves were kept closed, the splitter tower was 
fed with flammable fluid for over three hours without any liquid being removed. It must be 
noted that “critical alarms and control instrumentation provided false indications that failed 
to alert the operators of the high level in the tower” (CSB40, 2007, p. 21). In the press and 
media, “operator error” was immediately cited as explanation for the disaster (Cordeiro & 
Resnick-Ault, 2005). It is also (perhaps unsurprisingly) retained by BP as one of the four 
critical factors in the occurrence of the accident, who named it “Raffinate splitter start-up 
procedures and application of knowledge and skills” (Mogford, 2005b, p. 23). As a result, BP 
fired some staff and blamed / disciplined others involved in the occurrence of the event (Belli, 
2005; Macalister, 2005). 
According to the CSB there was in the refinery, a “work environment that encouraged 
operations personnel to deviate from procedure” (CSB, 2007, p. 69). Furthermore, “these 
deviations were not unique actions committed by an incompetent crew, but were actions 
[that] operators, as a result of established work practices, frequently took to protect unit 
equipment and complete the start-up in a timely and efficient manner” (CSB, 2007, p 70). So, 
is this “error” a surprise? For 18 of the previous 19 start-ups of the unit, the level had been 
maintained beyond the limit recommended by the procedure. This operational practice was 
known and so acknowledged by the first line management. We can therefore think of being 
faced with a “normalization of deviance” (Vaughan, 1996). Some procedures were not 
adequate, and not updated to take account of the evolution of process and equipment41. 
Furthermore, after its in-depth investigation of the accident, the CSB (2007) found out, 
amongst other things: 
• Drastic production pressures leading, for instance, in cost-cutting in maintenance 
expenses, training reduction and staffing downsizing; 
• A lack of focus for controlling major hazard risks; 
• A flawed learning from experience process with, in particular, a confusion between 
occupational safety and process safety, and an approach mainly based on indicators 
rather than incidents analysis; 
• A weakness of the Safety Administrative Authorities that had little presence on the 
field and had failed to impose appropriate equipment to secure release of flammable 
products in the atmosphere. 
BP's willingness to tightly focus on human errors is not surprising, since looking at deeper 
causes could have brought into question its policies (with regard to safety, financial 
management, and concerning management involvement and commitment…). It seems that 
instead of handling process risks, BP preferred managing its image issues. Indeed, right after 
the accident, the public relations chief of BP America e-mailed other executives: “Looks like 
injuries and loss of life are heavy. Expect a lot of follow up coverage tomorrow. Then I 
 
40 U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. 
41 For instance: “SOP 201.0 was last updated on October 1, 2003, and the Superintendent confirmed in the last 
annual certification (early March 2005) that all ISOM unit operating procedures were current and accurate. 
However, on January 31, 2003 the Overhead RVs (RV-1001A/B/C) were de-rated from 70 psig to 40/41/42 psig 
respectively and this change was not reflected in SOP 201.0, although most of the operators were aware of the 
change”!!! A (Mogford, 2005a, p. 17) [emphasis added]. 
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believe it will essentially go away -- due to the holiday weekend”. She cynically added: “This 
is a very big story in the U.S. right now -- but the Terry Schiavo story42 is huge as well” 
(Boudreau & Yager, 2010). 
Amagasaki Train Station Accident 
On April 25, 2005, in Amagasaki, western Japan, a train from the West Japan Railway 
Company (JR) “derailed in a curve due to speeding and hit the front of a residential building”. 
This accident killed 107 people and injured more than 500 others. According to the 
investigation commission ARAIC43, the direct cause of the accident was entering in the 
curved track with an excessive speed of 116 kph, much higher than the specified speed of 
70kph. Delay in braking could have been due to driver inattention because he was conversing 
with the train dispatcher (ARAIC, 2007). So, “human error” is not in doubt. 
Nevertheless, we learn that “drivers who caused an incident or a mistake are put on an "off-
the-train" re-training course that can be considered as a penalty or are subjected to a 
disciplinary action” (ARAIC, 2007, p. 58). The question is whether— harsh, unjust or not—
these measures had a history of sustaining or improving levels of safety. 
We can assume that the train driver tried to recover the 90 seconds lost after overrunning the 
previous stop by 40 metres (which is a mistake according to the JR standards44). He had 
already been reprimanded three times during his career, including 13 days of “re-training” 
(McCurry, 2005). 
The re-training sessions could be seen more as degrading and humiliating retribution than as 
tools for improving skill and expertise (Japan Time, 2007). The sessions could (McCurry, 
2005; Pons, 2005; Japan Today, 2011) take the form of: 
• Writing 6 to 8 reports a day, detailing the reasons for the driver error and the 
inconvenience it had caused; 
• Wearing his drivers' uniform and standing on the platform to greet incoming trains and 
wish the driver a safe journey, so that the other drivers could realise he was being 
punished; 
• Put into a tiny office and continuously yelled at by managers; 
• Toilet duty; 
• Cutting weeds. 
JR conducted more than 500 re-training sessions per year, usually lasting four to six days, but 
sometimes as long as 51 days45 (Japan Times, 2005). 
Furthermore, JR was the only Japanese railway company that linked pay rises to employees’ 
performance (McCurry, 2005). 
Due to these psychological pressures, some employees committed suicide (McCurry, 2005). 
 
42 The Terri Schiavo case was a right-to-die legal case in the United States from 1990 to 2005. 
43 Aircraft and Railway Accidents Investigation Commission. 
44 Schedules were timed to the second because of the high frequency of trains. 
45 Once, JR ordered an employee to attend re-training for over five months. The cause was that he had running 
three minutes late at work!!! (Japan Today, 2011). 
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Taking account of all these facts, can we disagree with a trade unionist from the company 
who said: “The accident is the consequence of management choices that prioritize efficiency 
and profit over safety” (Pons, 2005)? 
Investigation and Mindset 
The examples above, even if seen as extremes, are symptomatic of the normal situation in 
industries. Safety is not forgotten: units dealing with safety are set up and staffed; workshops, 
seminars, “Safety Days” are organised; posters with safety mottos or principles are pinned up 
on walls. Yet, despite all of that, safety often seems to be missing from decisions, especially 
when it is weighed against production. 
Safety is matter of acts, not only speeches. Unfortunately, when it comes to accidents and 
incidents, the whole burden is often, if not always, put on shoulders of the first line or middle 
management employees. This is mainly because the event analysis methods are limited to 
finding direct and immediate causes. As such, some issues are rarely questioned in analysis 
conclusions. Notable by their absence are issues such as: 
• Decisions made by top management about cost cutting. These invariably have direct 
impacts on matters such as maintenance, equipment upgrading, employee training, 
but have indirect impacts on safety; 
• Role and acts of Safety Authorities based on logic that is insensitive to the safety 
deficiencies of a plant or company, leading to insufficient safety inspections or a lack 
of follow-up to recommendations made after safety audits; 
• Weaknesses of lessons to be learned, visible as reoccurrence of similar events, 
insensitivity to precursors, and poor trend analyses, amongst other things.  
 
The ability of decision-makers, who define and enforce safety policies and rules, to reflect on 
(some of) their past decisions, is one important issue for development of a “new” paradigm 
regarding event analyses. In other words, their capability to acknowledge that they could have 
been wrong would help to improve event analyses by allowing a wider scope of analysis: 
moving from a technical failure and human error paradigm (direct and immediate causes) to 
an “organisational analysis” paradigm (deep causes). 
Nevertheless, analysts have also to be convinced that another vision of event occurrence is 
needed. Often, they have implicit stop rules which prevent consideration of deep causes. The 
“culture of efficiency” is a widely shared paradigm in the industrial world. It can lead to focus 
on more manageable causes, that is, causes for which corrective measures have a quick, 
positive (but limited) effect and that can be easily implemented. It could also be difficult for 
them to see beyond their zone of accountability: for instance, would it be easy for them to 
question the company’s policies regarding production towards safety (Dien et al., 2012). It 
means that, often, analysts implicitly halt searching for causes beyond those that they can 
handle (Hopkins, 2003). 
4. Conclusion 
The aim of event analysis is not only to figure out causes of an event’s occurrence, it is also to 
define and to implement relevant corrective measures (related to causes), so that the same or 
similar events do not occur again. To reach this result, the event analysis method must have 
the capacity to embrace the whole situation. 
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First of all, persons in charge of analyses must “break some epistemological barriers”. People 
with an engineering background are predominant in industry. In the main they are influenced 
by a technical epistemology which is more “causally deterministic”: it means that an event is 
treated as directly and completely determined by the previous states of the system. It follows 
that analyses are carried out by “experts” who have an external vision of the event. 
Organisational analysis is more in line with a social epistemology which calls for a 
comprehensive approach; one which listens attentively to every actor involved in the event, 
whether directly or indirectly. A comprehensive approach assumes that those who work in the 
system, from the top manager to the field operator, have a vision of past and present 
situations. It is through the clash and contrast of these different visions that a global picture 
can be elaborated. 
Furthermore, analysts have to avoid: 
• Overly strict stop rules (analysis is a iterative process); 
• Self-censorship due to fear of the investigation getting off the tracks (mission creep); 
• Having “taboo issues”; 
• Compromising their independence of mind; 
• Thinking too early about corrective measures. 
Improvements are not just in the hands of the analysts because they are not the only ones to be 
in the loop of the “lessons to be learned process”. They are also connected to behaviour of 
recipients of the analyses and of decisions makers who need to: 
• Think and act beyond the operator(s) error; 
• Avoid defensive attitude and be able to take distance with past decisions and 
acknowledge potential mistakes; 
• Remain with listening capabilities (i.e. to be able get an empathetic hearing); 
• Learning ability according to "pressures"; 
• Be able to learn lessons from events while ignoring the pressures. 
But, as the popular saying goes, “there are none so deaf as those who will not hear”. Let us 
hope this proverb proves false with respect to event analysis. 
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Abstract 
Deriving insights and selecting issues for more detailed investigation from events analysis is a 
challenge. There are many methods and ways developed to derive insights and lessons 
learned from the events assessment. In general, this is done either by investigating 
individually the most significant events or by analyzed all available events with various 
groups and rankings. This paper is focused on the analysis of groups of events.   
Conventional analysis of events from database is based on the events characterization, 
rankings and related evaluation. The evaluation is based on trends for selected categories 
(e.g. causes and consequences) or relative importance rankings. Most important groups of 
events are then conventionally selected based on the agreed preferences and further analysed 
in details. The usual existence of multiple categories raises the question of their relative 
importance. This is typically solved by established weighting and with limited possibilities to 
consider different preferences. It is important to assure that applied preferences are verified 
for consistency. One way to make consistent variations of analyst's preference with multiple 
parameters is to apply analytical hierarchy process (AHP).   
The AHP allows analyst to derive relative importance for the set of parameters through 
pairwise comparison. Resulting weighting is accompanied with quantified level of consistency 
so that analyst could re-evaluate pairwise comparison before further assessment. 
The paper presents application of the AHP to the database of nuclear power plants related 
events. Events characterization scheme is presented first. Then the AHP application is 
described. Finally, selected results for the five years of events (about 1500 in total) are 
presented. Described application also includes simple quantification of uncertainty.   
Results obtained from the practical application prove that AHP could improve consistency of 
the events database evaluation for ranking purposes. Future work might investigate how to 
select important events present in more than one group and how to look for important event 
groups insensitive to parameters weightings.  
Keywords:  event importance, characterization, consistency, analytical hierarchy process 
(AHP). 
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1. Introduction 
European Clearinghouse on Operating Experience Feedback for Nuclear Power Plants has the 
objective to enhance NPP nuclear safety through the dissemination of lessons learned from 
past operating experience. Learning from event analysis is a challenge for multiple reasons 
(0). Event analysis could be performed at different levels considering selected examples or 
looking at all events together. Lessons learned are raised by a first-level analysis, i.e. 
investigation of individual events but operating experience feedback can also be gained by a 
second-level analysis consisting of screening a large group of events. This second-level 
analysis allows identifying possible trends (in terms of time, components affected, causes of 
events…) which are not visible through the investigation of individual events and also to 
highlight types of events which should be further investigated because most important in 
terms of recurrence, consequence, common cause failure, and other events characteristics. 
Very often practical approach is mixture of event analysis at both levels by focusing on the 
selected events related to special topic, e.g. 0.  
This paper is addressing potential to analyse all events in order to provide new insights and 
point to groups of events which might be candidates for more detailed analysis. New method 
and tool, named OPERATE, has been developed as second-level analysis tool of events at 
Nuclear Power Plants which allows identification of possible important trends which are not 
clearly visible through individual event investigations and also identifying important types of 
events which should be further investigate based on events characteristics and experts relative 
preferences. The most important findings from pilot characterisation and assessment are 
presented here. More detailed description of the method and results is described in 0, 0, and 0. 
2. Method 
After events of a database are characterised according to a predefined taxonomy (in the 
present case the IRS taxonomy but in principle other taxonomies of national databases are 
also possible), they are grouped according to five parameters: Activity (maintenance, 
inspection…), Direct cause (mechanical deficiency, electrical deficiency…), System, 
Component, and Root cause & Causal factor (personal work practice, training/ qualification. 
etc…).  
In a second step, these groups of events are ranked according to seven parameters: Frequency, 
Trend over time, induced outage Extension, Multiple failure, Safety consequences, Category 
(plant transients, release…) and Consequences.   
The user can allocate different weights to each of these ranking parameters thanks to the 
Analytical Hierarchy Process where one is able to generate weights through pairwise 
comparison of parameters. The level of confidence in the results obtained is then evaluated 
with uncertainty and sensitivity analysis.  
Special attention was given to the accounting for uncertainty and verifying that results are not 
too sensitive to some selected comparison values and resulting weights. 
2.1 Implementation - OPERATE Tool 
The tool is implemented as a stand-alone application based on the database. The program is 
named Operational events ranking tool (OPERATE).  
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OPERATE is designed with intuitive user interface for on-screen, text, graphical and file 
reporting options. The program consists of four different parts: Statistics, AHP, Ranking and 
Confidence.  
The Statistics part presents reports for all parameters which are used for grouping and ranking 
plus the following parameters: Vendor, Reactor type, Status, Group of staff and Time of 
event (yearly, monthly, daily and hourly).  
In the AHP part of the application, the user can perform pairwise ranking comparison to 
allocate ranking indexes weights. Program provides also consistency ratio (CR) for resulted 
weighting (pairwise comparison is considered inconsistent if CR value is >0.01). Ranking is 
then performed based on the AHP results. Figure 1, left part, presents AHP module with 
example of indexes comparison and related consistency result. 
The Ranking part determines total and groups ranking based on the AHP and ranking weights 
values. Figure 1, right side, presents ranking module and results for Direct cause group.  
Finally, the Confidence part calculates the uncertainty and sensitivity for the selected groups 
ranking. This is done by ranking additional cases recalculation for changed RI weighting. For 
each RI two cases were calculated with increased and decreased weighing by selected factor. 
Based on confidence results user can go back on the AHP module and change RI relative 
importance comparison in order to better reflect their importance and impact on final ranking 
order.  
All results can be printed and exported to the file or clipboard. This allows results to be 
incorporated into reports or used as a basis for some additional assessment.  
Results from real demonstration set of five years of US NRC LERs show that method is 
working and providing interesting and valuable results. For example, two the most important 
component groups are clearly Mechanical and Electrical; four top ranked important systems 
are Reactor auxiliary and primary, Electrical and Secondary (i.e., FW, CS and PCS); four 
most important direct causes are Electrical, Mechanical and Hydraulic and pneumatic 
deficiencies and Human factor. 
As it can be seen ranking results for different groups should be viewed together. Quantitative 
ranking estimate allows additional insight besides rank. 
 
 
Figure 1. OPERATE: AHP and Ranking modules. 
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3. Results 
Method was pilot tested with characterisation and assessment of almost 1500 events taken 
from five years of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Licensee Events Reports 
(LERs) database. Results are presented for all five groupings separately. For each group, the 
graph is also presented and the ranking score is noted in brackets (scale 0 to 1).  
In the Activity group, events occurred during the Normal operation (.95) and Routine testing 
(.49) are distinctively the most important, after that six more activities are about three times 
less important (~.16), and the rest of 14 activities are similarly less important (<.10). 
The Electrical (.59) and Mechanical (.57) deficiencies are clearly the two most important 
Direct causes groups, followed by Hydraulic and pneumatic deficiencies (.43), Human 
factors (.38) and Control and instrumentation deficiencies (.27). The four remaining groups 
have a score below .14. This is also presented in the Figure 2 (left side). 
Four Systems are top ranked (with score ~.38): Reactor auxiliary, Electrical, Primary reactor 
and Secondary (feedwater, condensate and power conversion) systems. Instrumentation and 
control with Essential auxiliary systems are following (~.25). The last five unimportant 
systems have a low score (<.16). This is presented in the Figure 2 (right side). 
Three top ranked Components are Mechanical (.87), Electrical (.59) and Instrumentation and 
control (.32). Remaining four component groups are closely low ranked (<.16). 
Inside Root cause and Causal factors grouping four groups are closely top ranked (~.26): 
Maintenance, testing and surveillances; Procedures and documentation; Equipment 
performance and Design configuration and analysis. The following three groups (~.16) are: 
Equipment specification, manufacture and construction; Personnel work practices and 
Supervisory methods. The remaining groups are closely ranked around two scores (nine at 
~.10, and six at ~.05). 
Sensitivity and uncertainty analysis (not presented here) shows that ranking results are robust. 
Further investigation is interesting in regards to special importance of certain ranking indexes 
(e.g., Trend). 
 
Figure 2. Ranking results example for two groups of events: Direct 
causes (left) and Systems (right). 
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3.1 Other results 
Coding scheme allows the creation of many additional reports and some results are presented 
here.  
Distribution of events in time is available on various scales. On the monthly bases average 
number of events is 24. Three months have 25% more (April, May and October: 30) and less 
(July, August and December: 18) events.  
During the week events are significantly less frequent on weekend (-38%). 
During the day events are also not evenly distributed. They are occurring more frequently 
between 8 and 18 h, and they are especially rare between 6 and 7 h. The precise time of event 
is available for ~80% of events. 
Duration of event caused shutdown is available for ~40% of events, and majority of events 
are causing between 4 and 240 h long shutdown. 
Reports about number of events per vendor, reactor type and involved staff are also available 
(not presented here). 
 
 
Figure 3. Monthly events distribution – April, May and October are 
top three months. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Proposed method and implemented tool OPERATE allow ranking event groups by 
importance for decision about further detailed investigation and for providing additional 
insights into the operational experience events. OPERATE is computing event groups ranking 
for five categories and creating additional reports as basis for selection and second-level 
insights into the operational experience events. 
Ranking results for different groups could be also viewed together as intersection of different 
categories (e.g., systems, component and causes, etc.). This will allow for more focused 
selection of most important events as candidates for detailed analysis. 
Further use of this tool seems promising. It is important to realise that OPERATE use relies 
on the creation of the suitable database where events are fully characterised according to 
defined coding scheme. Alternatively, tool could be customised to use database with some 
different coding scheme then used in this pilot exercise.  
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It also seems interesting to continue with tool functionality development, e.g., separate 
ranking for different groups of plants and selecting events which are present in the more than 
one high ranked groups, etc. 
The additional value of the OPERATE interactive features is that users could educate 
themselves about the nature of all events which are occurring in the one nuclear power plants 
of a group of NPPs for a given time period. This could enhance understanding of different 
factors related to all events.   
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Abstract 
  
Accident investigations are executed by e.g. authorities, insurance institutions and companies 
themselves. The scope and objectives of the investigation depend on who is investigating. The 
quality of the investigation and the results depend on several constraints, e.g. the knowhow of 
the investigators. The investigations that aim to improve safety in the future usually include 
recommendations that are directed to the companies involved and/or the industrial sector 
where the accident occurred. Sometimes recommendations may even be directed beyond the 
sector involved.  
This paper aims to raise discussion on reasonable recommendations. That is, 
recommendations that are usable, realizable, and hopefully even measurable. What should be 
recommended and to whom? The paper presents, with examples, how the ESReDA Cube 
model may be used to systematically identify recommendations to improve safety on different 
organizational and societal levels.  
Keywords: accident investigation, recommendations, ESReDA Cube model 
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1. Background  
Scenario 1. You’re investigating an accident. Writing the report: background, chain of events, 
causes of accidents, recommendations. What should you recommend and to whom? You list 
recommendations that are based on both the results of the investigation and your expertise in 
the field. Are you missing something?  
The problem of generating “smart” recommendations is a universal one. One of the reasons is 
that many of the current accident investigation methods don’t give the investigator support in 
creating the recommendations for improvement, nor in their follow-up.   
Scenario 2. You’re reading an accident report. You reach the chapter on recommendations. 
And… you just can’t grasp them. The recommendations sound like good ideas, but there is no 
manual on how to turn the good ideas into practice. Who should utilize the recommendations 
and how should they be implemented? Should they be developed further?  
And, sadly, why is this accident not unique? You’ve read other reports much like this one, of 
accidents that were due to similar causes. The previous accidents were also investigated, and 
recommendations were made to prevent similar in the future. In vain? 
2. The ESReDA Cube model  
The ESReDA Cube model was created by the ESReDA Project Group on Dynamic Learning 
and published in 2015. Originally the Cube consisted of a 3x3x4 matrix (hence the name 
“Cube”) with three systemic dimensions representing a) the level of learning, b) the 
stakeholders involved and c) the work organization where the problem lies. The idea was to 
use the Cube as an aid to identify and categorize accident factors more systematically.  
The Cube was developed to provide the ability to optimize, adapt and innovate sustainable 
change beyond the level of intervening in the actual accident process itself.  Intervention does 
not only focus on eliminating or mitigating causal factors which were disclosed during the 
investigation of the sequence of events. Causal factors are answering questions dealing with 
the what and how, while understanding the why of an occurrence requires additional 
information about conditions, context, assumptions and simplifications. Such information can 
only be derived from a diagnosis of the system itself. Applying the Cube enables an 
investigator to disclose the origin of contributing factors to different phases and states of a 
system. This can be as early as in the conceptual design, up to operations, both in normal and 
in safety critical states. In short: The Cube enables an investigator to analyse an event in the 
context of the system in which it occurs. The purpose of the Cube is to enlarge the scope of 
recommendations to the system and not restrict recommendations to the sequence of events 
under scrutiny.  
Since its publication the Cube has been utilized in the post-investigation analysis of several 
accidents and, based on these results, developed further. The original publication introducing 
the model is available free to download on the ESReDA website46. The publication includes a 
more detailed description of the thoughts and theories behind the Cube than is presented in 
this paper, and several examples of the use of the Cube.  
 
46https://www.esreda.org/projectcasestudy/dynamic-learning-as-the-follow-up-from-accident-
investigations/#more-322 
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The Cube was developed further based on the thought that the model itself and the guidelines 
to use it need a more simplistic form that will allow to use the Cube more intuitively. The 
result is a 3x3x3 matrix, see Figure 1a.    
          
Figure 1a. The ESReDA Cube 2.0. A model with three dimensions and 27 individual cells that represent different 
possibilities to improve safety. 
Figure 1b. The Cube may be sliced into planes. If sliced into horizontal planes, each plane represents a different 
organizational or societal level where safety may be improved. Slicing vertically (different aspects of work 
organization) or in-depth (levels of learning) is also possible, depending on the objectives of the analysis. 
During the development process it was identified that the systematicity of the Cube may be 
utilized from several viewpoints. These viewpoints will be discussed in detail in the upcoming 
ESReDA book on Foresight in Safety (estimated to be published in 2019), and here we will 
concentrate on only one of them: the intriguing thought that the Cube may be used to create 
(on-going investigation) or analyse (post-investigation) the recommendations that are 
generated by the accident investigation results. 
In the example figure 1b above, the stakeholder dimension has been cut into three levels. The 
levels represent different organizational and societal levels, not unlike those presented by 
Rasmussen and Svedung (2000).  
Stakeholders involved (y-axis)  
1. MICRO level. Organisations, teams or individuals.  
2. MESO level. Industry sectors  
3. MACRO level. Governments, agencies, authorities and society   
  
The stakeholder levels must be explicitly defined before the analysis. There may be more than 
three levels, if needed.   
Once the stakeholders have been identified, the factors that enabled the accident to happen 
may be divided into three categories of work organization. In the original publication there 
was a fourth category of context, but in the further development of the Cube it was identified 
that context is best written into the narrative of the accident due to its specific impact on the 
accident sequence. This does not mean that context, the operations environment, should be 
excluded from the analyses. Careful consideration should be given to the possibility of 
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existing accident factors that are not included in the three levels of work organization 
presented below.   
Work organization (x-axis) 
1. STRUCTURE is about the (re)design of the system architecture: hardware, 
technology, functionality, organizational scheme (static) 
2. PROCESS is about the actions and decisions made in both actual and formal 
operational conditions (dynamic) 
3. CULTURE is about the values, norms and behaviour (inherent/abstract) 
 
The first step of the analysis is to place the accident factors into the grey 3x3 matrix presented 
in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Identified accident factors (x) may be divided according to stakeholder and work organization. 
When all the accident factors have been identified, it is time to start thinking about the lessons 
learned: what can be learned from the accident. How deep have we learned and what lessons 
have possibly remained unlearned? The depth of the Cube (z-axis) represents the depth of 
learning, expressed by its rate of change: optimize, adapt or innovate.   
Level of learning (z-axis) 
1. RULES, single-loop learning: react, improve, optimize 
2. INSIGHTS, double-loop learning: adapt, renew  
3. PRINCIPLES, triple-loop learning: develop, innovate 
 
More information on single-, double- and triple-loop learning may be found from the original 
ESReDA Cube publication (2015) and Stoop (2018).   
The task at hand is to take the identified accident factors (step 1, figure 3) one-by-one, and 
think what are the lessons learned (step 2, figure 3) from that factor on the x-, y- and z-levels. 
What can different stakeholders learn from it? On what levels can learning occur? Can the 
learning involve different parts of work organization? Take one accident factor and place all 
the things that may be learned from it into the cells of another empty ESReDA Cube. After 
this has been done, do the same to all the other accident factors. The results will be a Cube 
full of lessons learned.   
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The final step (step 3, figure 3) is to use the full Cube to generate or evaluate the 
recommendations. You must learn something before you can recommend improvements. 
Slice the Cube into three planes. Do this first from one direction, then later on from the other 
two, and target your recommendations to a) different levels of stakeholders, b) different parts 
of work and c) different levels of learning.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Use of the ESReDA Cube. Utilizing identified and categorized accident factors to formulate precisely 
targeted recommendations.  
The ESReDA Cube may also be used to assess the quality of a former investigation and thus 
to improve the investigation process itself. It can also assist in tracking which 
recommendations have been addressed, and with those that have been addressed, could result 
in a post-implementation reclassification, becoming evidence of good practice to be shared 
with the safety management communities. Additionally, for those recommendations that were 
not implemented, the researcher could investigate what the reasons were behind, triggering 
another research thread. What were the obstacles? Where was the governance bottleneck, 
etc.? 
3. Examples of ESReDA Cube applications 
The four examples of use cases presented in this paper represent four very different kinds of 
accidents: a train derailment, a large petrochemical explosion, a smaller explosion and a large 
set of recommendations made in aviation. Each example represents a different use case of the 
Cube:  
3.1. Derailing in Romania in 2017 
In 2017 a rail crane derailed in the centre of Romania, on the track that runs between Mureni 
and Beia. The rail crane was one part of a train in traffic, the 4th vehicle after the locomotive. 
At the moment of accident, the rail crane came out of a small radius curve. The train speed 
was 44 km/h.  
The accident investigation and subsequent investigation report47 was made by a commission 
of the Romanian Railway Investigating Agency (AFIGER). The investigation commission 
concluded that the frontal traverse deformation which was the immediate cause for the 
derailing must have occurred before the train was composed, and not in this accident. Most 
probably the deformation occurred during a previous intervention. The deformation should 
have easily been detected when the train was prepared for circulation. 
Figure 4 shows identified accident causes and contributing factors from the viewpoint of the 
ESReDA Cube. These factors are only a few examples of what was found in the accident 
investigation.   
 
47 https://www.agifer.ro/images/rap-finale-ro/117---Raport-Investigare-Mureni-Beia-15-04-2017.pdf   
What are the 
accident factors? 
What are the 
lessons learned? 
What should be 
recommended? 
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macro    
meso  no written inspection 
procedures 
 
micro weight of crane no written confirmation 
of the technical 
inspection 
no inspection before 
leaving station 
lateral wear and 
transversal level 
 structure Process culture 
Figure 4. Examples of accident causes in the cells of the ESReDA Cube. Here the cells represent the single loop 
learning plane (the light grey plane in Figure 2). 
The objective of applying the ESReDA Cube is that the analyst/investigator will think of the 
accident causes, the lessons learned, and the recommendations from a more systematic 
viewpoint. Many accident causes may be put into several cells of the Cube. The placement 
may depend on perspective, but the perspective does not hinder the possibility to learn from 
all viewpoints of the Cube. For example, the fact that the locomotive driver did not get a 
written confirmation of the technical inspection is a problem of that railway station (micro) 
but possibly also  a sign of a larger problem of no valid inspection procedures (meso) or not 
enough conditions (inadequate rules) to establish the responsibility of the person in charge 
with technical revision (macro).   
Through the above-mentioned line of thought one accident cause will result in several lessons 
learned. Some of the lessons learned concerning the lack of written confirmation are 
presented in figure 5.   
macro There are not enough 
conditions (inadequate 
rules) to establish the 
responsibility of the 
person in charge with 
technical revision.  
  
meso  The operating company 
should have valid 
inspection procedures 
 
micro  Written confirmation 
should always be part of 
the railway station’s 
normal operations 
 
 structure Process culture 
 
Figure 5. Lessons learned from the accident factor “lack of written confirmation”. 
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Usually most lessons learned are rules-based (single-loop learning, z-axis), and the question 
that should be asked is how to learn in-depth, taking into consideration the possibility to gain 
insights (double-loop learning) or change principles (triple-loop learning).  
 Once the lessons learned have been inserted into the Cube, the recommendations are based on 
these lessons. For example, the inspection before leaving the station (and thus written 
confirmation), recommendations based on lessons learned could be e.g. ”More conditions to 
establish the responsibility to make technical revision” (macro process cell), ”Ensure the 
inspection before leaving station” (macro process cell) or ”Valid inspection procedures” 
(meso process cell). Examples of other recommendations identified in this investigation are 
presented in figures 6 and 7.  
 
macro    
meso Practical training of 
employers when 
working in abnormal 
situations, and risk 
analysis 
Establish obligation to 
perform an activity only 
in accordance with 
procedures 
 
micro   New training for the 
staff involved in safety 
control 
 structure process culture 
 
 
macro   The regulations for 
planned reparations 
meso The communication 
between rail actors at 
managerial level should 
be more efficient, 
Practical training  
micro to perform the risk 
analysis for intervention 
train activity as well as 
for its circulation. 
 
  
 optimize adapt innovate 
 
Figures 6 and 7. Recommendations derived from accident causes and lessons learned. 
 
From the viewpoint of context, the system level (the system as a whole) was identified as a 
factor that may contribute to such accidents. It was established that the condition of the 
infrastructure (railroad tracks) affects safety, and that the regulation concerning intervention 
trains should be reviewed. One of the commission’s main conclusions was that the barriers 
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which could have prevented the accident did not work, and that there were not enough 
(adequate) barriers to prevent a human error.  
 
3.2 Explosion at BP Texas in 2005  
Another use case example presented in this paper is the BP Texas City refinery accident, 
which took place in March, 2005. A series of explosions occurred during the restarting of a 
hydrocarbon isomerization (ISOM) unit, resulting in 15 deaths (workers) and 180 people were 
injured. Most of the victims were near work trailers not far from an atmospheric vent stack. A 
distillation tower was overpressurised as it was inundated with hydrocarbons, creating a 
geyser-like release from the vent stack. This release resulted in the formation of a dangerous 
vapour cloud, which was ignited by an unknown source (could have been a running vehicle 
engine) and triggered the series of explosions. The refinery was severely damaged. 
As the incident has already been thoroughly analysed, neither additional analysis of the 
accident itself is attempted in this paper nor are the numerous findings of accident causes 
listed. Instead, as a second use case example we analyse and map onto the ESReDA Cube the 
recommendations formulated by one of the investigating groups, i.e. the Chemical Safety 
Board CSB48. Furthermore, in this paper we focus our analysis on those recommendations 
issued by the CSB to the chemical industry as a whole. We will concentrate here on the meso-
plane of the ESReDA Cube49, presented as the middle plane of the sliced Cube in Figure 1b. 
Out of the 26 recommendations issued by the CSB, there are six meso-level 
recommendations, which are mapped in figure 8. It can be observed that of the six meso-level 
recommendations one occupies the structure-insights (S-I) cell, two recommendations are 
situated in the structure-rules (S-R) cell, two recommendations are located in the process-
insights (P-I) cell and the remaining recommendation is found in process-rules (P-R) cell. 
   
Principles 
(P) 
   
Insights 
(I) 
2005-4-I-TX-10 2005-4-TX-6 
2005-4-TX-7 
 
Rules  
(R) 
2005-4-TX-2 
2005-4-TX-4 
2005-4-I-TX-3 
 
 
 Structure (S) Process (P) Culture (C) 
Figure 8. Meso-level Chemical Safety Board recommendations mapped onto the ESReDA Cube. 
 
Because of the length of the recommendations, the recommendations are presented in figure 8 
in the original CSB code. A brief explanation of the mapping of each recommendation:  
 
• 2005-4-TX-10 (S-I):  
o Structure: mainly a design of Management of Change guidelines;  
 
48 The recommendations are available at https://www.csb.gov/recommendations/?F_InvestigationId=3515  
49 The meso level in the accident is represented by the recommendations for American Petroleum Institute (API), 
National Petrochemical & Refiners Association (NPRA), United Steelworkers International Union (USWA) and 
the Centre for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). 
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o Insights: double-loop learning – new insight to monitor changes. Potential for 
culture change – but not guaranteed. 
• 2005-4-TX-2 (S-R) and 2005-4-TX-4 (S-R):  
o Structure: mainly a re-design of existing API guidance (recommended Practice 
752 and 521);                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
o Rules: only single-loop learning where a rule has been changed. No evidence 
of insight change. 
• 2005-4-TX-6(P-I) and 2005-4-TX-7 (P-I): 
o Process: requires working together towards a definition of a new standards 
(development of process safety indicators and fatigue prevention guidelines) in 
a multidisciplinary and multi-sector team. Dynamic. 
o Insights: double-loop learning. Development of new indicators to monitor 
(2005-4-TX-6) 
• 2005-4-TX-3(P-R):  
o Process: prompt action to alert API members;  
o Rules: only single-loop learning – no evidence of insight change. 
 
The mapping of the meso-scale recommendations onto the Cube led to some interesting 
results and related questions: 
• There were no triple-loop learning recommendations.  
• There were no culture-oriented recommendations. 
 
Perhaps, when designing recommendations, safety boards should consider to also target 
recommendations that lead towards triple-loop learning and culture-building at all levels 
(meso, in this event, but also micro and macro.  
 
Additionally, it would be relevant to check whether all recommendations have been 
implemented and consequently map the current follow-up situation onto the Cube. Such an 
exercise would trigger questions such as: 
• What were the obstacles encountered at the meso level that made it difficult to 
implement a given recommendation? 
• Which recommendations led to an improvement in the mapping classification onto the 
Cube? 
• How can these results feed into improving safety-related aspects at the meso-level 
across the given industry? 
• How can we design better recommendations that target a triple-learning loop learning 
level and a culture-building organisation level? 
 
 3.3 Explosion in Finland in 2018 
An explosion occurred in Finland in March 2018, at a company that makes aerosol products. 
The explosion was most probably caused by the sudden ignition of a flammable gas or 
vapour. The explosion and the subsequent fire destroyed about half of the building. One 
person was injured.  
 
The Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency (Tukes) investigated the accident with the 
objective to identify the chemicals that caused the explosion and the ignition cause, the chain 
of events, and the causes of the accident. 
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The investigation has concluded that in a probable chain of events, solvent vapours had risen 
close to the ceiling and ignited. The full accident investigation report is available in Finnish 
on the Tukes website50. Some of the lessons learned from the accident are presented in figure 
9. The lessons learned were directed to the industry as a whole. 
 
Meso-level 
 
principles    
insights Install the gas alarm as 
a part of the safety 
automation system 
  
rules Ensure that the 
adequacy of ventilation 
is measured 
Install enough gas 
detectors  
Pressure relief walls in 
safe direction 
Ensure that alarms are 
noticeable at all 
entryways 
Storage and handling 
must be in their own 
fire compartments 
Systematic 
maintenance must be 
carried out 
Workers (incl. new and 
temp.) must be trained 
to work safely, and 
they must be told about 
the plant’s hazards. 
 structure process culture 
 
Figure 9. Lessons learned from most probable immediate cause of accident: flammable solvent vapours rose to 
the ceiling, and ignited. 
This example shows how the Cube could be utilized during an accident investigation. The 
empty cells in the accident causes matrix will provoke further questions during the 
investigation, and the lessons learned matrixes may be utilized in targeting recommendations 
better to specific stakeholders.  
3.4 A large set of recommendations in aviation 
Karanikas et al (2018) describe an analysis of 82 aircraft accident investigation reports, 
published by four different accident investigation authorities between 1999 and 2015. In total, 
625 safety recommendations were included in the reports. The ESReDA cube was used to 
analyse the scope of the recommendations with respect to the work organization, stakeholders 
involved, and the level of learning. The ESReDA Cube was selected for this purpose as it 
provides a convenient, easy to apply multidimensional reference framework for the 
comparison of the scope of the safety recommendations. Apart from the work of Karanikas 
(2016) who classified safety recommendations as Actions, Assignments and Reminders in the 
context of evaluating aspects of safety management within an organization, the literature 
reviewed by the authors does not suggest any other categorization. 
 
 
50 The Finnish investigation report and English powerpoint-slides https://tukes.fi/onnettomuudet/tutkitut-
onnettomuudet/muut  
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The results of the analysis showed that in the work organisation dimension, the majority of 
recommendations were made at the structure and process levels, with only a small percentage 
(smaller than 5%) aimed at the culture level. For most of the investigation authorities the 
recommendations were evenly distributed between structure and process, but one authority 
made a large majority (84%) of the recommendations at the process level. The severity of the 
accident did not influence the distribution of recommendations across work organisation 
levels. 
 
In the stakeholder dimension, most of the recommendations were made at the micro and meso 
level, with only a few recommendations at the macro level. Variation across the four 
investigation authorities was significant: two authorities made roughly a similar number of 
recommendations at the micro and meso level, one authority made more recommendations at 
the meso level than at the micro level (20 % micro vs 80 % meso), while the 4th authority 
made more recommendations at the micro level than at the meso level (67 % micro vs 33 % 
meso). The severity of the occurrence had a significant influence on the stakeholder level of 
the recommendation. Fatal accidents were more often associated with recommendations at 
higher stakeholder levels than incidents with no fatalities.  
 
In the level of learning dimension, most (approximately 80%) of the recommendations were 
at the insights (double loop learning) level, and this result was consistent across all four 
investigation authorities. However, two of the authorities made virtually all the remaining 20 
% at the rules (single loop learning) level, while the other two authorities made all of the 
remaining 20% at the principles (triple loop learning) level. The severity of the accident did 
not influence the distribution of recommendations across learning levels. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
The four examples above demonstrate different ways to utilize the Cube. Although the 
examples represent only a small portion of the full analyses of the cases, they show how the 
accident causes and lessons learned do not fill the cells evenly. Some cells remain empty or 
emptier. The investigators may consider whether these cells are irrelevant to the case at hand 
or if the empty cells represent something that has remained unidentified or unlearned.  
 
Considering the depth of learning, critical questions should be raised about the clarification of  
- who is involved 
- who is responsible 
- who is able to change the system 
- who is capable of assessing the validity, efficiency and sustainability of the 
recommendations made 
 
The example of the application of the Cube to a large set of recommendations resulting from 
aircraft accident investigations demonstrate that applying the Cube allows the identification of 
interesting patterns: the majority of recommendations are located near a particular corner of 
the Cube, there are significant differences across investigation authorities, and the severity of 
the accident influences the location of recommendations in the Cube. These results may be 
used to better understand how recommendations are constructed and to subsequently identify 
best practices for the formulation of effective regulations. 
 
The remaining challenge is to create recommendations that are possible to follow up, and that 
it is possible to verify afterwards that they have been followed up.  
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Compared to other accident models and methods of analysis, the added value of the ESReDA 
Cube is that it is both visual and systematic, allowing simple decomposition into three 
dimensions. It gives the analyst the possibility to “eat the elephant bit by bit” instead of trying 
to grasp everything at once, while maintaining a clear picture of which elements have been 
covered and which are still to be analysed.   
 
5. Conclusions 
Putting recommendations into practice seems like a never-ending battle. Another accident 
occurs and you think how was the risk not identified, understood and/or eliminated? There are 
several accident reports of similar accidents available and even more near misses known of. 
This paper aimed to raise discussion on reasonable recommendations. That is, 
recommendations that are usable, realizable, and hopefully even measurable. What should be 
recommended and to whom? 
 
The idea of grouping accident factors according to stakeholder is not new. But the idea of 
categorizing factors according to work organization at the same time is new. Continuing the 
process by adding levels of learning means the ESReDA Cube model may be used to 
systematically look at accident factors from several perspectives. 
 
To some stakeholders, recommendations may be seen as suggestions, without an obligation to 
act upon them. Sometimes recommendations are very abstract, and often they are repetition to 
recommendations made in other reports. Very seldom we know to what extent the 
recommendations have been followed-up. As a solution, this paper shows how the ESReDA 
Cube may be used to assist in constructing more reasonable and better targeted 
recommendations. In addition, the need to act upon recommendations is discussed. When 
recommendations are abstract and/or repetitive, they may not be implemented.  
 
The concept that the Cube may be sliced from three directions gives the analyst the possibility 
to identify accident factors, lessons learned and/or recommendations. 
 
The Cube is a model, not a method, and we believe it is best used as an aid to improve 
consistency and completeness. The ESReDA project group welcomes all comments for 
further development of the model. 
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Learning from incidents – the interactive way 
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Abstract 
Learning from major industrial incidents is possible applying different methods. The 
approaches demonstrated in various literature can provide a new perspective of learning and 
implementing the lessons from past events. A completely new way of learning lessons without 
experiencing the same costly mistakes that could occur during a major incident is possible via 
interactive case studies.  
 
These case studies used as a training resource, developed by the IChemE Safety Centre are 
focusing on major incidents from different sectors, such as the oil, mining, space or even 
nuclear industries. The other advantage of the studies is that lessons from these events can be 
retrieved and applied across various sectors because the fundamentals are the same. Also, 
topics such as management systems, corporate government, ethical decision, emergency 
response, organisational and human factors or safety culture are the core areas which are 
similar in many operations.  
 
The objective of the paper is to demonstrate the advantages of using interactive case studies 
to promote an active way of learning from past incidents without repeating the costly 
mistakes. The paper addresses different areas of interest where various industrial sectors can 
find relevant learning opportunities that can be implemented in their operation. 
Keywords: interactive, case study, learning, industrial sector 
Introduction 
A key focus area for organisations is to look at what can be learned from incidents to prevent 
recurrence. Deriving lessons from incident investigation reports is not complicated, but it may 
not be the case when we try to implement the learnings within the organization. Applying 
lessons from any incident is a complex task and organisations can fail in implementing them, 
despite their great effort. The question arises how we can improve the effectiveness of 
learning? Is there another way than reading investigation reports or watching videos of such 
events? 
 
 
 
 Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) 
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1. How hindsight bias can impact learning? 
When we review the findings of an incident, we do it with the knowledge of what happened 
and what were the causes. It is easier to look for a way to rationalise why the incident would 
not happen to us. This impacts why we fail to learn from others’ errors. We justify that we 
would not have made that decision or taken that action. Finally, we believe that the incident 
could not happen to us.  
We even at times state that we would have known better and made better decisions. This 
rationale however fails to take into account the full context of the original decisions, or the 
fact that “the historical judge typically knows how things turned out” (Fischhoff, et al., 1975). 
 
Hindsight bias is a tendency to view the outcome with the belief that you could have predicted 
it after learning what the outcome is. This hindsight bias makes it difficult to objectively 
review an incident without second guessing the actions taken by those involved in the event 
(Fischhoff, 1975).  
As highlighted in the Clapham Junction railway incident report (Hidden, 1989) "There is 
almost no human action or decision that cannot be made to look more flawed and less sensible 
in the misleading light of hindsight. It is essential that the critic should keep himself 
constantly aware of that fact." The fact is we cannot “unknow” information. Once we learn 
about any information, we inevitably know it and it cannot be unknown anymore. Therefore, 
overcoming hindsight bias can be very difficult. 
 
If hindsight bias is difficult to overcome, what can we still do about it? Let’s take an example; 
cases are widely used in various industries to learn from incidents. They explain the direct and 
indirect or root causes of an incident, and it makes them a powerful tool to understand what 
went wrong. When reading investigation reports the temptation to pass judgement on those 
involved is very strong, but it is flawed. This judgement is made with currently available 
information that may not have been available at the time.  
Hindsight bias inhibits our learning from incidents which means that once we know the 
outcome of an event, we can see exactly what went wrong in leading to the outcome. We see 
this information with the benefit of knowing the outcome, and therefore we do not see the 
events develop in the context under which they occurred. This may cloud our judgement with 
information that was not known to the people in the event. The question is whether there is a 
better method of learning from past events. 
 
2. How the case studies work 
The case studies developed by the IChemE Safety Centre consist of short videos, with breaks 
in between for facilitated discussion.  
The incidents are presented as a story and efforts have been made to make them generic and 
anonymous. The reason is to try and prevent the audience from succumbing to the hindsight 
bias. Real life cases are used as the basis for the videos to address the audience stating ‘but 
that would never happen’ as the events unfold. Once the actual incident is disclosed, the story 
becomes real. 
The sessions begin with an introduction to the facility type and the team involved in the 
facility, as well as introducing the audience to the role they will be playing in decision 
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making. This provides a chance to set the context of the case study. Figure 1 shows the 
example of setting the context using the Offshore platform case study that simulates incident 
investigation. In this example the audience plays the role of an investigator.  
      
Figure 1: Example of setting the context 
  
Once the context is set, the events that led up to the incident start to develop. At certain points 
in the story the audience are given a chance to make a critical decision. They obtain the 
summary information and the video stops for the audience to make their decision (See Figure 
2). The type of decision making in each case study remains consistent, so as to create a degree 
of familiarity with the decision framework used.  
As a next step, the facilitator discusses the decision made by the audience before start again 
the video to see what decision was made by the people involved in the real case. Each case 
study typically has three decisions to be made. Once the final decision is made that leads to 
the event, the actual incident is revealed. The learnings of the particular incident are then 
discussed in the video. Once the videos conclude the facilitator holds a final discussion on the 
learnings and what people have taken away from the experience.  
 
       
Figure 2: Example of a decision question 
  
The presentation of the material allows us to create some of the initial pressures felt by the 
individuals involved, such as time delays or financial constraints. For example, with financial 
constraints, as it is presented in the Coal mine case study it will reference the money spent or 
cost cutting. This starts to provide some of the original context.  
At times this can mean that the study presents additional unnecessary information. This is 
done not to confuse the audience, but to show some of the information overload that people 
experienced in the real case. The audience needs to figure out what is important and what is 
not to be able to make the decisions.  
 
2.1 The case studies 
The ISC has released six interactive case studies up to the date of the paper. Those case 
studies are focusing on the following aspects of process safety and addresses the issues: 
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1. Coal Mine – simulating design, construction and commissioning decisions 
- This study guides users through the challenging practice of engineering decision 
making, this time focusing on the design, construction and commissioning of a 
coal mine. It highlights the pressures of budget and schedule, enabling users to 
experience how these factors influence vital decisions. 
2. Gas Plant – simulating operational decisions 
- In this study the user will encounter a stream of crucial decision making points, 
which would typically occur while on shift, operating a gas plant. Users will 
practice managing the tenuous balance between meeting production output 
targets, while managing a process upset. 
3. Tank Farm – simulating operational decisions 
- This study exposes the user to a series of challenges associated with operating a 
tank farm. They will make ongoing decisions about the operations, comparable to 
those that could occur while on shift. Users will practice managing the tenuous 
balance between meeting production output targets, while adhering to essential 
safety requirements. 
4. Offshore Platform - simulating incident investigation 
- In this study the user will play the role of the incident investigator tasked with 
identifying the root causes.  The case study explores the complexity behind the 
incident and prompts the user to identify the true causes beyond the immediate 
direct cause. 
5. Lift off - exploring decision making 
- This case study takes the user through the process of making critical decisions 
within a complex organisation as they manage a busy launch schedule.  It 
highlights the ethical pressures of working within existing processes to solve 
problems. 
6. Tidal Wave - emergency response 
- This case study will take the user through an emergency response event as it 
unfolds.  It highlights the different risks and challenges of responding to a natural 
hazard triggering a technological accident. 
 
2.2 Application of the case studies 
A question arises as to how to apply the case studies and what effective ways are possible to 
transfer the message to the audience. One way to use of the studies could be the application 
and implementation of the lessons highlighted in the studies.  
A detailed discussion with the workforce or the management of the facility would provide 
further insights as to where it is possible to improve the safety management system. The 
purpose of the case studies is to promote a different tool to advance learning from past events 
and learnings found in those real-life cases can be implemented in the policy and system of 
the organization.  
For example, the case study on developing lift off can have applications for senior executives 
and directors on governance decisions, as well as for front line operators on factors that 
influence certain critical decisions.  
 Accident Investigation and Learning to Improve Safety Management in Complex System:  
Remaining Challenges 
125 
 
Further to that, these studies take the facts of an incident and simplify them in terms that can 
be understood by a wide range of people. This makes the application of the case studies very 
broad. They are also designed in such a way to ensure the delivery of the facts is constant 
using videos, and have comprehensive facilitation notes, so the discussion can be led by 
someone from within the organisation, from a manager to a team leader.  
Lessons from these events can be retrieved and applied across various sectors because the 
fundamentals are the same. For example, Lift off is a space shuttle incident and Tidal wave 
discusses emergency response in case of a Natech event in a nuclear environment. However, 
operators, managers working in a completely different environment will find the relevant 
message without necessarily having a thorough knowledge in the field. 
Topics covered in these studies, such as process safety management systems, corporate 
government, ethical decision, emergency response, organisational and human factors or safety 
culture are the core areas which are similar in many operations. 
 
Conclusion 
The case studies have been run a number of times across varied audiences and received 
positive feedback and both engaging and well presented. Putting the learner in the event as it 
unfolds and encourages them to make decisions without knowing the outcome.  
A completely new way of learning lessons without experiencing the same costly mistakes that 
could occur in real life. The lack of real consequences for the participants may reduce the 
experience of learning, but it is still a greater understanding than simply reading an 
investigation report with the dry facts or watching a video knowing the outcome.  
Seeing an incident unfold in the context of what else is occurring at the time can help us 
understand why people made the decisions they did. This can be more powerful that just 
questioning the decision that they made. Understanding the why allows us to address similar 
issues in our facilities.  
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Abstract 
 
Industrial accidents continue to occur despite prevention efforts of high-risk industries. One 
can state that failures to learn occur, similar accidents recur in some organisations (NASA, 
BP), and we observe that similar root causes and accidents patterns recur whatever the 
industrial sectors, the country, the culture and historical period. This empirical statement 
opens towards the possibility of accidents’ lessons capitalisation into a structured ‘knowledge 
of accidents’ (Dechy et al, 2010) that includes the ‘pathogenic factors’ (Reason, 1997), and 
‘pathogenic organisational factors’ within organisational diagnosis (Dien et al, 2004, 2012, 
Rousseau et al, 2008). Our goal is to address the challenge of using this knowledge of 
accidents in normal operations. We will address this challenge through an analysis of a case 
study. The case study aims at describing how experts used in practice this knowledge to define 
the analysis framework of a safety management assessment conducted by IRSN for the 
nuclear industry. 
Keywords: Accident, Organisation, Diagnosis, Safety, Learning. 
1. Introduction 
Industrial accidents and disasters have occurred in every industry and country especially since 
Second World War and the 30 years of glorious industrial development. After an accident, an 
investigation aims at identifying lessons to be learned, for instance through the definition and 
implementation of corrective actions to prevent similar accidents from recurring. The learning 
process, the risk analysis process and more globally safety management are supporting the 
implementation of preventive, protective and emergency safety measures. 
  Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0) 
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One could state that an overall reduction of industrial accidents for the last 50 years has been 
achieved and some authors claimed that some industries reached an ultra-reliable state 
(Amalberti, 2006).  
However, this improvement has plateaued for a few decades, and a “tango on an asymptote” 
(Frantzen, 2004) is observed on accident statistics. Major industrial accidents continue to 
occur. Moreover, failures to learn are observed with similar accidents that recur, for example 
at NASA with the loss of two space shuttles for different technical failures but similar 
organisational failures; and at BP with a relentless series of accidents with Grangemouth 
(2000), Texas City (2005), Prudhoe Bay (2006), Deepwater Horizon (2010). 
Our working position and research work in such high-risk industries lead us to develop an 
assumption that the lessons of accidents are neither learned sufficiently nor sufficiently used 
in practice, especially across industries (Dien, 2004, Dechy et al, 2008). We therefore 
proposed that the lessons from accidents should be capitalised into a structured ‘knowledge of 
accidents’ (Dechy et al, 2010). It follows some conceptual and formalisation efforts of human 
and social scientists that led to the notions of ‘pathogenic factors’ (Reason, 1997), ‘pathogenic 
organisational factors’ especially for the use within organisational analysis of accident and 
organisational diagnosis of safety (Dien et al, 2004, 2012; Rousseau et al, 2008; Llory et 
Dien, 2010; Llory et Montmayeul, 2010).  
In developing this concept of knowledge of accidents, we mentioned the necessity to address 
the challenge of using this knowledge in normal operations. This questions how it can be 
achieved in practice and how it can be enhanced through different tools, processes, skills and 
knowledge management provisions.  
Several contexts of use of this knowledge of accidents in normal operations should be studied, 
as for instance the use by operators (workers and managers) in the daily practice of 
management of performance and safety, as the use by experts during a safety assessment, as 
the use by regulator inspectors when conducting an inspection, or after a training where 
lessons from accidents are transferred.  
In this paper, we reflect and analyse expert practices in using this knowledge of accidents 
during a safety assessment performed at Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire 
(IRSN) for the French Nuclear Safety Authority.  
In safety and reliability, both applied sciences, two research traditions in human and social 
sciences are often opposed. The first studies normal operations to identify features of 
reliability (High Reliability Organisations, e.g. Rochlin et al, 1987; Roberts et al, 1990; 
Laporte and Consolini, 1991) and of resilience (Resilience engineering tradition, e.g. 
Hollnagel, 2006). The second considers the ‘gift of failure’ (e.g. Wilpert, 2011) and that 
accidents are the ‘royal road’ to access real organisational (mal-)functioning (Llory, 1996) 
and vulnerability.  
In this paper, we want to address how knowledge of accidents is used in normal operations, in 
one of its contexts of use (safety assessment). From a theoretical point of view, our study 
creates an operational link between the two research traditions and could support their 
articulation rather than their opposition. 
In this theoretical context, our specific research question is: How experts can use the 
knowledge of accidents to frame an organisational diagnosis in normal operations?  
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After some reference to the theoretical context, we will describe the context of the case study 
for our research before the analysis and the discussion of the findings. 
2. Learning from Accidents, Knowledge, Normal Operations and 
Organisational Diagnosis 
2.1 Learning from events and accidents research tradition 
Learning from accidents and failures is an established tradition in engineering, safety and 
reliability of high-risk industries, for instance since the birth of some industries such as 
aviation with the first public accident investigation board set-up in 1917 in the UK (ESReDA, 
2005; Dechy et al, 2012). Learning from human errors and organisational failures has also 
become a hot-topic in practice and for scholars since the end of the seventies (e.g. Turner, 
1978; Perrow, 1984) with accidents such as Tenerife in 1977 and Three Mile Island in 1979 
that changed worldviews on the causal factors of accidents (Wilpert and Fahlbruch, 1998).  
Indeed, to improve safety, some researchers conceptualised the approach and advocated for 
the study of events (incidents, near-miss, failures and accidents) to highlight features of 
vulnerability (e.g. lack of robustness such as redundancy, safety margins), as they consider 
not enough attention is given to those events. Wilpert (according to Carroll and Fahlbruch, 
2011), considered that undesirable incidents and events, serious and disturbing as they may 
be, are a ‘gift of failure’. In short, events offer an opportunity to learn about safe and unsafe 
operations, generate productive conversations across engaged stakeholders, and bring about 
beneficial changes to technology, organisation, and mental models (understanding). Llory 
(1996) goes further, arguing that accidents are the ‘royal road’ (referring to Freud’s metaphor 
about dreams being the royal road to access the unconscious) to access to real (mal) 
functioning of organisations. Indeed, some hidden phenomena, hardly evident in normal 
operation may become more visible in accidents (especially those in the ‘dark side of 
organisations’ (Vaughan, 1999, Llory, 2006)). Studies of accidents help to reverse our 
perspective: if normal operations hardly show organisational pathologies, accidents help to 
better understand the risks associated to the banality of the daily life in organisations.  
2.2 From failures to learn accident’s lessons to the knowledge of accidents 
After an accident, an investigation is launched to understand what, how and why it happened 
this way, why it was not prevented despite safety measures (preventive, protective,…), to 
identify the direct and root causes, the lessons that could be learned, the corrective actions that 
could be implemented, to prevent a similar event to recur (here and also elsewhere) (e.g. Frei 
et al, 2003; Sklet, 2004; Dekker, 2006; ESReDA, 2009; Ziedelis, 2011; Dechy et al, 2012; 
Dien et al, 2012; Hagen, 2018). Efforts and investments have been made by the high-risk 
industries in operating experience feedback systems to make the learning process a pillar of 
modern safety management (Dien, 2004).  
Learning is a process that generates outcomes especially changes, in other words ‘learning 
involves a change’ (Koornneef, 2000). It can be in the knowledge base, the beliefs, the risk 
perception and the technical, human and organisational provisions to prevent accidents. It can 
come from experience and study. After an event, several learning loops (single, double, triple) 
have been qualified by the organisational learning researchers (e.g. Argyris and Schön, 1996) 
and multi-level learning is acknowledged (Hale et al, 1997; Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000, 
Dechy et al., 2004, Svedung and Radbö, 2006, Cedergren 2013; Hovden et al, 2011, 
Tinmannsvik et al., 2013; Ramanujam and Carroll, 2013; Drupsteen and Guldenmund, 2014; 
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Bringaud et al, 2016; Blatter et al, 2016). In addition, the depth of change varies (optimise 
practice within existing constraints, adapt and modify conditions, innovate). This depth of 
change is one of the three dimensions of the ESReDA cube (ESReDA, 2015) taking into 
account the learning scope (structure, culture, process…), and levels of sociotechnical system 
addressed (micro, meso, macroscopic). 
However, lessons learned from accidents (e.g. Columbia space shuttle in 2003, Texas-City 
refinery in 2005, flight Rio-Paris in 2009…) have shown some failures to learn from previous 
events, weak signals, near-misses and accidents (e.g.; Dechy et al, 2009; Hopkins, 2010; 
Paltrinieri et al, 2012; ESReDA, 2015). Some lessons on the root causes are not identified 
especially due to the lack of depth of analysis and therefore jeopardize the relevance of 
lessons to be learned (CAIB, 2003; Dien et al, 2012, Thellier, 2017). If there were changes, 
they were ‘too late and too little’ as said by the chair of US CSB (Merritt, 2006) after Texas 
City refinery accident.  
Beyond these statements, especially the ones on learning loops which may focus the issue on 
the organisational learning mechanisms from only one accident, the specific challenge we 
invite to tackle is to broaden the research on learning mechanism in two directions, historical 
and transversal, in order to integrate other accidents in the perspective (Dien, 2006, Dechy et 
al, 2008). It requires to consider the opportunity to learn from other sectors’ industrial 
accidents, for example to transfer the lessons from Columbia space shuttle accident to the 
process industries (Dien and Llory, 2004). It requires also to consider the opportunity to learn 
from many accidents that occurred in the world over a few decades and that provided several 
lessons to be learned.  
Indeed, several researchers studying industrial accidents observed that similar root causes 
recur whatever their occurrence context (industrial sector, the country, the culture and 
historical period, regulation). They found ‘echoes’ (as said by the former astronaut Sally Ride 
about Columbia space shuttle loss which echoed Challenger loss) and ‘striking similarities’ 
(as mentioned by US CSB chair in front of US Senate about Texas City and Prudhoe Bay 
accidents) not only in NASA and BP’s accidents’ patterns, but in most if not all accidents 
(Dien et al, 2004; Rousseau and Largier, 2008 ; Llory and Dien, 2010; Llory and 
Montmayeul, 2010; Dechy et al, 2010, 2013, 2016).  
Based on this empirical statement and on the assumption that recurrences are meaningful, 
several researchers provided concepts that have been articulated to form a generic model of 
accident based on recurring patterns (Dien, 2006, ESReDA, 2009). Indeed, lessons from 
accidents showed that an accident is a combination of direct and root causes at several levels 
in sociotechnical systems (Rasmussen, 1997) which have implemented several lines of 
defence to prevent accidents. In this way an accident is “hard to obtain” (Perrow, 1984). The 
safety degradation (Dien, 2006) may have started long ago with latent flaws as soon as the 
design phase for instance (Reason, 1990) that generates warning signs in an incubation period 
(Turner, 1978), with weak and strong signals (Vaughan, 1996; Llory, 1996). Some signals 
may be recognised within processes such as audits or investigation of events, or by some 
actors such as whistle-blowers. But accidents showed that signals of danger were not 
adequately treated by the organization and management through the implementation of 
proactive or corrective action (Merritt, 2006; Guillaume, 2011; Jouniaux et al, 2014; Dien, 
2014). Similarly, several researchers formalised and conceptualised the recurring root causes 
of accidents, called ‘pathogenic factors’ (Reason, 1997), and then ‘pathogenic organisational 
factors’ (Dien et al, 2004, 2006, 2012, Rousseau et al, 2008) (see §2.3).  
 Accident Investigation and Learning to Improve Safety Management in Complex System:  
Remaining Challenges 
130 
 
In line with this approach that takes into account this empirical statement about recurring 
patterns of accidents, the idea of ‘capitalisation’ of generic patterns of accidents emerged and 
was formalised in a concept called the ‘Knowledge of accidents’ (Dechy et al, 2010, 2013, 
2016). This conceptual approach assumed that the systematic and cumulative study of several 
incidents, accidents and crises, provides us an understanding and knowledge, which can 
hardly be obtained in another way, of the dysfunctional dynamics and pathogenic factors that 
undermines organisation and the way these factors erode defence in-depth.  
This assumption is valid only for some high quality and exemplary in-depth investigations of 
accidents such as Ladbroke Grove rail accident near Paddington station in United Kingdom in 
1999 (Cullen, 1999), Columbia accident investigation (CAIB, 2003), Texas City refinery 
accident (CSB, 2007) that provide ‘thick description’ (as defined by Geertz, 1998) of 
organisation (mal-)functioning. 
In our definition, the ‘knowledge of accidents’ does contain mainly some structured 
knowledge such as grid of analysis and models of recurring patterns (model of accident, 
pathogenic organisational factors) and some stories, than can be transferred, memorised and 
used by safety analysts but also managers, operators, regulators.  
2.3 Organisational analysis and diagnosis, pathogenic organisational factors 
Methods in human and organisational factors that are used by experts for assessing safety 
management or investigating an accident incorporate some key principles of human and social 
sciences approaches such as the reliance on subjective information data collection from 
interviews and workplace observations, as well as documents. More specifically, some 
researchers developed some methodologies for conducting organisational diagnosis of safety 
and organisational analysis of accident (Dien et al, 2004, 2012; Rousseau and Largier, 2008; 
Llory and Dien, 2010; Llory and Montmayeul, 2010, Dechy et al, 2011a) that integrate some 
methodological lessons from exemplary organisational analysis of accidents such as the three 
investigations mentioned in the previous paragraph (Cullen, CAIB, CSB). They are also 
inspired by lessons from organisational diagnosis in normal operations when conducting an 
assessment of management of safety (Rousseau and Largier, 2008).  
One of their key characteristics is to rely on the so-called ‘pathogenic organisational factors’ 
which formalise some knowledge about the recurring root cause of accidents at a rather 
generic, global and macroscopic level. Within this method, the pathogenic organisational 
factors can be used by an analyst to support the framing of its assessment, to support its lines 
of analysis and to audit their presence and severity in an audited organisation. Here is a list 
extracted from the following references (Dien et al, 2004, Rousseau and Largier, 2008, Llory 
and Dien, 2010): 
• Poor recognition of critical components, of critical activities or deficiency in 
anticipation and detection of errors, 
• (Excessive) production pressures, 
• Deficiency of communication or lack of quality of dialogue, 
• Excessive formalism or proceduralisation, 
• Organisational complexity, obscurity and compartmentalisation, 
• Learning deficiencies (operating experience feedback, closing feedback loops, lack of 
listening of whistle-blowers), 
• Lack of accountability,  
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• Inability to develop and maintain individual competencies, and to develop and use 
collective competencies, 
• Lack of adequate human resources (in numbers),  
• Lack of organisational culture of safety, 
• Deficiency of daily safety management, 
• Complacency or deficiency of control authorities, 
• Failure to re-examine design basis and operations assumptions. 
2.4 Some limits of the approach relying on lessons from accidents 
This learning from accidents research tradition and our theoretical proposal cannot ignore the 
challenges raised by other researchers in safety. Firstly, some researchers are cautious about 
the relevance and validity of the lessons learned from accident investigations, either due to 
political pressures, resources constraints or biases. One of the most critical comment is that 
the hindsight bias influences accident report findings. Accident investigators could hardly 
avoid the wisdom after the event (Reason, 1990) and would explicitly or implicitly develop 
harsh judgment of human actions and decisions, knowing the overall story. In search for 
accident explanation, investigators would pay more attention to relevant signals that became 
meaningful in retrospect and would not be in the position to be “comprehensive” to the people 
facing blurred and contradictory signals masked by the daily noise, ambiguities and 
uncertainties in the course of events. To the extent that Vaughan (1996) concluded that some 
weak signals could not be understood before the accident because they were normalized in 
NASA’ culture.  
On this aspect, we have also been critical considering that although the risk of bias is serious 
and has to be managed by investigators and human and organisational factors analysts, 
empirical data from several major accidents showed that some people in the system did detect 
some safety issues, did recognise some early signs of danger, did alert of potential accidents 
(Dechy et al, 2011). Furthermore, audits and learning from event processes can capture such 
warning signs. For instance, the Texas City refinery accident in 2005 was preceded by several 
events, even serious incidents of 30 million dollars, by claims from managers, by internal and 
external audit alerts and investigation alerts (CSB, 2007; Hopkins, 2008; Dechy et al, 2015).  
In addition, some researchers (e.g. Bourrier, 2005) considered that accident reports are 
secondary documents whereas research based on ethnographic studies of the daily life of 
organisations would provide more reliable data.  
To this point, we opposed that though it can be indirectly collected data rather than directly 
collected data for a researcher, major accident and disaster investigations are often analysed 
by large teams, sometimes with human and social scientists, and are provided important 
resources that both support the quality and depth of findings and lessons. Their reports, made 
of hundreds of pages, provide “thick descriptions” (Geertz, 1998) of the practices. They are 
not perfect, and may contain under-investigated issues but are valuable pieces of knowledge.  
2.5 Normal operations research tradition 
A second research tradition advocates for the studies of normal operations, the so-called High 
Reliability Organisations (Rochlin et al, 1987; Roberts, 1990; Laporte 1991; Bourrier, 1999, 
2001, 2011). Instead of explaining accidents and defining strategies to prevent them based on 
lessons learned, those researchers would rather concentrate their understanding effort on the 
surprise of a rather lack of accidents and high reliability of some organisations operating high-
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risk systems. In this research tradition, we would add another research group that formalised 
Resilience Engineering concept and more recently with Safety II concept (Hollnagel, 2006, 
2014). Those researchers have been seeking factors, practices, and “best ways”, especially 
remarkable to explain how success is obtained daily despite adverse conditions. In such a 
way, they would grasp features of reliability, resilience and safety.  
These research approaches have emphasised as well but in a different manner the need to 
learn from experience, from events, from adaptations when unexpected events show up, 
especially minor events as no major accident often occur and offer opportunities to learn.  
On expert judgment activity, stories of internal events incidents and external accidents are 
sometimes used by managers to support decision-making in high-risk industries in normal 
operation and to mentor younger colleagues (Hayes and Maslen, 2014). In the context of 
crisis and unexpected events, Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) insisted on the dual role of 
experience that supports sensemaking but that can lead to excess of simplifications based on 
the recognition of similarities between present and past that are in fact superficial. These last 
points open the possibility to support expert judgment with stories of past events such as 
accidents, with knowledge from the past, though it can bring biases.  
2.6 Research gap: the challenge of using knowledge of accidents in normal operations 
This review of the scientific literature leads us to point that we have little evidence on how the 
knowledge of accidents is used in normal operations. Indeed, one of the goal of the 
knowledge of accidents is to enrich safety analysts, prevention actors such as decision-
makers, operators and inspectors, with some background knowledge references and to support 
the expert knowledge ‘black-box’. More precisely, we lack of evidence on how knowledge of 
accidents can be used in practice by some analysts in the framing of an organisational 
diagnosis of safety management in normal operations. 
As a matter of the fact, as the two research traditions (normal operations, accidents) in safety 
management are often opposed, we propose a way to connect them in the safety practice. By 
doing so, we also aim at fostering the theoretical debate between these two research traditions.  
3. Approach 
The research approach is qualitative and, in a first step, relies on first-hand data as researchers 
who participated to the development of these concepts of knowledge of accidents and 
pathogenic organisational factors and as analysts who implemented it in practice as experts 
within an institution (IRSN) for a case study of organisational diagnosis of safety 
management in normal operations. To understand the case used for our research, some context 
is provided on the safety assessment process.  
3.1 The context of the research case 
3.1.1 Assessing management of safety by experts at IRSN: generic principles 
In France, the nuclear power plants’ licensee, Electricité de France (EDF), remains 
responsible for ensuring nuclear safety, radiation protection and occupational safety on its 58 
nuclear reactors in operation on its 19 nuclear power plants (NPP). External control is carried 
by the regulatory body that is composed of the control authority, the nuclear safety authority 
(Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire, ASN) with the support of IRSN which is the Technical Support 
Organisation (TSO). This control is regularly performed through inspections checking 
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regulation compliance that are led by ASN inspectors with the support from IRSN experts. 
Comprehensive safety assessments are performed by IRSN experts. Both approaches are 
complementary.  
The goal of safety assessment is to provide a robust basis (facts, findings) to support a 
rigorous analysis involving collective expert judgment to aid a decision-maker. For IRSN, the 
decision-makers that will use the conclusions of the analysis are the control authority (ASN) 
and the operator (Electricité de France). Both will use the findings, the criteria developed, the 
recommendations proposed to define regulatory requests or safety management provisions. 
A nuclear operator has to submit to the regulator a report about a “safety case” to obtain a 
license at different stages of its life cycle: for constructing, operating, and dismantling. 
Different report types can be distinguished, as the report about the safety case can be the 
safety options report, the safety analysis report that formalises the safety demonstration. In 
addition, and more often, the case is an object related to safety engineering but with a reduced 
scope such as a modification of a manufactured equipment item, such as a safety equipment, 
or such as a safety calculation for a demonstration of robustness of a building. But a case can 
also be an object related to management of safety, such as an activity performed by a person 
or group of workers, an organisational change, the real functioning of an organisation or the 
real performance of some safety barriers and provisions. The real functioning implies to 
consider its observable performance when implemented by people within the constraints and 
resources of a work organisation. To report on the real and daily performance of the 
sociotechnical system, data collection methods such as observations in the field, interviews of 
workers, records and documents are required.  
IRSN is then requested by the control authority to provide a technical expert opinion. To 
support the collective expert judgment process, a key activity is to be able to confront the case 
with some criteria. The criteria to support expert judgment can come from norms, design and 
safety rules, analysis guidance with criteria and threshold or from scientific knowledge and 
research, lessons learned from internal events or international events, experience and 
experiments... For example, for a safety case to justify the mechanical robustness of an 
equipment, an analysis is performed to verify that the equipment can sustain a load to some 
threshold and that the conditions of operations will not create loads that overcome the 
thresholds. Sometimes, especially at the beginning of safety assessment on new issues, criteria 
are blurred and not really fitting the expertise need; problems are sometimes ill-defined rather 
than well-defined; thus, a decision-aiding process is required for the expertise itself that is 
rather an exploratory process than a standardised activity (Merad, 2010). To support its 
independent assessment, often some additional data about real performance of the 
sociotechnical system is collected in the field by IRSN experts which complements the case 
report provided by the operator. This normal operation field data is collected within the 
established framework and should provide evidence on the identified criteria for assessment. 
In practice, especially in human and organisational factors safety assessment, it is not a linear 
process and is rather complex and iterative as the case (e.g. the real observed performance) 
can help to define as well the framework and criteria.  
Before starting the safety assessment, it is necessary to address its key shaping factors: the 
risks related to processes, activities and management provisions, the stakes, the scope of the 
assessment, the delay to report findings and conclusions, the type of decision to be taken by 
the decision-maker, … Then, the generic question to address: is the information about the real 
performance satisfying the assessment criteria to develop with reasonable confidence the 
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judgment that the provisions implemented by the operator are sufficient to manage risk? In 
other words, how safe is safe enough? 
3.1.2 Assessing management of safety and radiation protection during outages: building a 
specific analysis framework 
Maintenance on NPP reactors is mostly performed during planned outages, either for 
preventive and curative maintenance. A planned outage is organised every year or eighteen 
months depending on the reactor design and nuclear fuel management. Around 5 000 
maintenance activities and sometimes up to 15 000 maintenance activities are scheduled. All 
these maintenance activities are performed during the outage in one to six months. Though the 
preparation of the outages starts years before with support from central engineering divisions, 
a dedicated outage project team is set-up for a year and staffed with more than 50 engineers 
and technicians. It is coordinated by a group of twelve to fifteen people. The maintenance 
activities are executed by hundreds of workers, mainly subcontractors but also internal 
maintenance technicians and operators.  
To define the scope of analysis for the assessment of safety and radiation protection 
management of maintenance outages and to build the framework of analysis, IRSN experts 
addressed several issues in initial and preliminary studies (Dechy et al, 2014): 
1. What is an outage? What are the risks in outages? What are the risk management 
provisions? 
2. What are the lessons learned from outage events? 
3. What were the past vulnerabilities (found in former audit, assessment and 
inspections)? 
4. What are the changes implemented? Are they introduced to treat past vulnerabilities? 
5. What are the lessons from outage management benchmarking? 
6. What are the lessons from industrial accidents? 
In addition to the studies conducted to identify potential recurring vulnerabilities in former 
events, inspections, safety assessments (questions 2 and 3), a benchmark (question 4) was 
conducted in North America to three nuclear operators that implemented the outage control 
centre (OCC) that the French operator wanted to transfer as a new organisational model. OCC 
are open-floor offices where the group of twelve to fifteen coordinators manages the outage 
on a continuous basis (up to 24 hours basis) with shifts. They are equipped with many screens 
and computers like in crisis centres. This benchmark helped experts to confirm the analysis 
framework, to provide other questions and a more critical view on the “best way” to organise 
outage management. In addition, several international guidelines on outage management were 
consulted and some relevant research were reviewed to support the understanding of the risk 
management provisions, the human and organisational issues (Bourrier, 1999; Reiman and 
Oedewald 2006; Grusenmeyer, 2002). 
To conduct this assessment of management of safety during outages, the approach 
implemented by IRSN experts relied on extensive fieldwork investigations with: 150 
interviews of operators, managers, subcontractors, technicians, engineers from maintenance 
and operations; 70 days of normal operations work observations performed on three French 
NPPs at several stages of the outage preparation, execution and learning; hundreds of 
documents reviewed; technical discussions with engineering and management headquarters. It 
involved a team of mainly four HOF analysts, supervised by two HOF managers, supported 
by three engineers in nuclear safety and two engineers in radiation protection and one retired 
nuclear plant operator. The final report is about 185 pages and IRSN recommendations were 
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submitted to the French nuclear Advisory Committee of Experts in charge of nuclear reactors 
(Groupe Permanent Réacteur) the 13th of June 2013.  
3.2 Methodology, data collection and analysis 
The research goal was to establish a case study that provides a narrative that enables an 
understanding of the performed uses of knowledge of accident especially in the context of an 
organisational diagnosis in normal operations. The assessment of safety management during 
maintenance outages is the case with the most systematised used of ‘knowledge of accidents’ 
though it is not the first (Rousseau, 2008) nor the only one at IRSN. In other words, the focus 
of this paper is to address how the sixth question had some effects on the assessment. Though 
every aspect (answers to all six questions) had its impact in the definition of the framework of 
analysis and on the interpretation of some data found during investigation, the case study we 
describe in this paper on the use of knowledge of accidents and analyse hereafter is only a 
small story in the bigger story of the IRSN safety assessment of outage management. 
In the team of twelve experts involved all along the safety assessment and at various degrees, 
the coordinator of the HOF analysts and its line manager were the two experts who explicitly 
used the knowledge of accidents and are the two first authors of this paper. This specific 
situation enables to have access to first-hand data as participating observers. Another 
specificity of this context of use is that these two analysts in charge of this safety assessment 
by IRSN are among the researchers who participated to the development of the concepts of 
knowledge of accidents, pathogenic organisational factors, and organisational diagnosis of 
management of safety. This second specificity highlights their role of ‘research-intervention’. 
One could notice that these two specificities implies a major bias as the two analysts are 
experts and researchers, and are at the same time judge and stakeholder, by being in this case 
study the users and the developers.  
The case study relies on a retrospective analysis of some expert work conducted from 2011 to 
2013 that implies a loss of memory. The reliance on tracks of expert activity was a key, 
achievable in practice with records of text documents produced at that time. With these biases 
and limits in mind, data collection focused on the initial analysis that was the key step to 
justify the launch of a safety assessment by IRSN under the request of the control authority. 
Indeed, the issues raised about outage management, the definition of scope of analysis, the 
identification of the framework of analysis were formalised within a twenty pages document. 
The presentations of the document enabled exchanges within IRSN with other analysts 
involved, with internal managers of safety and radiation protection engineering. It enabled as 
well to agree with the most critical lines of investigations with the control authority and the 
NPP operator. To support the establishment of this analysis framework, studies to address the 
six questions mentioned in § 3.1.2 were conducted by IRSN experts. Some available 
knowledge from accidents was reviewed for this purpose. When necessary further researches 
on lessons from accidents were initiated to produce knowledge of accidents for further use. 
However, the knowledge and lessons from accidents, used as references to support the 
definition of analysis framework, were primarily discussed by the main analyst and its 
supervisor and not systematically communicated and discussed with other analysts, engineers 
and managers. 
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4. The case study on the use in practice of the knowledge of accidents in 
organisational diagnosis of safety management 
For the IRSN assessment on “safety and radiation protection management during maintenance 
activities in outages” (IRSN, 2013, Dechy et al, 2014), ‘Knowledge of Accidents” and 
organisational diagnosis methodologies was particularly useful (Dechy et al, 2016) at three 
stages of the safety management assessment : (1) a planned use to define the scope and 
framework of analysis ; (2) for the interpretation process to support expert judgment ; (3) for 
rhetoric purpose during interactions with stakeholders to convince them about the potential 
impact of the risk and the relevance of IRSN recommendations. The first type of use is further 
analysed in this paper to get a detailed analysis. 
In this chapter 4, we aim to describe the experts’ practices, putting light on the analysis 
processes and the tools that supported them. With the following case study, we look at the 
small story of the use of the knowledge of accidents in a bigger story of the IRSN assessment 
of management of safety during NPP maintenance outages. Therefore, the way lessons from 
accidents supported the analysis are presented after some explanations on the other data, 
factors and clues that shaped the definition of analysis framework. In other words, our 
preoccupation was to deal with our own biases, of being researcher and expert, and to avoid 
an effect of presentation as well that would exaggerate the influence of lessons from 
accidents. The initial analysis enables experts to identify the key topics to investigate in order 
to frame the assessment. The issues raised in outages are numerous and were prioritized. The 
selecting and prioritisation process are not discussed in this paper but only the use of 
knowledge of accidents for the six main lines of analysis from § 4.1 to 4.6. Indeed, 
‘Knowledge of accidents’ helped to identify the scope of the assessment, to better justify the 
most important risk management provisions to audit and assess, and the key likely potential 
deficiencies that could be found.  
4.1 The use of the generic accident model and the dynamic of risk management 
High-risk systems have a history and so do their risk management and the regulatory requests 
to enhance safety. In other words, though the focus in this paper is limited to one case of 
IRSN safety assessment, it is connected to previous ones and does not start from scratch. 
Indeed, two key previous IRSN safety assessments were conducted from 2006 to 2008 and 
their findings pointed several vulnerabilities. In this perspective, to establish the analysis 
framework of a safety assessment, past vulnerabilities can provide investigation paths and 
assessment lines.  
Indeed, in 2008, IRSN completed its first large scale HOF assessment of management of 
safety in a competitiveness context after EDF’s partial privatisation in 2004 (Rousseau, 2008). 
Several weaknesses were already identified on outage risk management: practices of 
overburdening the schedule, operation asymmetry towards outage project, inadequate human 
resources (in numbers) for field actions by operations. Other issues were found in 
identification and use of lessons, the position of the independent safety line, management of 
organisational changes and their interactions. In parallel, in 2008, IRSN also completed 
another large-scale safety assessment on maintenance policy: among the deficiencies, one can 
mention skills management (in house contractor oversight, at subcontractors), understaffing of 
in-house control of subcontractors, outages preparation difficulties due to their proximity and 
overlapping at sites level.  
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After the IRSN safety assessment in 2008, ASN requested the nuclear operator to strengthen 
the operation team’ position during outages with complementary organizational provisions in 
order to adequately respond to outage project’ requests. In addition, it was requested to 
establish an analysis of schedule pressures and operation staffing. To these regulatory 
requests, the French NPP operator mentioned it would start to implement in 2009 Outage 
Control Centre (OCC) which objectives are to improve all performances (safety, radiation 
protection, availability of plant, and cost). This change in outage management was aimed at 
solving former deficiencies and was part of a large-scale program of changes to improve all 
performances of the French nuclear operator a few years after privatization. 
The end of the OCC implementation was scheduled for 2012 outages but its efficiency had 
not been assessed so far and the first feedback from the regulator inspections showed 
heterogeneous implementation in 2010. In addition, inspectors of ASN had contrasted lessons 
on first plants where OCC was tested: at the same time, it was limiting some overtime in daily 
work hours, but also enabling a “double day” for managers, meaning that after OCC shift, 
they would continue to work at their office. 
In this context of warnings from the past vulnerabilities to be solved and the contradictory 
signs received from implementation, it was worth to inquire in order to provide evidence. To 
this purpose, for the current 2011-2013 analysis on outage management a set of general 
questions was framed to wonder if risk management was improved with OCC or not: Does the 
new organisational model to manage outage enable the risk management in outage to become 
more efficient than in the past? Do the performance factors introduced by these new 
organisational provisions compensate past vulnerabilities? Are they creating new 
vulnerabilities? This approach, this rationale and those questions were written and developed 
in the initial analysis document as a basis to launch the IRSN safety assessment.  
Though no clear references to the lessons from accidents were explicitly made for this point in 
the initial analysis document, the underlying rationale was influenced by the knowledge of 
accidents. To support this approach, the coordinator of the analysis and its direct supervisor 
clearly referred to their background knowledge on lessons from accidents. In particular, they 
both referred to a generic model of accident causation (see § 2.2). From this perspective, both 
analysts assumed that ‘history is a cause’ as the Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
(CAIB, 2003; Starbuck and Farjoun, 2005) clearly recalled the limits of safety improvement 
after Challenger accident in 1986 and the safety degradation that are connected to the NASA 
management policy ‘Faster, Better, Cheaper’. The policy was aiming at improving 
performance, specifically doing more with less in a constrained environment set-up by US 
Congress that was translated into budget and staff reductions and increase transfer of activities 
to private sector.  
In addition, the two analysts considered that the historical dimension is one of the three key 
dimensions of an organizational analysis of safety (Dien, 2006; Llory and Dien, 2010; Llory 
and Montmayeul, 2010). Having this accident model, this historical approach and these stories 
in mind helped both analysts to remain pragmatic and critical about the potential impact of 
changes. One should note that this view challenges continuous improvement motto and beliefs 
associated with changes and the quest for forever higher performances. Indeed, the effects 
from changes can be negative (see hereafter in the next § about management of change). This 
knowledge (of accident model, historical dimension and stories) helped to formulate the 
questions to wonder if this program of changes solved former safety issues and if they 
generated perverse negative effects.  
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In other words, and more generally, rather than a photograph of risk management, one of the 
purposes of a safety assessment on safety management, is to situate it in a historical 
perspective. The safety assessment should provide evidence in order to appreciate the global 
trend of the system, the dynamic of risk management. So, in addition to the generic goal of a 
safety assessment and associated question (how safe is safe enough?), a second generic goal is 
to wonder if safety is improving or degrading. The outcome is often to look for provisions to 
enhance safety that provide an increase of safety margins. This generic mindset helped to 
share a broader and longer-term view which was the key overarching rationale to establish 
conclusions beyond the five-key topic of the analysis discussed hereafter. 
4.2 The use of lessons from accidents to address management of change 
In addition, the program of multiple changes set-up by the NPP operator was aimed at 
improving all performances (production, safety…). This ambitious program could require 
from IRSN some investigations on the conduct and implementation of all changes which 
could provide evidence for a potential conclusion on management of change. However, within 
the resource constraints of the assessment (e.g. the delay to conclude) which scope was rather 
on safety and radiation protection management during outages, it was considered relevant to 
focus only on the conduct of the outage management change related to the implementation of 
OCC while addressing the effects of other changes during outages. 
In high-risk industries, the risks generated by technical modifications have been monitored for 
decades by engineers and operators. The risks introduced by organizational changes have 
been widely recognized since the nineties in some industries and since the early 2000s in the 
nuclear industry by institutions such as IAEA and OECD that edited some recommendations 
and guidelines to assess risks (IAEA, 2003; OECD, 2004). In France, specific requests were 
made in the early 2000s by ASN and IRSN to the NPP operator to develop methods to address 
human and organisational factors impact of technical modifications and later of organisational 
changes. The operator had developed a method for that purpose and the implementation of 
OCC was the first organisational change to be analysed using this method (Le Guilcher and 
Carballeda, 2011; Dumont et al, 2011).   
In this context, a set of general questions was framed and formalized in the initial analysis 
document and the final report of the IRSN safety assessment to consider if this approach was 
efficient: How risks were assessed? How was OCC designed? How was change conducted? 
How were the interactions between changes taken into account? What was the support 
provided by the central engineering departments to the local plants? What adjustments have 
been required? 
The framing of this approach could be performed by most HOF analysts and would not need 
in a first approach to look at the insights from accidents. However, some issues in the 
program of change let the analyst and its supervisor to reactivate some knowledge of 
accidents and infer some potential analogy with some stories of accidents such as NASA 
before Columbia accident. Indeed, for both analysts, some key sentences seem to echo with 
the case. Indeed, the CAIB (CAIB, 2003) entitled a chapter “Turbulence in NASA hits the 
space shuttle program”. Indeed, Daniel S. Goldin, NASA’s Administrator, self-proclaimed 
that he was an “agent of change”. In order to obtain “administrative transformation” of 
NASA, Goldin engineered “not one or two policy changes, but a torrent of changes. This was 
not evolutionary change, but radical or discontinuous change.” […] “His tenure at NASA was 
one of continuous turmoil, to which the Space Shuttle Program was not immune”. 
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Though no clear written references to the lessons from accidents were made in the final 
version of the document formalising initial analysis prior to the launch of the safety 
assessment that was shared with other analysts, engineers and managers, an explicit effort 
with this perspective in mind was made to model the risk induced by an ambitious program of 
changes to improve all performances (see figure n°1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 : Safety and radiation protection outage management at 
the intersection of changes 
 
This modelling effort – in figure n°1 - has been in retrospect one of the most useful tool to 
communicate to the operator and regulator, the risks induced by the multiplication of changes 
as observed in accidents and helped to raise the challenge upon the analysis of their 
interactions.  
In addition, during the initial analysis in early 2011, a dedicated review of lessons from 
accidents was conducted in order to sensitize our lenses of analysts. It focused on the 
management of change as a root cause of some accidents (e.g. Columbia, Texas City, 
Paddington…) and the goal was to identify further issues, questions, and to formalize a grid of 
analysis. Among the lessons gained from this knowledge generation approach that were 
published and presented in May 2011 (Dechy et al, 2011), it appeared that very few changes 
motivated for safety reasons were the root cause of accidents. Though, they could complexify 
a system’s safety (Sagan, 1993, 2004), organisational changes to improve safety were often 
implemented after events. To the opposite, changes motivated by performance goals are a 
recurring cause of accidents. This research work was useful to consider that effects of change 
can be positive and/or negative. Therefore, a pragmatic and critical approach was determined 
as relevant for the safety assessment in coherence with § 4.1. With these insights, and rather 
than focusing only on the risk analysis, the time dimension appeared to be a key aspect of 
change and an opportunity to consider, implying that a proper monitoring of effects of change 
would be relevant to gain empirical evidence of their effects. These lessons from accidents 
impacted more broadly the rationale for the conduct of the assessment.  
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4.3 The use of lessons from accidents to address organisational complexity 
The previous assessment of management of safety in 2008 focused on how decision-making 
was impacted by the privatisation of French NPP. This analysis on the production pressures 
was explicitly referred to be influenced by lessons from accidents (Montmayeul, 2006, 
Rousseau, 2008; Dechy et al, 2016). So was the level of analysis, which shifted from human 
error to flaws in decision-making processes which are indeed often mentioned in accident 
analysis (Vaughan, 1996; Llory, 1996; Morel, 2002, CAIB, 2003). Some flaws were found by 
IRSN during 2007 outages and recalled in § 4.1 (asymmetry of power relations between 
project and operations, staffing issues, over-burdening the schedule). The OCC was for the 
NPP operator a new organisation that would cope with those vulnerabilities.  
In this context, an analysis on the scope of organisational complexity was considered as it 
articulated also with the two formers (production pressures, decision-making). Indeed, the 
initial analysis enable to grasp the complexity of outage management: thousands of activities 
have to be prepared within a project team for months by several tens of maintenance and 
operation specialists and with subcontractors in order to be executed in a few weeks by 
hundreds of actors from maintenance, operations and subcontractors that are coordinated for 
about a year by a dozen of engineers. The interface management (communication flows, 
coordination, cooperation) between multiple actors (OCC, shift operations, maintenance, 
subcontractors, safety, radiation protection, logistics…), internal and external, at different 
level of hierarchy, in different space, territories and time all along the organisation chain from 
preparation years and months before, to the execution (territorial complexity and time 
complexity with synchronisation issues at different phases) challenged the continuity of 
decision-making processes. It enabled also to address how trade-offs integrate safety concerns 
beside the schedule, production pressures and other concerns. In this context, the new outage 
project coordination organisation (OCC) was introducing new interfaces with new 
communications lines and with new people who had to understand and take ownership of the 
outage preparation. In such context, one could wonder about the effects on information 
reliability and decision-making.  
The relevance of this scope of assessment was confirmed by the benchmark performed in 
North American NPP where interface issues between operation and maintenance were 
familiar, and OCC was indeed considered as adding an interface to solve an interface problem 
which would increase the complexity of the organisation.  
Topics like organisational structure, processes of coordination, communication, cooperation 
are widely addressed in the human and social sciences literature and familiar to HOF 
specialists. However, here again, the two analysts considered that there were strong echoes 
with accidents, especially the Paddington rail collision in United Kingdom in 1999 and the 
Columbia space shuttle loss in 2003). Organisational complexity (internal, external with 
subcontractors), interface issues and fragmentation after privatisation, were at the origin of 
several accidents which the analyst and supervisor were familiar to as they had produced 
knowledge such as grid of analysis related to these accidents. Complexity was in this sense 
defined as a pathogenic organisational factor that could be analysed within an organisational 
diagnosis (see § 2.3, Rousseau and Largier, 2008; Llory and Dien, 2010).  
In addition, similarly that for the topic of management of change, an additional and dedicated 
effort was made to review several accidents with these root causes to establish more detailed 
knowledge of accidents. A paper has been prepared in parallel of data collection and analysis 
for IRSN safety assessment all along 2012: on organisational complexity (Dechy et al, 2012; 
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Dien et al, 2013). Additionally, at the end of IRSN analysis, a paper was made on 
organisational fragmentation (Dien and Dechy, 2013). This research showed that complexity 
can help to some extent safety (for instance with automated sequence, additional safety 
devices), but it was observed how adverse can become the trend to increased organisational 
complexity through division of labour, hyper-specialisation, bureaucratisation, matrix 
organisation to communication channels, blurred responsibilities and increased the challenges 
of coordination, cooperation and integration. 
4.4 The use of lessons from accidents to address subcontractor’s integration 
Along the previous line of assessment on organizational complexity and interface 
management, a specific room was considered for the external interfaces involving 
subcontractors. Indeed, in some type of maintenance activities, up to 80% are subcontracted. 
The new outage organization provisions aimed at better integrating subcontractors in 
preparation work but as well in decision-making processes for instance at interface with OCC. 
In this purpose, some questions were prepared to define the analysis framework like the 
reality and level of integration at the level of the work organisation, the impact of these 
relationships with oversight, the effect of the different type of structures… One should notice 
that the depth of analysis was aimed to remain limited in this safety assessment as it was 
agreed with the ASN to launch in 2012 a dedicated safety assessment focused on the 
subcontracting process. In this case, the assessment was therefore more focused on the 
interface and integration of subcontractors. 
Subcontracting is often looked as a risk for safety and health conditions though it is used by 
companies to improve performance. No extensive review of academic literature in human and 
social sciences was directly performed by the coordinator analyst as it was specifically 
performed for the purpose of the safety assessment on subcontracting process that was 
launched during the outage assessment. However, the issue of subcontracting has been 
highlighted in several accidents in France such as DC-10 crash at Ermenonville in 1974 
(Llory, 1996) and AZF in Toulouse in 2001 (Dechy et al, 2004), in Macondo oil spill in Gulf 
of Mexico in 2010 or in the case of Challenger shuttle loss in 1986 with communication flaws 
between Morton Thiokol engineers, their management and NASA regarding the fatal decision 
to launch the shuttle.  
Similarly, a specific review of lessons from accidents which root causes involve 
subcontractors was undertaken to produce some insights, questions, issues to address and was 
formalized in a publication along the analysis in 2012 (Dien et Dechy, 2012) and after the 
finalization of the assessment on fragmentation issue as an articulation of complexity, 
subcontracting and privatization (Dien et Dechy, 2013). Among these, the knowledge gained 
by this analysis of lessons from accidents showed an increase of complexity with the 
divergence of interests which challenge communication at interface for instance during 
preparation work, under-investments in skills, under-reporting of field issues in the learning 
from experience. The fragmentation of organizational network with less interactions 
challenged the relationships, the skills at interface and favour insular attitudes.  
4.5 The use of lessons from accidents to address human resources management 
The topic of human resources was particularly identified for integration in the analysis 
framework as it was impacted by the organizational change and the implementation of OCC. 
Indeed, to operate 24h/24h and 7 days a week in other to reduce outage duration and provide 
availability of outage project decision-makers for issues that arise overnight and over the 
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week-end activities, it required staff in quantity and quality. The operator had identified the 
risk of stressing the staffing capabilities in numbers and in competencies to operate OCC and 
the ASN had already observed adverse consequences. Indeed, it would require to set-up shift 
hand-overs with enough competent engineers in maintenance and operations. However, the 
request for staffing occurred at a time where the French NPP workers were about to retire 
with 30 to 50% leaving in 5 years. Within this context, several questions were prepared to 
support the analysis framework on human resources management: as the OCC requires 
staffing in quantity and quality, how is it implemented? What are the side effects? How are 
the skills acquisition managed? What are the effects of the human resources policy? 
Human resources management is an important issue in management, human and social 
sciences that is often addressed when conducting a HOF analysis within high-risk industries 
as it started several decades ago with the ‘human error’ concept. IRSN had completed in 2006 
a thorough assessment of competencies management. Indeed, the skills acquisition and 
maintenance were an important issue in perspective of the retirement wave. In addition, 
human resources management was already one of the pathogenic organisational factors that 
was formalised in organisational diagnosis framework (Rousseau and Largier, 2008; Llory 
and Dien, 2010). Therefore, no complementary analysis of lessons from accidents was found 
necessary and enough lines of assessment could be raised. However, the lessons from root 
causes of accidents with under-staffing at Texas-city refinery in 2005 and years of workforce 
reduction at NASA in the nineties were in the background references of the coordinator 
analyst and its supervisor. 
4.6 The use of lessons from accidents to address learning process from outages 
Learning from events, often called operating experience feedback in the nuclear industry, is 
recognized as a priority in risk management, especially since Three Mile Island accident in 
1979. It was found that an incident could become a nuclear accident implying a nuclear 
reactor meltdown. This accident had precursors in the US at Davis-Besse NPP in 1977 and in 
Switzerland at Beznau NPP in 1974 (Llory, 1999). The NPP operator was also looking at 
improving learning from outage unexpected events by setting-up within the outage project 
team a dedicated team called “high-impact” team. This team’s goal was to capitalize lessons 
to avoid the recurrence of the same unexpected situations as these kinds of events challenge 
the outage team capabilities and the duration of outage project. Within this context, the 
questions prepared for the assessment were about the process to identify and capture lessons, 
the overall efficiency of learning and the efficiency of the use of lessons in outage 
preparation. Moreover, the French NPP operator made in 2009 an internal audit which pointed 
some deficiencies in the operating experience feedback processes and benchmarked the north 
American NPP which implemented a so-called ‘corrective action program’. A reform of the 
learning device and organization was in progress and its support to outage learning was 
raised.  
Operating experience feedback performed by NPP operator on around 10 reportable events 
per year per reactor are challenged on a continuous basis since the eighties by IRSN and ASN. 
In addition, the integration of HOF in the event analysis has been regularly investigated by 
IRSN since the nineties. It was known that some accidents were partly caused by failures to 
learn, for instance since Three Mile Island accident (Llory, 1996, 1999). In addition, prior to 
this safety assessment, a review of several industrial accidents was made and enabled to 
formalize a grid of analysis that articulated numerous learning deficiencies (Dechy et al, 2008, 
2011, Dien et al, 2012). This specific knowledge of accidents provided more than 30 lines of 
questioning and in this context of an assessment on management of safety a more limited 
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focus to the main issues was necessary. The questions raised focused mainly on two key 
issues such as the formalisation of lessons and their use. However, the numerous learning 
failures remain in the background knowledge of the two analysts. 
5. Conclusion 
This case study helps to make more explicit how lessons and ‘knowledge from accidents’ 
were used in the context of normal operations, specifically to support the framing of a 
regulatory assessment of safety management in nuclear power plants. As researcher 
mobilising in retrospect our embedded experience of expert, as analyst and supervisor at 
IRSN, special attention was first given to the summary of the main performed expert activity 
dealing with the bigger story of the assessment of outage management. It therefore provides 
the narrative of the main expert rationale that lead to establish the framework of analysis. 
And, it was indeed in this context that the small story of the use of accident knowledge in the 
safety assessment occurred. Our research aimed at discussing some underlying factors, 
conditions that facilitated this process and the barriers we had to overcome at the analyst 
level.  
At this stage of the research, it shows that for four of the five main lines of analysis selected 
(interface management, integration of subcontractor, human resources management, learning 
from experience), some pathogenic organisational factors (POFs) were available before the 
IRSN assessment in some scientific publications or along the analysis (management of 
change). Labelled in positive terms, they could constitute five items of risk management 
provisions, but they may be affected by deficiencies or pathologies. Although, other POFs 
could be activated by this case, an implicit prioritisation effort lead to focus on the key ones 
for this safety assessment. Similarly, the sixth line of analysis, on a broader issue of potential 
safety improvement or degradation is connected to the formalisation of a generic model of 
accident.  
This background accidents’ knowledge and the memories of stories of accidents were part of 
the references of the analyst in charge and its supervisor. These references were appropriated 
because at the same time the experts conducted research on lessons from accidents. However, 
these background knowledge references are activated during the initial analysis when there is 
a confrontation to other sources of information such as the provisions implemented by the 
operators, the lessons from events, the lessons from ASN inspections, the lessons from 
previous safety assessment of IRSN. This activation may trigger either some structured 
knowledge on pathogenic organisational factors either some memory of specific accidents’ 
lessons for instance with echoes of Columbia when thinking to multiple changes or 
organisational complexity. At this stage, this kind of knowledge of accidents, either as a list of 
POFs and as a memory of some lessons already helps the analyst to raise the issue, to be 
critical, to sensitize its grid of reading, to identify a few questions for further analysis. In other 
words, it helps to focus the analyst’ mindset to a preoccupation with failure (Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2007).  
Indeed, knowledge of accidents is supporting reflexive processes. In other words, using a POF 
in this context was not a paste-and-copy exercise but was rather activated after initial analysis 
of the case of the nuclear operator. Therefore, this knowledge should be used as a starting 
point of the investigation not as an ending point. In addition, POFs are rather macroscopic and 
generic which implies a loss of context. The investigation consists in analysing the relevance 
and intensity of the POF with regard to the context and determine the potential adverse impact 
on safety.  
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However, the level of abstraction related to the knowledge of accidents remains limited if the 
analyst can only rely on generic POFs. In other words, it was found necessary to establish a 
more refined grid of analysis by using the standard approach of reviewing lessons from 
several accidents with a narrow focus on one POF in order to elaborate a more structured and 
refined knowledge of accidents with analytic and synthetic conclusions. Some of the lessons 
were formalised before the IRSN assessment on production pressure by another researcher 
and on learning from experience in association with the analyst. However, some topics such 
as organisational change, complexity, subcontracting and fragmentation were not analysed in-
depth before the safety assessment. In this context, and in a role of research-intervention, 
specific reviews of lessons from accidents were performed in association with other 
researchers to provide a structured knowledge of accidents ready for use. Being an active 
participant researcher in these reviews that lead to four scientific publications in French 
definitely helps the assimilation as an analyst. 
So, in summary, the use of the knowledge of accidents was favoured by available publications 
on POFs that were part of the analysts’ background knowledge on top of the memory of 
accident stories acquired by reading and researching on reports of lessons from accidents. The 
appropriation of this knowledge was favoured by the cumulative role of researchers and 
analysts who themselves produced some of this knowledge for the specific use in the situation 
to support their expertise for assessing the management of safety. This configuration will 
likely contrast with other configurations of knowledge generation and use. With this double 
hat of knowledge producer and researcher and analyst, we played a role of acteur-pivot 
(Journé and Raulet-Crauset, 2005) with a dedicated responsibility in the framing of the 
analysis.  
Finally, this case study on the use by experts of accidents’ knowledge to support the framing 
of an assessment of safety management in normal operations starts to show how we can build 
a bridge between two research traditions, relying on lessons from accidents and normal 
operations. It was beneficial to analysts to get more references to support choices, to sensitise 
the lenses of analysts and to support the analysis framework. This on-going case study already 
provides its first lessons but it is too early to define generic mechanisms, to generalise and to 
pave the way towards some engineering and management proposals. Further research is 
required, more in-depth and with other cases and other actors. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper is about the capacity to investigate and learn from incidents. Capacity is seen as 
the outcome of individual practices and facilitating social structures. Practitioners create 
practices that fulfil their goals in a specific work context. To the extent that a practice 
succeeds, it could be deemed a ‘good’ practice. Practices are shareable in principle, but there 
are many conditions. Creating and sharing 'good' practices depends on the social 
structures— stable and enduring social institutions, organisations or arrangements that make 
up the social world—that facilitate or limit practitioners. This paper considers structures 
under three broad headings: lifelong learning, empiricism and cooperation between 
practitioners and academics. These structures offer opportunities for improvement. 
Keywords: Values, context, empiricism, cooperation, good practice. 
“There is base51 labour, and noble labour. There is base sorrow, and noble 
sorrow. There is base joy, and noble joy. But you must not think to avoid 
the corruption of these things by doing without the things themselves. Nor 
can any life be right that has not all three. Labour without joy is base. 
Labour without sorrow is base. Sorrow without labour is base. Joy without 
labour is base.”  
John Ruskin, 1867. 
1 Introduction 
The present authors noted the following passage in the call for papers for the 55th ESReDA 
Seminar: 
“There are major challenges in bringing into practice a body of existing knowledge on 
accident investigation and learning to generate system change for safety improvement. 
This requires better understanding of the obstacles to practical application of good 
practices. Given differences in histories, technologies and culture, these obstacles are 
 Non-Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) 
 
51 In nineteenth century usage, ‘base’ could be used as an adjective to mean low value, or unworthy. 
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sometimes sector-specific, or peculiar to certain countries, or more generic. New 
strategies need to be identified to overcome the obstacles to sharing of good practice and 
improvement of the quality of safety investigations.” [Emphasis added] (ESReDA, 2018.) 
 
The present authors agree that practice is a helpful focus for improving the quality of 
investigating and learning from safety incidents52. Furthermore, improvement will depend in 
part on describing what the to-be-adopted practice is. However, this paper argues that the 
value of that description depends on knowing why the practitioner does it this way, how they 
vary their practice in different situations, and what constrains their choices. 
The concept of 'good' practice is itself contentious, as is sharing of 'good' practices. The call-
for-papers (ibid.) mentions obstacles to applying 'good' practices. Sometimes it will be that a 
'good' practice requires facilities that are absent elsewhere. For example, the ergonomics of 
some charting methods need wall space, and not all offices have that. However, physical 
reasons aside, ‘obstacles’ suggests that merely removing an impediment would allow a 'good' 
practice to flow into practitioners do. The implication is that 'good' practice is somehow self-
evident and transferable. However, what is ‘good’ in one context, might not be so ‘good’ in 
another—hence the use of inverted commas. Therefore, although there may be obstacles, 
another factor affecting application may be differences of goals and constraints between one 
situation and another. Sensitivity to context will be a recurring theme in this paper. 
To the extent that contexts have shared characteristics, sharing of practices is possible. This is 
in contrast to an extreme constructivist stand, which is that “phenomena can be understood 
only within the context in which they are studied; findings from one context cannot be 
generalised to another; neither problems nor their solutions can be generalised from one 
setting to another” (Guba and Lincoln, 1989; p.25). However, if the contextual aspects of a 
good practice can be understood, then perhaps that practice could be generalised to other 
settings that share those aspects. Later in the paper, examples are given of 'good' practices of 
interviewing. Some aspects of practice that are claimed to be 'good' in the independent 
investigation setting may not be tenable in the self-investigation or regulatory investigation 
settings. On the other hand, some other aspects of interviewing 'good' practice, such as the 
PEACE model in law enforcement (Clarke and Milne, 2001) seem to be truly generic. One of 
our conclusions about empiricism in this area is the importance of accounting for the 
conditions under which a practice can be claimed as ‘good’. 
The present authors agree with the implication made in the call for papers, that developing, 
identifying and sharing 'good' practice could happen to a greater extent than at present. The 
interviewees (investigators, and managers of investigation programmes) who contributed to 
this paper often voiced frustration about this. To an extent, this frustration points to limited 
 
52 While discussing this with a French speaking colleague, it became clear that this wordy phrase ‘investigating 
and learning from incidents’ needs some explanation. The English word ‘investigate’ has two senses. The first 
sense is of inquiring into something unexpected, the second sense is to look into a case of misbehaviour (e.g. a 
crime). In practice, these two meanings interfere with each other. Sometimes while the investigators believes that 
they are inquiring into causes, other stakeholders anticipate blame and recrimination. The word ‘incident’ is in 
the wordy phrase because ‘experience’ or ‘events’ are neutral, whereas ‘incident’ has the connotation of being 
both unexpected and unwanted. The neat French phrase ‘Retour d’Expérience’ seems to avoid a lot of problems. 
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agency53 amongst practitioners to develop their practice as they see fit, as well as limited 
structures to share and learn from others. 
If 'good' practices originate in the work of the individual practitioner then what governs this 
creativity and what enables others to learn from it? The very general answer is structures— 
“stable and enduring social institutions, organisations or arrangements that make up the social 
world, and that appear to exist independently of individuals and their agency.” (Mythen, 
2012; p.125).  
The title of this paper asks whether structural weaknesses are limiting the capacity to learn 
from incidents. By ‘capacity to learn from incidents’, we refer particularly to the practices of 
investigating and learning from incidents. Insofar as the capacity to investigate and learn from 
incidents is produced by the practices of individuals, that capacity is structurally determined. 
For example, a structure like a training course enable practices to be shared, but will also limit 
the scope of what is shared. And because the definition of structure is wide, we are entitled to 
look into how different forms of structure constrain and enable creating, identifying and 
sharing 'good' practices.  
This paper looks at the impact of three, interrelated structural weaknesses on practices of 
investigating and learning from incidents: (i) the cooperation between practitioners and 
academics; (ii) empiricism in safety management, and; (iii) lifelong learning structures.  
The issue of structural weaknesses reflects the current agenda of the NRI Foundation. NRI 
was founded in 1998 to improve safety management practice. Its Board, reflecting on its 
future contribution, recognises untapped potential for cooperation between practitioners and 
academics (NRI, 2017). Hence, the hypotheses presented here concerning ‘structural 
weaknesses’ do not arise out of thin air, but are born out of reflections about how safety 
practice can be advanced. The ESReDA seminar has been a welcome focus for discussing 
these ideas with practitioners and for reviewing the literature. 
This paper is an exploratory exercise. It is written to inform discussion rather than arrive at 
conclusive findings. It reports what the authors learned from discussions with a purposive 
sample of respondents—all involved directly in investigating and learning from incidents—
about the relevance of the structures mentioned to identifying, developing and sharing 'good' 
practice. The interviews were semi-structured and lasted between one and five hours. The ten 
respondents are, or have been until recently, investigators and managers of the investigative 
function within their respective organisations. The organisations include independent safety 
investigation bodies, safety regulatory agencies, and large businesses. The businesses are in 
diverse sectors—food, chemicals, and transport— but all of the businesses have programmes 
for self-investigating safety incidents. 
 
53 Agency, in the social scientific sense “is the capacity to act freely according to one’s own choices, intentions 
and desires.” (Mythen, 2012; p124) 
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2 Good practice: what is meant by the term? 
The term ‘good practice’ does not have a settled definition. During the interviews held for this 
paper, the present authors paid attention to the different meanings attached to the phrase. Two 
meanings seemed particularly close, yet distinct: method and 'good' practice. In the area of 
incident investigation, method usually refers to a formalised procedure, invariably written 
down somewhere or encoded as software. Practice, on the other hand, seems often to mean a 
habitual action. The 'good' prefix appears to endorse a practice, marking it as approved or 
respectable. An example from one of the interviews may help to illustrate the distinction 
between methods and 'good' practices. 
Interviewer:  We have been talking about ‘good’ practices, but what do you think 
those words mean. Is Tripod a good practice? 
Respondent: Tripod is a method, to me. What’s a good practice? We use good 
practices for a lot when we have requirements, so when there’s a 
certain requirement or a lifesaving rule and it’s more or less the way 
we make this happen, the way we comply with that rule, and we call it 
a good practice. A good practice most of the time is more or less a 
toolkit of things. 
Although distinct in their meanings, practices and methods are related. For example, the 
ECFA+ method54  is a procedure for creating timelines. In the preface of the ECFA+ manual, 
Kingston and Koornneef (2014) explain that “This is the second edition of the ECFA+ 
manual. It contains the insights gained by the authors during the last seven years of applying, 
reviewing and teaching ECFA+.” Most of those insights stemmed from observations of how 
people actually worked with ECFA+. The authors incorporated into the ECFA+ procedure, 
rules derived from practices that they evaluated as ‘good’. Similarly, when training people to 
use the EFCA+ method, the expectation is that users will incorporate ECFA+ principles into 
various aspects of their practice, as well as being competent to apply the method ‘as taught’ if 
needed.  
2.1 'Good' practice and practitioner’s discretion 
In keeping with the above, the word practice is taken to mean how a practitioner does their 
work, or some aspect of it. Furthermore, ‘practice’ is taken to be discretionary; the 
practitioner is free to do their work this way, or another way. What makes a practice ‘good’ is 
that doing the work that way achieves the goals of the work, in ways that fit within the 
constraints of the context in which the work is done.  
Practice also implies the freedom of the practitioner to experiment, to find better ways of 
doing their work. This also means having the freedom to experiment when it produces 
negative results. As some costs and some outcomes may be unacceptable to stakeholders, this 
freedom, like all freedoms, is relative. Between acceptable and unacceptable boundaries for 
experimentation is the space where 'good' practice can develop. A mandatory behaviour is 
better referred to as a method, procedure or simply as a ‘rule’. 
 
54 Events and Conditional Factors Analysis. 
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2.2 Values define practice as ‘good’, ‘good enough’, ‘poor’, or ‘corrupt’. 
The word ‘good’ implies values, and one of the issues about 'good' practice is that it is not 
always clear which values are promoted by a practice that is claimed to be ‘good’ (Everitt and 
Hardiker, 1996). As values are to some extent subjective, we should expect there to be some 
scope for disagreement about which values define 'good' practice and, even if there is 
consensus about that, differing views about their relative priority. Furthermore, if it useful to 
talk about practices as ‘good’, we may also find ourselves discussing practices that are ‘good 
enough’, ‘poor’ or, if they represent a betrayal of values, ‘corrupt’. 
Lewin (1946) notes that one cannot improve one’s practice unless it is clear what one is trying 
to achieve.  
“In a field that lacks objective standards of achievement, no learning can take place. If 
we cannot judge whether an action has led forward or backward if we have no criteria 
for evaluating the relation between effort and achievement, there is nothing to prevent 
us from making the wrong conclusions and to encourage the wrong work habits. 
Realistic fact-finding and evaluation is a prerequisite for any learning.”  
(Lewin, 1946; p.35) 
In an organisational setting, explicit criteria are also useful for monitoring quality, to ensure 
that goals are pursued consistently and standards maintained. However, not all values will be 
equally clear, or understood and valued by all stakeholders in the same way. Full consensus 
about what is good and about priorities, as Everitt (1996) points out, is unlikely.   
A further complication is that an organisation’s espoused values are not always identical to 
their implicit values (so-called ‘values in use’) that guide actual practice (Argyris and Schön, 
1975). For example, an organisation might prize the scale and inclusiveness of its 
investigation programme whilst also valuing depth of investigation. However, with finite 
resources, an investigating organisation cannot maximise both the volume of incidents 
investigated and the depth of each investigation. According to some of the interviews with 
practitioners working in self-investigation programmes, volume usually wins in that setting. 
One interviewee stated that allowing enough time to investigate properly is a condition 
imposed by the business: 
“Time is a critical resource in an investigation and, in commercial world, you will 
never get away from that completely.” 
Therefore, the number of investigations is likely to be explicit and monitored, while depth is 
left implicit and unmanaged (which is what we have heard from interviewees working in 
organisations that conduct a high volume of investigations).  
2.3 The overlap between the 'good' and ‘best’ practice concepts  
In this paper, the term ‘best’ practice is put aside. Definitions vary, but ‘best’ practices are 
notionally “those that will lead to the superior performance of a company” (Camp, 1989; cited 
in Davies and Kochhar, 2002). In their extensive review, Wellstein and Kieser (2011) 
conclude that ‘best practice’ is “a buzzword launched by consultants out of marketing 
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purposes” (page 686). Farrell (2002) echoes those remarks, and notes that there are types of 
organisation, such as standards bodies and software houses, that also use the term to advocate 
their products.  
There is no consensus about the level of abstraction at which a ‘best’ practice can be 
described. A ‘best’ practice may sometimes be little more a stylised interpretation of practice, 
or even a philosophy (e.g. ‘Lean Production’, Womack et al., 1990), rather than a detailed 
description of practice observed in context. Wellstein and Kieser (2011) conclude that ‘best’ 
practices cannot be objectively identified, and the ability to transfer them between 
organisations is fundamentally contested.  
There is no neat dividing line between the concepts of good practice and best practice. As 
overlapping terms, all the criticisms just made about ‘best’ practice may also apply to 'good' 
practice. Perhaps, because ‘good’ is a more modest claim than ‘best’, the criticisms apply to a 
lesser degree. However, the prudent advice is that each practice claimed to be good must be 
examined on its particular merits and compared to its goals. 
2.4 Context and the objectification of practice  
In the area of incident investigation, there has been a tendency to objectify practice; to ‘distil’ 
its essence and to ‘bottle it’ in tools and guidelines. Perhaps this is done in the interests of 
writing clear procedures. Perhaps combining the words ‘good’ and ‘practice’ conveys the idea 
that a way of doing something is intrinsically good, and therefore separable from the 
practitioner and the context. However, the effect of the distillation is to remove the contextual 
details that allow practitioners to assess the value and suitability of the practice. Wellstein and 
Kieser (2011) found attempts to transfer practices by stripping them of their original context 
to be “highly problematic” (p.692). Even if practitioners in a new setting, perfectly emulate a 
practice, it may not measure-up as ‘good’ using the yardsticks that apply in the new situation. 
We take it as axiomatic that 'good' practices are a function of their context and are good only 
to the extent that the constraints and values in the new context are shared with the old.  
The NRI Foundation has acted both as poacher and gamekeeper of objectification. As 
gamekeeper, its board members have presented warnings in past ESReDA seminars that 
investigation tools “are servants not masters” (Frei, et al., 2003) and that practitioners should 
beware of “methodolatory”, that is, of treating a tool or a method as universally applicable 
and intrinsically valuable (Kingston and Mertens, 2007). As a poacher, the Foundation 
maintains in the public domain a number of user manuals (e.g. MORT Tree Analysis, Events 
and Conditional Factors Analysis, Energy Trace and Barrier Analysis) but has not so far 
published any case studies that document how practitioners apply these methods. Wellstein 
and Kieser (2011) demonstrate that good documentation is not itself sufficient to achieve the 
transfer of a practice. Even so, as a necessary condition to sharing, it seems that writers need 
to do a better job—not merely documenting the activity of a practice, but also the salient 
aspects of context, including the viewpoint of the practitioners that enact it. In other words, 
the writer must understand why that particular practice works well in that environment. 
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2.5 'Good' practice: a cliché? 
Any term used very often is in danger of becoming a cliché; the phrases 'good' and ‘best’ 
practice are used a lot. A Google search returns 19.9 and 49.7 million hits, respectively.  One 
of the properties of clichés is that sheer repetition deadens the critical sense of readers and 
listeners. Hence, rather than merely offending norms of literary style, some clichés may be 
rather more pernicious. In this case, the property of being a cliché makes it easier to have 
implicit claims to 'good' practice accepted uncritically.  
Lifton (1961) argued that the regime in Maoist China used clichés as a means of mind control. 
He describes coining clichés as a process in which, 
 
“The most far-reaching and complex of human problems are compressed into, brief, 
highly reductive, definitive-sounding phrases, easily memorised and easily expressed.”. 
(Lifton, 1961, p.429). 
Lifton describes this kind of cliché as ‘thought-terminating’, and an example of language that 
is 
“… prematurely abstract, highly categorical, relentlessly judging and to anyone but its 
most devoted advocate, deadly dull: in Lionel Trilling’s phrase, “the language of non-
thought.” (Ibid.).  
Although the present authors do not argue for a different term (e.g. ‘effective’ practice), users 
of the term 'good' practice need to be alert to the ease of its abuse55. 
3. Practices in investigating and learning from incidents 
This paper is about the capacity to investigate and learn from incidents. The present paper 
looks at capacity as a function of individual practices and social structures.  
To ensure that the present authors and interviewees had a shared definition of incident 
investigation, the Kingston et al. (2006) description was used. According to that description, 
incident investigation is composed of 34 tasks. Taken as a whole, the list defines ‘what’ 
investigation is. The practices associated with these generic tasks comprise ‘how’ a 
practitioner investigates an incident.   
Kingston et al. (2006) researched the list with investigation in mind, rather than learning from 
incidents. Nonetheless, some of the tasks mentioned appear to be implied in learning from 
incidents, according to their numbering: items (29) Develop remedial actions, (32) Debrief 
affected staff/others, and (33) Manage recommendations. For the purposes of this work, 
including briefing the interviewees, learning from an incident was defined as preventative 
change in at least one level—from individual learning to change of organisational policy and 
 
55 The term, ‘lessons learned’ risk being another thought-terminating cliché in this area. One of the present 
authors (Kingston) witnessed recently a presentation in an organisation given by a member of its safety staff. 
One of the slides shown was titled “Familiar lessons learned from recent incidents”.  
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strategy. Corrective action on its own was not considered as learning, because this kind of 
action is usually isolated in time and place. 
3.1. Examples of 'good' practices of investigating incidents  
Although the interviews were about capacity, some specific examples of 'good' practice were 
asked for to ensure that everyone was talking about the same subject. A selection is presented 
in Table 4, below. These were typically discussed in a fairly general way, more as goals than 
actions, but with enough familiarity to assure that the interviewees had detailed knowledge. 
• Making shareable, reviewable models of the incident (e.g. ECFA+, STEP type 
descriptions). 
• Reviewing the context of the investigation during the investigation.  
• “Timeline is the bedrock, because it shows how conditions combine with events to 
produce the accident”. 
• Evidence must be accurate (e.g. actual heights, weights etc., measured by reliable, 
calibrated instruments).  
• The ‘chain of custody’ must be maintained. 
• Through discussion, the Health, Safety & Environment team decide their priorities for 
supporting specific investigations. 
• Investigator’s awareness of the context for victims and next of kin. 
• Laser-scanning to quickly and accurately record positions (before the accident scene is 
disturbed). 
• Actively managing stakeholders’ expectations of an investigation.  
• “Terms-of-reference serve two purposes. Inside your investigation is to steer your 
investigation. Outside your investigation is for them to have control in your 
investigation.” 
• Identify improvements needed in safety management. 
• Identify the witnesses as early as possible. 
• Review, by investigators and by stakeholders, is critical to self-investigation. 
Table 4. Examples of investigative 'good' practices volunteered by 
interviewees 
3.2. Examples of 'good' practices of learning from incidents  
As with investigation, interviewees were asked for examples of 'good' practices for learning 
from incidents. A selection is presented in Table 5, below. 
• Use of plain language in reports (because the boss may be non-technical, and the 
report may be read by others who are non-technical)  
• Analyse events with similar outcomes because causation will differ (the danger is 
treating is treating 'similar' as the same)  
• The rate of safety alerts can improve learning by giving the statistical picture (this is 
learning based on the mass of initial reports, not the final investigation outcomes). 
• Reviewing the findings of an investigation at a meeting representing the different 
stakeholder groups, allowing each representative to identify the learning points. 
Table 5. Examples of 'good' practices in learning from incidents 
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3.3. Examples of 'good' practices that overlap investigating and learning from 
incidents  
Schreuder (2017), discussing the goals of investigation, points out that learning from an 
incident often competes with other goals, such as apportioning liability. Therefore, it is not 
safe to assume that all investigative 'good' practices will also be 'good' practices of learning 
from incidents—the interviews produced some examples of this: 
• An interviewee from a regulatory agency: “The aim of investigation is to improve 
safety; that’s what they all say! The only goal?  I have hundreds of goals here!” 
• An interviewee from an independent investigation body observed that “If the people 
involved in an accident were involved in the investigation, they might learn a lot more 
than they would just by reading report. However, conflicts of interest exist.”  
• An interviewee from an airline noted that aviation has a strong culture of “findings 
must be fixed”. Therefore, on the strength that recommendations reliably lead to 
actions, this appears to be 'good' practice with respect to learning from incidents. 
However, the interviewee pointed out some drawbacks both to investigation and to 
safety management more widely. The “findings must be fixed” culture encourages 
investigators to produce ‘fixable findings’ but not to take opportunities to understand 
the sources of the problem found. He saw ‘finding must be fixed’ as a form of 
normalising deviance, and that it creates complex patchworks of fixes that may 
actually weaken control and resilience. 
3.4. ‘Good’ depends on context 
Only in some contexts are specific practices seen as ‘good’. For example, in the UK, after 
suffering technical criticisms in prosecution cases, regulators have tightened their 
arrangements for chain-of-custody during investigations. Maintaining a chain of custody 
means securing and controlling access to material evidence in a way that demonstrates that 
the evidence is reliable and free from tampering. However, in all but the most serious self-
investigation cases, maintaining a chain of custody is irrelevant.  
Another example was given in respect of witness interviewing. One of the respondents 
interviewed by the present authors recounted an experience on an investigation training 
course for airline managers.  
 “I was in an interviewing session and the interviewee—the actor—was going to 
script but was going a little bit aggressive, and …  I thought: ‘I am an airline 
investigator: if we’re in the same airline, then I can’t hold the interview to the point that 
it actually breaks down to a complete catastrophe’. He [the trainer] came back and said 
“you had the guy on the ropes” (those were [his] words with regards to this battery) 
“you should have gone in for the kill”.  And if I was an external investigator, and this is 
my only opportunity to speak to this person, then maybe I will ‘go in for the kill’, but if 
I’m in an airline, this person has got a day job and he is my colleague. Am I destroying 
them or am I educating them or am I trying to find the facts?  So, I didn’t get the same 
take as other people from all these things”. 
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3.5. Instrumental use of the phrase 'Good practice’ 
Some interviewees voiced caution about how the term ‘good practice’ is used, particularly 
because of the unsubstantiated claim to effectiveness. One interviewee voiced scepticism as 
follows— 
“…we’re very good at that ‘cut and paste’ kind of approach to things here” […] “It 
usually involves—quite a lot of the time—involves cut and paste of some sort of 
documentation or some sort of report or whatever. But we’ve never had this means of 
coherently and consistently making judgements about whether whatever is presented is 
actually good. We don’t have any panels of experts to think about, pontificate over these 
examples.” 
Some of the interviewees mentioned that 'good' practice can sometimes refer to methods that 
are advocated externally or even imposed on investigators. 
 
“The more skilled the investigator, the less dependent on a method. For a bad 
investigator, a method can help as a guideline, but it will not lead to a 'good' 
investigation and learning.” 
“In an investigation you never really know what the outcome will be. You make a 
plan and you have to be able to adjust that plan. That's a bit where those methods are 
against me, I do not like to force myself into a harness and those methods create a 
harness if you take [it] literally. To begin: You become very heavy. It impedes your 
freedom of movement. You often have such a flap for your eyes with such a harness. Your 
ears are often sealed and, if you have to urinate, it runs along your legs. That 
intrusiveness (of such harness) in an investigation is exactly the opposite of how you can 
come to learning.” 
The quotation is given in its entirety to preserve the parallel it draws between practitioner 
discretion and self-respect. For that interviewee, mandated investigation methods derogate, 
even vitiate, professional responsibility, and are counter-productive to the investigator’s role 
as a learning agent. 
A wider point here is the underlying power balance between the practitioner’s discretion and 
their organisations’ priorities. As discussed earlier, the term 'good' practice is redolent of 
practitioner-led empiricism. There will be occasions, as the ‘cut and paste’ scenario suggests, 
when this is misleading—perhaps intentionally. Practitioners are justified, even professionally 
bound, to treat claims of 'good' practice with scepticism. Later on, in section 7, this point will 
be returned to when discussing evaluation of practice. 
4. Social Structures and 'good' practice 
Mythen’s definition of social structures is paraphrased below; the phrase ‘individuals and 
their agency’ has been replaced by ‘practitioners and their discretion’. 
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We have argued that practice is discretionary. However, the practitioner’s freedom of choice 
is relative, not absolute. Practitioners do not work in a social vacuum: they rely on the 
resources of others, chiefly those of their employers, and work towards achieving goals that 
are shared by other stakeholders, at least in part. Furthermore, how the practitioner can 
achieve these goals is constrained by numerous contextual factors. Therefore, to understand 
how 'good' practice might be better created, identified and shared, it is necessary to look at the 
social structures surrounding practice. 
The present authors suggest that structures both limit and enable the development of 'good' 
practice. In principle, an investigation training course is designed to enable the practitioner. 
Similarly, a debrief with investigators might aim to identify potential 'good' practices and 
points to improve. The training course and the requirements for the debrief can both be 
considered as structures that enable practice. Conversely, investigators may be given limited 
time in which to conduct investigations, thus ruling out relatively time-consuming practices 
that might be otherwise valuable. Another example is adversarial juridical structures that rule 
out certain practices that might otherwise promote learning from an incident.  
All of the examples just given are of structures with fairly direct impacts on 'good' practice. 
However, understanding structures that have indirect impacts may also offer insights into how 
to improve capacity through creating and sharing 'good' practices. For this reason, the present 
authors have adopted quite broad headings under which to consider social structures: lifelong 
learning, empiricism and cooperation between academics and practitioners. These broad 
categories overlap, but for clarity they are discussed separately. 
5. Lifelong learning and the capacity to investigate and learn from 
incidents  
Lifelong learning empowers individuals to contribute to the goals of the institutions in which 
they participate. This section looks at how lifelong learning contributes to the capacity to 
investigative and learn from incidents. 
The aim of lifelong learning is defined by Eurostat (2016) as the  
Social structures are stable and 
enduring social institutions, 
organisations or arrangements that 
appear to exist independently of 
practitioners and their discretion. 
 
Adapted from Mythen (2012) 
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“Lifelong, voluntary and self-motivated pursuit of knowledge for personal or 
professional reasons. The overall aim of learning is to improve knowledge, skills and 
competencies”. 
Various authoritative publications (e.g. UNESCO, 2010; Eurostat; and, the European 
Commission, 2012) define lifelong learning. In general, these agree that lifelong learning 
includes a range of formal, informal and non-formal learning. These terms are subject to 
various definitions, but Smith’s is indicative: 
“Formal education is linked with schools and training institutions; non-formal with 
community groups and other organizations; and informal covers what is left, e.g. 
interactions with friends, family and work colleagues.” 
Smith (2008) 
Smith’s definition is helpful, but very coarse grained with respect to the structures at work in 
lifelong learning. It is convenient to think about learners attending courses offered by 
organisations, and then returning to their workplace more knowledgeable, competent, and 
skilled. But even if we thought of learners as robots to be programmed, rather than as 
practitioners with their own intentions and values, there are numerous steps between creating 
knowledge, running a course, and enacting behaviour in practice; as well as complexity 
throughout. It is questionable how structures like educational and training courses affect 
'good' practice. There appear to be large discontinuities and assumptions.  
5.1. Education and training structures aimed at competence in incident 
investigation  
One example was given earlier (page 158) in respect of interviewing (‘you had him on the 
ropes’). Colleagues in most workplaces can’t pin each other ‘on the ropes’, not if they want to 
work together afterwards. Neither can law enforcers (in the UK) cross the line into oppressive 
interviewing, not if they want interview evidence accepted by the Courts. But the interesting 
thing about this example is that a university course advocated practice that would be ‘poor’, 
even ‘corrupt’, if applied in the work settings of the students for whom the course is intended.  
Another example is drawn from the experience of the present authors. By 2002, one of the 
Competent Authorities, applied Events and Conditional Factors Analysis (ECFA+, Kingston 
and Koornneef, 2014) widely in their investigations of incidents on major hazards sites. Using 
ECFA+ was not a procedural requirement, but its inclusion in practice grew from a handful of 
inspectors to most of them. However, in 2003, on the basis of theoretical research it 
commissioned into investigation methods, the regulatory body in question mandated that all 
its inspectors must use ECFA+. Many inspectors in this widened group reported that they 
found the analysis a burdensome task that did little to help them secure the goals of their 
investigations. On reflection, although it was the same regulatory organisation, the 
investigative settings of its directorates were often dissimilar. The Competent Authority’s 
process safety investigations often needed inspectors to describe long chains of cause and 
effect, and to find gaps in their understanding of how these were manifest in the engineered 
processes in which the incident occurred. Inspectors found ECFA+ to be helpful for this. 
However, inspectors investigating occupational safety accidents are often focussed on finding 
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(enforceable) conditions that were thematically relevant to the accident, but not necessarily 
causal. For example, an up-to-date risk assessment might not have prevented the accident, but 
an out-of-date risk assessment is a breach of legally enforceable requirements. Applying 
ECFA+ adds little value to that, but takes time nonetheless. As with most organisations that 
conduct investigations, there was a corporate aspiration towards rationality, as exemplified by 
evidence-based policy-making. However, in this instance the evidence-base was at quite a 
high level of abstraction: theories of accident cause and general methods of accident 
investigation, rather than theories of regulatory investigation born from observation across a 
variety of regulatory investigative settings.  
A third example is the UK police investigative interviewing course—PEACE.  
The PEACE course was based on an earlier evaluation study of 400 videotaped police 
interviews with suspects. A training course based on that study was developed in 1992. This 
provided instruction on interviewing victims and witnesses as well as suspects. (How the 
content on witness and victim interviewing was developed is not described in the documents 
seen by the present authors). Clarke and Milne (2001) report that the course, intended for 
officers with 5-10 years experience, was held in such “high regard” that it was made available 
to all police officers from the mid-1990s. However, an evaluation study done in 1998 found 
only limited positive impact on practice. Nonetheless, by 2001, 70% of officers in England 
and Wales had been trained. Clarke and Milne’s 2001 evaluation study also found 
disappointing results. Paradoxically, there is plenty of support for the PEACE model (e.g. 
Shawyer and Milne, 2015), and for PEACE training. However, the well-documented 
experience with PEACE shows that training alone is not enough to cultivate 'good' practice. 
As well as opportunities for instruction, and to experience simulations, courses also serve as 
structures for lateral sharing of knowledge between the participants. The extent to which this 
happens in general is a moot point. However, speaking as trainers, the present authors note 
that promoting this aspect of knowledge sharing is expensive in time, unpredictable, and 
although appreciated by most learners, is not appreciated by all. 
Interviewer:   “Did you feel there was scope for the students [of the investigation 
training course] to share their experiences about what works and 
what doesn’t?” 
Respondent:  “No, not really. Actually, the debriefs were quite weak. After a two-
day simulation I got a ten-minute debrief. And the ten-minute debrief 
was quite one-way from the course/simulation leader: What you 
‘might like to think about’… “when ‘PC Plod’ stood all over your 
evidence”, or… “when you interviewed ‘Mavis Whoever’, you kept 
asking ‘was it a white aeroplane,’ instead of asking ‘what colour was 
the aeroplane?’”. But not: “What did you think about it all? or “Joe 
Bloggs, what did you think about it all?” Because, bearing in mind 
that those people have probably been investigating already 
elsewhere, they could not only have fed-back into the course content, 
but fed into all the other years of students in the classroom. They’ve 
definitely got the balance wrong there. And they always running 
behind, anyway. It’s hard to keep those things on time.” 
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Proponents of lifelong learning urge formal and non-formal learning to “move away from the 
structured, directed, content-led implications of ‘education’ towards a more actively engaged 
process of ‘learning’” (ETUI, 2009). However, whereas practitioners are adults, formal and 
non-formal learning structures seem often to apply design principles optimised to educating 
children. The countervailing philosophy is andragogy56, which asserts that,  
“adults should be involved in the learning process, must perceive a need to learn 
something, are oriented towards problem-focused and immediately valuable learning, 
and possess reservoirs of experiences– both successes and failures – that are resources 
for learning. Additionally, andragogy prioritizes adults’ internal motivations to learn 
over external motivations.” 
Carpenter and Linton, 2018; p.57 
If 'good' practice is shareable, then courses play a role. Courses create opportunities as well as 
providing instruction and experience via simulations. However, if they are relied upon as the 
main means of sharing 'good' practice, they are almost certain to disappoint. Education and 
training courses can do better—by better attention to context, and by creating opportunities 
for lateral sharing among practitioners and with teachers—but they are a limited means of 
increasing the capacity to investigate and learn from incidents. 
5.2. Structures, learning-to-learn and the development of practice 
If we accept that practice is defined as the way people do their work, then practice is to a great 
extent developed by the practitioners themselves. Therefore, we need to think about how they 
are enabled to develop their own practices as investigators and learners from incidents. To an 
extent, business as usual enables practitioners; they learn to investigate by doing 
investigations, and ‘learn to learn’ from incidents (e.g. how to spot trends, evaluate 
information, overcome defensiveness, influence colleagues, etc.). This can be very productive 
if there is freedom to experiment, opportunity to reflect and power to affect how resources are 
allocated. However, some practitioners will be better at this than others, and this is due to 
their competence as lifelong learners, and the structures that support/limit their capacity to 
learn. 
Lifelong learning policies in Europe emphasises individual responsibility. In essence, these 
policies assume that you are in charge of your learning (Volles, 2016). However, formal 
structures (which tend to be associated with education and training organisations) can only 
partly fulfil the development of adults as lifelong learners, and only partially resource their 
learning from ‘cradle to grave’. Therefore, there is a shortfall between the assumptions of 
lifelong learning and the extent to which it is provided for by formal structures. 
Not everyone is equipped equally to learn throughout their working lives. Looking first at 
practitioners in organisations that investigate their own incidents; some of the time, these 
practitioners will be people in professional occupations. However, in many cases, 
practitioners are people who have achieved promotion in the operational parts of 
organisations. Even if maintaining their technical qualifications, such individuals may have 
 
56 Androgogy—leading adults, in contrast to pedagogy—leading children. 
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limited competence as lifelong learners with respect to underpinning investigating and 
learning from incidents. The present authors continually encounter examples in their work of 
men and women who seem to be marooned on an island of technical qualifications. Their core 
competence gets maintained (until promoted into senior managerial positions where even this 
is discontinued) while many analytical, creative and evaluative competencies remain 
relatively undeveloped. Creating 'good' practice in investigating and learning from incidents 
depends, it is contended, on these more general competencies57—competencies that are less 
developed by the lifelong learning experiences of operational staff. This is discussed further 
in section 7.  
The problem of being ‘marooned’ on a lifelong learning island is part of a larger structural 
problem in lifelong learning. As Busccher et al. (2018) points out, “The new foundations of 
the 21st century depend on people who lack learning ability, and who are not able to adapt 
and become proficient in new insights and techniques.” … “our production workers do not see 
themselves as professional managers and will not take to this as easily"…"Maybe they were 
never treated as a professionals.” (Busccher et al., 2018; p14. Translated from Dutch by the 
present authors). 
The present authors do not have objective data about the professional backgrounds of 
practitioners in independent investigation bodies and regulatory agencies. However, some of 
the respondents in our interviews were members of that population. Our impression is that, 
although they possess the educational background and attitude to learning that Busscher talks 
about, maintaining lifelong learning is not plain sailing for them. One of the interviewees, a 
professional investigator, mentioned a methodological reflection forum in which he 
participated. This was set-up with a university and allowed the investigators and academics to 
reflect on how investigations were done. Unfortunately, this stopped meeting after staff 
changes among the key staff who sponsored it. The respondent pointed out that this was one 
of the few routes he had to a wider world of learning beyond his organisation.  
The forum mentioned by the respondent is an example of a kind of lifelong learning structure 
that the present authors feel is lacking. The closest term is informal learning. Whereas formal 
and non-formal learning are characterised by reliance on pre-established knowledge structures 
(e.g. text books, fixed syllabus, fixed instruments of verification and qualification) the 
knowledge structure of informal learning is situationally determined (Livingstone, 2006).  
Smith explains: 
“The key dimension, in many respects, is intention. Education is a conscious activity; 
learning isn’t necessarily. People may not have a clear idea of the knowledge or skill 
they want to acquire, but they are committed to a process. This focus on intention in 
education allows us to explore different ways of organizing and articulating this. My own 
preference is to separate those approaches that depend upon the planning and 
 
57 The present authors suggest that the list of competencies proposed by Nixon and Braithwaite (2018), although 
relating to investigators in the UK’s Air Accidents Investigation Branch, would be relevant to practitioners of 
self-investigation. They list 19 general competencies, including: addressing development needs; awareness of 
bias; presentation skills; writing skills; empathy; evidence-led approach to investigation; imagination; leadership 
skills; objectivity of analysis; openness to discussion and challenge; organisational skills; self-insight; team 
working; understanding the organisational mandate; and, working to standards. 
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sequencing of learning (via something like a curriculum) and those that are essentially 
dialogical or conversational (and hence hold little prospect of pre-organizing if we to 
stay true to their nature). The former can be seen as formal, and the latter as informal, 
education. 
Smith, 2008. 
Nixon and Braithwaite (2018) recognise practitioner ‘self-insight’ and ‘addressing 
development needs’ as among the various competencies needed by (professional) 
investigators. They go on say that developing those and the other competencies they describe 
“can effect transition from the good to the great investigator” (p.160). Perhaps the evidence of 
the great investigator is that their practices are judged as good by all stakeholders.  
The impression given by the interviews conducted is of unmet needs. Not specific, 
predictable, easily defined needs that might be met by formal or non-formal courses. Nobody, 
not even the practitioner, can predict exactly what they will need to know next week, or what 
scrap of recalled knowledge or chance conversation will suddenly be important in their work. 
The question is how uncertain, situationally-defined learning can be structurally supported.  
Informal learning, unlike formal and non-formal learning, has “no sustained reference to an 
intentionally organized body of knowledge” (like a syllabus or textbook). It is characterised 
by learning situations that are “incidental and spontaneous […] such as acquiring job skills”. 
Teachers and mentors may well be involved in informal learning situations, but when they are 
not, terms like “self-directed or collective informal learning” convey the idea that informal 
learning can be intentional. (Livingstone, 2006; 249). 
The words “incidental and spontaneous” make it unsurprising that informal learning is a 
difficult matter for policy makers to get much traction on. It is excluded from EUROSTAT’s 
reports about lifelong learning. Informal learning does not line-up easily with things that can 
be counted, such as the courses, hours, enrolments and other attributes of formal and informal 
learning. Nonetheless, Van Dam (2017; p.68) reports some statistics about informal learning 
in The Netherlands: 
• “38 percent of people learn a lot or quite a lot by just doing their job.” 
• “18 percent of people learn nothing and 44 percent just learn a little bit by just 
doing their job.” 
• “People learn significantly less on the job after age 35.” 
• “Informal learning supports the development of competencies that are required in 
an existing role but don’t prepare people for a very different role in the future.” 
According to the figures above, we should assume that the majority of practitioners are 
learning little, especially if they are aged 35 or over. Actually, for practitioners in self-
investigation settings, matters may be worse than in the general case. First, their skills are less 
often practiced than those of the full-time investigators in the regulatory agencies and 
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independent investigation bodies58. Second, as noted in the previous section, practitioners in 
the self-regulatory setting may at a further disadvantage if they happen to belong to the group 
that Busccher et al. (2018) claim “lack learning ability”. Therefore, if we wish the 
development of 'good' practice to be more vibrant with respect to investigating and learning 
from incidents informal learning seems to be the area to look at. 
5.3. Lifelong Learning Structures: Summary  
Practitioners create their practices. They operate at the interface between the working context 
(of investigating and learning from an incident) and the experience and resources they can call 
upon to innovate 'good' practice. Formal and non-formal learning appear to give impetus to 
developing practice, but have limited value as a direct ‘source’ of 'good' practice. Informal 
learning appears to be the main forum in which 'good' practice is developed and shared. 
However, the bias is towards formal and non-formal, and away from informal learning 
structures. The general picture is that only a minority of workers benefit from informal 
learning, and this depends in large part on their own competence as learners. It is argued that 
learning competence enables practitioners to innovate 'good' practice, to identify them and to 
share them with other practitioners.  
As Ellis (1990) points out, formal, non-formal and informal learning do not have hard 
boundaries, it’s a question of finding the right blend for different learning needs. The 
impression formed in the interviews, and in conversation with practitioners more widely, is an 
unmet need for lifelong educational opportunities to which practitioners can bring their vast 
store of practitioner knowledge and particular issues they wish to explore. Rather than 
delivering a scholarly, one-size-fits-all product, these opportunities would see academics as 
educators enabling a learning process in which they and the practitioner were equal partners. 
For some academics this would mean a change of approach, and perhaps a change in how 
academic resources are funded.  
6. Empiricism as a determinant of the capacity to investigate and learn 
from incidents 
To summarise the discussion so far. The premise of this paper is that various structures 
support the development of 'good' practice and may hold the key to improving it. The first set 
of structures was grouped under the heading of lifelong learning. Within lifelong learning, 
informal learning appears to be of particular importance to developing and sharing 'good' 
practice. However, informal learning and learning ability seem relatively marginal as a 
resource in the lives of most workers, according to Dutch statistics. For the present purposes, 
informal learning is suggested as a useful source of challenges to the assumptions of formal 
and informal learning (e.g. the ‘blended’ approach mentioned earlier). However, informal 
 
58 The situation with respect to practices for learning from incidents (rather than investigating them) may be 
different. Firstly, learning from incidents is a necessary function in the self-investigation setting, but not of the 
regulatory and independent setting. Secondly, the practices of learning from incidents may be shared with 
learning from events that are more frequent than safety incidents.  
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learning remains rather intangible. As Livingstone (2006) puts it: “the various forms of 
informal learning “constitute the most elusive and shifting domains of adult learning”. 
In this section, the concept of empiricism to identify structures that support, or limit, the 
creation of 'good' practice. Empiricism describes the creation of knowledge through 
experiment and observation, and this is one way of looking at the creation of 'good' practices. 
There is a good deal of overlap between the concepts of empiricism and informal learning; 
central to both is the idea of learning from experience. Empiricism allows us to consider how 
'good' practice is discovered by individuals, and by groups, at different levels of formality. 
These variations are discussed in the sub-sections that follow.  
Overall, the interviews conducted for this paper, suggest that empiricism is mostly commonly 
experienced by practitioners working in a relatively isolated capacity, and rather less so when 
working as a group. This section will also indicate the scope for empiricism of a more 
systematic, scientific type, as this seems to happening very little in this field. 
6.1. Empiricism and the individual practitioner  
Earlier, practitioners were described as the engines of creative practice. By acting in context, 
practitioners find ways that meet goals while respecting the constraints of situations that are 
never twice exactly the same. One might even say that practitioners are profligate innovators, 
always experimenting. Whether doing an investigative task, like taking a photograph, or 
participating in a learning activity like taking part in a debrief, each new occasion brings new 
challenges and another opportunity to refine skills and try new approaches. When something 
new works, a 'good' practice is born. It might be very similar to the previous ‘good enough’ 
practice, but the new version has some advantage over the old.  It is quite possible for this 
experimentation to happen ‘wordlessly’, beneath the level of conscious deliberation. This is a 
form of informal learning, as mentioned earlier, but focussed very much in the head of the 
individual practitioner. As Schön puts it, 
“Practitioners themselves often reveal a capacity for reflection on their intuitive 
knowing in the midst of action and sometimes use this capacity to cope with the 
unique, uncertain, and conflicted situations of practice.” 
(Schön, 1983; p.viii) 
Reflecting ‘in the midst of action’ is a powerful means to improve practice. However, it is 
limited by competing with the work itself for the attention of the practitioner. However, the 
sheer volume of work experience must go some way to compensate for this. It is not for 
nothing that Schön (1983) placed so much emphasis on reflection-in-action. Rolfe (2014) 
notes that for ‘wicked’ problems that “resist and defy our attempts to formulate, tackle and 
resolve them” the dynamic, unrelenting quality of reflection-in-action has great strength. 
6.1.1. Reflection and the practitioner 
At the level of the individual practitioner, a number of assumptions of reflective practice are 
already visible. The first of these is opportunity, which means a conducive pace of work (i.e. 
not too fast) or time enough to permit reflection. Correspondingly, the first structure governs 
how time is allocated and work prioritised. Although most of the interviewees had large 
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degrees of control over how they used their time, they all reported large workloads. Unless a 
task produced a surprise that demanded their reflection, very seldom would the practitioner 
make time for reflection after action. 
At the level of the individual, reflection appears to involve several elements, chiefly: 
awareness of emotions, availability of data, awareness of values, an understanding that relates 
causes and effects (a ‘causal model’), and the ability to reflect. All of these, visible in the 
Cambridge dictionary’s straightforward definition of reflexivity, can be thought of as 
necessary conditions.  
“The fact of someone being able to examine his or her own feelings, reactions, and 
motives (= reasons for acting) and how these influence what he or she does or thinks 
in a situation.”  
Feelings are part of reflection, but can sometimes be a reason why practitioners do not reflect. 
As one of the interviewees describes it:  
“I’m almost cringing at looking at the examples that have gone on with the different 
things. But why am I cringing? I should pick them up. Those are the things that I have 
to take through and say ‘why are they cringe-worthy?’ and, ‘what don’t I want to 
repeat from these things?’, ‘what am I trying to step away from?’ Then I’m clear from 
that ‘case study’ that I don’t ever want to be in this situation. Why? Because I want to 
be in this situation. Why? Because it does this for me. And it’s played its benefit.” 
Practitioners may also unwittingly sacrifice reflection to avoid dissonance. Argyris (1999) 
proposed that practitioners are strongly motivated to see their actions as always consistent 
with their espoused values. Skilled-unawareness is a psychological means that individuals use 
to cover-up inconsistencies from themselves. Arguably, adherents preserve their dogma (or 
more likely, the dogma that they have internalised) through skilled-unawareness, which 
enables them to overlook the misfit between the action supplied by the dogma and the needs 
of the situation to hand. As Young notes,  
 “reflexivity in any dogmatic culture always presents the possibility that the whole 
scheme of things will simply fall to pieces.” 
(Young, 1991; p.15) 
Investigator’s reflection-in-action is an engine for developing practice, whether ‘good’ or 
otherwise. When the pressure of work is very great, and inquiry is not rewarded, one would 
predict practice to develop towards fast and shallow investigation. In this respect, it is a 
species of Rasmussen’s stop rule “Keep investigating until you find a familiar cause to which 
you know the cure; then stop” (Rasmussen, 1988). Whether to avoid dissonance, or simply in 
the rush to the meet deadlines, any conscious reflection on values is likely to be truncated. 
This also is empiricism: the practitioner is learning how to meet the demands of their work, 
and tacitly defining values like ‘learning from incidents’ in ways they can live with. 
Organisations that investigate large numbers (i.e. thousands per year) of incidents, tend to use 
categories against which frequencies are monitored. Coupled with high individual workloads, 
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categorisation provides a simplification that can dominate the approach of both the 
investigator and those who are to be informed by the investigation. 
“For example, if from experience we say it’s a short landing, it starts now to have 
hints of an unstable approach, all of a sudden it doesn’t matter what really happened 
in the event, it starts to become an unstable [approach] and then gets labelled as ‘the 
unstable approach into…’ but then all the other elements of the investigation are lost. 
[…] But that is one of the points, post-investigation, as part of that debrief of the 
event, with the inquisitive mind, you [the manager receiving the input from the 
investigator] should be looking at from a different perspective. Yes, you want to hear 
the story, but you should be then relating it back to your organisation as a whole. And 
also, the investigation process as whole, appreciating that it has its limitations, and 
questioning where it could have been stronger. But that doesn’t happen. Once we talk 
‘unstable approach’ we then focus in the learning bit on ‘unstable approach’. That’s 
where we live.” 
Unless actively opposed, structural constraints such as high workload, short deadlines, and 
cultures that prize action over inquiry, will drive investigative practice away from reaching 
goals such as learning from incidents. Disabling reflective practice means more than stalling 
the creation of 'good' practice, it may also make it harder to avoid the corruption59 of practice.  
6.1.2. Reflection through review and debrief 
So far, the discussion has focused on practitioners reflecting in isolation. However, reflection 
on practice by groups offers obvious possibilities for sharing practices. In the interviews, 
debrief and review were the overt activities most associated with reflection. What came 
through the interviews was that these activities often had a dual focus: on the goals of 
investigating the incident and the goals of learning from the incident. 
 
“[There are more or less obvious things that an investigation will pick up] that were 
directly linked to the event itself. But if you are clear on what investigation brings to 
the table, about what part it plays in your overall management of safety/risk 
management system, you should then also be taking a system view of it: as in has it 
performed? Has it [the investigation] given you what you want it to give you as a 
process? So, as well as the event, and working out why the [risk management system] 
didn’t pick up this issue, you have also got to take it back to the matter of how to 
improve the investigation process itself […] as a result of what has come out of this. 
There are two strands to the learning.” 
If combined into one activity, there appears to be a focus on the content issues (the incident) 
at the expense of discussing how the investigation was done. One of the differences between 
self-investigations and those by independent investigation bodies and regulators, is the extent 
 
59 The word ‘corruption’ is harsh, and tends to be reserved for deliberate wrongdoing, dishonesty, and the like. 
However, as Wardhough and Wilding (1993) argue, corruption is a justifiable term for conduct that betrays 
values. What should we call it when an organisation has the espoused value to learn from incidents, but enacts 
structural constraints that systematically reduce the scope and depth of learning?  
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and frequencies of review during the conduct of the investigation. In self-investigation, 
review is a limited managerial resource allocated on the basis of the safety risk, and more 
often, actual consequences of the incident being investigated. This is sometimes manifest in 
the presence of terms-of-reference for the investigation; a common practice for investigation 
of ‘serious’ events, but uncommon for anything ‘less’ serious. 
“If you look at an internal investigation, it [a terms of reference] would only be 
needed if otherwise you would not get those results [the right questions answered in the 
right way]. So, it is good to use them [terms of reference] for reflection and what I still 
want to do, although in the SHE management team they did not continue with that but I 
want to use them internally and have some reflection. These people sometimes ask 
‘[are] we doing the right things?’ So more afterwards using [terms of reference]: “OK 
this is what we could get out of incident investigation. Do we get it out of it? If not, are 
we doing something wrong?” That might be a more feasible, I’m not saying better use, 
but more feasible to use in that way than to say: hey guys, make up your terms of 
reference.”  
The issue is how to engage reflection on an investigation in a timely way that does not 
interfere with reflection on the findings about the incident. If only done in serious (and 
therefore relatively infrequent) cases, the effect on practice is likely to be slight, and 
secondary to discussing the safety implications of the serious incident.  
Still on the subject of self-investigation, an interviewee contrasts the duty of an accountable 
manager (in whose activities the incident happened) with those of the safety manager. 
“The accountable manager has got a duty to take a holistic view, balancing the 
business interests with a whole load of other things. The person responsible for the 
production or the activity should have the system view in terms of ‘how does this fit into 
the system, how does this help me make sure everything is working?’,  whereas, the 
safety manager is trying to make [it] that the investigation that’s just occurred followed 
the right sort of process […], and that the organisation has taken it into consideration, 
but also [to ask] ‘does the investigation process itself need to learn from this event?’ 
The intent in the way we’ve set ourselves up is that the ‘safety manager’—that’s [a 
function] made up of an individual and several other individuals—should be looking 
after those processes and making sure that they continuously improve. 
In the work setting, the dual focus appears to be hard to sustain, when specific incidents are 
discussed, safety lessons have the priority over investigation improvement. Schreuder (2017) 
also found a paradoxical relationship between perceptions of these goals. In his study, 
practitioners identified learning from incidents as the main goal of safety investigation in their 
company, “yet, not a single evaluation criterion was proposed for this goal” (Schreuder, 2017; 
p.29). Whatever the reasons, the goals of learning safety lessons and learning investigation 
lessons are difficult to achieve in the same review or debrief. 
6.2. The Case for Case Studies 
Several interviewees mentioned case studies as a missing ingredient from empiricism in their 
organisations. However, they saw it as an asset to assist in the sharing of knowledge.  
 Accident Investigation and Learning to Improve Safety Management in Complex System:  
Remaining Challenges 
171 
 
“It is more the power of the case study for me, really.” … “For me it was how you 
share the experiences and then also key with whom you share those experiences.” … “If 
I can talk to someone like [colleague’s name], who understands what I’m saying, give 
him the practical example and he sees it and now he can make the relation, then he can 
go and interpret [for] them: he can go in and give the message better in the language 
[of his department]. He can translate it much more effectively. I need him to understand 
what it is I’m trying to achieve by it, but then he’s better equipped to make or help his 
community understand it in those terms. So, it was about how information’s cascaded 
and how learning is actually [done].” 
 
“I think that’s the key— being able to say what makes this good, because if you have 
that sort of statement this is good because it does “duh, duh, duh, duh, duh,” it does this 
and then it does it this way and it does it with minimal whatever. If you can make those 
sort of statements then it becomes a bit…it lives a little bit more for people.”… “And so, 
I still come back to my view which is that you don’t say whether something is ‘good’ 
practice or ‘bad’ practice, what you say is this is how we do it here. And […] our 
experience is positive in the sense that …” 
 
“[…] you were asked to write a ‘no more than three hundred words’ example of a 
piece of work that you’d done that was challenging; and in this three hundred words 
you’ve got to say what the challenge is, you’ve got to say what you did, how you 
overcame those challenges, whether you had any success, [and] if you didn’t, what you 
did to re-correct, and what the ultimate outcome was. Now, actually, for some of the 
things we did, three hundred words is nothing for the complexity of some of these 
things. But invariably what I found was […] that there was very little how and a great 
deal of what. And, at the end of the day, that’s because it’s the what that the 
organisation values. They don’t care about how you do it, as long as you get the result 
that they’re looking for. […] but I think what it was really about, I suppose, is the 
‘how’; it’s less about the how you did it but more about how you did it bearing in mind 
the constraints that you felt existed or perceived. […] And I think that’s the piece [about 
context] that often gets missed in the example. So, because people haven’t said the 
constraints, they were under, that’s at least fifty per cent of the context, maybe more, so 
when you then see that example of good practice, your constraints are different. They 
will always be different and so does it look that good to you? Well maybe not. Or maybe 
your constraints are significantly more [limiting]. 
Practitioners can see great potential in case studies, but appear uncertain about how to create 
them and are daunted by the work they suspect may be entailed. 
“But there’s a lot of effort that would have to go into that and therefore I think 
people are less [likely to document it]—unless they’re tremendously committed to doing 
that and doing that well. [That’s why] it probably doesn’t get done well, and so 
therefore you end up with something that is less than it should be.” 
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But ‘case study’ sounds LONG. If I’m honest, I think when I first used to hear it 
being mentioned I did not know how it would be applied. And I’d hear my colleagues 
say it and I’d think ‘they’re saying ‘case study’ and they want to do a case study’, and 
they’ve produced what the case study is: here’s an investigation that was done. What 
was missed? What could have been done better? [But] … what are we doing? We look 
like we’re criticising someone’s work.” … “But I think the use of case studies, as silly 
as it sounds or as ironic as it sounds, is you need a good example of how a case study’s 
been used to solve a case study approach.” 
The use of case studies seems to be a tangible, untapped potential for communicating about 
'good' practice.  
Related to case studies, in the sense of documented ‘practices’ is an idea mentioned by one of 
the interviewees. The suggestion was for descriptions of practice accompanied by ‘Amazon’ 
style reviews. The interviewee described how a Sharepoint area was set up by a group of 
regulatory agencies.  
“They could upload examples of good practice. So that might be a campaign that 
they’d run or it might be prosecution they’d taken or it might be some research that had 
been undertaken, or whatever it was it might have been some sort of local guidance that 
they produced for distribution centres or restaurants or whatever it was. And we would 
ask them to upload it. And the idea was that then there would be a panel of experts 
[from the regulatory agencies] who would then make some judgements about how good 
this good practice was. And those judgements would also be about what was it really 
demonstrating. Was it demonstrating, ‘yes, this is a good example of a campaign’, or is 
it a demonstration of ‘this is a great way of communicating’, and ‘this is an example of 
how to communicate with a particular niche audience’, or whatever it might be. 
Because there’s different ways of looking at those. […] Getting people together to think 
about those sort of things at the same time was tricky because if you’re dispersed and 
remotely located you look at it as an individual and I think there’s a value in looking at 
it as a group, and having that dialogue between the members of that group. Because I 
think you probably approach a greater proximity to the truth. But we found that very 
difficult […] to do that, to be perfectly honest. And just getting people to assign the time 
and commit to doing that became very difficult. So we ended up going down the lines of 
‘actually, do you know what, sod it, why don’t we just do like Amazon?’  And we gave 
people the possibility of scoring up to five stars for whatever gets produced. And writing 
a short text piece about why they think it is so good or so bad or so mundane or 
ordinary or whatever it is, but it would give them that opportunity, and then give other 
people the opportunity to read those reviews. […] I think the key thing is the currency of 
those reviews. The thing you don’t have any control over is the expertise, how insightful 
the person making the review is. To some extent that risk is offset by the quality of the 
text that you ask them to add, so if somebody’s marked something five stars out of five 
and then look at the text and it’s gibberish you might think well maybe this person 
hasn’t actually got the judgement skills after all. And I think the individually poor 
reviews—I don’t [mean] bad reviews, but poorly written or poorly thought-through 
reviews—the […] sheer number of the reviews starts to reduce the impact of the poor 
nature of some of the reviews.” 
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6.3. Continuous improvement and learning from incidents  
One of the fundamental tenets of empiricism, according to Shelley (2006) is that “knowledge 
is tentative” and therefore subject to continual revision60.  
Some of the interviewees, recognising that shifting priorities are normal their organisation, 
mentioned the importance of an explicit strategic approach to improvement. A strategic view 
accepts that current practice is usually something less effective than the ideal, but that it is 
improving along defined lines. In this way, a strategy provides a structure that helps to secure 
a set of values within which practice can be assessed. As one of the interviewees explains: 
“The ‘Safety Plan’ should be supporting and endorsing our future, where we’re 
going, so when someone at whatever level in the company asks the question you say to 
them ‘this is what we’re doing about the here and now’, ‘here’s all the effort and 
activity’; ‘the things that you’re paying for us to do today’; ‘you may not be with the 
company in ten years, but you want to hand over something responsible, and this is 
what we’ve outlined for the next few years, and we can even tell you next year how 
much we intend to spend and where we intend to go with it’; ‘from what you’re seeing, 
is that right’? Then you can have a management conversation where they’ll say to you 
‘can we look at this in year two?’, ‘push that down to year four’. And then at least 
you’re aligned with company thinking and you can work those things, and then they can 
see that if you’ve got some innovation you can test it. You can bring it forward, innovate 
and test with [a specific operational department] but the plan will say it will be in the 
organisation in 2020. And I think people can live with that. As long as you show 
material movement, but you don’t have to do it across the board. So it’s also from the 
practitioners point of view, it’s what am I doing with this monster of information you’re 
giving me. And the practitioner needs to be in a position on how do you implement such 
new methodologies and new approaches, and that sort of thing. 
It was noted that most of the recommendations in the evaluation of PEACE interview training 
were for implementing structures outside of the classroom. In respect of supervision, they 
recommended: 
 
“... that a Nationally agreed policy on the supervision of interviews be developed. This 
should include (i) that interviewing and communication skills be an integral element 
of annual appraisals for all staff, (ii) that the priority be attributed to supervision by 
the service, and (iii) that subordinates’ performance become a criterion in the annual 
appraisals for all supervisors and managers.” 
Clarke and Milne, 2001; p.97-120 
In one way, it is perfectly clear that implementation involves creating structures that sustain 
activities at every level of an organisation. However, what appears to be widespread in 
investigation and lesson-learning is piecemeal, hesitant managerial attention on high level 
 
60 As the French say: “Il n’y a que le provisoire qui dure” (only that which is provisional endures). 
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policy ambitions. Meanwhile, for better or worse, practice evolves a long its own lines 
according to local goals and constraints. 
6.4. Mentoring and coaching practitioners 
The interviews were not designed to specifically look into structures that enable peers to learn 
from each other. It is likely that these are relevant in the development and sharing of practice.  
In the experience of the present authors, practitioners help each other on an ad hoc basis, and 
through informal ‘shadowing’ arrangements. However, in some organisations, practitioners 
are spread quite thinly across several locations. In examples of those organisations, we have 
seen attempts to set up structures where practitioners pair-up for key tasks like interviewing 
and analysis, and act as critical friends providing reviews of reports. 
The interviewees did shed some light on how safety departments involve themselves during 
investigations.  
“…So, I think they had the right qualities in the sense that they were very 
approachable. People respected them. People understood where they were coming from 
and they gained that respect through good intervention in the past. So that’s what their 
reputation was built on. And they were also proactive, so they would hear about an 
incident and actually: ’do you know what, that’s down on despatch again. We’ve had 
three in despatch in the last six months; I’m going to go down there’. And so they would 
be very active in that way. But it was very ad hoc, which is not necessarily a bad thing. 
[…] But what that also meant was it was also related to just how stretched they were, 
and so it was always a balance between yes I should go to despatch but actually I’ve got 
all of this other stuff to do, or actually no, this is a more serious event at despatch after 
we’ve had three less serious ones, and despite all of those other pressures this is 
actually taking priority. So exercising that judgement is what they would do. Now the 
way they would do that, and this was the maturity of the team, is they would discuss it 
amongst themselves. So it wasn’t just a decision of the [Health, Safety & Environment] 
manager or them as individuals, they would discuss it amongst themselves and they 
would come to some sort of alignment or consensus. So I think that’s how good [Health, 
Safety & Environment] team works and functions. It doesn’t come down to the decision 
of an individual. There is that maturity about ‘well let’s see what all our views are on 
this and where this sits in our overall or ever lengthening list of priorities that we have’. 
So I think that was a good thing and I suppose you could say that is a good practice. 
 
 
Interviewer: So how does it start? 
Respondent: “[…] my boss helps me: ‘We have a situation here and we’d like to look 
more into it. Could we get more deep into it?’ So not: ‘it’s all wrong!’, but 
‘there’s an interesting situation and we need to learn from it as a business 
group and not [only] as a site, can you help us with that?’ And then we dig 
into that and then you start talking with the site manager: ‘what do you 
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think of it?’, ‘who’s the best guy that can help me with this because it’s 
rather complex?’ So he [the site manager] knows that he needs to do 
something there because I’m not there just for fun. So getting the team 
together with him. And I know these people, and I know who are the good 
ones. You get the good people to work with you and they already know it. 
They just have to tell you. So it was wrong, but we need to learn. And we 
go into this and tell me what it is and during the process you get feedback, 
and every evening you walk by the site manager: ‘so we are here and we 
are learning this, and did you know that this guy knows a lot about the 
process, and what we learn here that’s new, and this and that’. And most 
of the time not always all is new for the site manager, but he’s very happy 
to learn what you all learnt in here. Getting insight together.” 
Interviewer:  “[So, a very light] vertical exercise of power – there’s a little bit because 
you’re saying [to the site]: ‘we’re interested, and we have a right to be 
interested’. 
Respondent: “You have the right to be supported”! 
Interviewer: “Very good [laughs]. It seems remarkably diplomatic”.  
Respondent: “To be honest, it doesn’t always work”.  
Interviewer: “What happens when it doesn’t work”? 
Respondent: “When it doesn’t work then people are really defensive.” 
The interviewee went on to explain that once practitioners are defensive, only very limited 
progress can be made. The interaction becomes an exercise in limiting the damage to the 
relationship. As another of the interviewees suggested, if an organisation wishes to contribute 
to the lifelong learning of the workforce, it may first need to create shared understandings 
about defensiveness and face-saving, as these are fundamental obstacles. Van Dam (2016), 
citing the work of Dweck, makes similar comments. He advocates Kegan and Lahey’s model 
of the ‘Deliberately Developmental Organization’ as a means to normalise the ideals of 
lifelong learning for all workers in an organisation. 
6.5. Post-investigation critical review of investigation practice 
Interviewees mentioned critical reflection on investigation practices. These, however, need to 
be specially organised and resourced. One of the respondents—a board member of an 
independent investigation body and a professor in a university department—explained that, 
 
“He [Adrianus De Groot) introduced the idea of a Forum as the regulative 
mechanism of the normal scientific process. In the context of scientific work this Forum 
is an abstract that relates to all kinds of evaluation and feedback in the academic world. 
That is normal. But applying scientific procedures/methods outside the world of 
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research thus not give immediately a critical context. You have to organize that 
yourself.” … “and I could practise it because of my position [in a University]” 
However, these apparently technical concerns appear often to be connected to power 
relationships and imbalances. The interviewees from independent and regulatory investigative 
backgrounds mentioned a structural lack of critical self-reflection on methodology.  
One interviewee described a situation in which a regulatory body was not willing to meet with 
a defence lawyer despite his repeated offers to give them insights (gained though some 60 
incidents) into the recurring weaknesses of their prosecution cases.  
Equally, and perhaps surprisingly in the case of regulatory agencies, respondents mentioned a 
lack of criticism from outside. In the words of three interviewees: 
“Even in the press there is no critical voice! [The investigation body’s] insights and 
statements are sacrosanct!”… “In a democracy a permanent discussion on the value of 
an insight must be possible – it is essential.” 
 
“Professional investigation bodies never hear criticism, it falls on deaf ears.”  
 
 “[This investigation body is seen as] whiter than white”. 
In the self-investigation setting, a lack of critical reflection can be driven by various forces, 
and not straightforwardly positional power61. One of our interviewees explained a dynamic in 
his organisation which he attributed to carrying-out actions identified after audits and 
investigations. These actions might be identified at one location but then required at all 
comparable locations throughout the company. The speed to implement actions has become a 
KPI for managers. As one might anticipate, managers have found ways to report actions as 
completed that might, in fact, be only at the planning stage or implemented only partly. In any 
event, this has created a culture in which: 
 “Senior leaders think that everything can […] be done that quickly, so their assumption is 
that whatever goes in there will be done within a quarter [of an hour]. So, their expectation 
has grown. We haven’t managed that very well at all. And then woe betide you if you are that 
sort of person who turns around and says ‘no, I’m not going to play this game’, because then 
the full furore of the organisation is focused on you” 
This creates a double-bind that is corrupting of practice: a belief amongst senior managers 
that all problems can be cured quickly by simple actions, and an intolerance of information to 
the contrary. Critical review has no place in this scheme, and such contradictory data have to 
be explained-away as exceptions. 
 
61 Charles Handy (1981, Understanding Organisations) identifies six sources of individual power: (1) Physical 
(‘might is right’), (2) Resource, (3) Position (such as the legal authority to do certain things), (4) Expert, (5) 
Personal (charisma) and (6) Negative (any of the first five powers used in an abusive way to stop or delay 
things, or to distort them). 
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6.6. Systematic study of 'good' practice. 
The foregoing sub-sections have been presented in order of formality. It started with the 
individual practitioner learning from experience in relative isolation from their peers. In this 
sub-section, empiricism is considered in terms of attempts to identify 'good' practice through 
research activities.   
What constitutes a research activity is a moot point. However, the present authors were very 
broad. Any activity aimed at finding out how some practitioners do some aspect of 
investigating or learning from incidents, would have qualified. Then inquiries could be made 
about the aims of the research, its results and so forth. The first point to make is that among 
the organisations contacted, admittedly a very small sample, we heard of no examples. (The 
next section considers the motivations of practitioners towards this kind of research). 
Assuming that there is little research going on into 'good' practice of investigating and 
learning, we need to ask whether there a need for it. What kinds of knowledge might be useful 
to practitioners, investigating organisations and investigation stakeholders? Looking back 
over the issues discussed in this paper, research into 'good' practice of investigation and 
learning could aim to: 
• stimulate practitioners’ development by identifying current 'good' practices elsewhere; 
• inform competence by identifying knowledge underpinning 'good' practice as observed 
in the field; 
• manage better the conditions found to drive ‘corrupt’ practice; 
• specify structures needed to develop practice “in the direction of the good62”;  
• challenge current ideas by identifying ‘good’ practices in investigation that constitute 
‘poor’ practices for learning from incidents; 
• identify values held by stakeholders that are not currently reflected in practice; 
• discover the contextual criteria that qualify or limit a ‘good’ practice;  
• stimulate research into practices that will better fulfil goals and constraints that are 
currently met poorly; 
• in general, improve selection, training and management of practitioners. 
Turning to the form of research, if 'good' practice is ‘what works’ we have to ask about the 
criteria for judging success, what evidence is used, and who gets to judge. It is also necessary 
to think about the method for doing this kind of work. It brings to mind the start of Feynman’s 
famous commencement address on joining Caltech as a professor: 
“During the Middle Ages there were all kinds of crazy ideas, such as that a piece of 
rhinoceros horn would increase potency. […] Then a method was discovered for 
separating the ideas which was to try one to see if it worked, and if it didn't work, to 
eliminate it. This method became organized, of course, into science.” 
Feynman, 1974; p.10 
 
62 (Everitt and Hardiker, 1996; p.171) 
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A scientific approach, in the Feynman sense, certainly has a role here, but it is not assumed 
that science is the only approach that is helpful, or that there is only one valid scientific 
paradigm in which to assess 'good' practice.  
Given that value comes supplied in the term 'good' practice, evaluation research clearly 
applies. As well as medicine, evaluation is frequently used in public services, but appears to 
be largely unused in the field of investigating and learning from safety incidents, in either 
public or private organisations. The current authors are not aware of any reasons for this 
(beyond the general ones given by Niven, 2004).  
If evaluation research were to be made use of in this area, we should be careful to avoid some 
its traps, both paradigmatic and political. Discussions of evaluation research often rehearse 
the long-standing debate between a realist/positivist standpoint—that reliable knowledge can 
only come from objective observation of physical reality—and a social 
constructionist/relativist standpoint which maintains that “foundations and knowledge are 
value-laden, and, contra positive realism, that the distinction between objective and subjective 
knowledge is unclear” (Marks, 2002;  p14). In an area where context, values and the 
practitioner are often of decisive importance to any claim of efficacy, an extreme realist 
position looks unfeasible. It may only be tenable only for evaluating some aspects of handling 
and analysing physical evidence, but not much else. Even in areas that have more scope for 
them, such as medicine, advocates of positivistic approaches (e.g. randomised controlled 
trials—RCTs) recognise that practitioners should be empowered by their expertise.  For 
example, 
“Good doctors use both individual clinical expertise and the best available external 
evidence, and neither alone is enough. Without clinical expertise, practice risks 
becoming tyrannised by evidence, for even excellent external evidence may be 
inapplicable to or inappropriate for an individual patient. Without current best 
evidence, practice risks becoming rapidly out of date, to the detriment of patients.”  
Sackett, et al., 1996; p71. 
Similarly, in their most recent guidance from the UK’s National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE) distinguishes between ‘context-free’ and ‘context-sensitive’ scientific 
evidence, and states that these may be complemented by what it calls “colloquial evidence: 
including “evidence about values (including political judgement), practical considerations 
(resources, professional experience or expertise and habits or traditions) and the interests of 
specific groups (views of lobbyists and pressure groups)”. (NICE, 2012) 
The general aim of evaluation is to identify 'good' practices, and in order to do so, make 
explicit the values that define good. As stated earlier (Section 2.2) there may be a variety of 
views about what constitutes ‘good’. Everitt and Hardiker (1996) is a notable attempt to apply 
evaluation to identifying and sharing 'good' practice in social work. However, most of their 
arguments and much of their advice appears to be applicable more widely. They list seven 
principles “which any evaluation system should adopt to ensure ‘good’ practice”. These are: 
• “the importance of moral debate and everybody, irrespective of power, status and 
position, having the right to legitimate opinions; 
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• scepticism of rational-technical modes of practice; 
• the recognition of power, powerlessness and empowerment; 
• the development of genuine dialogue between users and those within the 
organisation, and within the organisation itself; 
• attention to be paid to the fundamental purpose of the organisation and caution 
about becoming diverted into demonstrating productivity; 
• the encouragement of openness, questioning, complaints and criticisms from 
outside and within the organisation; 
• the removal of ‘otherness’ that may be attributed to those lower in the hierarchy, 
to users and to those relatively powerless in the community.” 
 
Everitt and Hardiker, 1996; p.35 
Evaluation research tends to be done by social scientists for organisations as a means for the 
latter to demonstrate (e.g. to funders) that their goals are being achieved as advertised. Everitt 
and Hardicker (1996) recognise this summative aim, but have suggested that it can be shared 
with formative purpose. However, if we make that formative goal central to the research, 
other research approaches start to suggest themselves. Among these options are various forms 
of ‘action research’. These will be discussed in the next section. 
6.7. Structures that support empiricism: Summary  
Everitt and Hardicker’s principle of the “encouragement of openness, questioning, complaints 
and criticisms” echoes a theme in many of the interviews. Usually, this was demonstrated by 
negative examples: stories of individuals being defensive, senior managers that accept only 
‘successes, and professional investigation bodies content to ‘rest on their laurels’. However, 
the principle stands—the readiness to learn has to be encouraged and led. 
Lack of time/work pressure is an issue. While useful to motivate productivity on certain 
operational tasks, when learning how to improve safety, pressure of work is inimical to 'good' 
investigative practice and its development. However, even without these pressures, there 
needs to be a structural gradient that influences practice in the direction of the ‘good’. 
Supervision, mentoring, peer-review need to have values defined in a meaningful way, such 
as though plans and strategies that show how the ideals of policy are being pursued.   
Debriefs and reviews are opportunities to discover 'good' practice. These need to be planned 
for and resourced. Furthermore, as learning about safety and learning about investigation may 
be difficult to combine, separate arrangements may be needed. 
There is an argument that investigating organisations need to be more ‘research-minded’, 
valuing more the ‘how’ things are done and not just the outcome of doing them. As well as 
debriefs and reviews, the ‘how’ could be made more visible though case-studies. How to 
document case studies is a moot point, and itself a research need. One possibility, more to 
complement case studies than as an alternative, is computer supported collaborative review of 
documented practice experiences.  
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An underlying theme in this section has been the relative weight attached to knowledge 
created from practice compared to that created from a positivist interpretation of scientific 
method. As Rolfe (2002) pointed out, “If you apply the criteria of positivism to 
reflective practice, then it deserves to be at the bottom of the hierarchy of evidence, just as if 
you apply the criteria of reflective practice to positivism, then the RCT will be at the bottom.” 
This distortion in our views of what works can be compounded by scientific evaluations in 
which ‘good’ is defined unilaterally by a powerful group. If evaluations are to be used more in 
this area, then these are traps to avoid. 
7. Cooperation between practitioners and academics as a factor of the 
capacity to investigate and learn from incidents 
This section presents some views of the current situation and the potential benefits of closer 
cooperation between academics and practitioners. Many of the issues described in this 
paper—the obstacles to 'good' practice alluded to in the call for papers—could be addressed, 
at least in part, by better cooperation between academics and practitioners.  
‘Could be addressed’ is the point, because the interviews revealed so few examples of close 
cooperation. During the research, the authors have asked themselves whether they are in the 
position of the person who emerges from the Ironmonger’s shop disappointed by the lack of 
pork pies for sale. The Ironmonger could start selling food, but, in general, ironmongers do 
not. We have often asked ourselves if we are making a category error. However, whereas the 
hungry shopper can find satisfaction elsewhere, the choices for the needy practitioner appear 
to be quite limited. The nearest option seems to be consultancies—these have their place and 
serve well some needs. However, cooperation on 'good' practice seems to require the 
objective research, and educative skills of the academic, rather than the sectoral subject matter 
expertise of consultants.  
7.1. Definitions of ‘cooperation’ and an ‘academic’ 
Based on the Wordnik dictionary entry, cooperation could be defined as: active help from a 
person or organisation involving the orderly sharing of resources which are mutually 
beneficial. For reasons, which will be explained, the present authors suggest that the word 
meaningful needs to be added in there somewhere. 
While on the subject of definitions, an academic—for the purposes of this paper—is a scholar 
who is most likely working at an educational institution, where they have the overlapping 
roles of educator and researcher, mixed in various proportions.  
7.2. Practitioners’ expectations of cooperation with academics 
The practitioners interviewed during the research for this paper expressed views about 
cooperation with academics that, for the most part, were close to those expressed by Schön 
twenty-six years ago.  
“There has been, on the one hand, an erosion of practitioners' faith in the ability of 
academic research to deliver knowledge usable for solving social problems-indeed, a 
growing suspicion that academic research may actually exacerbate social problems. In 
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this sense, practitioners may feel, in relation to the academy, a sense of having been 
seduced and abandoned. On the other hand, when practitioners accept and try to use 
the academy's esoteric knowledge, they are apt to discover that its appropriation 
alienates them from their own understandings, engendering a loss of their sense of 
competence and control.” 
Schön, 1992; p.120 
A selection of illustrative quotations gives a flavour of the responses, including one from a 
practitioner who recounts a master’s degree project that gave him insight from the academic 
‘side of the fence’. (Most of the interviewees had post-graduate qualifications). 
“The practitioner will look at the scientist and say, ‘all that nice data you’re 
collecting, how is it actually helping this situation?’ And the scientist says:’ this is the 
basis of science: we need baseline information;’ ‘we need to be able to…’. They’ve got 
the whole reasoning around their activity. And it’s probably lost in how each of the 
parties will use what actually comes out of their interactions. And I’ve met some really 
clever people trying to do some things, and half of me says ‘we’ve got a responsibility to 
feed this sort of activity because otherwise where will it be done?’” 
 
 “We went to [the academic] and we were saying ‘we’ll pay for him to give human 
factors briefing to the senior managers within […]’  and he produced a whole ream of 
slides. And we said ‘what are you going to do?’, and he says ‘I’m going to talk to the 
slides’. Well, no; hang on! ‘We’re giving you access to our senior management and you 
want to take them through some sixty slides?’ […]. So the expectations of the two worlds 
were [quite different].” 
 
“Anywhere I've worked in aviation, other than at […], there has never been any kind 
of direction [towards]: ‘I think we should get some academic help here’. Other than at 
[…], and I suspect that was only because of [a senior manager], and I think his 
reasoning was 'I want to make sure that I am bullet-proof in court'. But looking anywhere 
else across aviation, no links at all. 
 
“[concerning an industry group set up by a regulatory agency] academics used to 
visit that group. They’d typically be PhD students who had finished or were coming close 
to finishing their PhDs. [I'd characterise it as] here's something you might want to use, 
boys. 'I've created this method; I've created this way of thinking. It would be two-way: 10 
minutes to present something, then questions at the end. 
 
“It was hard to get access to the organisation and the data.  Two reasons really.  
Most organisations didn't really seem interested or see the point.  And secondly because 
they were worried about where the data might end up; in what form it might be in the 
public domain. It was about a predictive tool, […] for predicting maintenance error. I 
compared the areas that were predicted to have problems in, with the areas they were 
actually having problems in. In terms of working with industry, it was quite hard. I went 
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into to 2 or 3 organisations, it was hard. None of them saw any benefit in it. It was an 
arduous task to get [their] time. And then there was the data issue: they were really 
frightened where the data was going to be used. They were very, very cautious about 
that.” 
 
“So, when [the Regulatory Agency] put out the call, all these organisations started 
trying to put together cases to get funding. [The company] are experts at doing this, to try 
and secure funding from [the Agency]. And in essence their R&D part of their business is 
funded for a bit. Even then, when they put out these ‘what do you think about what we 
want to do here?’, and ‘what we’re looking at’, in many ways they’re not really clear on 
the end game. They’ve kind of got like ‘I want to look into an airport and an airline 
interface and it needs looking [at]’; I agree, but then to what end?” 
 
“And sometimes I think the conversation [is not] clear. Maybe it is that element of 
politeness when they first come together. So, this lady at […]—who’s now at 
[University]—heard we were interested in MOSS, which is a version of LOSA used in 
maintenance. We said we were interested. She said she’s done it with [an airline]. All of 
a sudden, we were both excited: from her point of view, [a large airline] is interested; for 
us, someone’s done it. And we’re really excited, to the point that we formed an agreement 
off being excited about the same subject [up] to the point that when we started getting 
into actually ‘what are you going to do?’, ‘how are you going to help us get this going?’ 
[and] to her then saying ‘what are you going to give me access to?’ Then it started not 
looking good; we were not on the same page.  Although there was common interest, I 
don’t think the expectation was explicitly laid out. […] And I think anyone that’s doing a 
PhD or a Masters and they want to approach an airline in particular, I think just being 
aware of some of these things – I don’t think it’s exclusive to an airline, and [applies] 
maybe to some other industries, I don’t know.” 
 
“But working with the likes of [University] it is a little bit frustrating but there has to 
be something in it for both, in that if it’s a student from [University] they have a PhD or 
something they’re doing. But they could, as university, work with you because you pay 
them to do the thing. But there’s always something attached to it where there’s someone 
developing something out of it and then it’s at that point, when you’ve got conflicting 
objectives, that it starts to then become a bit of a problem where—if I was hiring any 
other supplier, in the most black and white approach to this—they would provide a 
service to specification. But in this case, it’s almost like I have to, and it’s not my view, I 
like the learning, but from an implementation point of view I’m entertaining what 
someone needs and paying for it as well at the same time [laughs].” 
 In balance, there were some positive stories also. Two respondents, who had little other 
cooperation on research, nonetheless described how they valued reflective dialogue 
sustained over a long period with an academic. And another practitioner, who was 
unaware of any research relationships on the subject of safety, nevertheless mentioned 
two occasions of contact between academics and senior management in his company. 
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“The only time recently I would say is 2016, which is summer 2016, when there was 
a safety symposium that was organised in the U.S. and a number of […] senior leaders 
went along to that and it was presentations from a series of academics to them.  I think 
the most impactful one, or most visibly impactful one, was […]. And that led us, I 
remember, that led us to the […] and that whole process which then led on to the serious 
incident review board kind of approach. So that was a positive outcome from that. […] 
But then the other one was a few years ago when we had a different composition for the 
[Health, Safety & Environment] leadership team and we had a presentation given to us 
by […]. He was utterly brilliant. He was a fantastic speaker [laughs]. He was very vocal. 
So, there was only about fifteen of us in the room so he was very, very [effective].” 
These quotations are given here only as illustrations, but are suggestive of a more general 
picture. Even so, the authors do not claim this to be a reliable representation, and are tentative 
about analysis presented here. Nonetheless, the interviewees included practitioners from 
global businesses, large European airlines, and regulatory agencies from the UK, Europe and 
the Middle East. In short, organisations whose scale and complexity would make them likely 
candidates for relationships with academic institutions. And indeed, there were relationships, 
but these appeared to be limited to formal education and, to a lesser extent, non-formal 
education. These relationships appeared to be largely one-way: purchasing places on courses, 
or providing students with access to data. The impression is that academic institutions set the 
terms of these transactions, with practitioners acting as gatekeepers, not equal partners. 
7.3. What might academics expect from cooperating with practitioners? 
All but one of the respondents interviewed for this paper were practitioners. The present 
authors would have liked to have heard more about academics’ perspectives on these issues.  
In particular, we wanted to hear stories of cooperation that defined success from their point of 
view. However, it takes two to tango, and the practitioners we spoke to seemed used to be 
being ‘wallflowers63’ at this particular dance. 
The authors considered whether the topic of investigating and learning from incidents defines 
a group of academics who see their role quite conservatively. By conservatively, we mean 
limited to providing formal and non-formal education, and conducting research that they 
control unilaterally. Again, better data is needed before reaching any firm conclusions. 
However, there is at the least prima facie evidence in the literature that what we are choosing 
to call ‘conservative’ is actually normal—most academics tend to follow the pattern described 
and explained by Schön many years ago. 
“there is a dilemma of rigor or relevance, which comes to bear especially on those 
who consider themselves researchers. A topographical image helps to convey the feeling 
of this dilemma. One can imagine a cliff overlooking a swamp. Researchers may choose 
to say on the high, hard ground where they can conduct research of a kind the academy 
considers rigorous, though on problems whose importance they have come increasingly 
to doubt. Or they may go down to the swamp where they can devote themselves to the 
social problems, they consider truly important, but in ways that are not rigorous in any 
 
63 Wallflower is defined, in rather sad terms, by the Merriam-Webster dictionary as “a person who from shyness 
or unpopularity remains on the sidelines of a social activity (such as a dance)” 
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way they know how to describe. They must choose whether to be rigorous on the high 
ground or relevant in the swamp. Over the past twenty or thirty years, the social and 
personal costs of this dilemma have become increasingly apparent. In the same period, 
technical rationality, which is at the root of the dilemma, has come under vigorous attack 
on the part of such philosophers of science as Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Jürgen 
Habermas, and Paul Feyerabend. In these circles, hardly anyone wants any longer to be 
considered a positivist. Nevertheless, in everyday institutional life, technical rationality is 
resurgent. One has only to observe the deliberations of hiring, promotion, and tenure 
committees in the research universities, deliberations on which the future of the academy 
largely depends. One has only to observe the behavior of students who anxiously vote 
with their feet to acquire "hard skills" like statistical analysis and computer 
programming. Indeed, the contemporary academy is the scene of an epistemological 
battle, albeit a battlefield of snails (one has to look very closely and patiently in order to 
see it). As a result of this and related trends, the schools of the professions-not only the 
ones Nathan Glazer calls "minor," such as education, city planning, and social work, but 
the ones he calls "major," such as medicine, law, and business—are in a state of 
ferment.” 
Schön, 1992; p.119-120 
In the sectors that Schön mentions—education, city planning, and social work—academic 
involvement in informal learning and research of practice is visible in the literature. The 
upshot of this is that, indeed, there are models for cooperative work between academics and 
practitioners. Furthermore, these models are relatively mainstream in many areas of public 
service provision. Not that the grass is necessarily ‘greener over there’—the ferment that 
Schön describes still seems true in public services, as are his remarks about the resurgence of 
technical rationality.  
7.4. Technical rationality, and the risks created by limited cooperation 
As Rolfe (2014) explains, Schön used the term technical rationality to describe a situation in 
which “university-based technologists generate knowledge for practice-based technicians to 
apply. Technical rationality is a useful model for practice when situations are simple and 
straightforward and where the same solution can be expected to work in every instance.” 
(Rolfe, 2014; p.1180). 
The concern shared by many social scientists is threefold. Firstly, technical rationality 
oversimplifies complex situations. The simplification is partly to make problems amenable to 
research methods, and partly to reflect the problems defined by the policy-makers who 
commission research. Secondly, practitioners’ knowledge and values (and those of other 
disempowered stakeholders) are under-represented in defining these problems, the research 
design, and the requirements of solutions. Thirdly, that if the resulting solutions are enforced 
as rules, practitioners will not be able to adjust their practice to fit the needs of particular 
instances. As a result, some needs may go unmet. As Kingston and Dien argued in the 
ESReDA seminar last year, when monitoring is also defined by this process, unmet needs, 
which sit outside of the definition, may remain invisible to policy-makers. As they put it: 
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“the simplification implicit in the models which underlie most measurement schemes, 
may not be recognised as an over-simplification, in the sense that some relevant aspects 
of the system measured are not represented in the measurement” 
Kingston and Dien, 2017; p11. 
7.5. The divide between academics and practitioners 
Our discussions with practitioners have left us with a profound sense of opportunity. 
Academics and practitioners in this area could benefit from working together in the ways that 
their counterparts in other areas are working together.  
However, there are structural issues to overcome. One is the cultural inertia of the current 
patterns of behaviour (including funding): ‘it doesn’t happen now, so it need not happen in the 
future’. Another is the implicit and explicit assumptions of academic life—some academics 
may see these proposals as a threat to their reputation and identity. Then, there is the mutual 
confidence and understanding between the two groups, which the interviews suggest needs 
building-up.  
Darroch and Toleman (2007) looked at the gap between academics and practitioners working 
in Information Systems. Their literature survey identified several factors, of which three, 
paraphrased below, appeared pertinent to this paper. 
• Communication. 
o the research community, ‘is in danger of talking mainly to itself about itself’.  
• Academic promotion, reward and tenure mechanisms. 
o promotion and tenure processes are based on “publication in academic 
journals and evaluation from academics (to the exclusion of practitioner 
journals and evaluations); which result in, 
o “institutional pressures that foster irrelevance” […] “rather than reward 
interaction, it actively sustains the divide;” 
o The “structure is inflexible and does not reward innovation or state-of-the-art 
thinking. 
o The mechanisms also discourage “the PhD experience from making a greater 
contribution to industry” 
• Academic journal publication. 
o “Academics are most rewarded for publishing in highly-ranked academic 
journals, but are poorly rewarded for publishing in practitioner publications” 
o “It is widely accepted that practitioners do not have access to, or do not read 
academic publications. This represents a significant, lost opportunity for 
engagement, and thus further erodes the relationship. 
Absent from Darroch and Toleman’s list, is practitioners’ perception of academics as 
inflexible, a recurring point voiced in the interviews that informed the present paper. The 
authors interpret this as a reflection of the paradigmatic position(s) of academic researchers. 
As Rolfe (2002) explains: 
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 “the dominant paradigm defines how the knowledge-base of a discipline is built and 
maintained, what is to count as knowledge, and importantly, what are to count as valid 
ways of generating knowledge.”  
As well as creating obstacles to interdisciplinary work, adherence to a paradigm also reduces 
the flexibility available for cooperation with practitioners. Freidman, et al. (2015) relating this 
issue to problems in organisational learning, argue that the most likely way forward is to 
ground research “in the requirements of workable intervention”; a strategy that “blurs the line 
between research and practice, encouraging researchers and practitioners to act as partners” 
(Freidman, et al., 2015; 27). The implication of this is that in the cooperative generation of 
knowledge, it is the academics will have the most distance to travel, conceptually speaking. 
They are entitled to ask: what is in it for them? 
7.6. Models for cooperation between academics and practitioners. 
This subsection presents two general approaches, not recipes, for cooperative work—
evaluation research and Participatory Action Research—PAR. The aim of cooperative work 
could be to identify 'good' practices, to create new ones, and to document rich descriptions 
that allow others to develop their practice. However, although these outcomes would be 
something to celebrate, the larger agenda of such work would be to enable these two groups to 
shape each other, both in respect of both domain knowledge and learning to learn. Much of 
this benefit is likely to arise in non-linear, unplanned ways; similar in its principles to the 
reflective dialogue between academics and practitioners described by Mårtensson and Lee 
(2004). (Indeed, their approaches are another promising model that could be applied in this 
area.) 
7.6.1. Collaborative evaluation research 
In some areas of practice, such as education and social work, academics are involved in 
research of 'good' practice. Usually, these pieces of work are carried out in the form of 
evaluation research, as already mentioned (section 6.6). The usual situation is for the 
practitioners’ organisation, such as a government department, to contract a team of academics 
to evaluate some aspect of its service to the public.  
Evaluation research is both a source of inspiration for how this kind of co-operation can be 
done, but also a fund of cautionary tales. Concerning the latter, the main complaint is about 
who has the power to decide what is to be measured and how. In essence, this is the power to 
define what constitutes 'good' practice and, by the same token, to classify all other practices as 
less than good. Evaluation research has been widely criticised as empowering senior 
managers at expense the practitioners. (Everitt and Hardiker, 1996). As an academic recently 
remarked to one of the present authors [Kingston],  “Often the evaluators are not greeted 
particularly warmly; I remember turning up for a first meeting with local authority officers … 
to be told: I expect you are regarded as only slightly less welcome than the auditors.”  
The value that the academic brings to the practical setting is: 
• theoretical knowledge of the practical domain (e.g. of education). This can be a 
source of criteria for practitioners, and also a fund of diagnostic frames that academics 
are more likely than practitioners to be aware of. 
• a knowledge of practices gained from earlier evaluations. Academic evaluators are 
in a position to get insights into the practices of others that they can use to inform the 
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development of practice in a new setting. However, a certain degree of contractual 
prudence is needed to ensure that they share only that which previous partners agree 
can be in the public domain;  
• writing skills and publication routes for that portion of generated knowledge which 
can be shared with, and tested by, other academics and practitioners; 
• knowledge of research methods and technology with which to perform the 
evaluation, including the ability to enact the seven principles listed on page 178;  
• ‘objectivity and neutrality’ to the research (Everitt and Hardiker, 1996; p46).  
 
7.6.2. Participatory Action Research—PAR 
For about ninety years, researchers around the world have been identifying what they do 
“using terms like ‘action research’, or participatory research’, or a combination of these. 
Some have stressed the action component, while others have focused more on the 
participatory process. Still others have come from the field of social science and have 
identified it as a means of inquiry or research, per se.” (Wadsworth, 1998; p.1) 
Interviewees mentioned something that appears essential to cooperation, that it be meaningful 
to all the parties, not just the academics. This seems to be integral to Action Research and a 
key difference from what one might call conventional, academic-centred research. The 
participants in Action Research consist of stakeholders in the system that is the context of the 
research, working together with an academic. As a group they “organise the conditions under 
which they can learn from their own experiences and make this experience accessible to 
others.” (McTaggart, cited in Wadsworth, 1998). Schön (1992) found that academics tend to 
dominate relationships with practitioners, often redefining problems to suit their theoretical 
and methodological predilections. In contrast, the degree of agency possessed by the non-
academic participants in Action Research—their level of control—is much greater than in 
‘conventional’ academic research.  
Unlike evaluation, which is characterised by questions about what works, Action Research 
usually starts with a problem. In the business setting, practitioners are used to working on 
problems through  PDCA (plan-do-check-act) cycles. This is very close to the meaning of the 
‘action’ part of Action Research—finding out what the problem is by acting on it, learning 
from these interventions, and then acting on it some more, etc. The difference is that PAR 
brings to PDCA is the sensibilities of academic research—inquiring, self-critical, rigorous, 
and well-documented. In this respect the academic educates the group by leading them, rather 
than training them—educere, rather than educare64. 
The description of PAR provided by Wadsworth (1998) reads rather like an ideal incident 
investigation in terms of its principles. The difference is its inclusiveness of stakeholders, and 
that it is intimately connected to action, rather than making recommendations. In respect of 
 
64 Citing, Craft (1984), Bass and Good (2004), note “that there are two different Latin roots of the English word 
“education.” They are educare, which means to train or to mould, and educere, meaning 
to lead out. While the two meanings are quite different, they are both represented in our word “education.” Thus, 
there is an etymological basis for many of the vociferous debates about education today. The opposing sides 
often use the same word to denote two very different concepts. One 
side uses education to mean the preservation and passing down of knowledge and the shaping of youths in the 
image of their parents. The other side sees education as preparing a new generation for the changes that are to 
come—readying them to create solutions to problems yet unknown. Bass and Good, 2004; p.161. 
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'good' practice, PAR might be most useful as a means develop practices for learning from 
incidents, as well as a model for learning specific lessons  from incidents. In other words, the 
problem(s) would be identified by prior incident investigation, but PAR would be the way of 
further defining and alleviating the problem. The potential advantages are: 
• Stakeholders stick with a problem for longer, rather than finding only rapid fixes. This 
would be appropriate for those incidents that investigation, or monitoring65 reveal to 
be symptoms of ‘messy’ or ‘wicked’ problems; 
• By bringing together participants from different parts of the system, the PAR group 
own all parts of the problem and the solution, leading to deeper insight into goals and 
constraints; 
• Occupational ill-health tends to be the ‘poor relation’ compared to safety incidents. 
Whereas safety incidents are more visible and their localisation in place and time 
means that are more tractable. PAR has already been used in this area (e.g. “Barefoot 
Research”, Keith, et al., 2001)  
 
7.7. Cooperation in lifelong learning 
Since the European year of lifelong learning in 1996, the European Commission has 
recognised that co-operation between all the relevant actors must improve if lifelong learning 
is to flourish. 
“…  All relevant actors, in and outside the formal systems, must collaborate for 
strategies to work ‘on the ground’. Gaining insight into the needs of the learner, or the 
potential learner, along with learning needs of organisations, communities, wider 
society and the labour market is the next step.” … “ There is a clear need here for the 
formal sector to recognise and value non-formal and informal learning. Creating a 
culture of learning depends ultimately on increasing learning opportunities, raising 
participation levels and stimulating demand for learning.” 
 (European Commission, 2001) 
However, Volles concludes that there “are considerable implementation gaps between the 
education and training goals set by the EU and the actual – often disappointing – outcomes 
achieved by the member states.” (Volles, 2016; p.360). 
Perhaps the area of investigating and learning from incidents, serves as a microcosm of this 
wider problem. Cooperation seems to be marginal and hesitant. It is characterised by a lack of 
lifelong learning mindsets66 among practitioners (van Dam, 2016), a lack of mutual 
understanding between the actors involved in lifelong learning, and coloured by the tendency 
for academics and practitioners to undervalue the other’s knowledge. 
The lifelong learning competencies of the practitioner are equally an issue. As already 
discussed, the skills assumed of adult learners do not, however, spontaneously appear at age 
18, and practitioners will vary in their current level of competence as learners. Hence, 
‘learning to learn’ is as much a feature of lifelong learning as ‘content’ knowledge.  
 
65 which was the approach taken by Daltuva et al., 2009 
66 Van Dam (2016) does not use mindset as a way of referring to an all encompassing attitude, but instead 
describes many different forms of mindset that each contribute to lifelong learning. 
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Both PAR and evaluation are forums for development as learners—both for the academics 
and the practitioners. One of the claims of PAR is empowerment of the research participants, 
not only in terms of equalising power imbalances in the research setting, but by enabling the 
participants to take an active role in their own development. In the cyclic nature of PAR, 
developing learning ability increases, as it were, the individual’s capacity to acquire capacity.  
A similar benefit is claimed for evaluation, if performed according to the principles set out by 
Everitt and Hardiker (1996).  
There are likely to be innumerable ways that a more cooperative approach could improve 
lifelong learning. But, ironically, it seems likely that a higher degree of cooperation will 
needed if these ways are to be found and made to work. Some pump-priming will be needed 
to find these ways and make them work.  
8. Conclusions 
'Good' practice is a clichéd term. However, the problem of the cliché is not the language, it is 
the lack of critical reflection on implied claims to efficacy. This can make it harder, not easier, 
to reveal the values that define good and the causal theory that makes a practice effective. 
When ‘good practice’ is used as a cliché, claims efficacy remain implicit, especially when 
said by someone with more power than you. But it is a risk: the practice might not be ‘good’ 
in the context of your work; it might be a distraction from more deserving ideas. And it is also 
a lost opportunity, for practitioners and academics alike, to discover what ‘good’ is, and to 
understand the dynamics of ‘corrupt’ practice. 
Generalisation of 'good' practices is possible, but it depends on understanding the goals and 
constraints of the context. Documenting 'good' practice means also describing the context, 
rather than stripping it away to leave only the procedural steps. How to produce case studies is 
itself a research need. 
Practice is created by practitioners, sometimes in relative isolation, sometimes working in 
groups. As with ‘best’ practice, it is not possible to objectively identify 'good' practice. 
Furthermore, the values that define ‘good’ may not be a matter of consensus in a group of 
stakeholders. Influencing practice ‘in the direction of the good’ requires the group to 
recognise their values through reflection and research of practice. Organisations need a 
strategic view of the longer term development of investigation programme towards goals of 
learning (for safety) amongst others. It is not true that an investigation performed to high 
technical standards will induce learning.  Stakeholders will need to be prepared to resolve 
conflict between 'good' practices of investigation and those of learning from incidents.  
Lifelong learning is often talked about in terms of its most tractable parts – formal and non-
formal learning: courses, for the most part. These have a role in 'good' practice, but perhaps 
more as a focus and inspiration than as the main means for achieving competence or 
innovating practice. For these, the emphasis is on informal learning, which is a much more 
complex set of structures. In general, informal learning is not flourishing in organisations and, 
as a result, that practitioners’ capacity to acquire capacity is limited. In this respect, 
investigating and learning from incidents is a microcosm of wider problems in lifelong 
learning.  
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Rather than practice being in the margins, this paper has argued for it to become a focus for 
empiricism. As individual practitioners, and as groups, there are structures that can be built 
on. The accent is as much on relational work as much as technical skills. At these individual 
and group levels, pressure of work appears to be the main inhibition to developing and 
sharing 'good' practice. There is scope for structural adjustments to help this: planned 
debriefing, critical review, and the use of ‘terms-of-reference’ in both of these.   
The paper has discussed the role of systematic research approaches to the question of what is 
'good' practice. The most available ‘model’ for this is evaluation research. However, insight in 
'good' practice will require an approach to evaluation that addresses power imbalances and is 
sceptical about rational-technical outlooks on practice. 
The authors have argued for a larger academic role in the development and sharing of 'good' 
practice in investigating and learning from incidents. For the most part, this enlarged role is in 
research, but also in education—especially with respect to informal learning. We are mindful 
of Lewin’s advice67 that “action, research and training is a triangle that should be kept 
together for the sake of any of its corners.” Rather than more of the same, the argument here 
is for more academic activity enacted in collaboration with practitioners. Research designs 
consistent with evaluation studies and participatory action research, examples of which exist 
in the public sector, could be applied to investigative and lesson-learning practices in safety. 
The ambition would be for better, faster development of 'good' practice; and more grounded 
theorising of safety management.  
There are very strong constrains that limit our structures. However, the present authors see in 
this area abundant opportunity for projects that elucidate 'good' practice while demonstrating 
the art of the possible. 
After word 
In this paper the authors have tended to look at learning from incidents through the lens of 
investigation. This means that we have seen the issues of investigation first, and learning 
second. This paper is not so unusual in this respect, but this bias can be a problem. 
Organisations investigate accidents for lots of reasons, but if learning safety lessons is the pre-
eminent goal, we should remember look at investigation through the lens of learning, not the 
other way around. 
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Abstract 
 
The article returns to more than twenty years old, but very serious, accident from the Czech 
railways. It briefly reminds WHAT happened that time, and analyzes HOW and WHY the 
causal factors leading to the accident were combined. Lessons learned from the analysis are 
compared with available data. It turns out that surprisingly, in the course of the lessons 
learning, the possibilities for the prevention of initiating the basic hazard, which realized in 
the accident, have not been thoroughly analyzed. 
Therefore, it cannot be said that the accident was properly used as information to prevent 
similar accidents. Two recent media reports confirm that the basic hazard keeps being urgent 
and that the appropriate lessons are still missing.  
Therefore, the answer to the question from the seminar “what are the remaining challenges?” 
is: In the accident analysis, it is especially necessary to consistently accept and implement 
already known approaches to the analysis of causes and to the accident response, including 
the application of known principles for inherently safer solutions. Consistent work with 
existing tools is often everything what is necessary for satisfactory lessons learning. In the 
case described, it should not be forgotten that „When the scenario cannot be initiated, then no 
need for its mitigation." 
Keywords: Railway safety; Root cause analysis; Inherently safer design. 
 Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) 
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1. The incident 
The incident occurred on Saturday, June 24, 1995, at the end of the afternoon, during the 
disconnection of freight cars at Čachnov station. Four cars run away. Two cars were loaded 
with wood, one with iron scrap and the last car was a service one. On a nearly five-kilometer 
downhill journey with slope over 20 per mille, the cars reached a hundred-kilometer speed. At 
a neighboring village of Krouna they hit a small passenger train (railbus) moving at a speed of 
about 40 km per hour in the opposite direction. Of the 23 people present on the train at the 
time of the crash, 18 died, 4 were seriously injured, one died later in the hospital, and one 
woman survived with smaller injuries. See [1, 2]. 
Figure 1 shows the situation at Čachnov station shortly before the incident. The four freight 
cars represented the rear part of the train, which stopped at the main track to the left of the 
station building (the black rectangle indicates the locomotive). This quaternion of cars should 
have stayed in Čachnov. It was disconnected so that the locomotive together with front four 
cars could carry out other planned shunting operations in front of the station building. In the 
end of the shunting, the quaternion was planned to be parked on the track south of the main 
track, ie on the track closest to the building to the left. All shunting operations were to be 
completed before the arrival of a passenger train from Krouna. Four persons participated in 
the shunting operations: train driver (locomotive engineer), trainmaster, and two freight car 
conductors. Also a dispatcher was present at Čachnov station, but she did not participate 
directly in the manipulation. 
 
Figure 1. Railyard in Čachnov shortly before the incident. 
 
The quaternion that run away later stood at a place where the track was already falling 
towards Krouna with a gradient of more than 20 per mille. The conductors did not brake three 
of the four cars with a handbrake and did not use mandatory hand rail shoes, which were to be 
laid on the track directly to the wheel of the first car down the slope. They did so with the 
consent of the trainmaster and in violation of safety regulations. The impulse generated by the 
disconnection and the sloping position were enough for the standing quaternion to start move 
downhill in the direction of Krouna. The two conductors tried to stop with the help of brakes, 
but they did not succeed. The attempt of the dispatcher to alert a passenger train driver by 
calling the previous station served by a dispatcher was unsuccessful, too. When she was 
calling, the train had already left the station. Other posts occupied by railway personnel were 
not available on the 10 km journey to Čachnov. The collision could no longer be prevented by 
the available means. The quaternion travelled from Čachnov to the place of crash about 5 km. 
According to the first reports, the cars travelled to the crash site about 20 minutes. This has 
led to speculation that if the railway staff was equipped by means of interconnection (meant 
by radio transmitters; mobile phones were not yet available at that time) fatalities would have 
been prevented. Later, however, it became clear that the cars had only been traveling for a 
maximum of five minutes to the crash site, and that the shunters announced the event to the 
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dispatcher with an indefinite delay, perhaps after the collision. Therefore, it is not certain 
whether the radio link could have averted the tragedy at Krouna. Perhaps, if the 
interconnection existed on that track, the train driver could have been warned and he might 
have stopped and made the passengers get out. 
2. Application of methods for incident investigation 
In the article [3], a simple Kletz's method according to [4] was used to analyze the event. 
Since the publication of Kletz's ideas, his approach has developed into methods of root cause 
analysis. In this paper, a method from root cause analysis family is used to analyze the 
accident. According to the book's [5] terminology, it is a type B method using a predefined 
decision tree. 
First, we reconstruct the sequence of events. We describe the event development timeline 
using partial events in rectangles. The context of the incident is described by circumstances in 
the ovals connected to the partial events. After that the causal factors are identified in the 
diagram, as serious unplanned and unintended contributors to the incident, which, if removed, 
would either prevent the occurrence or reduce its severity or frequency (modified definition 
according to [5]). In this way, we gradually create the events and causal factors chart. The 
result is the diagram in Figure 2. 
Construction of the timeline proceeds from the occurrence or suppression of the harmful 
effects of the incident against the flow of time. It is desirable to include all the partial events 
that have brought into play all the hazards the realization of which was necessary for the 
occurrence of the incident. As the examples in [6] show, this often means to include events 
from the time of creation of the system in which the accident occurred, or to apply original 
design intentions when assessing whether a partial event is a causal factor or not. 
The considerations related to the designer's intentions are precisely the reason why partial 
events indicated as CF1, CF2 and CF3 were identified as Causal Factors in Figure 2. All three 
of these events undoubtedly fulfill the second part of the definition of causal factors - if they 
were removed, they would either prevent the occurrence or reduce its severity or frequency. 
But an argument could easily arise on whether they meet the first part of the definition, ie 
whether they represent serious unplanned and unintended contributors to the incident. We 
consider them causal factors because we believe that they are expanding the use of the 
Čachnov railyard above the scope originally intended and planned by the designer. The 
designer was undoubtedly aware of the fact that every railway vehicle left unattended on a 
track sloping down into other parts of the railway network is always a major hazard. You 
should always take advantage of the options offered by the local railyard to reduce the risk. 
First of all, it means that other tracks than the main track should be used to park vehicles. 
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Figure 2. Events and causal factors chart for the incident at Krouna 
24. 6. 1995. 
 
Only when the situation is exceptionally such that it is not possible to circumvent the use of 
the main track for parking of vehicles, it can be allowed but only in the horizontal section 
between the branches and, if possible, outside the time when another vehicle can enter the 
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slope. The use of a sloping section of the main track for parking unmanned vehicles can 
practically always be avoided in Čachnov. Hence, it seems unnecessary and therefore 
inadmissible. The regular repeated use of this track is especially inadmissible. Its regular use 
is not proved at Čachnov station, but there are indications for it. The fact that the negotiation 
of the trainmaster with the dispatcher about the shunting operations on the slope was easy and 
short, hints that it was a normal, established procedure. 
It is clear from the use of this procedure that the unmanned vehicle on the sloping track was 
not perceived by shunters as an unacceptable hazard. At the time of the incident, no 
identifications of hazards and risk assessments were required. The question of whether this 
has changed, for example, as a result of the use of more recent legislation [7], will remain 
open. 
In the next step of the analysis, we refer to the identified causal factors. Total of five causal 
factors was determined as seen in Figure 2. Root causes are assigned to causal factors. For 
this purpose, we use the description of root causes according to [8] as a predefined decision 
tree. Recommendations will then be linked to the identification of root causes. All these 
results are summarized in Table 1 below. 
Table I: Summary table of causes and recommendations for incident in Krouna 24. 6. 1995. 
Causal factor Root causes 
Lessons learned/ 
recommendations 
CF1: 
Trainmaster and 
dispatcher plan 
the shunting 
procedure that 
uses track #1 i.e. 
the main track. 
(It was probably 
the established 
"normal" 
shunting 
procedure.) 
Understand Hazards and Risk – Process 
Knowledge Management – Use Process 
Knowledge – Ensure awareness, Ensure that 
process knowledge remains useful. 
Commit to Process Safety – Process Safety 
Culture – Develop and Implement a Sound 
Culture – Maintain a sense of vulnerability. 
(At the time of the incident, the hazard, 
represented by the use of a sloped track for 
vehicle parking, was disregarded. The 
perception of this practice as a vulnerable 
point has disappeared from the general 
consciousness.) 
Ensure that everyone involved in 
the rail vehicle handling at the 
station knows the slope of the 
track and is aware of the 
inappropriateness of the use of the 
main track and especially the 
sloping section of the main track 
for vehicle parking. 
Reduce the opportunities for 
vehicle run away. Limit the 
shunting procedures using the 
main track. Do not allow shunting 
procedures that use the sloped 
section of the main track. 
CF2: The 
shunting 
operations take 
place shortly 
before a train 
arrives from 
Krouna. 
(Workers 
hurried with the 
shunting 
operations.) 
Understand Hazards and Risk – Hazard 
Identification and Risk Analysis – Assess 
Risks and Make Risk-based Decisions – Select 
appropriate risk control measures. 
(The stay of cars without traction vehicles on 
the main track was not assessed as a so 
significant hazard, that it should have been 
prohibited at a time when another train could 
approach. Nor was it taken into account that 
the short time until the arrival of a train could 
lead to an undesirable omission of safety-
critical operations that slow-down performing 
the activity.) 
Do not allow the stay of 
unmanned vehicles and the 
handling of free cars on the main 
track in a suitably defined period 
prior to the arrival of passenger 
trains. Ensure compliance with 
this prohibition. Ensure that all 
workers involved in shunting 
operations are aware that, unless 
the measures recommended 
against CF1 are in place, the 
constraints of the handling period 
provents the destructive 
realization of the present hazard. 
CF3: Coupled 
train arrives 
behind the 
westernmost 
Understand Hazards and Risk – Hazard 
Identification and Risk Analysis – Assess 
Risks and Make Risk-based Decisions – Select 
appropriate risk control measures. 
Ensure that everyone involved in 
the rail vehicle handling at the 
station knows the slope of the 
track and is aware of the 
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switch in the 
direction to 
Krouna. (Slope 
begins behind 
the switch. Its 
gradient has 
more than 20 
per mile.) 
Commit to Process Safety – Process Safety 
Culture – Develop and Implement a Sound 
Culture – Maintain a sense of vulnerability. 
(The stay of parked cars on the sloped section 
of the track was not assessed as a so 
significant hazard that it should not be used 
even though its use was not necessary during 
the shunting. It was not taken into account that 
the horizontal section of the track could also 
be used for the parking if only the shunting 
procedure would have been changed (and 
made somewhat more complicated). It was not 
considered that the use of the sloping section 
should have been compensated by the 
modification of the rail yard and instructions 
for its use, which would have limited the 
realization of the hazard. The perception of 
this practice as a vulnerable point has 
disappeared from the general consciousness.) 
inappropriateness of the use of the 
sloping section of the main track 
for vehicle parking. 
Do not allow the use of the sloped 
section of the main track during 
shunting procedures. 
If the use of the sloped section 
has been shown to be inevitable, 
compensate the increased risk 
associated with this practice by 
proper modification of the rail 
yard and the shunting procedure. 
See the discussion connected with  
Figure 3. 
CF4: During the 
compression 
after the move, 
conductor A 
disconnects the 
quaternion for 
Čachnov. 
(Conductor A 
claims to have 
seen conductor 
B as he layed 
the rail shoe. 
Disconnected 
cars were not 
secured by the 
brakes and the 
rail shoes.) 
Manage Risk – Conduct of Operations – 
Maintain a Dependable Practice – Validate 
program effectiveness.  
Commit to Process Safety – Process Safety 
Culture – Maintain a Dependable Practice – 
Establish and enforce high standards of 
performance. 
(Although an operating procedure requiring 
the combined use of brakes and rail shoes 
existed, managers did not look after that the 
requirement was met. The workers did not 
commit to safety so as to follow the 
requirement without supervision. Managers 
and workers apparently preferred other 
objectives than safety, and were not 
sufficiently aware of the vulnerability of the 
process in which they participated, and of how 
easily the present hazards could realize.) 
Ensure that brakes and rail shoes 
are used. Ensure that all managers 
and workers involved in the 
shunting are aware that unless the 
effective measures recommended 
against CF1 to CF3 are 
introduced, no action other than 
the proper use of brakes and shoes 
prevents the destructive 
realization of the present hazard. 
CF5: Dispatcher 
unsuccessfully 
attempts to warn 
the driver of 
passenger train. 
(Only the 
telephone to 
previous station 
was available 
for dispatcher.) 
Manage Risk – Emergency Management – 
Prepare for Emergencies – Plan defensive 
response actions. 
(The possibility that a vehicle could run from 
the station against an arriving train was not 
expected. No procedure has been prepared and 
trained to warn the driver of the arriving train. 
No tools existed to make such a warning 
possible.) 
Analyze possible incidents, their 
consequences and the response to 
them. Equip the station with a 
means of emergency 
communication between 
dispatcher and trains. Train the 
use of communication means. 
 
3. Lessons learned 
Quaternion of unmanned cars without sufficient protection against a runaway parking on a 
sloping track represented a hazard. This hazard has gone out of control, and caused an 
incident. If this hazard was not underestimated and insufficiently limited, it could not be 
realized. This is the basic aspect to which the incident turns our attention. 
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The lessons learned and recommendations obtained from the analysis are summarized in 
previous Table 1. Order of causal factors CF1 to CF5 approximately corresponds with the 
order how the lessons learned should be prioritized. The most important point is that the use 
of the main track for shunting operations creates opportunities for the realization of the above-
mentioned hazard. This use is in most cases unnecessary. It is advisable to organize the 
shunting so that the parking of unmanned vehicles on the main track is not used at all. The 
application of the shunting procedure that uses the main track results from human laziness. 
This is usually the simplest procedure that requires the smallest number of operations. 
However, the increased ease and speed of the shunting barely compensates the increased risk. 
If it is not possible to completely exclude the use of the main track for parking of vehicles 
during shunting operation, then it is reasonable to distinguish between two options. Whereas 
the use of the horizontal section of the main track between the switches for vehicle parking 
can be considered, the use of the sloping section behind the rail yard in direction to Krouna is 
to be regarded as completely unnecessary, risky and unacceptable. Routine use of this section 
for vehicle parking is particularly unacceptable. The following may be objected to the opinion 
that suitable measures (brakes and rail shoes) can ensure the safety of shunting operations: 
If a sloping section is regularly used for car parking, this creates a situation where the non-
realization of a serious hazard depends only on the perfect interplay of several persons. The 
actions of these persons are not redundant. Safety of the whole manipulation depends only on 
the fact that everyone will carry out their work without an error. It is known that the 
frequency of human errors in routinely repeated operations is quite high. Hence a situation 
arises, where due to probability laws, it is practically certain that the connected railway track 
will be seriously endangered within a foreseeable future. And if deficiencies in safety culture 
are added to this common human inclination to err, the situation is even more serious. It is 
difficult to control from the outside the correct execution of all the steps of shunting 
procedure. The temptation to shortcut the execution of shunting operations and the opinion 
that some safety measures are unnecessary, are not far away in such situations. And as soon 
as, for seemingly good reasons, such as making the work easier, an operation (such as 
multiple use of handbrake) starts to be omitted, easily it becomes to be a habit known as 
normalization of deviance. 
If a general rule was applied in Čachnov, that the main track, and especially its sloped section, 
would not be used for shunting unnecessarily, this rule would definitely limit the probability 
of run away. In addition, the adherence to this rule would be visible and controllable. And this 
is valid even although nothing is changed in the fact that a small group of potentially 
vulnerable people threatened by a possible collapse of safety culture performs the shunting 
operations. 
Such a rule would shift the emphasis from purely organizational or educational measures to 
technical measures. This would fulfil the idea of prioritizing technical measures over 
organizational or educational measures, which is one of the fundamentals of inherently safer 
design. 
A hazard, such as the presence of an unmanned vehicle on a sloped track, deserves to be 
treated according to all rules for inherently safer solutions. In limiting this hazard, for 
example, the risk control hierarchy described in [6] can be followed. (The general principles 
of risk control apply to railway transport as well as to the chemical industry.) The book 
recommends that six steps be attempted in order to control the risk associated with a certain 
hazard: 
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1.  Avoid Hazard; 
2.  Reduce Severity of Hazard; 
3.  Reduce Likelihood of Hazard Realization; 
4.  Apply Passive Safeguards; 
5.  Apply Active Safeguards; 
6.  Apply Procedural Safeguards. 
 
Step 1 would, in our case, completely eliminate the occurrence of unmanned vehicles on the 
main track. In the case of rail transport, however, the vehicles on the main track are 
inevitable. They can be found without the operator for many different reasons. Therefore, the 
absolute elimination of the hazard is not possible, even if we are limited to the surroundings 
of Čachnov. The second step is to reduce the severity. The severity of such a hazard is 
determined by its energy and the value of the targets that can be damaged by this energy. 
Reduction of the energy of these hazards or the value of the targets is not possible without 
essential change of the rail transport. Step 3 – reduction of the likelihood of realization of 
these sources, at least near Čachnov station – thus appears to be the first applicable step in the 
hierarchy. 
Things we suggest in the recommendation column in Table 1 – above all, the prohibition of 
the shunting where the cars are disconnected on the sloped section of the main track – would 
contribute to the implementation of step 3. The elimination of the procedures using the main 
track (proposed against CF1) and the elimination of as many as possible shunting operations 
during which the unmanned vehicle can get on the main track would reduce the probability of 
hazard realization even more. The top sketch in Figure 3 illustrates a situation where it is 
forbidden to use the main track and the disconnection is carried out on track 2 north of the 
main track. The likelihood that the disconnected train section will get from track 2 to the main 
track would be further reduced if a dead-end track was connected to the track 2 and the 
respective switch was turned into the dead-end track during the disconnection as shown in the 
middle sketch. Building a dead-end track represents an active safeguard. 
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Figure 3. Proposed risk controls in the railyard at Čachnov. 
 
If the use of a sloped section for shunting operations was unavoidable, it would be possible to 
compensate the increased risk associated with this practice by using a similar active measure 
– by realizing a dead-end track intended for coupling the trains as seen in the lower sketch in 
Figure 3. The recommendation against factor CF3 in Table 1 refers to this option. 
Construction of a dead-end track serving as a safety measure for shunting represents a change 
in the rail yard technical solution. It is worthwhile considering whether such a change will at 
the same time bring other hazards – for example the possibility that the train planned to 
continue in the direction of Krouna will inadvertently turn to the dead-end track. 
Technically, the exclusion of such a possibility is feasible by means of interlocking, which 
can be mechanical for manually operated switches or electric for remote control. If the switch 
in front of the dead-end track is not turned into dead-end track, then it is not possible to 
manipulate other switches and a signal allowing the shunting cannot be displayed. 
4. Comparison of lessons learned 
Table 1 summarizes lessons learned and recommendations based on authors' analysis. Table 1 
should logically be a base for more general lessons learning. Operators of the entire track or 
the entire network should explore the feasibility of similar recommendations for all of their 
stations. 
It would be very interesting to find out what lessons and recommendations were made by 
responsible persons after the accident. Unfortunately, our information on these lessons and 
recommendations is limited. From the available sources, we know only that the imposed 
measures were threefold: 
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1. Technical: the introduction of a radio system that ensures warning of the train driver of 
arriving train in the event of an accident and allows permanent contact between the 
dispatcher and the train driver. 
2. Organizational: Prohibition of shunting when a train approaches. 
3. Educational: training of workers, testing of knowledge by examination, increase of     
control activity. 
 
It is not known whether the investigation drew attention towards other ways of preventing the 
realization of the fundamental hazard presented in Table 1 in the recommendations against 
causal factors CF1 and CF3. This means, towards reduction of the use of the main track and in 
particular its sloped section for shunting operations, or towards compensations for the risk 
arising from the use of the sloped track. The situation for the implementation of technical and 
organizational measures, such as the introduction of a retreat (dead-end) track, was relatively 
favourable at that time: the railway operator and the rail transport operator were one legal 
entity. 
The above three measures have been implemented. The incident has accelerated the 
introduction of the track radio system on local lines throughout the Czech Republic. The track 
linking Krouna and Čachnov was equipped with the transmitters in June 1996. In 2012, the 
track was modernized by a dispatching control system, where the entire track is controlled by 
one dispatcher from the central workplace. A train without a connection to the dispatcher can 
no longer be put on the track. The dispatcher knows on which section of the track the train 
moves and what manipulations are performed with it in the stations. 
In all media reports that remind the incident at Krouna, it has become customary to draw 
attention to the introduction of remote communication with the driver as a measure that 
should prevent repeating similar incidents. For example, in an interview with a railway expert 
that was broadcast by Czech Television on the 20th anniversary of the crash on June 28, 2015 
(see [9]), the following information was heard: 
Today, such a tragedy could not occur because the track is equipped with technical devices 
that make such a type of incident impossible. Unlike the situation 20 years ago, the entire 
track is managed from one dispatch center. The dispatcher who controls the track sees on the 
computers what's happening on the track. If the wagons were run away during shunting as 
they were 20 years ago, the dispatcher would see them on the computer and know where they 
are moving. Depending on where the trains would be on the track, he would have enough time 
to decide what to do to avert the incident. In the first place, he could immediately contact the 
train driver at an endangered train and give him instructions on how to behave. 
This claim exaggerates. Communication between the dispatcher and the driver only increases 
the likelihood that they can avert or reduce the loss of life. But the claim that such a tragedy 
could not have happened again is technically wrong. Complete exclusion of such accidents 
would only be possible if vehicles running downhill stopped moving spontaneously. 
However, such vehicles would no longer be suitable for the operation of rail transport. Radio 
connection only leads to mitigation of the consequences of the incident. It cannot avoid its 
occurrence. 
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5. Twenty-three years after 
The fact that the repetition of such accidents cannot be completely ruled out is also confirmed 
by the accident that happened on August 2, 2017 (see [10]). 
The electric passenger train (multiple unit, a set of several cars) arrived early in the morning 
to the final station. The passengers went out, and finally also the driver left the train. Contrary 
to the instructions, he did not secure the parked train by means of a pressure or locking brake 
and did not check its securing. As the rails were sloped, the unit began to move. The driver 
failed to board the train and stop it. Fortunately, the dispatcher intervened and directed the 
switches to prevent damage. The unit stopped after about nine kilometres at the opposite 
slope. It spontaneously started to move back down the hill and stopped at the opposite slope 
again. This was repeated several times before the unit stopped completely and the firemen 
secured it against further movement by two rail shoes. The unit travelled unattended totally 
about 15 km, but due to favourable circumstances and mitigation by the dispatcher, there was 
no damage. 
If we analyzed this accident by the same method as the incident in Krouna, we would 
probably identify quite similar causal factors as those in Figure 2 and Table 1. The classical 
root cause analysis method is good enough for us to believe that it will help us determine all 
causal factors, all conditions necessary and sufficient for the incident. The problem does not 
arise in determining causal factors but in the way how these causal factors are used for lessons 
learning and recommendations. Any future consideration about the prevention of similar 
incidents should consider all causal factors, and first of all those that arose first in the incident 
timeline. 
The incident again arose at the track, which had a slope, and at the moment, when a set of 
unmanned vehicles parked here. It cannot be assumed that all the places where trains stop on a 
slope can be removed. But it would clearly be worthwhile to consider whether at least in some 
places in the rail network, where vehicles are regularly unmanned on a slope, would not be 
able to make adjustments that would increase safety, for example in similar ways as proposed 
in Figure 3. These considerations would be aimed to the actual prevention of similar accidents 
as this one at Krouna. It is not professional to rely only on the fact that after repeated training 
the employees will stop making mistakes in implementing organizational measures. 
Because the analysis has shown that it is important to encourage sense of vulnerability in 
workers’ minds, it should be reminded during the trainings how tricky are the places where 
the track is sloping, how tricky is the reliance on that the vehicle will not get an impulse to 
start running. This is much better than weakening the sense of vulnerability by reassuring that 
similar situations can be successfully mitigated with the help of improved means of 
communication. 
Measures that ensure communication after an initial event are also useful. But considerations 
about improving them should be given only after the measures against run away has been 
improved. Improvement of communication is a mitigating rather than a preventing measure. 
Even when communicating with the public, railway operators should not resort to misleading 
statements. The public should not be deceived that the measures introduced will completely 
exclude the possibility of repeating similar accidents. Whoever says something like this, 
promises that future trains will operate with vehicles that are not moving from the slope. 
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6.  Conclusions 
Analysis of a serious incident is an opportunity to rethink the importance of fundamental 
hazards and defense against them. The presence of an unmanned railway vehicle parked on a 
sloping track entering the rail network is definitely such a fundamental hazard in rail 
transport. 
The 1995 incident has prompted a great effort to introduce modern communication 
technology in the railway system. But apparently the discussion and new lessons learning 
related to the above-mentioned fundamental hazard have not been realized. The quote by the 
television expert and the incident from August 2, 2017, confirm that the appropriate lesson is 
still missing, but the hazard has not ceased to be up to date. To date, prevention of the 
realization of the above-mentioned fundamental hazard is not sufficient at rail transport 
operators. At the same time, the mere awareness of this hazard and of safety measures leading 
to its elimination could prevent many undesirable events. Our look into history shows, that the 
emphasis on prevention has not prevailed yet in learning from a real incident in order to 
improve safety management. Even the introduction of regulations, such as [7], has not 
changed enough. 
Obviously, an obstacle to lesson learning is not that the existing methods of accident analysis 
and recommendation making are not sufficient, but rather that they are not sufficiently known 
and consistently used. In our case, a thorough analysis of root causes, ie causes in 
organization and management, would leave no doubt that lessons and remedial measures must 
be devoted not only to the mitigation of scenarios in which long-term efforts have been 
invested, but also to the prevention of vehicle run away. When designing measures, the use of 
hierarchical risk control principles, as indicated by above examples, leading to increased 
inherent safety, could help to systematically exploit the potential for effective prevention. 
It is advisable to be equipped by the means of emergency communication for the event of a 
run away, but it is better to ensure that the brakes and rail shoes are used in the prescribed 
manner when vehicles are parked and that shunting operations are carried out at a time when 
there is no danger of collision with arriving trains. 
It is advisable to rely on compliance with the rules on the use of brakes and rail shoes and on 
the appropriate times for shunting, but it is better to compensate for the increased risk of 
vehicles parking on a sloped track using a retreat track. And it is even better to avoid parking 
vehicles on the sloping track. 
Pravděpodobně nejlepší je minimalizovat příležitosti k ujetí vyloučením všech zbytečných 
operací posunu na hlavní koleji. 
Probably the best thing is to minimize the opportunity to run away by eliminating all the 
unnecessary shunting operations on the main track. 
Do not repeat old mistakes in learning from accidents. It`s better to prevent a run away than 
be ready for it 
 
 Accident Investigation and Learning to Improve Safety Management in Complex System:  
Remaining Challenges 
209 
 
References 
[1]     ČTK (2010) Před 15 lety si srážka u Krouny vyžádala 19 obětí. Chrudimský deník, 23. 
6. 2010. Available from 
https://chrudimsky.denik.cz/nehody/nehoda_vlaky_krouna20100623.html [6.2. 2018]. 
[2]    Železniční nehoda u Krouny. Wikipedia. Available from 
https://cs.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C5%BDelezni%C4%8Dn%C3%AD_nehoda_u_Krouny 
[6.2. 2018]. 
[3]    Ferjenčík M. (1998) Poučení z havárií: Na co by se nemělo zapomínat při prevenci ztrát 
(část 2). Chemický průmysl 3/1998, p. 16 
[4]    Kletz, T. (2001) Learning from Accidents, third ed. Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford. 
[5]   AIChE Center for Chemical Process Safety (2003) Guidelines for Investigating Chemical 
Process Incidents, Second Edition. American Institute of Chemical Engineers. 
[6]   Center for Chemical Process Safety (2009) Inherently Safer Chemical Processes—A Life 
Cycle Approach, Second Edition. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
[7]   Ministerstvo dopravy České republiky (2006) Vyhláška 376/2006 o systému bezpečnosti 
provozování dráhy a postupech při vzniku mimořádných událostí na drahách. 
[8]   Center for Chemical Process Safety (2007) Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety. 
American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York. 
[9]    Česká televize (2015) Dvacet let od vlakové tragédie u Krouny. Dnes už by k ní dojít 
nemělo, 28. 6. 2015. Available from 
http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/regiony/pardubicky-kraj/1541404-dvacet-let-od-
vlakove-tragedie-u-krouny-dnes-uz-k-ni-dojit-nemelo [6.2. 2018]. 
[10]   Novinky.cz (2018) Prázdný vlak jezdil po Kadani sem a tam. Chyboval strojvůdce, 
rozhodla inspekce, 6. 2. 2018. Available from  https://www.novinky.cz/krimi/462632-
prazdny-vlak-jezdil-po-kadani-sem-a-tam-chyboval-strojvudce-rozhodla-inspekce.html 
[6.2. 2018]. 
 
 Accident Investigation and Learning to Improve Safety Management in Complex System:  
Remaining Challenges 
210 
 
 
Analysing the depth of railway accident investigation 
reports on over-speeding incidents, using an innovative 
method called “SAFRAN” 
 
Bart ACCOU 
European Union Agency for Railways  
120 Rue Marc Lefrancq, BP 20392 
FR-59307 Valenciennes Cedex, FRANCE 
 
Genserik RENIERS 
Safety and Security Science, Delft University of Technology  
 Jaffalaan 5, 2628 BX Delft,The NETHERLANDS 
 
Abstract 
With the publication of the public enquiry on the Piper Alpha disaster (1990), the concept of a 
safety management system (SMS) has found its introduction in high-risk industries. This 
concept went further than being “good practice” and became legally mandatory in some 
industries, where holding a certificate/licence, issued on the basis of a SMS, is necessary to 
operate. SMS requires continuous improvement, based on a combination of “knowing the 
unknown” (risk assessment) and “learning on experience” (occurrence analysis). To do so, 
accidents/incidents need to be reported and analysed and measures need to be taken to 
prevent future events. Additionally, national investigating bodies have been given the role of 
independently investigating serious events, with the same goal. Where a SMS is based on a 
holistic approach, with operational, supporting and controlling elements functioning together 
to improve safety, most reporting/investigation methods are not developed in line with a 
system thinking approach to accident causation. Also, how to link the top-down description of 
SMS requirements with the operational activities of the organisation that create these risks in 
the first place, is poorly understood. In result, the current practice in accident and incident 
investigation does not provide a systematic approach to analyse elements of SMS. As a direct 
consequence, the opportunity to use these investigations for introducing sustainable system 
changes is often missed. The paper briefly introduces the SAfety FRactal ANalysis (SAFRAN) 
method that is developed to guide investigators to identify where interventions might have the 
greatest impact for improving global system safety, by exploring the composing elements of 
the concerned SMS and the sociotechnical system surrounding it in a natural and logic way, 
starting from the findings close to operations that explain the occurrence – being the elements 
accident investigators are first confronted with. In addition, the proposed methodology 
provides an innovative visual representation of the investigation process.  
 
 Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) 
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The SAFRAN method is then applied to review a selected set of published railway accident 
investigations, all reporting on occurrences related to over-speeding, possibly resulting in a 
(lethal) derailment. The depth and focus of the performed investigations are assessed and 
compared with findings that would result from an analysis that is applying the SAFRAN logic, 
demonstrating the need to focus accident analysis on an organisation’s capability of 
managing the variability that might put successful process performance at risk. 
 
1. Introduction 
In the evening of November 1, 1918, a Brighton Beach Train of the Brooklyn Rapid Transit 
Company, packed with a rush hour crowd, derailed on a sharp curve approaching the tunnel at 
Malbone Street, in Brooklyn, and plunged into a concrete partition between the north and 
south bound tracks. When entering the reverse curve, which had a speed limit of 10 km/h, the 
train was operating at a speed of 48 km/h or more. At least 93 people died, making it one of 
the deadliest train crashes in the history of the United States. (NY Times, 1918; Wikipedia, 
2018).  
Now, 100 years later, the management of safety risks in railways, as in many other high-risk 
industries, is mainly relying on the holding of a safety management system (SMS). This 
organisational concept to continuously improve safety of operations, was launched with the 
recommendations resulting from the public enquiry after the deadly disaster on the oil 
platform Piper Alpha (Cullen’s, 1990) and introduced the transition from an often very 
prescriptive safety approach towards an approach that is evidence-driven and based on goal-
oriented legislation. In different industries, the holding of a SMS to control all risks related to 
a company’s operational activities not only became normative but even legally mandatory, 
forming the basis for certification and regulation (e.g. Vierendeels et al. 2011; Leveson, 2011; 
Grote, 2012; Deharvengt, 2013; Fowler, 2013; Lappalainen, 2017). Various standards and 
regulations exist that describe or prescribe the basic SMS components, but they all share the 
requirement for procedures to ensure that accidents, incidents, near misses and other 
dangerous occurrences are reported, investigated and analysed. They also have the 
requirement in common that this analysis should result in necessary measures to prevent 
similar, future events. Additionally, in some high-risk industries, national investigating bodies 
have been given the role of independently investigating significant events, with the same aim 
of preventing future accidents and improving the overall safety of the system. Despite these 
requirements, 100 years after the so-called ‘Malbone street wreck’, over-speeding is still 
causing some of the most lethal railway accidents; putting in question the capacity of a whole 
sector to learn lessons from the past. 
Johnson’s review (2004) of the original BFU accident investigation report of the famous 
Überlingen mid-air collision concludes that the investigation had insufficiently analysed the 
SMS. He further highlights the importance of looking extensively at organisational factors 
and their contribution to an accident. This finding is in line with the findings of other authors 
(e.g. Antonsen, 2009; Kelly, 2017) that the scope of accident and incident investigations, 
whether performed internally or externally, is usually limited to investigating the immediate 
causes and decision making processes related to the accident sequence. Important factors 
contributing to the accident are hereby often overlooked and the weaknesses in the SMS, or 
its composing elements, are hardly ever analysed. Since the type of data collected during 
accident investigation and the method used to analyse this data will highly influence and 
sometimes even constrain the proposed remedial actions (e.g. Hale, 2000; Hollnagel, 2008; 
Underwood and Waterson, 2013; Salmon et al., 2016), it should be of no surprise that those 
investigations don’t guide directly towards solutions that can be found within elements of the 
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legally obliged SMS. This, in turn, may result in the perception that the SMS approach does 
not deliver as much as was hoped for when Cullen published his recommendations. Different 
authors assign possible underlying causes that could explain these findings. Where a SMS is 
based on a holistic approach, with operational, supporting and controlling elements 
functioning together to improve safety, most accident reporting and investigation methods are 
not developed in line with a system thinking approach to accident causation (Reason, 1997; 
Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008; Dekker, 2011). More fundamentally, as pointed out by Lin 
(2011) but also by Deharvengt (2013), the top down description of SMS requirements creates 
problems of understanding how to link the generic management activities, aiming at 
identifying and controlling risks in a systematic way, with the operational activities of the 
organisation that create these risks in the first place. This is in line with the observation of 
Rasmussen (1997) that, by lack of vertical interaction between the different levels of the 
socio-technical system, there is a problem in incorporating theoretical management models 
like SMS as a tool for resolving issues related to human performance or technical failure at 
the operational level. Also, this could at least partly explain the difficulty industry has, to 
translate accident and incident findings into effective safety initiatives (Salmon et al., 2016). 
In order to address these problems, an investigation analysis method, called SAFRAN, was 
developed that can guide investigators to explore the composing elements of an SMS in a 
natural and logic way, starting from the findings close to operations that explain the 
occurrence – being the elements accident investigators are first confronted with. Furthermore, 
the method can help to identify those elements of the SMS where interventions might have the 
greatest impact for improving global system safety, in particular an organisation’s capability 
of managing the variability that might put successful process performance at risk (e.g. 
Hollnagel, 2014, Hollnagel 2018). This is illustrated in the next chapter, by applying the 
SAFRAN method to review a selected set of railway accident investigations reporting on 
over-speeding incidents. 
 
2. Case study 
As long as not all infrastructure and rolling stock is equipped with an automatic train 
protection system that continuously controls speed requirements, derailments because of over-
speeding will remain a major risk of the railway system, as has been demonstrated by several 
of the most lethal railway accidents over the last decades. As input for this case study, a set of 
six published investigation reports has been selected to check their depth and focus when 
investigating accidents or incidents caused by over-speeding. This selection has been made 
taking into account a geographical spread, the similarity of the accident (i.e. a critical 
variability in maintaining the appropriate speed of a passenger train), the author of the report 
in all cases being a national and independent investigating body and the availability of the 
report in a language that can be read by the author of this paper (that is English, Dutch, 
French or German). The following Table 1 provides an overview of the selected investigation 
reports, the allowed and actual train speed and the consequences of the adverse event.  
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event critical performance consequences 
Train derailment accident between 
Tsukaguchi and Amagasaki 
stations of the Fukuchiyama line 
of the West Japan Railway 
Company, April 25, 2005 
allowed train speed: 70 km/h 
actual train speed: 116 km/h 
107 people 
killed 
562 people 
injured 
Main-track derailment of a Via 
Rail Canada passenger train in 
Aldershot, Ontario, February 26, 
2012 
allowed train speed: 15 mph (24 
km/h) 
actual train speed: 67 mph (108 
km/h) 
3 people 
killed 
45 people 
injured 
Derailment of a passenger train 
near Santiago de Compostela 
station (ESP), July 24, 2013 
allowed train speed: 80 km/h 
actual train speed: 179 km/h 
80 people 
killed 
73 people 
seriously 
injured 
Derailment of Amtrak passenger 
train 188 in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania (USA), May 12, 
2015 
allowed train speed: 50 mph (80 
km/h) 
actual train speed: 106 mph (171 
km/h) 
8 people 
killed 
185 people 
injured 
Derailment of a SNCB/NMBS 
passenger train in Buizingen 
(BEL), September 10, 2015 
allowed train speed: 50 km/h 
actual train speed: 120 km/h 
39 people 
injured 
Overspeed at Fletton Junction, 
Peterborough (GBR), September 
11, 2015 
allowed train speed: 25 mph (40 
km/h) 
actual train speed: 51 mph (82 
km/h) 
4 people 
minor injured 
Table 1. Overview of analysed investigation reports and the identified critical performance 
These investigation reports have been analysed, using the logic of an innovative method we 
call “SAFRAN” (SAfety FRactal ANalysis) to set the reference of what to expect of a proper 
analysis of an over-speeding incident. When applying the SAFRAN method on the specific 
case of over-speeding incidents, the first step is the identification of the critical variability in 
the driver’s performance of maintaining the appropriate speed, as reflected in Table 1 above.  
The next step, is to identify the expected performance as prescribed and/or specified. Speed 
requirements within the railway system, and in particular speed restrictions, are imposed by 
the assets that are used, in particular through the characteristics of used rolling stock and 
infrastructure (through design or its actual state). Without an automatic train protection 
system in use, these constraints are traditionally communicated to the train driver via the 
lineside signalling equipment. In addition, the trained driver is required to have acquired the 
necessary route knowledge so that he knows what signalling aspects to expect and where on 
the line. The third step in the SAFRAN logic then consists of identifying those sources of 
performance variability (formal and informal) that contributed in shaping the train driver not 
respecting the applicable speed restriction. The fourth step in the SAFRAN method requires 
to identify the possibility to identify, analyse and report the critical variability of the specific 
process that is analysed (i.e. continuously monitoring the match between work as designed 
and work as actually performed). In this specific case study, this would mean that the 
investigation has analysed how the concerned organisations are monitoring the actual train 
speed and its criticality when compared to the allowed speed. With the existing state of 
technology, train speed is a parameter that is continuously recorded via on board data 
recorders and could form a basis for managing driver performance (e.g. Balfe and Geoghegan, 
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2017; EL Rashidy et al., 2017). Monitoring the match between work as designed and work as 
actually performed, in this context of managing the risk of over-speeding in a sustainable 
way, would therefore require a railway undertaking to continuously monitor the speed of its 
trains. Not in order to check driver-compliance, as is traditionally done, but to understand 
work place reality. Information on these four steps, that together form a first iteration of the 
SAFRAN method, applied on the driver’s activity to “maintain appropriate speed”, are 
expected to be found in the investigation reports. But more is needed if we want to introduce 
sustainable change. We would also expect to find elements that give indication that the 
process to “monitor over-speeding” has been analysed in a structured way, in order to assess 
an organisation’s capability to identify critical speed-variability. This represents a second 
iteration in the SAFRAN method, for which we at least would like to understand the actual 
and specified performance, as well as eventual factors that can explain the deviation. Finally, 
we need to understand an organisation’s capability to manage those conditions that influenced 
the driver’s performance (i.e. the previously identified sources of performance variability) to 
better support sustainable and safe performance, which is a next iteration of the SAFRAN 
method for each identified factor. Here also, we look for actual and specified performance and 
eventual sources of performance variability. In summary, the reference model that we look for 
in the selected investigation reports, can be graphically represented as follows, with each 
iteration represented by a different triangle. 
1
2
4
3
variability
1
2
3
variability
1
2
3
variability
 
 
Fig.1: Reference model for investigating over-speeding incidents, based on the SAFRAN logic 
When comparing the reviewed investigation reports with the reference model, as illustrated in 
Figure 1, we found that they all report on the allowed and actual train speed (see also Table 
1). Furthermore, all reviewed investigation reports mention the expected performance and the 
way this is formalised (i.e. the second step in a SAFRAN iteration) in a detailed way. Also, all 
reports identify the factor(s) that can explain the critical variability in the driver’s 
performance when maintaining the appropriate speed (i.e. step 3 in the first iteration of the 
SAFRAN method). Table 2 (see annex to this paper) provides an overview of all these 
sources of variability that were identified. Moving to step 4 of the SAFRAN method, we 
found that except for the investigation of the derailment in Philadelphia in 2015 (NTSB, 
2016), all other investigation reports mention (potential) elements of over-speed monitoring. 
But only the investigation reports on the derailment on the Fukuchiyama line (ARAIC, 2007) 
and the over-speeding incident (RAIB, 2016) at Fletton Junction provide a structured analysis 
(at least identifying the first three steps of a next SAFRAN iteration) on why the (non-) 
reporting of previous over-speeding incidents did not adequately address the risks related to 
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speed variability on critical parts of the infrastructure. The former report goes even further 
and actively reflects on the possibility to monitor speed at critical curves, resulting in a 
recommendation to monitor speed variability by using already existing technology. The 
reports on the derailments in Buizingen (IBRAI, 2017) and Santiago de Compostela (CIAF, 
2014) both witness on the identification of monitoring activities that took place to detect over-
speeding incidents and conclude on the inadequateness of these activities. All this, however, 
without analysing possible factors that influenced this poor monitoring and with the 
Buizingen-report surprisingly stating "the difficult detection of this type of events" as an 
explaining argument. The investigation reports on the derailments in Philadelphia (NTSB, 
2016) and Aldershot (TSBC, 2012), in turn, do not mention any reflection on the railway 
companies’ activities to detect over-speeding. In particular for the latter report this is curious, 
since the implementation and maintenance of an SMS, including monitoring and evaluation 
processes for all aspects of operations, is explicitly mentioned as a legal obligation, in order to 
integrate safety into day-to-day operations (TSBC, 2012). For the iteration related to the 
identified sources of performance variability, we found that two of the reviewed investigation 
reports (i.e. Fukuchiyama line and Aldershot) do not further analyse the capability to manage 
these. The investigation on Santiago de Compostela identifies a lot of relevant management 
processes, but systematically only compares the actual performance with the expected and 
specified performance, turning the investigation into a pure (non-) compliance exercise. A 
similar remark can be made for most of the processes that are identified to manage sources of 
performance variability in the Buizingen and Philadelphia investigation reports, with the 
exception of the analysis of the respective processes that manage train driver competence. The 
investigation report of the over-speeding incident at Fletton Junction, finally, gives a mixed 
image. On the one hand there is only mention of the specifications for the processes related to 
equipping engineering controls and, on the other hand, a detailed and structured analysis is 
providing for the processes related to the management of driver fitness and the equipment of 
lineside signs. A complete overview of these findings is provided in Table 2, as an annex to 
this paper. It has to be noted that all these findings are solely based on the elements that are 
available in the published reports and cannot take into account analysed elements that are not 
reported upon. 
3. Conclusions 
Widely, in all high-risk industries, adverse events are investigated and analysed in order to 
develop recommendations that, when implemented, help to change the (safety) performance 
of sociotechnical systems in a sustainable way. To do so, it has been argued by various 
authors that the treatment of wider system failures, identified through system based analyses, 
is more appropriate than the treatment of local factors at the sharp end of system operation 
(e.g. Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000; Reason and Hobbs, 2003; Dekker, 2011). Also analysing 
the relationship between contributory factors appears to be critical for the development of 
appropriate countermeasures that will prevent future accidents and incidents (Salmon et al., 
2016). Furthermore, for these countermeasures to be sustainable, the performed investigations 
should enable both single-loop (i.e. correcting errors within the range set by organisational 
norms for performance) and double-loop (i.e. when correcting errors requires to change the 
organisational norms for performance) learning (Argyris and Schön, 1996). As stated by Hale 
(2000), we will be inclined to see the factors we have categories for, prompting those 
investigating to ask particular questions. It is argued that the application of the SAfety FRactal 
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ANalysis method can guide investigators to ask questions that help to gain deeper 
understanding of organisational factors and the capability of organisations to monitor and 
manage safety critical variability. The essence of using the SAFRAN method for evaluating 
the performance of the different processes in a socio-technical system, is to approach them in 
a similar way, regardless of the hierarchical level they are situated at, building on the generic 
elements that compose an SMS. 
The application of the SAFRAN method was demonstrated in this study, by reviewing a 
selected set of published railway accident investigation reports, all reporting on an occurrence 
related to over-speeding, possibly resulting in a derailment. A logical focus for the analysis of 
such an adverse event would be to check a duty-holder’s capacity to monitor the speed of its 
trains, to analyse it and to learn from experience. When issues discovered, it should be 
obvious that the issued recommendations will no longer be on the driver not respecting a 
speed limit and the individual corrective actions that need to be taken, but on the objectives of 
the monitoring process and the related management responsibilities. Also the latter is 
important, since the introduction of SMS can also be seen as part of a regulatory strategy to 
place the responsibility for managing safety at the level of the organisation best able to do so 
(Deharvengt, 2013; Kringen, 2013), challenging them to identify in a structured way what 
activities are critical for safety and what kind of safety management best fits their particular 
situation in order to achieve acceptable levels of safety performance, rather than blindly 
complying with prescriptive rules and regulations (Daniellou et al., 2010; Fowler, 2013; Grote 
and Weichbrodt, 2013; Kelly 2017). The results of the performed analysis show however a 
wide variety in depth and focus of investigation when compared with these areas of 
investigation (i.e. the reference model) that logically would result from an analysis that is 
applying the SAFRAN method from which one can only conclude that most of the reviewed 
reports just partly or not address an organisation’s capability of managing the variability that 
might put successful process performance at risk and therefore miss the opportunity to issue 
recommendations that could really introduce sustainable change. 
Based on the idea of nested control loops at operational, organisational regulatory and even 
political level, that together form a sociotechnical system (e.g. Rasmussen and Svedung, 
2000; Leveson, 2016), a similar investigation logic could even be extended beyond an 
organisation’s SMS. In this paper, an innovative method called SAFRAN was employed to 
investigate how to analyse an organisation’s capability of managing the sustainable 
performance of its processes in the context of an adverse event, detecting possible areas for 
improvement and safety learning from the factory floor to the Board room, and beyond. 
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event sources of 
performance 
variability 
iteration of the 
process to  
"manage source of 
variability" 
elements of 
monitoring  
(over-)speed 
iteration of the process 
to  
"monitor over-
speeding" 
Fukuchiyama 
line (JAP) 
April 25, 
2005 
driver attention, 
impacted by: 
-> stress, due to 
earlier station 
overrun 
-> pressure to 
contact train 
conductor 
-> driver taking 
notes 
-> negative 
reinforcement 
regime 
missing 
engineering 
control system 
no further 
structured analysis 
non-reporting of prior 
occurrences, although 
required 
non-reporting of prior 
occurrences, due to: 
-> negative 
reinforcement regime 
 
active reflection on 
possibility to monitor 
speed at critical curves, 
resulting in a 
recommendation to 
monitor speed using 
already existing 
technology 
Aldershot, 
Ontario 
(CAN) 
February 26, 
2012 
driver memory 
driver 
expectations 
driver experience 
quality of rules 
visibility 
crew interaction 
missing 
engineering 
control system 
no further 
structured analysis 
prior similar 
occurrences listed 
not mentioned in the 
report 
 
curiously enough, the 
regulatory requirement to 
implement and maintain 
an SMS is mentioned, 
including the obligation 
to have "monitoring and 
evaluation processes for 
all aspects of 
operations." 
Santiago de 
Compostela 
(ESP) July 
24, 2013 
driver attention, 
impacted by: 
-> answering an 
internal telephone 
call 
lineside signs 
system design 
missing 
engineering 
control system 
 
task complexity 
task monotony 
for processes to 
"manage driver 
competence" and 
"equip lineside 
signs" only 
specifications have 
been identified - 
limiting the 
investigation to a 
pure compliance 
check 
for processes to 
"equip engineering 
controls" also the 
"verification 
process" has been 
analysed, but for all 
only specifications 
have been identified 
  
performed by railway 
undertaking: 
- accompany of train 
- review of safety 
recorder content 
 
performed by 
infrastructure 
manager: 
- inspection of speed 
recorders 
internal regulations and 
number of performed 
monitoring activities are 
listed 
 
no reflection on why 
these monitoring 
activities did not enable 
to identify the critical 
variability 
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event sources of 
performance 
variability 
iteration of the 
process to  
"manage source of 
variability" 
elements of 
monitoring  
(over-)speed 
iteration of the process 
to  
"monitor over-
speeding" 
Philadelphia 
(USA) 
May 12, 
2015 
driver attention, 
impacted by: 
-> emergency 
situation with 
other train 
missing 
engineering 
control system 
 
driver 
competence 
driver fatigue 
driver fitness to 
work 
driver vigilance 
task complexity  
process to "train 
crewmembers" has 
been further 
analysed (steps 1, 2 
and 3) 
 
for process to 
"equip engineering 
controls" only 
specifications have 
been identified 
not mentioned in the 
report 
not mentioned in the 
report 
Buizingen 
(BEL) 
September 
10, 2015 
driver 
expectations 
driver experience 
decision making 
skills, impacted 
by: 
-> recent leave 
lineside signs 
process to "manage 
driver competence" 
has been further 
analysed (steps 1, 2 
and 4), without 
however identifying 
what could be the 
critical variability 
sample based analysis 
of speed recorder 
data 
identification of poor 
monitoring capability 
 
no further structured 
analysis is elaborated, 
with the report 
surprisingly stating "the 
difficult detection of this 
type of events" as an 
argument to explain poor 
monitoring 
Fletton 
Junction 
(GBR) 
September 
11, 2015 
driver fatigue 
engineering 
control system 
lineside signs 
 
driver experience 
driver 
expectations 
time pressure 
processes to 
"manage driver 
fitness" and "equip 
lineside signs" have 
been further 
analysed 
 
for process to 
"equip engineering 
controls" only 
specifications have 
been identified 
(non-)reporting of 
over-speeding 
incidents 
 
OTDR downloads to 
monitor compliance 
with speed 
restrictions 
only the monitoring (and 
learning) capability 
based on reported 
incidents has been 
further analysed, 
identifying (monitoring) 
task instructions and 
supervisor training as 
possible sources of 
performance variability 
for the process of 
"monitoring over-
speeding". 
Table 2. Overview of analysis findings 
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Abstract  
 
In some complex industrial systems, as the Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) the evaluation of the 
potential risks induced both by natural phenomena and man-made, like for instance railways 
events in their proximity, are of high importance. This trend became even more important for 
NPP after the latest accident in Fukushima. Therefore, the re-evaluation of the risks induced 
by external events to the NPP became very important. This trend is supported by 
implementing new methods for external risk evaluations. One of the new methods defines an 
external challenge as a hazard, which has an associated risk description. The description of 
external risks by using hazard risk curves is usual for seismic, airplane crash or other 
external hazards. Therefore, the use of this method for railway hazards is expected to be 
useful in improving the risk analyses for NPP. The paper presents a case of preliminary study 
on the use of hazard curves to evaluate risk on the NPP. 
Keywords: Probabilistic safety analysis, Risk, Fragility curve, Hazards curve, railways 
1. Introduction 
Industrial activities, including the railway traffic and its potential impact, are evaluated as part 
of the risk analyses for the Nuclear power plants (NPP). Currently, for most of the industrial 
activities, the evaluations are on a case-by-case basis, depending on the type of challenges. 
Potential challenges due to the railways in the proximity of a NPP are related to the type of 
the damages induced, depending on the transported materials/substances. The evaluations are 
so far based on the analyses of such cases for potential fire and /or explosion risks and 
deterministic calculations are used. 
However, the evaluation of deterministic type needs to consider the variability of the 
accidents/incident’s statistics, which may indicate that there might be cases when the 
deterministic analyses are conservative. 
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The best-known standardized methodology for the NPP is the Probabilistic Safety Analyses 
(PSA), which is used both for internal and external events. The PSA model for external events 
starts usually from the evaluation of plant reaction to the internal events is modelled in PSA, 
by adding on the external events impact. 
For the case study a set of real data was used and some probabilistic characteristics used as 
input are represented in Figure 1. 
 
  
 
Figure 7. Probabilistic characteristics of railway events considered in the case study [1]  
 
The impact of the railway accidents and / or other events is evaluated using a specific for the 
evaluation of the risk impact on NPP, called the hazard curve methodology. The results of the 
case studies are analysed and conclusions are drawn for the future work. 
2. Method and case study results 
The process of building an integrated PSA model for internal and external events is 
represented in Figure 2. 
The process comprises the development of three modules. It starts from the development of 
the internal model and of the preparation of the external challenge input in the format suitable 
for PSA approach and it is followed by their integration for overall risk evaluation. 
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Figure 8. The flow path with the main steps of the Hazard risk methodology applied for railway events 
 
The following main steps are performed in the Module I: 
 
1. Step 1 Define external challenge and its Probabilistic like characteristics 
2. Step 2 Build the Hazard curve of the challenge 
3. Step 3 Build the description of the NPP reaction to the challenge -Fragility  
  Curve 
4. Step 4 Calculate the probability of NPP systems/components failures due  
  to external challenge 
 
Module II is developing the internal events plant model in the following basic steps (the 
detailed tasks, as described by the standard are extensively presented in the literature [2;3]): 
 
• Step 5  Define NPP PSA model for internal events 
• Step 6 Build the Event Trees for Internal events 
• Step 7 Build the Fault Trees for the mitigating barriers for each event 
• Step 8  Integrate Fault Trees into Event Trees and calculate the sequences  
  leading to damage states of NPP - Risk metrics for level 1, 2 and 3  
   PSA due to challenges (Initiating Events) Internal and /or External: 
− Level 1 (Impact on the plant without containment) - Core damage 
frequency (CDF)   
− Level 2 (Impact on the plant considering containment)  - Large 
Early release Frequency (LERF)  
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− Level 3 (Impact on the personnel, population and environment) - Risk 
calculation on personnel, population and environment (Risk) 
 
In the Module III, the two parts (preparation of the external events impact in a PSA like 
format and the development of internal events model), are integrated in a single model in the 
following main steps: 
 
• Step 9 Integrate basic events of component failures and calculation of  
  railway related initiating events probabilities and their integration  
  in the Internal Events model 
• Step 10 Build the Event Trees for External events 
• Step 11 Build the Fault Trees for the mitigating barriers for each  
 external event based on the internal events models 
• Step 12 Integrate Fault Trees into Event Trees and calculate the  
sequences leading to damage states of NPP (Risk metrics for level  1, 2 and 
3 PSA) 
 
This paper presents only the main differences and specifics of using the methodology 
framework represented in Figure 2, as follows: 
 
1.  The external challenge (probability to have railway events with potential impact 
on an NPP) is based, in this case study, on specific data, as it was mentioned before 
and it is represented in Figure 1. 
 
2.   Based on the probabilistic characteristics and evaluation of the potential damages on 
the nearby NPP the curve defining the Railway Hazard is defined (Figure 3). The 
curve is divided in discrete intervals for which probabilities of exceedance of a certain 
impact level from the event to the plant are considered (HRi). The case study if 
grouping the resultant HRi into three groups (RH I, RH II, RH III). Those three groups 
define three Railway related external initiating events.  
 
3.   For the plant components, designed to be a barrier for potential challenges from the 
railway events, a set of Fragility Curves are derived (Figure 3). During the step xxx 
the probabilities of failures of plant structures/systems/components and the evaluation 
of the railway. 
 
4.   For each group of railway related initiating events (groups RH I, RH II, RH III) the plant 
reaction assumes that a certain set of barrier is designed and a certain failure mode and 
magnitude may take place for its components (as it will be presented in the paragraphs 
below on event trees and fault trees). The basic events (Railway generated plant 
components failure probabilities” for NPP components are coded as in formula (1): 
 
  RH i _BE j_k  = BE ik              (1) 
 
             The BEik are calculated as in formula (2) (and represented in Figure 3) 
 
 
                                   (2) 
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where the sign  represents the calculation of the convolution integral, for a certain 
uncertainty level  
 
The details of the evaluation of the component failure probability due to external 
challenge are defined in previous applications, as for instance in the seismic PSA 
models and it is represented largely in the literature (as for instance in [3]). 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Presentation of the flow path for the risk evaluation by using the hazard curves 
 
 
5.   Event Trees are built for each group of railway related initiating events (IE_RHI, 
IE_RHII, IE_RHIII). In the event trees the barrier systems (RH_SYS1, RH_SYS2, 
RH_SYS3 ) are considered to be designed to withstand a certain level of the challenge 
(a certain group of the initiating event) as represented in Figure 4. The function event 
BAS_MOD is a connector with the internal events part of the model. In the event trees 
the following end states are defined: 
o End states designating situation of now impact on plant, but leading to 
various level of emergency states declared in a preventive manner (on 
increasing magnitude with their indexes 0,1,2,3).  
o End states leading to the increase of the risk level of the plant (the coding is 
related in this case study to the PSA level 1 risk metrics R0, R1, R2.). 
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Figure 10. Event Trees for the Railway Initiating events 
6.   Fault Trees are built for each group of barrier systems designed to withstand also 
an impact of the railway events (RH_SYS1, RH_SYS2, RH_SYS3) as represented in 
Figure 5. Special techniques existent in previous studies [3] are used to include 
external events impact on the internal events model (represented in principle in Figure 
5).  
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Figure 11. Fault Tree for the barriers designed to withstand railway events, too 
 
 
The modules coded BAS_MOD represent the fault Tree part available from the model 
of internal events. This module is coded as per formula (3) 
 
BAS_MOD_AFFECTTED m  = Bm , where m=1,2       (3a) 
 
BAS_MOD_UNAFFECTED = BAS_MOD       (3b)  
 
 
7.   During the last step of the methodology the integration of the Fault Trees into Event 
Trees is performed and the calculation of the sequences leading to damage states of 
NPP (Risk metrics for level 1, 2 and 3 PSA) is performed. The process is presented in 
summary in formulas (4) – (7). 
 
 
  (4) 
 
   (5) 
  
  (6) 
 
        
 (7) 
 
The results of the risk impact are represented in Figure 6, which illustrates that: 
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• There is an impact of considering the external challenges generated by events on the 
railway.  
• There are combinations of non-railway related plant failures and railway related 
plant failures, which usually are not considered in a pure deterministic analysis. 
The screening of such combinations gives the confidence that the conservatism of 
risk metrics is preserved even for such combination cases. 
• However, the values are still under the limits that require special actions for 
additional protection of the NPP. 
 
 
Figure 12. Risk profiles for the basic case and the case study considering railway events 
 
3. Conclusions 
The paper presented the results of a case study of using the hazard curve and fragility 
approach modelling for the railway of the potential risks on an NPP. 
The case demonstrated the feasibility of the use of such an approach for external events of 
railway type and the fact that its use assures a greater confidence that the results are still 
conservative, even if unexpected external induced events and internal failure combinations 
take place. 
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Abstract 
 
The Cultural-Historical Activity Theory (CHAT) enables us better to understand work 
accidents as the unexpected results of contradictions generated by the historical and 
dialectical relationships between the different elements that compose an activity system. The 
objective is to highlight historical contradictions that might contribute to the occurrence of 
accidents in the railway sector in which workers are run over by trains. Ethnographic data 
collection was undertaken. In recent years, 9 work accidents and 12 deaths due to this cause 
occurred in this company which has a highly hierarchical organizational structure, and was 
created by the merger of three companies 12 years ago and as a result of which there still 
persist vestiges of the cultures of the original companies. There is a lack of workers in various 
departments, as well as a lack of materials to carry out maintenance activities. It is a state-
owned enterprise in which the procurement of new materials and hiring of new employees is a 
time-consuming process. 
Among the hypotheses of historical contradictions that contribute to the occurrence of 
accidents there are technological quality changes and an increase in the demand for 
passenger transport and the flow of trains, which reduce the time available for maintenance 
and adjustments in the system. In addition, there is a hypothesis relating to difficulties in 
coordination between different departments, the goals they are submitted to, and the material, 
technical and professional conditions for carrying out the activities. 
 
 Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) 
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1. Introduction 
Work accidents are complex events that require detailed and deep analysis for their 
prevention. It is still very common to come across work accident analyses that reduce the 
event to the consequence of a few causes, and usually all the complexity of the event is 
understood as due to an unsafe act on the part of the operator or a failure in the related 
material conditions. There has been a change in the comprehension of the work accident 
analysis approach from the reductionist ones to a broader, systemic approach (Vilela, Iguti 
and Almeida, 2004; Llory and Montmayeul, 2014; Dien, Dechy and Guillaume, 2012). 
Based on this systemic perspective, the Model of Analysis and Prevention of Work Accidents 
(MAPA, in Portuguese) was developed during a public policy project between 2007 and 2009 
(Almeida et al., 2014; Almeida and Vilela, 2010). MAPA is based on the Ergonomics of 
Activity (Wisner, 1994; Guérin et al., 2004), cognitive psychology (Clot, 2006) and 
Organizational Analysis of Events (Llory and Montmayeul, 2014; Dien, Dechy and 
Guillaume, 2012), and proposes some categories of analysis that help to understand the event: 
Habitual Work Analysis, Change Analysis, Barrier Analysis, and Conceptual Expansion 
(Almeida and Vilela, 2010). 
Using the Organizational Analysis of Events, the investigator tries to understand in depth the 
systemic and historical origins of the accident in relation to production, procurement and 
maintenance processes and the conditions of the materials which determine the operational 
modes. For this, it is important to understand the Pathogenic Organizational Factors (POF) 
which correspond to an organizational degradation that leads to the occurrence of phenomena 
which diminish safety. Some POFs are commonly found in accident analyses and include 
time pressure; insufficiency or lack of a safety culture; complexity, obscurity or 
maladjustment of the organization; the fragility of control bodies, and the lack or inefficiency 
of the feedback from operational experience (Llory and Montmayeul, 2014; Dien, Dechy and 
Guillaume, 2012). 
After this expanded analysis, the investigator proposes some recommendations for 
implementation, but the organizational recommendations are not usually implemented by the 
company concerned. Cedergren (2013) points out two factors involved in the challenge 
presented by the process of the implementation of recommendations: first, the trade-off 
between the internal and external actors of the company, and second, that between the micro 
and macro levels. Both these trade-offs are usually made by individual actors, and the author 
observes that the co-ordination between the different actors involved in the implementation 
process is important. 
Besides that, the accident analyses are usually undertaken by experts and do not involve any 
other of the company’s actors (Osório, Machado and Minayo-Gomez, 2005; Vilela et al., 
2018), especially that ones who will implement the actions, and when it involves them, they 
participate mainly as informants during the accident analysis process. Moreover, the accident 
analysis is not based on a learning theory - which hinders the organizational learning and the 
implementation process. 
Despite the relevance of historical prospection to the understanding of the incubation period 
of the POFs (Dien, Dechy and Guillaume, 2012), it is not clear in the Organizational Analysis 
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of Events approach, how to conduct this historical analysis and, when following this path, 
how to identify and grasp the contradictions that underlie the accidents and how they arose 
historically within the system. 
To conduct this narrative some research questions, emerge:  
• What is the activity system under analysis? What are its elements today and how and 
when were they modified in the past? 
• What historical events favored the changes made in the activity? 
• What contradictions led to the development of the activity and in what direction? 
• What contradictions underlie the disturbances observed now and in the past? 
 
Within this perspective, the Cultural-Historical Activity Theory (CHAT) presents some 
answers and helps one to understand work accidents and other organizational anomalies as the 
unexpected results of contradictions generated by the historical and dialectical relationship 
between the different elements that constitute an activity system. 
The CHAT can be summarized in terms of five principles: the Theory of Cultural mediation 
by human actions; multivocality, historicity, contradictions as sources of changes and 
development, and the possibility of expansive transformations in activity systems (Engeström, 
2001). Many accident analyses do not present any well-defined unit of analysis and CHAT 
can contribute in this way by the use of an activity system. 
The activity system (Figure 1) is considered the unit of analysis and is composed of a subject 
whose perspective of analysis is driven by an object (the motive of a collective activity). Here, 
subjects’ actions are mediated by instruments. The activity system has rules that need to be 
followed within the context of the division of labor and with a community which also 
intervenes in the object. All these elements interact dialectically among themselves over time 
and are dynamic. Some contradictions can occur within one element or between elements, 
thus giving rise to unexpected results (Engeström and Sannino, 2011) such as work accidents 
in the health and safety area. 
 
 
Figure 01: Activity System Model 
Source: Engeström (1987; 2016). 
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There are but few studies that use CHAT in accident analyses (Nuutinen, M, and Norros, 
2009; Yoon, Ham, and Yoon, 2016; Lopes, Vilela and Querol, 2018) and this paper presents 
this innovation, important to this discussion. For this, an empirical case within the Brazilian 
railway context - which is a complex system and can help to understand the potential of the 
tool – will be used. 
In recent years, nine work accidents and 12 deaths caused by trains’ running over workers 
occurred at this company. Thereafter, the Labor Prosecution Service sought a researcher from 
the São Paulo University - School of Public Health to help with the accident analyses. It was 
then proposed that the MAPA (Antunes, Vilela and Almeida, 2018) be applied and a 
formative intervention undertaken using Change Laboratory concepts and tools (Engeström, 
1996; Virkkunen and Newham, 2015) to help understand the accidents and implement any 
changes considered necessary to prevent new events. 
The objective of this paper is to highlight the historical contradictions that may contribute to 
work accidents in which workers in the railway sector are run over. 
2. Method 
This research adopts a qualitative approach. It can be divided into two phases: the 
ethnographic phase and the formative intervention phase which consists of sessions based on 
MAPA along with the CHAT and the Change Laboratory (CL) method (Engeström, 1996). 
The formative intervention seeks to create a new activity concept and present solutions with a 
view to overcoming contradictions by developing the agency of the actors involved 
(Virkkunen and Newnham, 2013; Engeström, 2011). 
For the ethnographic phase, 46 individual and collective interviews and two sessions of 
Collective Work Analysis (ACT, in Portuguese - Ferreira, 1993) were conducted and the 
observation of activities related directly or indirectly to work accidents in which workers were 
run over and the related documentary analysis were undertaken. ACT is a method that helps 
to understand the real work done, and is applied by posing one leading question "What do you 
do at your work and how do you do it?" which will be exhaustively detailed by a 
homogeneous group of workers. The interviews, to a total of 29 hours, with workers from 
different positions and departments were recorded, and the ACTs lasted 5 hours. 
Four workshops, to a total of 40 hours, were conducted with 49 workers, on the methods to be 
used. These workshops were planned according to the double stimulation method (Engeström, 
2007), and they were applied in such a way as to help the participants to understand and apply 
the MAPA and CL methods and their principles. 
The interviews and workshops were recorded and transcribed. These ethnographic data were 
analyzed based on CHAT, and helped to build the hypothesis from the main historical 
contradictions within the activity system which will be presented in this paper. They will also 
be used as mirror data on the formative intervention phase. The mirror data reflect the reality 
and will stimulate the participants during the debate of the next phase (Virkkunen and 
Newnham, 2015; Engeström, 2011). 
The results are preliminary and after this phase the Model of Analysis and Prevention of 
Work Accidents – MAPA in Portuguese (Almeida and Vilela, 2010) will be applied together 
with the CHAT and the Change Laboratory to implement changes, which is also an 
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innovation that enables collaborative analysis with workers from the company to be made and 
organizational learning to occur. 
The CL method creates a favorable environment for the construction of theories, models and 
concepts about the learning process and management organizational development which 
contribute to an expansion of concepts and ideas for the understanding of the activity system 
(Querol, Cassandre and Bulgacov, 2014; Querol, Jackson Filho and Cassandre, 2011; 
Virkkunen and Newnham, 2015; Engeström, 2007). 
For this, 8 sessions will be applied based on the double stimulation method and on the 
expansive learning cycle to provoke the actors’ agency and their protagonism. The 
participants will debate the main problems of current practice, making an analysis of their 
historical contradictions and then creating new solutions based on this analysis. In this 
empirical case, they will together analyze the work accidents in which workers are run over 
and create collaborative solutions. It will be important to listen to different voices during these 
sessions (Virkkunen and Newnham, 2015). They will be recorded and filmed for future 
analysis. 
This research is part of a Thematic Project "Work Accidents: From socio technical analyze to 
the social construction of changes" (FAPESP process nº 2012/04721-1) which has been 
approved by the Ethics Committee of the School of Public Health of the University of São 
Paulo nº CAAE 11886113.5.0000.5421. 
3. The railway activity system 
CHAT helps to understand accidents within a dialectical, systemic, historical, and dynamic 
perspective. For this, it uses the activity system as a unit of analysis, which helps systematize, 
understand and analyze complex systems. As has been said above, tensions can arise over the 
years between elements of the activity system that lead to unexpected results, such as 
accidents, rework, occupational diseases, etc. 
In the empirical case of this railway system (Figure 2), the subject was the railway company 
X (subject) taken as the perspective of the analysis whose object is the safe transport of 
passengers. 
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Figure 2: Railway Company’s Activity System 
 
The activity of passenger transport is mediated by the use of instruments such as trains, 
meetings, accident analysis tools, work materials, maintenance equipment, railway sleepers, 
computerized training systems, simulators, etc, and must follow rules such as technical rules, 
labor rules, safety rules, operating procedures, concession rules and internal rules. It is a state-
owned company that follows the rules of the state government, like norms for the 
procurement of human resources, as well as of materials and equipment. 
Some of these rules are developed by public institutions, such as the federal government, state 
government, the Labor Prosecution Service, and the Ministry of Labor and Employment. 
These institutions, besides producing rules for this activity system, also act as part of the 
community, intervening to ensure safe passenger transport (object) by means of the 
interdiction and inspection of the activity and the production of rules as well. Other important 
elements of the community are the passengers and the media, which are always demanding 
better conditions of transport and the punctuality of the service, thus interfering in the object 
of the transport activity. 
Finally, to deal with this complex object, this activity system presents a division of labor 
which consists of various departments and outsourced companies, such as those relating to 
health and safety, maintenance, operation, strategic and operational planning, administration, 
finances, etc. 
3.1 A dialectical, systemic and historical perspective for the understanding of work accidents 
The ethnographic phase permitted the elaboration of the historical hypotheses regarding the 
contradictions (Figure 03) that contributed to the occurrence of work accidents and other 
organizational anomalies, which will be detailed throughout this section. 
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Figure 3: Main contradictions in the railway sector and the work accidents 
Historically, this company X was formed 12 years ago by the merger of three previously 
separate companies (1, 2 and 3). However, according to workers' reports, the distinct cultures 
of those original companies still persist. On the occasion of the merger, all workers, regardless 
of the conditions of their initial contracts, became employees of company X, though they are 
still classified according to their company of origin as coming from company 1, company 2 or 
company 3, or they are classified as “pure” when they have been hired, more recently, by 
company X. 
The creation of an organizational identity and culture requires some time for its consolidation 
in a new organization (Daniellou, Simard, and Boissières, 2010). According to the origin of 
the individual companies concerned, there are differences in labor rights acquired as also in 
the work process itself and the method used to fill in documents. Further, in the history of the 
individual railway lines, different procedures were also observed according to their origin. At 
the time of the merger described above, there were technological, procedural and financial 
differences between companies 1, 2 and 3. In consequence, there continue to exist 
contradictions within the subject itself between the definition of identity as company X and 
the plurality of cultures present within it (Figure 03-A). 
"And they [those hired from Company 1] still work today with the kilometer. And 
we [those hired from Company 2] there used to work with intervention between 
signals. And that still happens…There in the strategy department, when you 
receive a Request for Access from one line to another, if the person who made it 
comes from line B or C, you write “between signals”. But if you get it from line A, 
D or E it is expressed in kilometers. And now as the Access request system was 
drawn up on the basis of a kilometer/post parameter, they put “kilometer/post” 
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but in “Observations” we put “between signals” […] That’s a concept which I 
think is taking a long time to change […]   At the beginning it can cause some 
kind of problem. Afterwards you get used to it.  But initially you feel a rejection, a 
desire to change it. But what is written there is the same thing as the other has 
written, just expressed differently." 
As a reflection of its history, this railway company presents a hierarchical organizational 
structure in its division of labor, which delays and reduces feedback between the different 
levels and also the access of the workers from the lower to the higher hierarchical levels 
(Daniellou, Simard, and Boissières, 2010). It is a company with many departments between 
which there are difficulties of coordination. In addition, safety is not integrated into company 
management, so in practice the safety department usually works separately from other 
departments. There is thus a hypothesis of contradiction due to the difficulty of coordination 
between the elements of the division of labor (Figure 03-B). 
Over the years there has also been an increase in the demand for passenger transport and in 
the circulation of trains (object) and, as a consequence, a reduction in the time available for 
railway maintenance activities. Also reported during the ethnographic phase was that the same 
financial resources had been available over the last few years both to hire new workers and to 
buy new equipment to carry out the company’s various activities (rules), including 
maintenance. In addition, in recent years changes have been made to some railways tracks 
that used to be shared with freight trains, which has increased the deterioration of the tracks 
and led to a correspondingly greater need for maintenance. There is thus a contradiction 
between a more complex object and the established rules not yet adapted to the new reality of 
increased demand (Figure 03-C). 
It is noteworthy that many of these rules used by company X, such as those related to the 
hiring of new workers and the purchase of new equipment made by the state government by 
auction, have been made by the community. As it is a state-owned company, the auction 
process usually takes a long time and undergoes delays. When there are disputes in the 
judicial sphere, the process is delayed in court and new employees and equipment cannot be 
hired. 
Also related to the community, it was pointed out that the railway sector is a very specific 
sector, calling for the specialization of workers which in its turn requires longer preparation; 
further, such persons are not easily available in the community. In addition, historically, many 
of these workers came from families with a tradition of working on the railway and had a 
passion for and an identity with the railway sector. Currently, due to the present tendering 
process, many workers begin with no experience in the area and without this "passion" for 
and identity with it. There is a contradiction between the lack of engaged, committed and 
qualified professionals in the community to be hired to work in the rail sector and the 
expertise demanded by the division of labor and hiring rules (Figure 03-D). 
"In fact I came here young. I am proud to be a railway worker, so that every 
novelty that appears related to railways I read about [...] So being a railway 
worker to me is a matter of pride, I am the son of a railway worker, grandson of a 
railway worker. I have grandparents who were railway workers, an uncle who 
was a railway worker, I am also the last generation here. It is because my son is 
studying production engineering and I don’t know if he will want to come to work 
here." 
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Another point raised during the ethnographic phase was related to the creation of operating 
rules and procedures inside company X. After some serious accidents and fines applied by the 
Labor Prosecution Service (community), company X began to encourage the creation of 
operational procedures. Nowadays, there is a large number of such procedures. There is a 
hypothesis that because of the heavy workload required due to understaffing, it is not always 
possible to go to the field to verify the real needs and talk with the workers in the field. There 
were discrepancies between the activities prescribed in the procedures and their 
implementation in practice (prescribed work versus real work). 
"The rule states you have to maintain a distance of 1.80m from the tracks while 
you inspect them with trains circulating. But how can you make a good inspection 
and check on any problems from that distance? It is impossible!! You have to be 
right on the tracks to do the job well. And at night there is just not enough light to 
enable you to make a good inspection. You have to do it during the day while the 
trains are in movement." 
With regard to the activities carried out on a permanent railway track, it was mentioned that 
workers from outsourced companies earn according to their production for activities such as 
the changing of railway sleepers, and there is a resulting intensification of work which means 
the workers put their own safety at risk to produce as much as is possible. 
The main contradiction may be summed up in terms of the conflict between, on the one hand, 
good-quality work and the rapidity necessary to avoid stopping trains and not diminish the 
passenger flow and, on the other, compliance with the safety procedures which state trains 
must be stopped for the maintenance job to be done, which reduces the passenger flow. The 
rules cannot be followed because it is necessary to see the rails and components from close 
up. On the other hand, failure to follow the rules exposes workers to the risk of undertaking 
operations on the track and thereby increasing the risk of accidents in which workers are run 
over. 
The increase in passenger demand and the demand for good quality services (object), pressure 
on the part of the passengers and the media (community), all lead to the briefest possible 
interruptions for maintenance (rule), which also reduces the time for the maintenance carried 
out on the rails. The maintenance activity (division of labor) is therefore preferably performed 
at night when there is no movement of passenger trains, however, depending on the line, it 
may be shared with freight trains which also reduces the time available for maintenance. 
This results in time pressure for the execution of maintenance activities, aggravated by the 
reduced staffing (division of labor), with insufficient materials (instruments) available for the 
job. This creates a situation which facilitates the occurrence of fatal work accidents in which 
workers on the tracks are run over (an undesirable outcome). Many workers try to remedy 
these difficulties by acquiring the necessary materials for their activities themselves and also 
by leaving aside some procedures, in which they adopt, for example, new methods of carrying 
out their inspections different from the prescribed methods which are of better quality and 
safer. 
4. Final Considerations 
It has been shown that historical analysis deals with activity system created from the 
juxtaposition of companies fusions, that is to say, fusions which result in previously inexistent 
interactions, cultures, technologies, types of equipment, teams, activities and practices. The 
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resulting, new system continues to maintain different, parallel procedures that have 
historically operated on some lines, creating situations in which it would essentially fall to the 
operators to ascertain in what type of situation they find themselves. Maintenance personnel, 
with no experience of acting in this type of situation, are selected to participate in such 
interventions in these segments. 
Further, initiatives are taken for the application of technological innovations, such as the 
creation of new computerized centers for traffic control, without the necessary related 
modernization of the trains, methods of communication and other related services and 
equipment. This process has already been described as an asynchronous evolution of the 
system and has been seen as creating new types of hazard and risk, especially in the interfaces 
between the new activity system and the old. 
Unfortunately, the new challenges that this process presents to safety were not previously 
recognized as requiring the adoption of related prevention strategies. In addition to this time 
lag, the non-detection of and failures in the correct interpretation of the warnings provided by 
the accidents which occurred in the system, in particular those involving collisions of trains 
with workers discussed in this study, were not perceived. Superficial, hasty investigations 
attribute such occurrences to human error, namely to the unsafe acts practised by the operators 
involved; and the system was thus deprived of the opportunity for learning. 
One of the main contributions of this study is the way it highlights the need for an integrated 
new safety system, closely related to the notion of activity system. Safety in permanent 
monitoring should involve the anticipation of changes, of necessary adjustments, the 
recognition of emergent risks and hazards as well as the capacity for system adaptation. A 
safety that is not restricted to the management of equipment for personal protection and that 
includes in its agenda the notion that total safety requires the combination of normative 
practices with those of safety in action, understood as that which is carried out to deal with 
variability, uncertainties and challenges for which there are no rules that would indicate a 
priori what needs to be done. 
From this point of view, CHAT contributes to safety by using the activity system as a unit of 
analysis which contributed to the visualization and understanding, systemically and 
historically, of the development of the railway activity system on both the micro and macro 
levels and the contradictions within it which led to collisions involving trains and workers in 
work accidents. Based on this analysis it is possible to create systemic solutions to prevent 
similar events. 
In addition, as a continuation of this research, it is necessary that these hypotheses of 
contradictions should be confronted and debated in the next phase of the MAPA and Change 
Laboratory sessions so that the participants are able to assume responsibility for the work 
accident analysis process and become protagonists in the process of change in the health and 
safety areas, thus avoiding undesirable events such as work accidents and other organizational 
anomalies. 
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Abstract 
The railway accident that occurred 12 July 2013 in Brétigny-sur-Orge has deeply impacted 
the French railway sector. It is one of the deadliest disasters to have occurred on the French 
network in recent decades. But it is also and above all an accident that has seriously 
challenged the national railway network maintenance policy as it has been conducted for 
more than thirty years. 
The analysis of this railway disaster takes us right to the heart of the organisation of a large 
scale socio-technical system that has undergone far-reaching changes in a context focused on 
productivity gains. It reveals many examples of dynamics that, at different levels of the 
organisation, can contribute to the degradation of the security of the system. 
We show in particular how regulatory changes and productivity pressures have led the 
network manager to undertake various reforms that will result in radical changes in 
maintenance. This transformation was affected by a succession of adaptations and deeply 
impacted the fundamental equilibrium of track safety without any real consequence 
assessment. These weaknesses proved to be critical in a local sector that is subject to extreme 
traffic conditions in a highly unfavourable technical and organisational environment. 
Most of the factors and mechanisms brought to light in the analysis of the Brétigny accident 
(productivity pressures, insidious impact of reorganisations, getting used to deviations, loss of 
skills…) can be approached in a generic way. As such, they constitute a useful source of 
feedback for industrial risks management. 
Keywords: Industrial risks management, railway safety, feedback. 
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Warning 
The analysis presented in this document is based on public sources. It does not claim in any 
way to identify individual or collective responsibilities for the Brétigny accident. 
It aims to learn from the accident, on the basis of feedback, for the management of industrial 
risks. The objective is to understand the factors (technical and organisational) that may have 
contributed to the likely occurrence of the accident, in order to identify items that could be 
worked on to help prevent an industrial disaster. With this in mind, we are paying particular 
attention to generic aspects that could potentially be transferred to other socio-technical 
systems. This is therefore not an exhaustive analysis of the accident. 
Introduction 
On 12 July 2013 at 4:53pm, train n°3657 that ensures the national connection between Paris 
and Limoges, leaves the Paris-Austerlitz train station with 385 passengers on board. It 
consists of a motor and seven passenger cars. Its maximum authorised speed is 200 km/h. 
When it approaches the Brétigny-sur-Orge train station (about thirty kilometres south of 
Paris), the train is travelling at 137km/h and accelerating to reach its cruising speed. At 
5:11pm, the four last train cars derail over the switches and crossings area located 200 metres 
upstream from the train station, before toppling over and ram into the station platform. The 
accident killed seven people (3 train passengers and four people on the platform) and injured 
another 32. 
According to the official reports of BEA-TT68 [1] and SNCF69 [2] [3] on the accident, the 
derailment was caused by a track failure. Both forensic experts [10], BEA-TT and SNCF 
CHSCT (health and safety committee) [4] point severe maintenance failures on the set of 
switches involved in the accident, questioning the maintenance policy of both SNCF and 
RFF69.  
Moreover, the maintenance policy for French rail infrastructure had been questioned for 
several years before the accident, notably through international audits (Rivier’2005 [6] and 
2012 [7] audits) and through national public reports from the Court of Accounts [8] [9]. These 
reports describe a structural crisis in the maintenance of the railway infrastructures associated 
with decades of underinvestment by the public authorities. 
On the basis of this abundant documentation, we will analyse how these productivity 
pressures have over time impacted the fundamental equilibrium of track maintenance and 
resulted in the end to a setting in the Brétigny-sur-Orge area that was conducive to the 
occurrence of an accident. 
We will proceed with our analysis in four parts: first, we will present the track maintenance 
model as it is specified in the reference guides. We will focus in particular on the principles 
 
68 BEA-TT is the French public body responsible for investigating accidents in the land transportation sector (rail 
and road). 
69 SNCF is the historical French national railway company. Its maintenance department SNCF Infra was 
responsible for the implementation of the RFF maintenance policy for railway infrastructure. RFF (Réseau Ferré 
de France) was the public institution that owned the French railway infrastructure. It was responsible for defining 
and funding its maintenance policy (cf. Figure 13) 
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that can be used to ensure track safety. We will then use these items as a basis to understand 
and analyse factors likely to negatively affect this safety model. In the second part, we will 
then describe the structural crisis in the funding of the maintenance of railway infrastructures, 
which results in the aging and significant deterioration of the national railway network. Then, 
in the third part, we will study how this crisis has impacted over time the organisation of the 
maintenance and resulted in the significant deterioration of the safety management in 
Brétigny. Last we will mention in the conclusion (fourth part) the findings of this analysis for 
understanding industrial accidents and risk management. 
Bodies involved with the maintenance of the French railway network 
The French government has always played a leading role, as the architect and 
financier of the national railway system. It decides of the strategic orientations and 
controls the various public entities to which it has entrusted the management of the 
network. 
From 1937 to 1997, the railway infrastructures belonged to the SNCF (Société 
Nationale des Chemins de Fer français), which was responsible for the 
development, maintenance and operation. 
In 1997, as part of the European policy to open national railway networks up to 
competition, French lawmakers created a new public body, RFF (Réseau Ferré de 
France) to whom they transferred the ownership of all national railway 
infrastructures. RFF became the new network manager, responsible for its 
maintenance and operation. The operational maintenance of the network however 
remains the responsibility of the SNCF, via its subsidiary SNCF Infra. The 
maintenance policy results then in a contractual agreement between RFF, which 
specifies and finances the maintenance policy, and SNCF Infra, which applies this 
policy in the field and ensures the monitoring and maintenance operations on the 
equipment. 
In 2014, the lawmakers brought together all RFF and SNCF Infra personnel and 
activities into one public entity called SNCF Réseau. 
Figure 13: Organisation of maintenance for the French railway network70 
1. Track maintenance and safety model in France 
Before going into the analysis itself of the accident, it seems necessary to present the main 
principles of track maintenance in France, and in particular those that are used to ensure its 
safety. This is what we will refer to as the track maintenance and safety model. 
According to the SNCF reference guides, the purpose of track maintenance is to “ensure the 
safe flow of people and performance of the network for the best maintenance cost”71. This 
statement is widely reported by the management and highlights the three conventional 
 
70 Source [4]  
71 [5] page 1 
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objectives of an industrial system: safety, technical or functional performance (train traffic in 
this instance) and economic performance. 
We will focus here on three basic principles of track safety: the preventive maintenance of 
the network in good working order to help prevent the occurrence of physical failures, the 
provisions to help manage systems that are periodically deteriorated, and the territorial 
organisation of operational maintenance around the brigade route. 
1.1. Preventive maintenance of tracks to keep them from deterioration 
The maintenance policy for French railways72 is based on the preventive renewal of the 
network to help keep the tracks from getting deteriorated. This policy is all at once a 
performance objective in terms of operation, safety and economic optimisation of the 
maintenance. 
Keeping a network in good working order is the basis for track safety. Preventive 
maintenance helps anticipate network deterioration and makes it possible to intervene (thanks 
in particular to the renewal of equipment) before physical failures occur. It helps reduce 
physical failures that could cause accidents. 
It should be noted that a network in good working order is also a source of operational 
performance: it can help prevent traffic disturbances associated with equipment deterioration 
and corrective maintenance interventions. 
Last the economic efficiency of the preventive track restoration is linked to the fact that an 
aging network generates an exponential increase of the corrective maintenance volume whose 
cost rapidly exceeds that of the preventive renewal of tracks. Examples in Germany, Spain or 
Switzerland prove that policies based on strong restoration investments achieve good 
technical and economic results [6] [9]. 
1.2. Precautionary measures to manage occasional deteriorations 
In addition to the preventive renewal of tracks, a continuous monitoring of the equipment 
helps detect the deterioration of components (rails, switching and crossings…) in order to 
anticipate and prevent their failure. With this in mind, the reference guides provide a 
classification of the condition of the components split into four levels, and specify the 
precautionary measures to undertake in case of deterioration (see Table 1). The prescribed 
provisions may go as far as slowing down or stopping traffic when the deterioration level 
endangers train safety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 Reference guides SNCF IN 00312, IN 0022, IN 0114. 
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Table 6: Qualification standard for the condition of track components 
Qualification of the condition 
of the component 
Definition and precautionary measures 
required73 
Objective value: Condition of a new or renovated system 
Warning value: Condition that is still acceptable but observation 
is needed for the purpose of increased 
monitoring. 
Intervention value: Poor condition that requires correction in the 
short term (response times are specified in the 
reference guides) 
Slowdown value: Highly deteriorated condition that requires, for 
safety reasons, for the traffic to be slowed down 
or stopped. 
This system is designed to manage the occasional deterioration of a few isolated pieces of 
equipment, pending their renewal. As such the prescribed precautionary measures 
significantly impact maintenance activities: they impose complicated interventions with 
highly costly resources and tight deadlines that disrupt planning. The system is therefore not 
adapted to the sustainable management of an overall deteriorated network. 
Finally, we emphasise the crucial importance of equipment monitoring, on which the 
whole system is based. 
1.3. The assignment of a track sector to a dedicated team that is responsible for its 
maintenance. 
Practically the operational maintenance of tracks is historically based on the brigade route, 
which is a 3-5 km track section, dedicated to a team that ensures both its monitoring and 
maintenance. The team leader, a foreman, is responsible for the condition and safety of his 
brigade route. 
The brigade route constitutes a powerful tool to manage equipment: it defines 
responsibilities clearly, based on a detailed network grid and consistent with the activities of a 
team. Moreover, the fact that the team agents carry out all of the maintenance activities on 
their route allows them to gain an accurate knowledge of the equipment and maintenance 
history. 
2. An aging network that is deteriorating due to a lack of investment 
The Brétigny accident is part of a broader context of structural crisis in the maintenance of 
French railway infrastructures, in association with several decades of underinvestment. 
We will first present some items that will help appreciate the level of underinvestment in the 
maintenance of French railways and its impact on the network. We will then present the 
 
73 These definitions are taken from the report by Cabinet Aptéis [4] page 61. 
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situation specific to the Brétigny sector that is subject to local factors that add significantly to 
the deterioration of the tracks. 
2.1. A structurally unprofitable system that is inadequate to maintain the substance of 
the network. 
From the 1980s onward, the French railway network has been suffering from a significant 
reduction in the government’s financial commitment, thus resulting in a 20% budget decrease 
for network development and maintenance. This financial reduction was not accompanied 
however by an adjustment of the perimeter, in particular with the closing of less travelled 
secondary lines74. On the contrary, the government required SNCF, then RFF, to develop a 
significant network of very high-speed lines. Due to a lack of public funding, these works 
were paid with an unchanged budget to the detriment of the maintenance of the existing 
network.75 
In comparison with other European countries, in 2005, the maintenance budget for the French 
network was more than 30% less than that of neighbouring countries (Italy, Spain and 
Switzerland - see Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14: Comparison of track maintenance expenses between European countries [6] 
What is striking beyond the overall amounts is above all the very low level of expenses for 
track renewal: in France, the investment level (per km of track) is 60% lower than that of 
Italy, 70% lower than that of Spain or Switzerland, and 90% lower than that of the United 
Kingdom. This means that the French network is hardly renovated thus leading to the aging of 
infrastructures. 
Over time, the low investments in the renewal of tracks leads to a cumulated delay that is 
difficult to make up: in 2011, it is more than 40% of the French network that has 
exceeded its normal renewal age. Moreover, the aging of the tracks leads in the long term to 
an explosion in corrective maintenance costs, which, in a constant (or decreasing) overall 
 
74 While most of the other European countries have massively closed secondary lines in order to focus their 
resources on the maintenance of main lines, France has maintained an important secondary network (more than a 
third of the French network consists of lines that are used by less than 20 trains per day). 
75 SNCF, then RFF have had to heavily rely on loans to compensate for their insufficient maintenance and 
network development budget. RFF’s debt amounted to 20Md€ in 1997, and 34Md€ in 2011. 
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maintenance budget means an ever-increasing reduction in resources dedicated to renewal. 
This spiralling situation resulted in the renewal rate of French tracks to be halved over 20 
years. 
In 2005, within the scope of an independent audit of the maintenance policy for the French 
railway network76, international experts warn about the risk of system failure if nothing is 
done to stop the aging of the network, by boosting in particular massive investments for the 
regeneration of infrastructures: 
“It is worth reducing the maintenance costs by regularly investing in renewal, a policy that is 
implemented by several European railway networks. Therefore, an inadequate maintenance 
policy incurs, in the medium and long term, a serious drift in infrastructure costs and/or 
performance, which can seriously affect the technical and economic efficiency of the railway 
industry. Such a drift is part of an exponential process. If it is detected too late, it can lead to 
the ruin of the railway network and deterioration of traffic safety and reliability. Over time 
it incurs massive financial rehabilitation requirements, which must be raised very quickly. 
Great-Britain has acutely experienced this. Keeping working components to the very end 
reveals a lack of resources and/or lack of long-term vision for the system or “infrastructure” 
as a whole. Savings are made in the short term but to the detriment of the substance.”77 
Experts outline an important consequence of network aging: the exponential increase in 
maintenance volume. Indeed, deteriorated pieces of equipment require corrective maintenance 
that proves to be more complicated and expensive than preventive maintenance. When a 
significant part of the network is in a deteriorated condition, the increase in maintenance 
volume quickly puts pressure on the maintenance organisations whose resources are otherwise 
constrained. The maintenance teams are then unable to keep the network in a state that 
complies with the reference guides: 
“The maintenance managers responsible for the implementation of the policies specified by 
the reference guides are then facing a dilemma: allocate restricted budgets to actions that are 
vital and not to necessary and sufficient. They allocate resources on the basis of emergencies 
[..]. This situation makes the application of maintenance reference guides increasingly 
difficult in practice”78.  
This situation is formalised by RFF with the introduction of “forfeitures”. The network 
manager thus accepts the non-upgrade of certain track sectors due to a lack of resources. The 
sectors in question are then subject to precautionary measures to limit traffic, in order to 
guarantee traffic safety. This was explained by the Court of Audit in its 2012 report [9]: 
“The adjustment that could not be made on prices occurred on volume, with SNCF adjusting 
its performance downwards from 2009 and 2010 onwards, that is a 30M€ decrease per year 
over those two financial years, when the maintenance need was simultaneously increasing 
with the continuing aging of the network. These planned production reductions, these 
 
76 In 2005, as a result from the difficulties encountered by RFF and SNCF Infra in the contractualisation of 
agreements for network maintenance, both entities jointly commission an audit by international experts from the 
École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL, or Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne). A 
second audit will be commissioned from EPFL in 2012 to assess how the situation changed when compared to 
the first audit. 
77 Rivier audit 2005 [7] page 14. 
78 Rivier audit 2005 [7] page 10. 
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“forfeitures” result in an agreed decline in network performance, mainly by way of traffic 
restrictions and slowdowns.” 
In 2011, some 3,200 km of tracks are subject to slowdown measures imposed by the 
forfeitures, thus representing 10% of the national network. 
2.2. A specific local context that heavily penalises the Brétigny sector 
We have noted that track aging impacted a significant portion of the national network. But the 
condition of the infrastructures varies greatly per location. Indeed, the speed of deterioration 
strongly depends on the level of mechanical stress to which it is subject and as such on the 
traffic conditions. 
We will see that the Brétigny track sector is subject to highly penalising traffic conditions, 
both in terms of equipment configuration and traffic density. The combination of these factors 
leads to a critical level of stress on the equipment. 
2.2.1. The intense traffic on the Brétigny sector accelerates track aging 
The Île-de-France network is the heaviest in the country: it counts 30% of the national traffic 
in number of trains, and 70% in number of passengers, with an ever increasing traffic79. 
Moreover because of the density of its grid, the Île-de-France network counts a significant 
number of track equipment (in particular switching systems) that are fragile and difficult to 
maintain. 
The Brétigny-sur-Orge track sector constitutes an important junction in the Île-de-France 
regional network, crossed by very dense suburban passenger transportation (in particular the 
C Line of the RER). Moreover, it is usually crossed by national lines for passenger 
transportation and freight, each generating significant traffic, with a total of 400 trains per 
day.80 
This convergence of three types of traffic with such density levels constitutes an 
exceptional configuration on the French network. Its outcome is the combination of 
mechanical stresses associated with high passage speed (passenger trains of national lines 
pass at speeds ranging from 130 to 150km/h), significant volume of tonnage and frequent 
passages, thus increasing the speed of aging and deterioration of the tracks. 
2.2.2. An inadequate track design that exacerbates equipment fatigue 
In addition to highly penalising traffic constraints, the Brétigny-sur-Orge train station is also 
plagued by track design problem that further exacerbates track deterioration. 
The presence of a railway junction results in a rather complicated railway tracks layout 
around the Brétigny train station. It is characterised in particular by a row of four double slip 
switch on a narrow plateau to enable the connection between the different lines (see Figure 
15). 
 
79 Between 2000 and 2010, regional transport increased by 33% in Ile de France. The figures mentioned in this 
paragraph come from the 2010 report of the Court of Audit on rail transport in Ile de France [8]. 
80 This traffic density puts the Brétigny track sector in the UIC 2 group. (UIC groups correspond to the 
classification of lines as defined by the International Union of Railways, depending on the density and type of 
traffic they support. It consists of 9 groups: UIC 1 group corresponds to heavily used lines whereas the UIC 9 
group corresponds to lines with very little traffic.)   
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Figure 15: row of track equipment around the Brétigny train station 
This equipment set has been experiencing recurrent problems related to the geometry of the 
tracks and repeated switching equipment failures since its installation in 1991. Defects and 
significant damages were discovered during each inspection visit carried out between 2001 
and 2011. Considering only double slip switch 6-9 (the one implied in the 2013 accident), the 
maintenance teams detected between 2001 and 2013 36 serious flaws with a slowdown or 
intervention value (see Table 6 p. 249), and changed 8 crossing centres impacted by 
mechanical breakdowns or cracks.81 
The national engineering department of SNCF Infra, concerned by the recurrence of the 
problems carried out in 2009 technical appraisals that concluded to design errors in the 
plateau: the switches and crossings are set in a curve, on a slope, in a place that is too narrow 
and that requires their interweaving. As a result, vibrations propagate from one piece of 
equipment to the next each time a train comes through. Moreover, the rails are too long for 
such a configuration: it magnifies constraints and dance phenomena (vertical oscillation), in 
particular for trains travelling at high speed. 
Such a configuration proves to be ill-adapted to the traffic conditions (density, and most of all 
speed). It magnifies greatly the mechanical stress on the tracks and as such the speed of 
deterioration of the equipment82.  
2.2.3. The combination of these mechanical stresses leads to accelerated track deterioration 
The combination of the stresses to which the Brétigny tracks are subjected result in an 
extraordinary situation for the area. The level of equipment fatigue is such that checking 
annually as is recommended by the reference guides is not enough to guarantee the condition 
of the switches on the plateau of the Brétigny train station. 
 
81 A double slip switch has four crossing centres. The break of one of those centres, due to a crack, is the reason 
behind the derailment. The centre in question had been replaced in 2003 and 2006. 
82 As a result from these appraisals, RFF and SNCF had planned a complete overhaul of the Brétigny railway 
junction for completion between 2018 and 2024. 
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The multiple corrective interventions carried out on the double slip switches show indeed that 
the fastenings and bolts did not hold from one inspection to the next. The Aptéis report [4] 
mentions the example of an incident that occurred in November 2002 on the very equipment 
involved in the 2013 accident and which showed that the bolts could come completely undone 
(with loss of nuts and washers) a few weeks only after a thorough inspection. In his 
intervention report, the District Manager wrote that it was “surprising to note that the bolts 
had loosened over such a short period of time (4 weeks)”.83 
2.3. Budgetary pressure blocks the implementation of measures adapted to the 
excessive track solicitation in Brétigny 
The speed of equipment deterioration in Brétigny thus justified a fast track renewal. We note 
however that budgetary pressures have led to the delayed replacement of the equipment. 
Indeed, agreements with RFF state that the replacement period for switches is “about 25 
years”84. This approximate duration that is solely governed by budgetary considerations [4], 
is included in the maintenance programmes of SNCF Infra regardless of the level of stress 
on the tracks. This life duration however is totally unsuitable for the aging of the switches 
and crossings located on UIC 2 group tracks, such as Brétigny. By way of comparison, the 
other European countries completely replace all of the UIC 2 group tracks every 15 to 20 
years.85. 
Moreover, under pressure from the budgetary constraints, the interpretation of this 
reference guide tends to drift: the maximum 25 years tends to become a minimum age to 
start planning for replacement. This is used to justify the postponement of replacements that 
cannot be carried out for lack of budget. This is how in 2009 more than half the double slip 
switches under the regional maintenance body responsible for Brétigny had exceeded their 
theoretical 25 years lifespan [4]. 
This drift will then impact the replacement process for double slip switch 6/9 involved in 
the accident (see Figure 16). It took five years of legal investigations and two appraisals for 
the replacement request made by the local manager to be approved by the national 
engineering department. To add to this, there was also a minimum additional period of four 
years for planning, as required by the regulatory constraints set out in the contracts between 
SNCF Infra and RFF. 
The replacement of the double slip switch was requested in 2007 and was actually planned 9 
years later in 2016. The fact that the double slip switch, installed in 1991, was only 16 years 
old at the time of the initial request is probably the reason behind the reticence of the decision 
centres to validate an early replacement, even though its need was acknowledged by all. 
 
83 [4] p. 212. 
84 Appendix 1 of Item 2 of the RFF/SNCF Programme Agreement, stated in the SNCF Infra report [3]. 
85 The fact that the replacement periods are much more restrictive than with our European neighbours was 
known to SNCF Management, as is evident in a 2011 internal note: “if certain components can have up to 50 
years of service life for class 4 lines, for the equivalent of Group 2 lines, the Dutch consider that both the track 
and the ballast must be completely replaced every 15 to 20 years. The Swiss have a similar view of the matter” 
(SNCF Infra, Productivity at Infra (2), 2011, p. 2/16, stated by the Aptéis agency [4] page 209). 
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• 2016: Intended planning for replacement of 
double slip switch 
 
2013: ACCIDENT 
 
• 2011: Decision to replace the double slip switch 
 
 
2008: Detection of cracks & increased monitoring 
of double slip switch with annual check of 
splint joint (type A or B check). 
• 2007: ISOF request for the replacement of double 
slip switch 6-7/8-9 
Figure 16: Time to order the replacement of double slip switch 6/9 
2.4. Due to a lack of adjustment, the network’s deterioration level becomes critical and 
impacts safety 
In the absence of a replacement policy adapted to the extreme level of stress on the Brétigny 
tracks, the equipment fatigue level becomes critical as from 2009, with an increasing number 
of incidents and failures. An expert from the SNCF Infra national engineering department 
talks at that time of “a critical situation where nothing much is controlled anymore” 86 
This situation lasted until the 2013 accident and is not without impact on the track safety 
model: 
• It is indeed reflected in the discontinuation of the fundamental track safety 
principle. Namely the preventive maintenance applied to keep them in good 
working order. The Brétigny sector is then thrust into a deteriorated configuration for 
several years where traffic safety relies solely on the precautionary measures that 
were first introduced as recovery loops. 
• Moreover, maintaining a deteriorated network becomes highly penalising for 
maintenance operations: it causes an inflation of the maintenance volume and increases 
the number of intervention constraints. The teams are forced to react to detected failures 
or incidents, often within a specified timeframe (as such they lose the opportunity to 
plan for their activities). In the absence of sufficient resources, this overload can divert 
the teams from their fundamental monitoring mission, which constitutes the basis 
 
86 Delaunay report dated 15 September 2009 mentioned on http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/bretigny-revelations-sur-une-
catastrophe-annoncee-09-05-2016-5779129.php. 
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for all precautionary measures. 
• Last constantly facing a deteriorated network has an impact on safety representations. 
Indeed, the maintenance personnel become used to the deteriorated condition that 
eventually becomes the new normal in the end. As such they gradually lose sight of 
what should a safe network be, as it has become an unachievable goal with their lot of 
constraints and as they try to maintain a network in the least deteriorated condition as 
possible. In the long term, with the proliferation of incidents, precautionary measures 
tend to become commonplace and cease to be ultimate safety measures. 
3. A structural crisis that puts the pressure on maintenance organisations 
and impacts safety management 
The stress overload on infrastructures in the Brétigny sector and its ensuing accelerated aging 
cause maintenance requirements that are much greater than anywhere else. One could 
therefore expect that RFF and SNCF Infra mobilise special means to maintain this 
extraordinary sector. 
The unit responsible for the maintenance at Brétigny (ISOF) did not benefit from any special 
provisions however. On the contrary, it was penalised through a drastic reduction in personnel 
and skills. 
This situation results from the significant productivity pressure that requires maintenance 
organisations to significantly reduce personnel and undergo radical reorganisations. 
3.1. Reorganisations with insidious consequences 
Burdened by regulatory changes and increasing financial pressure, SNCF Infra initiates a 
number of changes to adapt and improve productivity. Many reforms developed since the 
2000s, in a difficult context, lead to significant gains in productivity. However, the 
cumulated impact of these multiple changes eventually end up modifying the 
fundamental equilibrium of the safety and track maintenance model. This change 
occurred insidiously, through successive adaptations without any real perception of the 
consequences. 
3.1.1. A process of progressive adaptations with budgetary imperatives 
Since the inception of RFF in 1997, the SNCF Infra branch has undergone many 
reorganisations that have significantly impacted its structures. The main objective of the 
consecutive reforms is to increase productivity, focus on specialised resources to enable 
economies of scale. 
The move towards focus goes hand in hand with the decrease in personnel (see paragraph 3.2 
below) by merging territorial operational units. This means pooling resources in bigger 
entities that cover territories that are larger and larger. The operational units were reorganised 
in-depth and quickly, and went from 81 entities in 2002 to about thirty in 2010.  
The reorganisations also concern the internal management of the entities. In the 2000s, SNCF 
initiated a general reform to improve its management line, by removing the hierarchical role 
of foremen (team leaders) and by placing several teams directly under the responsibility of an 
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executive, formerly a second level manager. For track maintenance, this means gathering 
several brigade routes under the responsibility of a sole manager (the local manager). 
Moreover, SNCF Infra is adapting to the new regulatory context87 that requires its 
organisational and functional autonomy from SNCF. It aligns its territorial organisation with 
that of RFF. SNCF Infra introduces a Industrial Production Directorate (DPI) with three 
Production Territories (TP – see Figure 17) that are in direct contact with RFF’s territorial 
levels. The TP oversee the work of the territorial operational units and support teams, and 
become real decision-making centres for network maintenance. 
 
Figure 17: Production Territories 
The move towards the specialisation of units implies the creation of logistic entities at 
national and regional level, which are specialised in the development and implementation of 
heavy interventions. It means the creation of dedicated units with heavy maintenance means 
(such as work trains) and associated expertise that were until then scattered across various 
territorial operational units. These specialised units can help significantly increase the usage 
rate of expensive equipment and thus increase their productivity. It should be noted that these 
specialised units are rigged by the transfer of personnel and equipment from territorial 
operational units. 
3.1.2. Reorganisations with an insidious and in-depth impact on the equilibrium of the 
maintenance and safety model 
These consecutive reorganisations are consistent within the scope of strong pressure of costs 
and personnel but have impacted the fundamental equilibrium of track maintenance 
function in its application until then. 
The first major change is the gradual discontinuation of the brigade route, which was the 
historical basis for the track maintenance. The teams who were until then committed to a 
 
87 “ORTF” law (organisation and regulation of rail transport) dated December 2009 that adapts the European 
regulatory changes for the opening of the railway network to the competition. 
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dedicated portion of track have been gradually removed from that territory. First with the 
local management reform that deprived the teams from their duty of responsibility for the 
brigade route. By combining several brigades, the local managers then became responsible for 
territory that was much larger and therefore much more difficult to manage. Subsequently, to 
counter the decrease in personnel and increase in problems, the teams became progressively 
non-territorial and started operating without distinction on any tracks in the sector, as and 
when required, and no longer on a dedicated route. This change may foster team polyvalence 
and responsiveness but it progressively deprives the entity from developing a specific 
knowledge of the each track sector and as such leads to the significant weakening of the 
monitoring function. 
It is interesting to note that this change occurred in an insidious manner, by way of 
successive adaptations, without any real management decision to relinquish the brigade 
route. As a result, its potential impacts on the track maintenance model, and in particular on 
the safety aspect, have not been assessed. 
This same reasoning is reflected in a second fundamental change that concerns the territorial 
organisation of maintenance units through the creation of regional support units specialised in 
heavy maintenance. In a decade, the organisation of track maintenance has thus gone 
from a preventive maintenance model, based on generalist units committed to a 
dedicated territory, to a reactive maintenance model, structured into specialised mobile 
units. This transformation however occurred through the transfer of resources that were 
originally affected to maintenance territorial units. It has therefore greatly drained the latter’s 
own expertise and resources. This change helps remove on-site expertise and as such 
weaken specific knowledge and the continuous monitoring of infrastructures. It should 
be noted that this change was once again insidious: territorial operational units are formally 
retaining their track monitoring and maintenance mission, even if in fact, they do not have any 
substance any longer as a result from the transfer of their most skilled personnel. 
The third change concerns the structural modification of the arbitration processes with the 
decision centres being now further away from the operational teams. This change started 
when the entities merged and was exacerbated after 2009 with the creation of production 
territories. 
For example, the Production Territories are responsible for managing the personnel of the 
entities as well as for planning major works and renewal projects. The three Production 
Territories that cover the national territory are removed from the operational reality of track 
maintenance and associated constraints while they are directly subject to the RFF’s 
productivity and budgetary pressures. In a general cost reduction environment, this change 
tends to favour the primacy of budgetary aspects over technical or safety aspects. 
We would like to see how these organisational changes have occurred in the Brétigny sector 
by taking as an example the management of personnel and skills. 
3.2. Arbitrary cuts in personnel that heavily penalise the Brétigny sector 
The decrease in maintenance personnel numbers has been continuous since the 1980s and 
accelerated with the 1997 reform. The Track activity lost 4400 agents between 2000 and 
2010, that is 20% of its personnel. This decline does not follow a diminution in maintenance 
needs, which increase with the aging of the network, but budgetary imperatives that are 
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imposed on the payroll. Disconnected from the operational needs, the management of the 
decrease in personnel in recent decades seems to be limited to the non-renewal of a certain 
percentage of departures, without taking into account the need to retain or renew key skills 
(see Figure 18). This policy reaches its peak when the Management of SNCF Infra blocked all 
recruitment during the second half of 2009 within the scope of a saving plan. Such measures 
deprive units from any room for manoeuvre when managing their personnel and skills. 
 
Figure 18: national departure and recruitments curves for track maintenance agents 
Since the number of departures varies greatly from one unit to the next, the accounting 
application of a replacement rate can impact the units in uneven fashion. The Ile de France 
units are penalised twice because their age pyramid and significant turn-over88. 
Moreover, during this period, the maintenance units underwent significant personnel turn-
over with the creation of specialised regional units. For the maintenance operational territorial 
units, this decrease in personnel is compounding the loss of personnel members who were 
transferred to specialised regional units. The cumulative impact on personnel and skills of 
these two concomitant measures can therefore be critical. 
The management of the maintenance units’ personnel was transferred to the Production 
Territories however. The Atlantic Production Territory (TPA) is therefore responsible for 
managing the personnel and skills for Brétigny. Based in Tours, the TPA manages all units 
located in the centre, west and south-west or France, and cannot know the detailed situation of 
each track sector. In any case, the TPA did not provide the Brétigny sector with resources 
adapted to the critical situation it was facing. 
Between 1985 and 2013, the personnel responsible for the Brétigny sector went from 78 to 
15 agents. The impact is even more critical taking the skills into consideration. 
 
88 The high turn-over in Ile de France is associated with the fact that track jobs in the region are not attractive due 
to high cost of living and difficult working conditions (obsolescence of infrastructures and traffic constraints). 
The Brétigny sector was short of staff by 20% in 2013 as a result from recruitment difficulties. 
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The three key positions for the local technical and managerial supervision are filled in 
by inexperienced agents: in July 2013, the local sector manager is a young recruit of 24, who 
has been in the job for 5 months only. His two technical supports were recruited in 2012 and 
have hardly more experience. Within the Essonne–Val-d’Orge track Production Unit (that 
includes Brétigny and three other neighbouring sectors), 8 of the 9 main executives are also 
“young executives”. Moreover the Unit Manager had taken office in April 2013 and his 
predecessor had stayed in the job for less than a year. 
By July 2013, there are therefore no members in the Unit management with enough 
seniority and hindsight to control the maintenance function for the tracks of the 
Brétigny sector. This constitutes a major organisational flaw for a sector that is as 
exposed in terms of traffic, volume and complexity of maintenance. 
As far the track teams are concerned, the situation is hardly any better as stated by a former 
executive: “For Brétigny, we have sixteen agents including two who delegated periodically. 
Out of the remaining fourteen, there were maybe two agents with proper technical skills and 
they are currently retired.” 89  
Moreover, the remaining experienced agents are monopolised by emergency interventions 
that are more and more complicated that only they are able to address. As such they no longer 
have the time to train less experienced agents. This is how once the skilled personnel gets 
below a critical threshold, the loss of team competence becomes barely reversible, even if 
new agents are hired. 
Finally, we can note the de facto disappearance of the brigade route principle: the sector 
used to have five brigade routes and by 2013 it had only two teams left that were not even 
territorial. The responsibility of the entire sector used to spread over five experienced team 
leaders and by 2013 it had become that of one only novice local manager. 
3.3. The collapse of the track safety management system in Brétigny 
The convergence on the Brétigny sector of the track deterioration and considerable weakening 
of the maintenance operational teams leads to a spiralling loss of control of the 
maintenance function. 
Indeed, the Brétigny track sector is subject to extreme stress levels due to a very high traffic 
density in terms of frequency, speed and tonnage, on unsuitable pieces of equipment. The 
constraints cause an accelerated aging of the equipment that in the absence of anticipated 
regeneration lead to an ever increasing deterioration of the tracks. 
As such safety is not longer guaranteed by the appropriate condition of the physical 
pieces of equipment. It refers then to organisational barriers that rely in fact on all of the 
sectors’ maintenance operational teams. 
A deteriorated network however does generate a higher maintenance load with prescribed 
monitoring and corrective maintenance that are forced upon the teams and reducing their 
room for manoeuvre. Last the proliferation of problems interferes with scheduling, generalises 
 
89 Extract from judicial statements mentioned by Le Parisien (Mai 9th 2016),  
http://www.leparisien.fr/espace-premium/actu/bretigny-ou-la-chronique-d-une-catastrophe-annoncee-09-05-
2016-5778305.php  
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working in a state of emergency and disrupts maintenance. Forced to focus on emergencies 
and corrective maintenance for the most deteriorated systems, the maintenance agents lose 
sight of the global concept (already weakened by the discontinuation of track routes) for their 
sector and are no longer able to ensure an efficient monitoring. 
For the Brétigny sector, the reduction in competent personnel magnifies the saturation and 
disorganisation of the teams and reduces even further their flexibility. Lacking hindsight and 
sufficient room for manoeuvre, the weakened and inexperienced operational management is 
not able to stop this dynamic. In this increasingly restricted framework, the work practices 
move even further away from the reference guides that have become inapplicable in such a 
deteriorated environment. 
The Local Manager is the one who is ultimately responsible for managing track safety in his 
sector. But he is also responsible for track maintenance and to ensure the tracks are returned 
to traffic as quickly as possible. This concentration of responsibilities causes him to make 
operational arbitrages between the requirements in maintenance or safety, the resources 
available and the traffic imperatives. In the Brétigny sector, such arbitrages are subject to 
heavy pressure: the level of deterioration of the tracks requires a maintenance volume that the 
track teams cannot address. The Local Manager must manage the work by addressing what is 
most urgent. Moreover, the density of the passenger traffic generates some strong pressure 
from the driving and traffic operators who seek to reduce the number and duration of traffic 
stoppages, in particular at peak times. 
However, as we have seen, the Local Manager function is entrusted in Brétigny (and for the 
whole Production Unit for EVO track) to young inexperienced executives who must make 
multiple at-risk arbitrages for a deteriorated facility whose control they no longer have. 
Overworked, far from the decision centres and deprived from room for manoeuvre, they are 
hardly in a position to effectively fulfil their role of ultimate defence. 
Thus, the deterioration of the network together with the exponential increase in workload 
leads both to the saturation of the operational teams and to the collapse of the safety 
management system in Brétigny. 
4. Conclusions and perspectives 
We have demonstrated that the Brétigny accident occurred in a context of structural crisis of 
the maintenance of French railway infrastructures, associated with several decades of under-
investment. In the absence of an adequate renewal rate, the tracks do age and end up 
deteriorating over an increase part of the network. Under increasing financial pressures, the 
network manager has initiated multiple reforms to improve productivity. The adjustments 
however have led over time to deep changes in the maintenance entities, which have impacted 
the fundamental safety equilibrium. These weaknesses have proved to be critical in the 
Brétigny sector that is subject to extreme traffic conditions in a highly adverse technical and 
organisational environment. Whereas this sector was going through an accelerated 
deterioration of its equipment, decision-making authorities, removed from operational reality 
and under budgetary pressure, failed to initiate the renewal of the equipment within an 
appropriate timeframe. The local teams, heavily affected by the reorganisations and drastic 
cuts in personnel, were overwhelmed by the proliferation of equipment failures and by the 
explosion of the corrective maintenance volume required by pieces of equipment on their last 
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leg. Saturated and disorganised, without any real room for manoeuvre, the local maintenance 
entity has lost its coherence and ability to keep the Brétigny track sector in a safe state. 
The Brétigny accident highlights several industrial safety concepts that have already been 
noted in other major accidents: 
• It confirms that a major accident results from the conjunction of multiple Factors that do 
not always constitute individually sufficient cause for the event to occur but which can 
overlap and get stronger together in an enabling environment and lead to an accident (Y. 
Dien [11]). We also note the determining influence of productivity pressures studied by 
C. Perrow [12], which tend to generate bureaucratic decision-making systems that are 
disconnected from operational realities. 
• The fact that the deterioration of the network in Brétigny is part of long-term dynamics 
whose impact can appear only years, or even decades later (such as the under-
investment in the renewal of the infrastructures) is a good example of the incubation 
phenomenon of accident as theorised by Turner [13]. 
• The deep changes in the maintenance system that insidiously modify the fundamental 
equilibrium of organisations and representations of the stakeholders are reminiscent of 
the dynamics of normalization of deviance as theorised by the sociologist D. Vaughan 
in her analyses of the accidents of the Challenger [14] and Columbia [15] space shuttles. 
The Brétigny accident confirms the generic nature of these concepts that apply to different 
socio-technical systems. Moreover the multitude of sources available for Brétigny makes it 
possible to appreciate the variations and interactions at different levels of an organisation and 
over long periods of time. 
As far as the accident investigation and learning methodology is concerned, the Brétigny case 
outlines the interest in going beyond the paradigms of human error and direct causality, 
which prove ineffective in the understanding of the complexity of such an accident. It 
seems necessary to dig into the history and depth of the organisations to understand their 
systemic dynamics and weaknesses because it is where the future accidents are growing. 
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Abstract  
 
The derailments of trains could have serious consequences related to service interruptions, 
property damage, including environment and possible victims, so the study of this 
occurrences through methods and models borrowed from other sectors of economy, may be 
beneficial for the railway sector. 
The paper has analysed a railway accident occurred through a freight train derailment on the 
Romanian railway network (the derailment of the freight train no.51720 occurred in the 
railway station Ditrău, on 17th of November 2016) using two working instruments: the 
investigation method developed by the Accident Investigation Board Norway and Safety 
Management System developed by European Union Agency for Railway.  
In the first part of the paper it is presented a short description of these two working 
instruments and goes on by identifying safety problems for this accident, comparing the 
results and usefulness of those two methods. 
By applying these two methods it is shown their ability to a thorough investigation of the 
occurrence by analysing organizational and working environment as well as by identifying 
the key factors that contributed to the accident. It also highlights the action directions for 
improving the safety level on which the safety recommendations were designed. 
Although at first sight the accident could be categorized in a series of accidents generated by 
a simple human error, by analysing the factors that have influenced the behaviour of those 
involved, some aspects represent safety issues. These issues could affect in the future the 
activity of other economic operators on the railway market and can represent lessons to learn 
for the entire sector.  
Keywords: railway transport, accident, safety, investigation methods 
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1. Railway safety (Safety Management) and learning from experience 
The safety management system (called further SMS) can be defined like the totality of 
procedures of an organization to ensure and optimize safety. In other words, SMS is the basic 
element that ensures the safe functioning of the railway system. 
The concept of safety management through processes and management systems was inspired 
by the standards used in the production processes. The initial standards were asking the 
producers to document their working procedures, that were then inspected to confirm that the 
activity was completed accordingly. These early approaches aimed at compliance rather than 
improvement.  Then another approach was applied, generated by the experience of the 
Japanese companies that looked to involve the whole organization and its workers in these 
processes, continuously, in the whole production cycle, the approach being known in the 
literature as Total Quality Management (TQM)[1] 
Until 15-20 years ago, in the railway system, traditionally, when rail safety was discussed, the 
main principal was to ensure a conformity with the standards and regulation. Currently, 
through updating the regulation at national and European level, the safety management 
achieved a greater importance in the industry. An efficient safety management needs to ensure 
a balance between the conformity achievement operationally and understanding the way the 
processes and procedures are implemented across the organization. 
Learning from experience is one of the key pillars of safety management and safety 
investigation of accidents and through a deep analysis of the way technical and organizational 
systems interact efficiently could help ensuring that in the future similar accidents would be 
avoided. 
Generally, an accident occurs [Turner 1978] [2] as a result of an incubation period, in which 
events and signals are produced and after which no measures are taken either because those 
signals were not received by the ones accountable or the events did not receive the required 
attention proportional to its degree of threat to the safety.  
The decision to launch an investigation can be taken only in the case of a serious accident 
with material damage and human victims. The organizations and systems with high defence 
capability launch investigations for the near miss situations that could easily lead to disasters, 
those being occasions to intervene in the events chain by taking the necessary safety measures 
to avoid more serious accidents that could have the same determining factors. 
An accident investigation involves three main elements: what happened, why it happened and 
reaching conclusions and recommendations to establish the actions to be taken in order to 
prevent a similar accident. 
In such cases, near miss, an inductive analysis of the accident is being done, in which starting 
with a single event, similarities with other accidents can be found and learnt from, identifying 
safety recommendations that could be valid for a larger range of accidents. One of this type of 
accidents is analysed here, out of which the infrastructure management can draw some key 
learnings, referring to the way of controlling the associated risks of a third-party work and the 
way of considering the risks coming from the collaboration with other organizations. 
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2. General terms about investigation methods, the method of the 
Investigation Body of Norway AIBN and ” SMS wheel” tool of the 
European Union Agency for Railways 
An accident model is a referential format or a pattern way of thinking over an accident used in 
order to understand how the accident occurred. The advantage of using a pattern is given by 
the fact that sequencing the events is easier to present and understand [3]. Validated accident 
models are: 
1. Sequential models – based on a events sequence. 
This one is a simple, linear model type cause-effect, the accidents being considered the 
highlight point of some events, circumstances, actions that happen in a specific order. This 
model can be represented through a chain that contains a weak link or a domino series. The 
consecutive events that lead to an accident starts from an environment factor, an individual 
one, an action that puts in danger the safety, the mechanical or physical dangers, etc. 
Preventing accidents in this idealized way could be done by replacing the weak link or 
through the elimination of a piece that could interrupt the domino effect. [4]. 
In this model, an unexpected event initiates a sequence of other events that culminates with an 
unwanted occurrence. The unexpected even is usually a human error or an action that 
endangers the safety. 
This model has some limits, because it implies the existence of a strong link between cause 
and effect, a link more visible in the technical aspects case but less visible in the human factor 
or organizational one. 
2. Complex linear models. 
The most well-known model of this type is borrowed from the medical industry, the accidents 
being seen as a combination of actions that jeopardises the safety and latent conditions with 
influence on the safety. The latent conditions are as the pathogenic factors from the human 
body that produce effects only when a trigger appears. In the case of this model, the trigger is 
an action that puts in danger the safety and that leads to the accident occurrence. Inside this 
model, the accidents are prevented by enforcing the barriers and defence systems. One of the 
best illustrations and development of this model is by James Reason [5] 
 
Figure 1 “Swiss Cheese” model developed by James Reason 
Courtesy and Copyright DOE HANDBOOK Accident and 
Operational Safety Analysis 
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In the case of this model, the occurrence of an accident is the result of older deficiencies that 
under certain conditions generated by the initiators result in an unwanted event. In this 
situation, attention is focused on organizational contribution to the occurrence of accidents 
and allows investigators to learn in a way other than that of a causal series. However, a 
sequential character is retained, projecting the event along a line passing through all the 
barriers. Because it is a linear system, it tends to simplify the complex interactions between 
latent conditions and safety-critical actions. 
Its limitations are due to the fact that an analysis of the deficiencies is made at all hierarchical 
levels, but no attempt is made to explain why these conditions and decisions seemed logical to 
those involved before the accident. 
Another model is the nonlinear, systemic model [6], [7] where the accident is seen as an 
unexpected combination of variables. In this case, both variants (the accident and the success 
of the operation) are viewed as developing from an unexpected combination of variables in 
the system. Accidents are triggered according to this view of unexpected combinations of 
ordinary actions rather than failed actions, which combined or in resonance with other actions 
lead to conditions whose common result determines the accident. Accidents can be prevented 
by understanding the factors that interact. 
Erik Hollnagel's resonant functional model uses a metadata signal to visualize this model with 
the undetectable variables that resonate unexpectedly to result in a detectable result. 
Often a worker makes a mistake or undertakes certain actions that appear to be appropriate 
but combined with other variables can produce the accident. The first impulse is to blame the 
worker whose actions triggered the chain of events, but it should be kept in mind that the 
action would not have the same result, if there would have been other elements whose 
combination had determined the event. 
An advantage of the systemic model is that it provides a comprehensive understanding of the 
interactions that led to the accident. In fact, this model seeks to understand how certain 
variables - common inter-vals, latent conditions and weaknesses of the organization-in a 
particular combination may have an unwanted outcome. 
The AIBN [8] method, is a framework for process analysis and systemic investigation, taking 
into account collecting, organizing, analysing and interpreting information and data in a 
verifiable manner that enables those who use it to understand why accident and how the level 
of safety can be improved to prevent such accidents from occurring. 
It starts from the data collected at the site that forms the basis for process analysis in all 
investigations, so that the quality and confidence in the accuracy of the information is decisive 
for the validity of the analyses and conclusions. 
The AIBN method combines elements from the STEP sequential method (sequential graphic 
representation over time) developed by Hendrik and Benner in 1987, elements of barrier 
functions Hollnagel, E. and other concepts developed by Sidney Dekker.  
Starting from a graphical representation of the events in time, pursue further with identifying 
the safety issues -figured in Figure 3 with triangles, problems that are further analysed in 
depth to identify safety factors at all levels. 
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To identify safety issues, that is, “what went wrong"" in this chain of events, the authors of 
the method recommend using more systems to conduct "cause-effect" analyses. One of the 
easy-to-use options is the barrier theory [9], developed in the sense of identifying the 
"position" of the matrix in which the course of events leading to the accident can be changed 
or stopped. 
Barriers (illustrated for the case made for discussions with arrows)) are technical, operational 
or organizational measures that either separately or together could have prevented or stopped 
the chain of events in question, or could have limited the accident in terms of consequences. 
This means that barriers can prevent non-compliances, prevent accidents by detecting / 
notifying nonconformities, prevent deaths and injuries by limiting the consequences. 
In most specialized papers, when first classifying barrier types, taking into account their 
existence or non-existence, respectively their functioning at the time of the event can be 
divided into: 
• barriers that were in place and worked; 
• barriers that were in place but did not work (inefficient); 
• barriers that had not been established at the time of the accident. 
 
For an accident to occur, it is necessary that all the barriers in the chain of events leading to 
the accident are overcome due to the fact that they have not worked or because they have not 
been sufficiently strong. 
Barrier analysis provides identification of the security features of investigated systems, 
barriers that could prevent or limit damage. By doing so, we can identify and prioritize areas 
of action to improve the safety of these systems. 
After performing this type of analysis, the identified security issues are detailed to explain the 
links between event chaining and the contribution of safety factors at different organizational 
levels. 
There may be factors that did not make an essential contribution to the accident but increased 
the risk of it occurring. 
The next stage of the investigation, according to the AIBN method, is to analyze these safety 
factors, taking into account several elements: the human factor, the technical factors, the 
consequences (damages / victims) and how it could have diminished, the investigation of 
safety-related framework conditions, the organizational factors , etc., to determine which of 
them and the extent to which they have influenced the accident. In other words, a verification 
of the relevance of the factors in the accident is made to find out which of the previously 
identified safety issues can decisively affect the activity and which one characterizes an 
organization or an operational environment at a particular time. These can be considered as 
significant safety findings and are called "systemic safety issues" in specialized papers [10]. 
These are the directions to which the investigation commissions focus their attention on 
developing safety recommendations. 
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The "SMS Wheel" is a tool developed by the European Railway Agency for Railways, which 
was designed in principle to support the design, implementation and development of a safety 
management system for infrastructure managers and railway operators, making a 
comprehensive picture of the SMS elements contained in Annex III of Railway Safety 
Directive No. 49/2004. [11] SMS directive and guide. 
This instrument can be used also in accidents investigation, by addressing of the elements that 
form SMS, according to Annex III of the Directive 2004/49/EC. The analysis will consider, in 
a structured way, all the processes that contribute to the design, planning, delivery and control 
of operations. It is important the way in which are choose that elements which had an 
influence in the accident occurrence and this is the role of the investigator. To achieve in-
depth investigation, based on professional judgment, and experience the investigator will 
focus on the latent conditions that influenced the occurring of the accident.  
Analysing each sector from SMS tool it can be identified some safety issues, that contributed 
to the accident, and from which it can be emerge safety recommendations.  
3. Information on the accident covered in the Investigation Report 
On 17.11.2016, around 1:25 p.m., on the railway network in Romania, on the Siculeni - Deda 
traffic section, at the end Y of the CFR Ditrău railway station, at km 162 + 600, in the area of 
the switch no.4  4 wagons from the freight train no.51720, (wagons 17, 18, 19 and 20 from the 
locomotive in the running direction of the train) derailed. 
The derailment occurred in an area where works were carried out to replace the special 
sleepers at switch no. 4 at the Y end of the station. The works were performed by an 
authorized company (SC Euro Construct SA), which had a repair works contract with the 
infrastructure manager CNCF "CFR" SA. 
According to the existing regulations, this event was classified as a railway accident and was 
investigated by the Romanian Railway Investigation Agency, the specialized body for 
conducting such investigations on the Romanian railway network. 
The investigation report [12] drawn up for this accident shall include the findings made on 
site, the summary of the testimonies of those involved and other findings resulting from the 
consultation of the documents drawn up in connection with the execution of the works and of 
the train running. According to the investigation report, the derailment occurred on 
17.11.2016, in an area where replacement work was carried starting to 06:45. The works have 
been previously scheduled as part of a contract between the infrastructure manager (owner) 
and the firm that ensure the works (contractor).  From the findings of the investigation 
commission it was found that the derailment occurred because within the switch of the switch 
no.4 and the following wooden sleepers, after railway joint, the fastening between sleepers 
and rail was not done. This happened in the following circumstances: 
• the performance of special wooden sleeper’s replacement work was carried out 
without requiring the closing of the traffic without protecting the work area; 
• the contractor's staff worked within the track clearance without being supervised and 
coordinated, being surprised by the freight train no.51720. 
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At around 13:25 freight train no.51720 leaving Subcetate Mureş railway station and entering 
to line 4 in Ditrău railway station via the Y end, derailed. At that time, when was performed 
the train route for entrance in Ditrau railway station closing the traffic has approved by 
telegram. 
The reason the train was scheduled at that time was that, although there was a telegram 
approval, nobody required to close the train traffic on the Y end before 13:00. 
The freight train was to wait at line 4 for the reopening of the traffic on the area of the 
switches no.1 and no.5 (located at the X end of the station) and the passenger train no. 4507 at 
line III.  
 
Figure 2 Ditrău railway stations- tracks layout adapted from [12] 
At 1:25 p.m, the time of the route for receiving and stabling the freight train no.51720 at line 
4, the team of SC Euro Construct SA worked without supervision on the switch no.4, located 
on this route. At the time of passing the train over the switch no.4, the fastening was not made 
at a number of six consecutive sleepers. 
The sketch of the area on which the derailment occurred, the detail A of figure 2 is shown in 
figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 The sketch of the area on which the derailment occurred adapted from [12] 
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The conclusions of the investigation commission were as follows 
” The derailment occurred as a result of inappropriate state of the track superstructure 
(because the lack of fastening rail-sleepers), which favored the increase of track gauge, under 
the action of dynamic forces. This increase made possible the fall between the rails of the 
wheels on the right side of the first bogie of the 17th wagon in the running direction and the 
derailment of the next four wagons. " 
 
Technical condition of locomotives, wagons and the hauling mode of the train did not 
influence the occurrence of the accident. 
 
The Investigation Report shows that the status of the works scheduled for 17.11.2017, 
according to the line closure approval telegram, was as follows: 
• on the Y end of the station, in the area of the switch no. 4, replacement work of special 
sleepers, work done by the contractor, between 07:50 and 10:20 and 10: 50 to 13: 40, 
free intervals of movement; 
• on the X end of the station, in the area of the switches no.1 and no.5, on the same 
interval replacement work of rail fasteners, work done by the staff of Infrastructure 
Manager. 
On the morning of that day, the responsible for the safety of the contractor (hereinafter 
responsible SC) presented himself at the station at 06:45 and started the replacement work of 
the special sleepers by 2 consecutive pieces without registering it in the RRLISC (Revision of 
Lines and Traffic Safety Installations). National regulations in force provide that the 
execution of works of the type scheduled could not be performed without closing the line. 
 
On the same day at 10:35, the district chief of the Infrastructure Manager requested closing 
the line only on the X-end of the station, where he carried out replacement rail fasteners. 
From the findings in the report, the Infrastructure Manager's representative did not request the 
closure of the line at the Y end. In the previous days, although the work in the same area of 
the station was carried out by the contractor, the line closure was also done by the district 
manager of the infrastructure manager. 
According to the scheduled closure telegram, the SC's , clearance responsible and the re-
opening for the appropriate points at the end of the X works were the district chief of the 
infrastructure manager and for the work at the end Y, the SC's contractor. The SC's 
responsible and re-opening, clearance for both works was the district manager of the 
infrastructure manager. 
Although two different operators were working at both ends of the station, and the content of 
the telegram was detailed for each area, no reference was made to the person who had to 
request the closure of the line for each area, which what caused confusion. The clear mention 
of the SC responsible " safety officer", who should have asked RRLISC to close the line for 
the work done, would have avoided such an ambiguity. 
The Investigation Commission concluded that this was corroborated with the lack of detailed 
prescriptions (at the Line District Ditrău - owner and the contractor), which stipulated 
different responsibilities for owner and contractor, the closing of the railway traffic, the check 
of the line after the execution of the works for the reopening of the traffic and the way of 
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collaboration between owner and contractor during the performance of the works contributed 
to the confusion regarding the requirement to request the closing of the line and its inclusion 
in RRLISC. 
In the same context, the investigation commission found that the provisions of the works 
contract concluded between the parties were inconsistent with the provisions of the codes of 
practice regulating this type of work as that it did not expressly stipulate the tasks of the 
parties to traffic safety 
4. Analysis of the accident using the methods of investigation described 
above 
Using the information contained in the Investigation Report, the graphical representation of 
the accident was made using the AIBN method described in chapter no. 2, figure. 4. 
The actions of "actors" involved in the event were detailed, safety issues have been identified 
and then the safety factors that have had an impact on the accident have been established. 
The identified security issues, which are also included in the investigation report, were as 
follows: 
• How to set up the telegram to close the line; 
• Distribution of the telegram to those involved; 
• Lack of detailed working instructions for works performed at Ditrau Station; 
• Lack of oversight of the works by the beneficiary; 
Performance of certain works by the execution personnel of SC Euroconstruct without being 
supervised by a safety responsible (SC); 
In the chain of events that led to the accident, some organizational barriers have been 
identified that could have prevented the event from occurring when these barriers functioned: 
Barrier represented by the District Chief's duty to communicate non-commencement of works 
if they were no longer executed under the regulations in force. This instructional provision 
was not implemented in the days before the accident. A high level of awareness of the 
importance of safety rules (as outlined above) would have contributed to their implementation 
and would have avoided situations of that which have occurred in 17.11.2017, in which 
station staff did not know whether the works scheduled are running or not. 
Physical barrier – Represented by the signalling elements and the way of protecting the 
works, which, if carried out, would have prevented the accident. 
Then, starting from the identified safety issues, the safety factors were determined: 
The wording of the telegram issued for line closure scheduling as well as the lack of means of 
communication to the first level (execution) staff led to ambiguities and uncertainties 
regarding the responsibilities of those involved in the works carried out at the Ditrau station. 
Practice codes have not been complied with as to how works are required to close traffic and 
rail shunting, this being related to the safety management system at the level of the 
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infrastructure manager. No third-party risk assessment has been carried out and control of all 
the risks associated with the activity of the Infrastructure Manager, including the provision of 
maintenance / use of subcontractors for the execution of these works, has not been carried out; 
Limited awareness of the role of the infrastructure manager's oversight activities, including 
maintenance contractors / use of contractors to perform such works; 
By analysing the identified safety factors, resulting two safety issues at company to which 
they were then channelled safety recommendations issued. 
The two directions to which the investigation commission considered that the measures that 
the infrastructure manager should carry out were: 
• analyse the opportunity to update its applicable regulations for the line closing, so do 
not exist ambiguities in the appointment of the traffic safety responsible for each part 
of the work, to avoid ambiguities; 
• reassessment for all risks associated with the infrastructure manager's activity, including 
those cases where on the public railway infrastructure there are performed 
maintenance works with external companies.  
 
Both issues listed above and to which the safety recommendations were formulated resulted 
from the findings of the investigative commission and are determined by the infrastructure 
manager's perception of the responsibility for its part of the system and the safe operation of 
the system. Both aspects reflect the level of safety culture within that organization. 
Accident analysis using SMS tool 
The first step, after collecting the information, is to identify the failures in the safety 
management system that led to the accident. In our case I started from the information in the 
Report and I marked with a red triangle the sectors of the Management System where there 
are deficiencies. Considering the statements in Chapter 5 of the investigation report: 
• The Infrastructure Manager has failed to fulfil requirement C3 of Regulation (EU) No 
1169/2010 -Responsibilities and tasks concerning railway safety are clearly defined, 
known and shared between the contractual partners and other stakeholders " 
− From the testimonies of CNCF "CFR" SA, it was revealed that this requirement 
was not fully respected as there were problems regarding the distribution of the tasks related 
to the closing of line the trains during the execution of the replacement work in the row and 
the way of communication between the head of the train the local district of CNCF "CFR" SA 
and the representative of SC Euro Construct SA. 
− The provisions of the Works Contract and Instructions 317/2004 were not 
sufficient for the safe execution performance of the maintenance works as well as for the 
execution performance of the railway traffic running of the train and shunting, and in this 
situation, it is necessary to draw up detailed prescriptions/procedures regarding the to how the 
parties involved (representatives of CN "CFR" SA and those of SC Euro Construct SA) 
should act. 
As well as those in Chapter 6  of the investigation report: 
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• The execution of replacement wooden sleepers was carried out without the need to close 
the movement without protecting the working area; 
There were marked on the SMS wheel Figure 5: elements 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 in the area of design 
and improvement processes: 
Starting from the statements in the report  
• the provisions of the works contract concluded between the parties are not in 
accordance with the provisions of Art.138 of the Instructions for Speed Limitations,  no. 
317/2004  respectively 
•  the works performed by the contractor have not been checked by the beneficiary for the 
reopening of the railway traffic; 
elements 9.1.1 and 9.1.2 of the operating process area were marked: 
Taking into account the underlying and root causes: 
• The information sent by the regional leadership to the working level through the 
approval telegram on the conditions in which the line closure was performed was 
ambiguous and generated confusions. 
• Unsuitable communication between the representatives of the infrastructure manager 
and the staff of the economic operators that perform works at the track superstructure, 
with reference to the assurance of the traffic safety conditions along the performance of 
the works, and implicitly of their associated risks. 
There have been marked in the area of processes for implementation point 8.3.1. 
• Configuration, control of safety information 
These are areas where the investigation was focused and to which the safety recommendations 
were directed. 
5. Conclusions on strengths and weaknesses of the two methods 
Both methods allow an in-depth analysis of accidents: 
• first taking into account the processes and interactions between them, by explaining and 
understanding the safety issues and the barriers that could prevent the accident, 
• the second making a thorough verification of the safety management system and its 
constituent elements, in accordance with Annex III to Directive No 49. 
 
Using the SMS wheel tool, a task check is performed at all levels of management and all 
stages of the Plan Do Check Act, but the links between different processes can not be 
represented and a chronological representation of the events that led to the accident can not be 
achieved. 
If the method AIBN factors they identify safety risks and then the in-depth analysis of the 
accident is much more focused on organizational and frame influences that impact on the 
effectiveness of risk control. Simplifying things, one can conclude that AIBN seems to be a 
systemic approach and the SMS wheel more systematically. 
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Both methods allow identification of areas in the safety management system and not only to 
which the safety recommendations should be addressed. The AIBN method facilitates the 
identification of those recommendations that stem from systemic factors and less of those 
based on local conditions (closer to the source of hazard) with a limited effect. 
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Figure 4 AIBN method applied to Ditrau accident 
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Figure 5 - SMS tool applied to  Ditrau accident 
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Abstract 
Due to the current development of the transport industry, the quality of life and the 
environment are negatively influenced by chemical, noise, hydrocarbon residues from the use 
of non-renewable conventional fuels and, last but not least, by the consequences of accidents 
occurred in aviation, rail, maritime and on road.  
The European Union, through its representative institutions in the implementation of 
development policy, paying particular attention to optimizing and maintaining safety 
standards in transport and making every effort to reduce accidents, has established at 
European level the conduct of safety investigation in the event of accidents and incidents 
occurred in air, rail and naval transport, apart from any other form of administrative or 
judicial investigation that seeks to establish liability or fault, in order to determine the causes 
and circumstances that led to their occurrence, their analysis and the prevention of other 
similar accidents and incidents. Thus, the setting-up of specialized national, permanent, 
safety-related technical investigation bodies at the level of each Member State of the 
European Union was required. In their activity, these safety investigation authorities should 
be independent in relation to any legal structure, regulatory or other safety authority, 
transportation operator or agent, as well as in relation to any other part of which interests 
may enter into conflict with the assigned tasks. 
Keywords: safety investigation, accidents, multimodal, independence 
1. Romanian safety investigation authorities 
In Romania, the accidents and incidents occurred on the transport routes are investigated as 
follows: in civil aviation by the Civil Aviation Safety Investigation and Analysis Authority90 
(SIAA), in the railway field by the Romanian Railway Investigation Agency (AGIFER), and 
the road accidents are investigated by the Road Police. Also, the Naval Transport Safety 
Investigation Agency (AISTN) is currently being established in the maritime field. 
 Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) 
 
90 Former Civil Aviation Safety Investigation and Analysis Center, renamed as the Civil Aviation Safety 
Investigation and Analysis Authority, according to Romanian Government Ordinance no. 17/2018 
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European Union’s civil aviation safety investigation authorities are organized in the European 
Network of Civil Aviation Safety Investigation Authorities (ENCASIA). ENCASIA was set 
up in January 2011 as an independent body without legal personality, thanks to the entry into 
force of the Regulation (EU) no. 996/2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents 
and incidents in civil aviation. 
ENCASIA is composed of the heads of the safety investigation authorities in each of the 
Member States and/or, in the case of a multimodal safety investigation authority, the head of 
its aviation branch, or their representatives. 
Some Member State Safety Investigation Authorities are multimodal. This means that they 
not only investigate accidents and incidents involving civil aircraft but may also investigate 
other transportation modes such as marine and rail. 
After analyzing the current situation in the 28 Member States of the European Union, we note 
that there are currently 14 states whose safety investigations authorities are multimodal: 
Austria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and Hungary. 
 
Figure 19. Multimodal safety investigations authorities in the European Union 
In the United States of America, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an 
independent Federal agency charged by the Congress with investigating every civil aviation 
accident occurred in the United States and significant accidents in other modes of 
transportation – railroad, highway, marine and pipeline. NTSB was founded in 1967 and is the 
first independent investigation agency in the world to cover all modes of transportation. 
Therefore, NTSB may be taken as a model when it comes to multimodal safety investigation 
authorities. 
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One of the main challenges faced by the multimodal safety investigation authorities is that of 
harmonizing accident investigation principles and practices across the various modes of 
transportation (aviation, rail, maritime, road, pipeline). But one of the basic principles of 
safety investigation activities that remains solid, regardless the means of transport in which 
accidents or incidents occur, is to conduct independent investigations. It is also important to 
provide statutory guarantees for all stakeholders to feel free to tell the truth (Just Culture 
principle). 
2. How appropriate is to have a multimodal safety investigation 
authority in Romania? What are the advantages and disadvantages of 
such an organization in Romania? 
Firstly, we have to take into consideration the fact that the history of independent safety 
investigations in Romania is still in its early ages, which can be both an advantage and a 
disadvantage. An advantage – as it is an opportunity to unify safety investigation authorities 
from different transport modes right from the beginning, into a multimodal organization; and 
a disadvantage, as the new role in conducting multimodal safety investigations will put new 
requirements to the skills, expertise and resources of the Romanian safety investigation 
authority. 
Secondly, we have to consider the fact that Romania has a territory with an area of 238,397 
km² and its landscape is almost evenly divided among mountains (31%), hills (33%), and 
plains (36%). These varied relief forms spread rather symmetrically from the Carpathian 
Mountains, which reach elevations of more than 2,400 meters, to the Danube Delta, which is 
just a few meters above sea level, as you can see in Figure 2.91  
 
Figure 20. Topographic map of Romania 
 
91 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Topography_of_Romania 
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These topographical features mean that Romania has a relief with hard-to-reach areas in the 
event of accidents occurred in mountainous areas, especially during winter92, when travelling 
by road, sea and air is much more difficult (being difficult also for the investigation teams to 
move to the accident scene as fast as possible). 
These challenges also involve a sufficient number of safety investigators, well professional 
trained and updated with the latest technological breakthroughs in safety investigations, so 
that investigation activities to be carried out in good conditions.  
From this perspective, a multimodal safety investigation authority can be a viable solution, as 
resources (investigation methods and techniques, procedures, processes and good practices 
that have proven to be effective) can be shared inside the organization so as to create a pool of 
useful information and know-how to be used when carrying out accident investigation 
activities in every transport mode. Multimodal workgroups can also be created so as to 
provide a wider perspective on the causes and circumstances of the occurrence of the 
investigated accidents. 
3. Present and possible future concerning the independence and 
interdependence in safety investigations 
The first major step has already made in this regard, as the Romanian Civil Aviation Safety 
Investigation and Analysis Authority (SIAA)  will have a much more important role both in 
Romania and at European and international level in the field of civil aviation safety 
investigation and analysis activities, following the entry into force of the Romanian 
Government Ordinance no. 17 from August 29, 2018, defining a new self-financing structure 
(own revenues, attracted sources, donations and sponsorships) and establishing new 
attributions and responsibilities for the safety investigators, in accordance with the Regulation 
(EU) no. 996/2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil 
aviation. 
Thus, the former Civil Aviation Safety Investigation and Analysis Center (CIAS) was also 
renamed, considering the need to ensure the independence of the civil aviation safety 
investigations, as well as the implementation of the concept of "investigation authority" as 
defined and imposed in the ICAO regulations (Annex 13 and Doc 9756), as well as in the 
applicable EU regulations. Changing the name from "Center" to "Authority" strengthens the 
fact that safety is at the heart of the investigation process and that its activity is of vital 
importance for determining the causes of an accident or incident, enabling its role in the 
region to become more important and creating the baseline and the perspective for a 
multimodal organization in the future. 
The requirements of the new international regulations in the field are to continuously improve 
the safety investigation activity and, implicitly, to strengthen the capacity of each 
investigating authority in the Member States of the European Union by redefining and 
strengthening the functional capacity of the authorities with relevant expertise in the field, 
through the establishment of such authorities where they do not exist, and through the creation 
of regional organizations around well-developed investigation authorities, capable of effective 
 
92 For example, see the Final Report of the aviation accident occurred on January 20, 2014, near Horea village, 
Alba county, in Romania, when a civil aircraft having onboard a medical team has crushed in the mountains, in 
an area very difficult to reach and after which the pilot and a young volunteer doctor lost their lives: 
http://www.cias.gov.ro/images/rapoarte/2015.10.16%20Final%20Report%20-eng.pdf 
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cooperation with surrounding states, which is another main perspective of the Romanian 
SIAA. Especially as its evolution has been taken as a benchmark by other states in the region, 
offering the chance of an increasing importance and role in the region, Romanian SIAA 
already being able to provide logistical and professional support to surrounding countries. 
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Abstract  
 
The railway events evaluations are performed with various methods, which are under 
continuous improvement, as defined now in this industry.  However, it is considered that the 
use of methods already implemented in other industries, as for instance in nuclear, might 
bring a new light and possible future benefit for the present approaches. The paper proposes 
a new view on the existing approach for the railway events evaluation, based on a case study. 
The case study is based on real database existing in Romanian national railways events data. 
The results indicate that, there are possible positive effects on the interpretation of existing 
data if methods from other industries (as for instance from nuclear) are used. 
Keywords: Insert here a maximum of 5 key pace before and after the keywords. 
1. Introduction  
The paper presents in a case study the possible impact of using diverse approaches (by 
comparison with the existing ones) in the event evaluations in railway industry. The proposed 
alternative is based on the experience from the nuclear industry. 
2. Method and results  
The case study is comparing two approaches: one based on the existing evaluation of the 
events statistics: 
• One as used in this moment in the railway national evaluations of the events and  
• The second based on the practice in other industries (as for instance in nuclear)  
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The current practice (as illustrated by internal documents [3] in the official designated 
organizations at national level) is aimed to comply with the existing national legislation [1]. In 
accordance with the national requirements the event review for the railway industry is 
organized and it is performed as defined in the national legislation. Criteria of the accidents 
classification 
a. Collisions 
b. Derailments 
c. Impact on cars at railway passages 
d. Impact on people/passengers 
e. Fire  
 
There are also defined classification criteria used for the accidents of categories a) and b) 
above, as follows: 
 
• Severe accidents (deaths, injures, environmental impact etc.) (AG) 
• Accidents non-AG (A) 
 
Two other groups are considered in internal reviews for practical purposes: 
 
• Incidents (I) 
• Non-significant reports (Inf) 
 
A very laborious work is performed for detailed analysis of each event. Apparently, a 
database based on the existing detailed reviews is yet to be developed. There are some 
internal assessments that could be used for some statistical type analyses (as illustrated in 
Table 1) [3]. 
Table  1. Extract from the internal event grouping for potential input to statistics database 
Încadrare
1 2/22/2007 3/7/2007 246 237 2/12/2008 Cluj Dej Triaj CFR SNTFM accident
2 2/22/2007 3/7/2007 224 215 1/11/2008 Galaţi Cricov CFR CTF accident
3 12/13/2007 12/14/2007 234 233 11/18/2008 Bucureşti Comarnic CFR SNTFC accident
4 12/15/2007 12/17/2007 188 188 9/16/2008 Timişoara Milova - Conop CFR UNIFERTRANS accident
5 2/5/2008 2/11/2008 156 152 9/16/2008 Braşov Odorhei RCCF TRANS REGIOTRANS accident grav
6 3/13/2008 3/17/2008 294 292 5/18/2009 Craiova Zăvideni CFR SNTFM incident
7 5/10/2008 5/12/2008 249 249 5/8/2009 Bucureşti Valea Călugărească CFR SNTFC accident grav
8 5/26/2008 5/27/2008 158 157 1/12/2009 Cluj Mogoşeni CFR SNTFC accident
9 12/16/2008 12/17/2008 251 250 12/15/2009 Constanţa Basarabi CFR SNTFC incident
10 3/14/2009 3/16/2009 154 154 10/22/2009 Bucureşti Comarnic CFR SNTFC accident
11 9/8/2009 9/23/2009 179 168 5/25/2010 Cluj Ilva Mică CFR SNTFC incident
12 9/21/2009 9/23/2009 109 107 2/24/2010 Craiova Banu Mărăcine - Malu Mare CFR SNTFC accident
13 10/17/2009 10/19/2009 89 89 2/23/2010 Constanţa Lehliu - Săruleşti CFR SNTFM accident
14 11/2/2009 11/5/2009 63 60 2/1/2010 Cluj Dealu Ştefăniţei - Fiad CFR SNTFC accident
15 12/5/2009 12/8/2009 69 68 3/15/2010 Bucureşti Pantelimon CFR SNTFC incident
16 1/25/2010 1/27/2010 39 37 3/18/2010 Braşov Malnaş Băi - Bixadu Oltului, Suceava, TuşnadCFR SNTFC accident
17 2/7/2010 2/8/2010 21 21 3/8/2010 Bucureşti Ciocăneşti CFR SNTFC accident
18 3/18/2010 5/13/2010 Div 105 67 8/16/2010 Timişoara Băniţa - Merişor CFR UNIFERTRANS inf N
19 3/18/2010 5/13/2010 Div 175 137 11/23/2010 Timişoara Merişor - Crivadia CFR UNIFERTRANS inc 7
20 4/7/2010 4/8/2010 93 92 8/17/2010 Cluj Mogoşeni CFR SNTFC accident
21 4/13/2010 5/13/2010 Div 48 27 6/21/2010 Timişoara Arad CFR SNTFC inc 8
22 5/11/2010 5/18/2010 19 14 6/7/2010 Craiova Amaradia CFR GFR inc 8
23 5/16/2010 5/17/2010 106 106 10/13/2010 Bucureşti Valea Largă - Sinaia CFR SNTFM acc 7
Data
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However, at the practical level the development and improvement of techniques to correlate 
the evaluation of the statistics (as derived from a database) and the implementation of 
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statistical type of connections into the further detailed reports might be in our opinion very 
useful. 
In order to perform statistical analysis to be used for risk insights (as per [4]) and develop the 
input for a database, the information is reorganized illustrated in Table 2. 
Table  2. Sample of the reorganized input from [3] for a statistical analysis of the railway events 
 
 
The two approaches used for the case study are based on evaluations considering: 
• The probability of occurrence of a certain type of event 
• The risk impact of an event 
 
The risk impact is based on general risk definitions in other industries, as for instance in 
nuclear [4] (as defined in formulas (1) and (2): 
 
 
         (1) 
 
               (2) 
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The nuclear industry has also criteria for event classification, as mentioned in [2] at art 16 on 
reporting criteria (that underlings the impact on nuclear safety measured by risk metrics) or in 
art 24 on ranking conclusions for operating feedback from event review and the use of 
external peer review for the whole process. 
  
The starting point of the case study was the information from [3] reorganized as illustrated in 
Table 2. The results of the statistical reorganization of the information are represented in 
Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Event statistics as resulted from reorganized information 
from source [1]. 
 
Starting from the results represented in Figure 1 and based on the damage evaluation for risk 
analyses (as defined by formulas (1) and (2)) the distribution of probabilities and risks for the 
railways database of this case study are represented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Results of probabilistic versus risk evaluation of events statistics 
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The further evaluation of the results is identifying the ranking defined by the two approaches: 
probabilistic and risk 
The ranking results for this case study identify the fact that the severe accidents (AG) are of 
higher safety significance than the Accidents (A) if the risk approach is used. This might look 
as an obvious result. However, in this specific case study the statistics and the samples lead to 
a simple combination, which usually in large railway databases do not happen. For large 
railway database risk insights bring a better perspective on the events ranking. 
Table  3. Ranking of the types of events  
Type Prob Risk
Rank by 
probability
Rank by 
risk
AG 1.50E-02 0.6 III I
A 5.35E-01 0.5 I II
I 4.20E-01 0.3 II III
INF_D 3.10E-02 0.005 IV IV  
 
3. Conclusions  
The case study identify the potential useful insights for trend analysis of railway databases if 
risk approaches are used. 
In order to benefit to the highest level of the aadvantages of using risk approaches, databases 
of the railways events have to be defined in detail and reorganized as proposed in this case 
study. 
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Abstract 
In this paper, it is proposed to study a method for assessing the systemic management of 
emergency management in case of nuclear accidents. In order to identify the key factors in the 
emergency management system the chosen analysis method is a systemic one that deals with 
the interaction of component parts for defining sensitive elements of weak links that require 
more attention to improve them.  
For this, a brief description of the National Emergency Management System [1] is 
needed to define it as a complex system. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Von Bertalaffy (1956) defines a system as a complex of interacting elements. Von Bertalanffy 
fosters systems thinking in all disciplines in order to find general principles valid to all 
systems. It introduces “system” as a new scientific paradigm contrasting the analytical, 
mechanical paradigm, characterizing classical science (von Bertalanffy, 1950). A fundamental 
notion of general systems theory is its focus on interactions. The center in relationships lead 
to sustain that the behaviour of a single autonomous element is different from its behaviour 
when the element interacts with other elements.  
This brief commentary was aimed at highlighting some elements of systems theories and their 
application in emergency management. Decision makers and Emergency Managers should 
become familiar with the concept of systems and the associated way of thinking.  Decision 
makers and Emergency Managers have to plan structural adjustments to guarantee the 
survival of the whole system, constantly formulating new interpretations of the scenarios in 
order to find an adequate positioning, implementing (when necessary) periods of adjustment, 
transformation and redefinition the organizational structure, plans, resources etc.  
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The National Emergency Management System [1] is based mainly on 3 structures organized 
at all levels, namely national level, county level, local level and site level of the facility, plans 
and resources dedicated to each structure. These structures are: 
• The decision-making structure are the emergency committees organized at 
all levels 
• Executive structure defined by the Professional Emergency Services, acting 
as County Inspectorates, and on the facility operator has the obligation to 
establish and maintain its own emergency or radiological emergency response 
system containing an emergency response structure. 
• Operational structure are emergency operational centers, organized at all 
levels, with the role of ensuring the monitoring in normal situation and support 
of the decision makers and coordination of the implementation of the 
protective action during the emergency situation. 
For all levels, the emergency response management is organized based on the following 
principles [2]: 
• Common terminology, which ensures that the terms used by all organisation 
are standard; 
• Scalable organization and concept of operation, which gives possibility to the 
command and control structure to adapt to all types of events at all times; 
• Integrated communication system is established and includes a 
communication plan, common for all structures with clear procedures, 
instructions and terminology; 
• Command control, with clear reporting lines and hierarchy between the 
different units and individuals with a single commander-in-chief at all time; 
• Location/facilities designated for response, these include operation centre, 
command and control post and, any other location/facility designated for 
response in emergency; 
• Optimal resources, that aim at the maximization of resources potential. 
2. THE MODEL OR EMERGENCY RESPONSE MANAGEMENT 
The emergency response management is a complex system [3], [4], [5] represented in 
figure 1 and it is considered that is composed by the following subsystems: 
• The sub-system 0 that manages the emergency response at the level of the 
operator (on-site), 
• The sub-system 1 that manages the response at the local, county and national 
level (off- site) and  
• A variable subsystem V that defines hypothetical emergency situations that 
would trigger the other two sub-systems f.  
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Level 0 = on-site level (facility) 
Level 1 = off-site level (local, county and national) 
S0 = on-site structural matrix 
MS1= off-site structural matrix 
VIN_0 = on-site Vector of perturbation   
 
The first and the second are defined as matrixes of the on-site and off-site emergency 
management systems and the third is defined as a vector.  
The systemic approach reflects in the fact that these systems describe matrixes. The 
interaction of the matrixes is described by the composition of these structures presented in 
matrix form, according to the rules of the operational calculation. Similar external 
disturbances are described by vectors, and their impact on structures is mathematically 
described by composing vectors and structural matrices. 
For this study the structural matrix (MS) is defined by the equation (1): 
 
              (1) 
 
And perturbation vector (VIN) is defined by the equation   (2) 
                                                                                              (2) 
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Description of the structural matrix of level 0, figure 2, consist of composition of elements 
representing the on-site emergency response organization and elements representing the on-
site emergency response plan. 
 
 
Figure 2. Structural matrix for level 0 
 
The input for the matrix calculation for level 0 the element of the perturbation vector VIN_0 
is defined in the table 1.  
 
Table 1. Elements of VIN_0 
Symbol Elements 
v01 Loss of cooling water 
v02 Loss of national grid  
v03 Loss of communication  
v04 Station blackout 
v05 Natural calamities 
v06 Terrorist attack 
 
                            (4) 
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=                                 (5) 
 
 
 
   X =                    (6) 
 
 
The structural matrix for level 1, MS, consists of the composition of the elements that 
describes the main elements of the National Emergency Management System (NEMS) in 
table 2, the resources of the National Emergency Management System in the table 3 and 
elements of the off-site emergency response plan in table 4.  
 
Table 2. The main components of NEMS 
Symbol  Elements 
c1 Incident Commander (CA) 
c2 Command and Control Unit (SCC) 
c3 Planning Unit (SP) 
c4 Operation Unit (OP) 
c5 Logistic Unit (SO) 
c6 Financial/Administrative Unit (SFA) 
 
Table 3. Resources of NEMS 
Symbol  Elements 
r1 Trained personal 
r2 Emergency facilities 
r3 Monitoring, dosimetry and protection equipment 
r4 Communication systems 
r5 Tools and materials resources 
r6 Documentation: procedures, contact lists, protocols, plans. 
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Table 4. Off-site emergency response plan 
Symbol  Elements 
r1 Trained personal 
r2 Emergency facilities 
r3 Monitoring, dosimetry and protection equipment 
r4 Communication systems 
r5 Tools and materials resources 
r6 Documentation: procedures, contact lists, protocols, plans. 
 
The first Intermediate Structural Matrix 1, MI1, for level 1 is the combination of the 
main components of NEMS and elements of resources of NEMS.  
 
    (7) 
The second Intermediate structural matrix, MI2, for level 1 is the combination of the 
main components of NEMS and elements of the off-site emergency response plan. 
    (8) 
 
The structural matrixes of level one I2 
MI1  x MI2 = MS level 1        
 
 X = 
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=      (9) 
 
the equations (6) x (9) will result: 
 
 X  =       (10) 
 
3. Results and conclusion 
For variations of the input vector and in various configurations of the structures, by applying 
the methodology described above, we obtain full series of quantifiable results of the dominant 
sizes on the stability of the structures (Figure 3). These variations indicate acceptable areas 
and directions for improving structures. 
 
CASE Phase1 
MM 27.1 
Mm 9.04 
mm 1 
mM 3.01 
AM 12 
Am 4.02 
Mmm 9.04 
mMM 3.01 
S0 max 8.37 
S1 max 3.35 
Sx max  4.69 
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Figure 3. Examples of results and their variation 
 
Case study. Natural disaster 
A critical situation, if it occurs an earthquake, at the Nuclear Power Plant combined with the 
lack of equipment and / or communications, means at least one of the regional / national 
levels, leads to a major disturbance in the emergency management system.  
 
CAZ Phase 2 
MM 245 
Mm 81.7 
mm 1 
mM 3.02 
AM 48.2 
Am 16 
Mmm 9.08 
mMM 27.2 
S0 max 18.9 
S1 max 12.6 
Sx max  13.7 
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Vector                                                                                    Structural Matrix 
1= no perturbation                                                                   1= inadequate 
2= uncertainty                                                                          2= partial adequate                                                                
3= certainty                                                                              3 = adequate 
 
Critical situation at level 0 (on-site):  
Maximum deficiencies with impact on structural matrix elements. 
• The Shift Supervisor (SS) may classify the emergency situation and reclassify the 
emergency situation  
• The Emergency Director (ED) may reclassify the emergency 
• The Technical Support Group (TSG) provides ED support for the reclassification of 
the emergency 
• SS decides on preventive actions and emergency response emergencies 
• ED decides emergency actions and measures and emergency response 
• TSG supports the ED in taking decisions on actions and protective measures 
• SS coordinates physical protection actions on site 
• TSG will assist the DU in making decisions as regards physical protection actions 
on site 
 
Medium deficiencies with impact on structural matrix elements: 
• Emergency Response Team (ERT) acts in line with the emergency  
• Command and Control Unit (CCU) coordinate the implementation of the 
protective actions 
• Physical Protection Unit (PPU) acts in line with the emergency class 
• ERT implements the protective measures  
• CCU coordinating the implementation of the protective measures 
• PPU implementing protective measures   
• ERT collaborating with PPU 
• CCU provides support for ED 
• PPU implementing physical protection measures 
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4. CONCLUSION 
a. Using the system theory by using matrix computation leads to quick, repeatable and 
verifiable results with many advantages over multi-criteria decisions and expert type 
analyses. 
b. For variation of the input vector (perturbation) and different configuration of the sub-
systems element, applying the methodology above described, it obtains a series of 
qualitative results of the dominant sizes on the stability of the sub-systems. 
c. Optimization of the National Emergency Situation Management System, namely how 
structure elements at all levels can improve the effort to which various components of 
structural matrices are subjected, especially those that define human resources. 
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Workshop 
 
This chapter provides an overview of discussions during a workshop organized during the 
ESReDA seminar on Accident Investigation and Learning to Improve Safety Management in 
Complex System: Remaining Challenges organized in Bucharest on 9th and 10th October 
2018.  
This transcript of the workshop discussions is published in the spirit of sharing ideas; it does 
not contain consensus opinions or carefully analyzed statements. 
During the workshop, participants were invited to describe problems and identify possible 
solutions that apply to the four main phases of accident investigation:  
1. Establishment of the organizational prerequisites 
2. Fact finding 
3. Analysis and the preparation of recommendations 
4. Follow-up on the recommendations.  
For each phase, two posters were prepared, in English and Romanian language, as shown in 
the examples below. 
                
 
The participants were divided into 8 groups: 4 with a majority of English speakers and 4 with 
a majority of Romanian speakers. Each group had a facilitator, who shared the group 
conclusions to the audience. The number of the persons in a group was about 20.  
During the course of the day, the participants were free to stick as many post-it (one colour 
for problems, another colour for solutions) to the various posters, either in English or 
Romanian, with problems, based on the accident investigation phase. If the participant could 
offer a solution, it had to be linked to a challenge/problem. 
To help the participants, for each phase, the organizers prepared some “trigger issues”, for 
example:  
1. organisational prerequisites:  
• ensuring readiness to investigate, resource issues; 
• tension between independence and competence; 
• guarantees offered to whistleblowers. 
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2. fact finding: 
• identifying causal factors (organizational, inter-organizational); 
• conditions of auditions and interviews; 
• dealing with media pressure.   
3. analysis and recommendations:  
• human errors or system deficiencies; 
• linking causal factors and recommendations; 
• ensuring ownership of recommendations. 
4. follow-up: 
• long timescale for organizational changes; 
• who needs to learn? 
• who is responsible for follow-up?   
 
Before the workshop started, the posters were put onto the 8 designated tables. The 
participants had to dialogue with their group colleagues to PRIORITISE which were the more 
important PROBLEMS that need addressing and to see whether there were proposed 
SOLUTIONS already on the poster. If not, they were invited to identify possible solutions.  
The most important problems/solutions have been communicated by the facilitators to the 
organizers, who presented them to all participants at the beginning of the second day of the 
Seminar. The text below provides a summary of the problems identified and the proposed 
solutions.  
Phase 1: Organizational prerequisites 
Problem:  
• The investigation agency may lack staff with specialized skills in issues such as 
risk analysis, communication and organizational factors of safety. 
Solution:  
• Specialized training organized by investigation board targeting the sensitive 
fields/domains, and also with input from / collaboration with other 
investigation boards in order for know-how and experience to be acquired from 
other European countries.  
Problem:  
• Investigators' salary level needs to be improved. The legal status of 
investigation agencies often means that their employees (including 
investigators) are civil servants, whose salary is fixed by law or by decree (for 
example, law 153/2017 in Romania). The associated salary levels are often 
considerably lower than people with the same skills would obtain working in 
industry, meaning that it may be difficult for the investigation board to attract 
and retain staff with the necessary skills.  
 
Solution: 
• Start legal efforts so that investigators won't be impacted by this law any 
longer. 
• Set up a multi modal investigative body reporting to the Parliament, and whose 
staff will benefit from special remuneration. 
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Problem:  
• Accident investigators as "safety gods". We often put investigators in the 
position of "super knowers", or Gods with a perfect understanding of system 
operation, of features of frontline work that produce safety, and of ideal 
solutions to fix the issues identified (all this under time constraints). This is 
generated by the political configuration of accident investigation boards and by 
the illusion of the possibility of obtaining perfect knowledge. 
• Allowing/triggering local debate among workers and managers on work 
performance and safety, exploring the articulation between top-down safety 
expertise and bottom-up situated expertise may be more productive than 
recommendations that the industry feel are not applicable. 
• Note that judges and juries are allowed to state "insufficient evidence to 
generate a definite decision of culpability"; we should perhaps allow 
investigators leeway not to generate recommendations when they are not 
confident of having sufficiently general findings. 
• Managing impact of financial considerations on effective independence. How 
does the way in which a regulator's budget is provided (taxpayer, fees on 
industry operators, mixed mode) impact its perceived and effective 
independence? How do we "keep the system honest"? 
 
Other observations 
Newcomers are obliged to undertake “safety archaeology” when trying to understand why a 
specific feature of a procedure or system design is present, because the underlying principles / 
axioms / reasons for recommendations and design choices are not saved and made 
transparent. However, too much transparency can lead to defensive attitudes and to 
unreasonably high demands on inspectors to justify their recommendations (“evidence-based 
decisions” vs “my experience tells me that this is a reasonable way forward”). 
 
The status and protections accorded to whistleblowers have impacts on inspectors’ ability to 
obtain the truth on certain politically sensitive issues in the organization. The definition of 
“who is a whistleblower” (who deserves protection) is sensitive; the cultural and legal context 
has an important impact on the level of trust in guarantees provided to potential 
whistleblowers. 
 
Distinction between legal and safety investigation: 
• In objectives: the legal inquiry focuses on attribution of responsibility, liability and 
blame, whereas the safety inquiry aims to understand, to learn and to improve safety; 
• In mindset: the legal inquiry has a mindset based on procedural compliance and 
deviations implying guilt, whereas the safety inquiry is typically based on a mindset 
that understands the difference between work as imagined and work as done (reasons 
for not following procedures to adapt to local constraints); 
• In legal power: varies depending on national legislation, but typically the legal inquiry 
has precedence over the safety investigation, can sometimes limit the access of safety 
investigators to evidence, can seize documents and interview data collected by the 
safety investigation (which means that attempts to protect witnesses from a blame-
oriented concerns cannot be guaranteed). But in some countries, legislation provides 
some protection and guarantees to the safety investigation, for example allowing 
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testimony to be protected from the legal inquiry under certain conditions. In the UK, 
the head of the RAIB is able to decide, on the basis of a number of published criteria, 
which information collected they keep for the safety investigation and which they 
transmit to the police to be used in the legal investigation. In Denmark, a 
constitutional modification after the Überlingen accident provides a guarantee of 
anonymity for testimony to the safety investigation under certain conditions (reports 
made within a certain timespan from the event, no people killed). 
 
Useful associated initiatives/solutions: 
• A useful practice is for legal inquiries concerning complex sociotechnical systems to 
be handled by specialized jurisdictions, where the prosecutors and judges have 
received special training and accumulate experience that helps them understand the 
factors that contribute to safety, develop a more subtle view of causality than simple 
linear consequences, and appreciation for how investigations should be run when there 
is no presumption of intent to cause harm. 
• In aviation, Eurocontrol has been running a multi-year program that brings together 
prosecutors and safety investigators to discuss collaboration within the legal 
framework of different European countries. It is a promising initiative but it is 
unreasonable to expect rapid change to the situation. 
Phase 2: Fact finding 
Problem:  
• Expert bias 
• Does expert knowledge open or close your eyes during fact finding? 
• Depending on the case, expert bias can influence fact finding 
• It can also be the case that accident investigation is carried out mainly 
by technical people with no forensic expertise, so this can also be 
considered as an expert bias (e.g. the investigation leads to an event 
tree (i.e. WHAT happened?), but not going further and asking WHY 
that happened) 
 
Solution:  
• For an open-minded multi-disciplinary team with a very clear scope and a 
dynamic terms of reference (ToR). 
• It can happen that during the investigation the team will need to adapt and 
change the ToR (e.g. more time needed to question other witnesses) to be able 
to pursue truth as much as possible, creating an appropriate relaxed atmosphere 
for this process, where blame must be avoided, as much as possible. 
  
 
Problem:  
• Fake news and social media 
✓ When an accident occurs, there is a risk that fake truths are fabricated 
and spread virally through social media. This can affect the fact finding 
process, putting unnecessary social pressure on the investigation team. 
(However, on the positive side, witnesses can more easily be found 
thanks to social media!) 
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Solutions: 
•  Train media representatives to deal with media pressure and prepare in 
advance reliable press/civil information for each scenario identified, also with 
help of mock/simulation situations through role playing to help media 
representative be prepared (also for unforeseen scenarios). 
•  Prepare well in advance the mayor and local authorities on how to 
communicate the messages, before social media get a hold of any information 
that risk disrupting this constructive process and to avoid any unnecessary 
misunderstandings and confusion. 
•  Use the same social media tools to provide reliable information in a timely 
manner. 
  
 Problem:  
•   Addressing political bias and personal agendas 
✓ It can happen that such agendas already predetermine the outcome of 
an investigation. Investigators could feel pressured and frustrated as they 
are not able to do their fact finding work in an open and free 
environment 
✓ E.g. insurance companies and companies, in general, may prefer to 
drive an investigation in a particular direction, preferring to 
compensate/pay off victims in order to have control (they often provide 
compensation to victims that is conditional on signing a contract stating 
that they will not sue the company responsible for the accident). Thus, 
they accept liability ASAP so as to avoid prolonging the process and not 
being able to know the outcome. Thus, accident investigators are put into 
a situation of unease, which can stifle their fact finding process. 
  
Solution:  
• Clarify for witnesses the legal status of testimony. An inquiry is not equal to a 
legal investigation (if supported by organization). 
 
Problem:  
• Witnesses hide information and other obstacles to fact finding 
✓ The people involved in an accident may hide certain information or 
provide information in a manner which serves their own interests or 
those of people they know.  
  
Solutions: 
•  Turn to other sources for evidence (CCTV footage, etc.) in order to identify 
the causes. 
•  Look for concurring favourable conditions, go back to the organizational level   
in order to find clues, create scenarios, and carry out other screenings. 
•  Conduct the interview as if it were a conversation. This puts people more at 
ease than just asking them to give a written account of the facts. Favour 
conversation over questioning because questioning comes with the risk of 
monosyllabic answers. Upside: they also might reveal more than they would 
normally tend to because they are relaxed. 
•  Record the interview and then get the interviewee's signature on the transcript. 
The possibility of recording should be provided for by the law. 
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Problem:  
•  Communicating with civil society + relieving media pressure 
✓ Starting to communicate too soon holds the risk of communicating 
assumptions, rather than informed conclusions. 
Solutions: 
• Maintaining transparency (at a moderate level nonetheless) by staying on a 
factual level and not going into too many technical details. Debate: how much 
is too much and what should be disclosed to the media; 
• Do not reveal the investigator’s identity. Inform that there is an investigation 
committee only once their job is finished. 
 
Phase 3: Analysis and establishment of recommendations 
 
Problems: 
• Recognising root causes instead of direct causes;  
• Analysis should not stop at “human error”; 
✓ Appropriate training should help investigators to distinguish direct 
causes from root causes; 
✓ It is important to avoid “human error” as term and use “human factor” 
or “human reliability” instead. Also, it is important to analyse system 
deficiencies contribution to human factor, ergonomic etc.  
• How to make recommendations really applicable; 
✓ Recommendations should be made with implementation in mind. This 
means considering experience-based results, including causal factors, 
specific targets for recommendations and clearly identified ownership. 
• Multiple investigation methods as a problem; 
• Analysis is uncertain because it depends on already uncertain factual basis 
which is not always easy to establish. Then recommendations are even more 
uncertain because they are not just depending on the analysis results but also 
on the interpretation. In addition, recommendations depend on communication, 
understanding and trust; 
• Important to use the term “human factors” and to discuss organizational issues         
and to ensure that findings are deep enough to distinguish situations where 
human error is the direct cause but not a root cause. 
• Are multiple investigation methods a solution or a problem? 
• Obstacles at administrative levels: recommendations should be made in order 
to remove the obstacles; 
• How to make the recommendations applicable: communication with the 
intended parties in order to discuss and put the recommendation into practice; 
• Recommendations should be reliable; 
• Risks have been identified, but elimination of the risk not possible due to 
funds. 
100 bridges with expired lifespan have been identified, solutions should be 
found to monitor the bridges so that risks can be minimized. The 
bridges should be planned, identified, prioritized for repair work. 
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• Gaps in the updating the safety culture: raising awareness of the management 
about the need to implement the latest European regulation (package: rail) 
 
Solutions: 
• Multiple investigation methods as a solution; 
• Considering that “human error” is also part of human variability; 
• Proper communication between involved parties in order to achieve an 
agreement. 
Observation of the organizers 
 
Multiple methods are both a problem and a solution (concerning analysis and 
recommendations). A number of methods exist for different domains and different problems 
need different approaches. What is important is that an APPROPRIATE METHOD IS USED 
for each particular case. 
Phase 4: Followup 
 
Problems: 
• Lack of identification of target of recommendations; 
• Resistance to safety recommendation; 
✓ Concerning European and Romanian regulations, safety 
recommendations must be addressed to Railway Safety Authority. 
Sometimes, this authority (who have only to check and to ensure about 
implementation), refuse to do that and to implement safety 
recommendation, even that recommendation is for rail operators. 
• Improperly framed and scoped recommendation; 
• Lack of safety training of managers; 
✓ The investigations reports are finalized in general after one year. At the 
moment of accident, the rail operators which are not involved in the 
accident, don’t have too much information to inform their employers, 
about what happened and about causes and contributing factors. When 
the investigation report for that accident is done, even if he is published 
on the Investigation Agency website, the managers of that operators, 
don’t read the investigation report to check if they don’t have similar 
problems, or to inform their employers about the causes, contributing 
factors and especially about the damages (every damage should be paid 
by somebody: person, company or society). 
 
• When to issue an urgent recommendation or a safety warning? 
✓ An urgent recommendation should be issued when it’s found a 
technical issue to a component of a rail vehicle (e.g. wheels, 
axle, or other component common on all rail vehicle from all 
rail actors). This urgent recommendation should be addressed 
to stakeholders. 
✓ A safety warning should be issued whenever it’s found a 
supplementary observation which is neither causes nor 
contributing factor. This observation should not be a simple 
observation in a supplementary chapter. 
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Solutions: 
• Train managers on safety issues 
✓ Because the stakeholders have the investigations reports and 
they are informed about safety recommendation, they should 
make their own analysis considering recommendation and to 
implement it, with or without acceptance from Safety Authority. 
They should make the analysis in according with their interest 
and risk assessment and not in according with an organization 
who is not involved directly (with real responsibilities) in their 
activity. 
 
• Work to generate changes in the safety culture 
✓ Investigation reports should be analyzed by all actors, not only 
by those involved. For them, reports should be like a safety 
warning signal. They should check if the problems raised in the 
reports can be found in their activity. In this respect, they could 
make a scenario of an accident. 
 
• Structure interface with investigator, operator, authority so (draft) 
recommendations are explained, discussed, challenged to improve their 
relevance, operability; 
✓ A draft of investigation report, before dissemination, should be 
discussed and analyzed with the rail actors involved in accident 
and with Rail National Safety Authority, face to face. The 
investigation commission could present the causes, contributing 
factors, system deficiencies and safety recommendations. In 
some cases, at the meeting, should be very good if the employers 
involved in accident will be present. The investigation 
commission could explain why their good activity would have 
been a barrier to the accident. The meeting might be a challenge 
for investigation commission in the respect that they should not 
hide behind of a paper which is send by mail. 
✓ The action should be divided in two parts: 
o With employers involved, rail actors’ managers and Rail 
Safety Authority to discuss the human errors; 
o With rail actors’ managers and Rail Safety Authority to 
discuss system deficiencies and safety recommendations; 
  
• Reduce turnover of managers so they “own” problems and monitor effects of 
implemented measures 
✓ The manager’s performance should not be counted in financial 
profit. In the railway sector, for example, it is easy to generate a 
profit if you have not invested in safety (e.g. rail vehicle 
reparations or new devices to prevent different accident with big 
damages or employers training). The manager’s performance 
should be counted also in the company safety activity. 
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Abstract 
The presentation will begin with a summary  presentation 
of the Emergency Interventions Department – DSU, part of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs – MAI, and of its tasks, 
respectively the coordination, permanently, at national 
level, of the prevention and management of emergency 
interventions, assuring and coordinating the human, 
material, financial and other resources, necessary to restore 
the normality. A part of Romanian critical infrastructure is 
the metro network in Bucharest – METROREX, consisting 
in 4 main lines with a total length of 69,25 km, double-
track line and 51 stations. The emergency interventions 
within this network can be generated by earthquakes, 
floods, failures of different afferent equipment’s, fires 
either in the train sets or in the tunnels, errors of the human 
factors and, not least, the terrorist attacks that are one of 
the world threats. The presentation will illustrate the legal 
and organization measures taken for the improvement of 
the emergency interventions, through a good cooperation 
between the institutions involved, the achievements and 
the future plans. The presentation will end with the 
operational analysis performed by DSU on the national 
situation of railway tunnels and bridges, in terms of the 
management of the emergency interventions and the need 
to draft some cooperation protocols. 
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and management of 
emergencies 
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Abstract 
It is recognized that there are similitudes and the 
interconnections in the accidents investigation and 
learning processes, during various lifecycle phases and 
for various socio-political environments for systems, 
which are using different and diverse technologies. 
However, the use of systematic approaches for such 
evaluations would be an example of very useful 
application of multi, trans and inter disciplinarily 
methods for complex systems. A new approach is 
proposed for the evaluation of accidents by using 
multiple criteria. The approach is based on an analogy 
with some existing results and on the use of the 
topological description for systems and models. 
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Abstract 
Accident investigation as a national affair is changing 
rapidly because the EU has formulated comprehensive 
interoperability standards touching every part of the 
railway system. The Chinese policy to develop the Silk 
Route necessitates rail safety to rapidly progress from 
national, to continental and soon intercontinental level.  
 
That poses major challenges for those in charge of the 
safety of railway systems, similar to those in the airline 
industry post WWII. Aviation safety investigation is a 
means to identify necessary fields of improvement, to 
learn from failure, covering both the national and global 
level. It is inevitable that the railway sector follows by 
establishing basic safety investigation standards, 
methodologies, responsibilities and reporting systems to 
cope with the globalisation of railway technology and 
industry.  
 
Railway Accident Investigation in a 
Globalising System 
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Abstract 
During history, several large accidents have been 
followed by investigations or – often in modern times – 
by the setup of an ad-hoc investigation commission. 
These early kinds of investigations had several 
shortcomings and were often followed 
by permanent commissions within a specific sector. A 
third phase was characterized by the need to emphasize 
the independence of such commissions as well as the 
necessity of splitting the police inquiries and the civil 
investigations. A fourth phase was identified as the 
development of broader, independent accident 
investigation commissions. However, the developments 
in Sweden and Finland included even broader sectors 
than transport in their mandates for a national accident 
investigation board. Denmark and Norway have had a 
similar development, but more restricted.  The paper 
presented especially the developments in the Nordic 
countries and discussed the role of international 
cooperation. 
 
From Sectorial to Multimodal 
Accident Investigation Boards – 
Some Lessons from the 
Development in the Nordic 
Countries 
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Abstract 
“Some of the insights here presented are founded on my 
experiences as Inspector, but many of my insights are 
based on study work and international meetings within the 
ESReDA – “Foresight in Safety” – project 
As such the content does not always reflect the opinion of 
my employer (Belgian COMAH Seveso Labour 
Inspection)” 
Investigating major accidents proves that organisational 
factors are contributing in causing them. In an organisation 
starting to dysfunction, OF’s become hidden latent causes, 
increasing exposure and probability of failures. 
In my study of our audits of the SMS-element 
“Investigation of accidents”, the shortcoming with the 
highest frequency was “NOT looking for organisational 
factors”. When an organisation is bad in detecting its 
dysfunctions, it will be missing early warning signs on 
several levels. 
To counter this, a functional analysis regarding an 
organisation’s safety with its strategy, structure, 
assignment of resources, policy deployment 
(roles/responsibilities) was made. 
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Effective communication 
during and after an aviation 
accident 
 
 
Abstract 
Accidents result in material or human losses, deterioration 
of transport infrastructure, bottlenecks in transport routes, 
reduction of transport capacities, all of which lead to an 
increase in the operating costs, less efficiency, and other 
long-term negative effects. Accidents also have a 
considerable impact in the media, and may affect the 
public image of state authorities, and at international level 
may even affect the State's image. We should always keep 
in mind that the lack of communication could result in 
media speculation, with negative effects for the safety 
investigation activities. 
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Issues with lessons learned, 
seen by field experts and 
managers, and synergy between 
experience reporting and 
experience sharing 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The purpose of this communication is to get better 
understanding of lessons learned issues. One of these 
issues is the non-reporting of some safety events, by field 
experts. This issue will be analysed by both field experts 
and managers, who will try to give some reasons for it. 
  
Often safety analysis is done on reports available, and it is 
rare that exhaustive data is available. We will try to 
determine why some events are not reported, and for what 
reasons. The cross-view from managers and from field 
experts may improve our understanding of the situation by 
adding different realities and perceptions to this fact. 
The study involved semi-structured interviews with Air 
Traffic Controllers and their managers, who were asked 
about safety, risks, lessons learned. The interviews were 
recorded and transcribed, the transcripts were counted by 
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two people. The aim of the results is not to claim any truth, 
but rather to give food for thought on one’s organisation. 
  
The deep understanding of the reasons why some events 
are not reported may help us to find some root causes to 
that phenomenon, and therefore to find more relevant 
solutions to improve safety. One of these solutions is to 
develop experience sharing as well as experience 
reporting. These means complement one another and their 
synergy may help to develop safety. Organisational 
experience report may also help, as well as organisational 
bottom up and top down efficient communication and 
human factors training at all hierarchy levels. 
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Abstract 
The role of accident investigations and, more generally, 
of event investigations, is to identify causes that have led 
to their occurrence in order to eliminate them by 
implementing corrective measures and thus improve the 
system. Unfortunately, according to the Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board, “[M]any accident 
investigations do not go far enough”. The CAIB 
statement shows, among other things, that event analysis 
methods must be improved in order to address the real 
issues that led to the failure. In the paper we will present 
a method called “Organisational Analysis of Safety” 
which tackles three dimensions intending to cover the 
 
Method and Mindset: Two basic 
elements for accident 
investigation 
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whole scope of the situation: “the historical dimension”; 
the “organisational network”, and “work relationships 
channels” (interactions between the different strata of the 
organisation). Furthermore, we will also argue that, for a 
method to be effective, as relevant as it is, analysts as 
well as decision-makers must demonstrate a certain 
mindset, a certain open-mindedness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Accident Investigation and Learning to Improve Safety Management in Complex System:  
Remaining Challenges 
327 
 
 
 SESSION 3  
Methodological aspects  
   
Biography 
Zdenko Šimić is working as scientist at the EC JRC in 
the area of nuclear operating experience and safety. He 
worked as a professor at the University of Zagreb, 
Croatia, for energy technology characterization and 
related risk and reliability. He has Ph.D. from the same 
University. He was twice in the USA for several years 
and two-year visiting scientist at the EC JRC IET related 
to nuclear power risk and reliability. He has published 
more than a hundred scientific papers and expert study 
reports. He was distinguished lecturer and Chapter Chair 
for the IEEE Power and Energy Society and president of 
the Croatian Nuclear Society.  
zdenko.simic@ec.europa.eu  
mZdenko ŠIMIĆmmmmmmm 
 
Scientific officer 
European Commission, Joint 
Research Centre (JRC), 
Petten, 
The NETHERLANDS 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper is focused on the analysis of groups of events 
with application of the analytical hierarchy process 
(AHP) to the database of nuclear related events. Events 
characterization scheme is presented first. Then the AHP 
application is described. Finally, selected results for the 
five years of events (~1500) are presented. Described 
application includes quantification of uncertainty. Initial 
results prove that AHP could improve consistency of the 
events database evaluation for ranking purposes. Future 
work might investigate important events selection for 
more than one group and how to look for important event 
groups regardless to parameters preferences. 
 
 
Events groups’ importance 
ranking with consistent 
preferences consideration 
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Abstract 
Accident investigations are executed by e.g. authorities, 
insurance institutions and companies themselves. The 
scope and objectives of the investigation depend on who 
is investigating. The quality of the investigation and the 
results depend on several constraints, e.g. the knowhow 
of the investigators. The investigations that aim to 
improve safety in the future usually include 
recommendations that are directed to the companies 
involved and/or the industrial sector where the accident 
occurred. Sometimes recommendations may even be 
directed beyond the sector involved. 
This paper aims to raise discussion on reasonable 
recommendations. That is, recommendations that are 
usable, realizable, and hopefully even measurable. What 
should be recommended and to whom? The paper 
presents, with examples, how the ESReDA Cube model 
may be used to systematically identify recommendations 
to improve safety on different organizational and societal 
levels. 
 
   Reasonable recommendations 
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Learning from incidents – the 
interactive way 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Learning from major industrial incidents is possible 
applying different methods. The approaches demonstrated in 
various literature can provide a new perspective of learning 
and implementing the lessons from past events. A 
completely new way of learning lessons without 
experiencing the same costly mistakes that could occur 
during a major incident is possible via interactive case 
studies. These case studies used as a training resource, 
developed by the IChemE Safety Centre are focusing on 
major incidents from different sectors, such as the oil, 
mining, space or even nuclear industries. The other 
advantage of the studies is that lessons from these events 
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can be retrieved and applied across various sectors because 
the fundamentals are the same. Also, topics such as 
management systems, corporate government, ethical 
decision, emergency response, organisational and human 
factors or safety culture are the core areas which are similar 
in many operations. The objective of the paper is to 
demonstrate the advantages of using interactive case studies 
to promote an active way of learning from past incidents 
without repeating the costly mistakes. The paper addresses 
different areas of interest where various industrial sectors 
can find relevant learning opportunities that can be 
implemented in their operation. 
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Using the knowledge of 
accidents in organizational 
diagnosis of safety 
management: a case study 
 
Abstract 
Industrial accidents continue to occur and do recur in some 
organisations (NASA, BP), with similar root causes and 
accidents patterns whatever the industrial sectors, the 
country, the culture and historical period. This empirical 
statement opens towards the possibility of accidents’ lessons 
capitalisation into a structured ‘knowledge of accidents’ 
(Dechy et al, 2010) that includes the ‘pathogenic factors’ 
(Reason, 1997), and ‘pathogenic organisational factors’ 
within organisational diagnosis (Dien et al, 2004, 2012, 
Rousseau et al, 2008). Our goal is to address the challenge 
of using this knowledge of accidents in normal operations. 
The case study aims at describing how experts used in 
practice this knowledge to define the analysis framework of 
a safety management assessment conducted by IRSN for the 
nuclear industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Accident Investigation and Learning to Improve Safety Management in Complex System:  
Remaining Challenges 
338 
 
SESSION 4 
Lessons learned and 
historical perspectives  
   
 
 
mAnthony GARFORTHmm 
Board Member 
Noordwijk Risk Initiative 
Foundation, 
The NETHERLANDS 
 
 
Biography 
Anthony Garforth has worked within the commercial 
aviation sector as a licensed aircraft maintenance engineer 
for over 20 years. In 2004 his interest in aviation safety led 
him to pursue a masters degree in safety and accident 
Investigation. Following graduation Anthony has held 
several posts within the aviation sector carrying out safety 
investigations and helping organisations to develop their 
safety management systems. Currently, Anthony works with 
aviation organisations independently and continues his 
research work with NRI. 
A.Garforth@nri.eu.com 
 
 
 
 
mJohn KINGSTONmmmm 
Board Member 
Noordwijk Risk Initiative 
Foundation, 
The NETHERLANDS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Biography 
John Kingston’s interest in safety began as an accident 
investigator with the London Fire Brigade. After studying 
Psychology, and then Ergonomics, in 1996 he gained his 
PhD for research into the evolution and regulation of safety 
management systems. He was a research fellow of Aston 
University in the UK, and a visiting professor at Delft 
Technical University. Through NRI and independently, Dr 
Kingston works in aviation, aerospace and the emergency 
service sectors. His work focuses on monitoring, accident 
investigation and organisational design. 
 
J.Kingston@nri.eu.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Accident Investigation and Learning to Improve Safety Management in Complex System:  
Remaining Challenges 
339 
 
mPetra Scheffersmmmmmm 
Independent Safety 
Practioner 
Noordwijk Risk Initiative 
Foundation, 
 
The NETHERLANDS 
 
 
Biography 
Petra Scheffers has a Bachelor in Business Administration 
and Safety education. Before Petra started as an independent 
safety practioner she worked at Delft University of 
Technology in the post master education of safety science. 
Nowadays Petra is a safety and training expert and supports 
organizations in the safety field. What distinguishes Petra 
from other safety experts is the ability to look at the primary 
process from an integrated perspective and the role of 
employees therein. Through coaching and guidance instead 
of control, employees grow in risk awareness, scenario 
thinking and control measures, and safe working practices 
are given a central place in daily practice. 
p.scheffers@lelieconsultancy.nl 
  
Are structural weaknesses 
limiting the capacity to learn 
from incidents? 
 
Abstract 
Most of us aspire to investigate to high standards. But how 
do we get there? Good practices are seldom evidence-based, 
and depend on context. In reality, practitioners find out for 
themselves what works; but they need skills and support in 
that search. They told us that these needs are not met 
reliably, and are even undermined by workloads and 
bureaucracy. We advocate influencing practice ‘in the 
direction of good’ and recognition of the field as the place 
where the seeds of good practice are sown and harvested. 
But skill and support matter: we need to blend action with 
research and learning. 
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Abstract 
The UIC decided to produce an enforced document in 
order to provide specific guidance to the ‘Railway’. This 
guidance document is designed to support the rail industry 
in reducing its vulnerability to cyber-attack and to be able 
to ensure availability, integrity, confidentiality of railway 
system and data during all the life of the network.  
The Safety-Security management System is a part of the 
Asset management strategy. For each railway necessity to 
include the security issues in the Asset management 
organisation especially: the physical access policy, the 
Invited lecture II 
Cyber security in railways, 
threats and challenges. Results 
of UIC project ARGUS 
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subdivision of the network regarding the business and 
operation targets, empowerment of the different authorised 
people, out sourcing and developments policy.  
The document is more a guide how to apply in the railway 
domain the ISO 27000 and other general norms. 
UIC is able to guide the railways to anticipate the security 
issues related to the safety and availability of the “digital 
railway”, including cyber, taking into account the railways 
specificities: 
       - unavailability lead to unsafety 
       - close link between safety and security of railway 
operation  
Also, UIC can guide the railways to define they own cyber 
strategy for critical system regarding they own “type of 
business” - by sub networks with different objectives. 
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Abstract 
The article returns to relatively old, but very serious, 
accident from the Czech railways. It briefly reminds 
WHAT happened, and analyses HOW and WHY the 
causal factors leading to the accident were combined. It 
turns out that surprisingly, in the course of the lessons 
learning, the possibilities for the prevention of initiating 
the basic hazard, which realized in the accident, have not 
been thoroughly analysed. Therefore, it cannot be said that 
the accident was properly used as information to prevent 
similar accidents. Two recent media reports confirm that 
the basic hazard keeps being urgent. 
 
 
Do not repeat old mistakes in 
learning from accidents: It`s 
better to prevent a runaway 
than be ready for it 
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and Safety for Infrabel, the Belgian Infrastructure 
Manager, where he was developing and implementing an 
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Since June 2017, Bart rejoined the European Union 
Agency for Railway, where he is now leading the Safety 
and Operation team. 
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Abstract 
With the publication of the public enquiry on the Piper 
Alpha disaster (1990), the concept of a safety management 
system (SMS) has found its introduction in high-risk 
industries. This concept went further than being “good 
practice” and became legally mandatory in some 
industries, where holding a certificate/licence, issued on 
the basis of a SMS, is necessary to operate. SMS requires 
continuous improvement, based on a combination of 
“knowing the unknown” (risk assessment) and “learning 
on experience” (occurrence analysis). To do so, 
accidents/incidents need to be reported and analysed and 
measures need to be taken to prevent future events. 
Additionally, national investigating bodies have been 
given the role of independently investigating serious 
events, with the same goal. Where a SMS is based on a 
holistic approach, with operational, supporting and 
controlling elements functioning together to improve 
safety, most reporting/investigation methods are not 
Analysing the depth of railway 
accident investigation reports 
on over-speeding incidents, 
using the SAfety FRactal 
ANalysis method 
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developed in line with a system thinking approach to 
accident causation. Also, how to link the top-down 
description of SMS requirements with the operational 
activities of the organisation that create these risks in the 
first place, is poorly understood. In result, the current 
practice in accident and incident investigation does not 
provide a systematic approach to analyse elements of 
SMS. As a direct consequence, the opportunity to use these 
investigations for introducing sustainable system changes 
is often missed. The paper briefly introduces the SAfety 
FRactal ANalysis (SAFRAN) method that is developed to 
guide investigators to identify where interventions might 
have the greatest impact for improving global system 
safety, by exploring the composing elements of the 
concerned SMS and the sociotechnical system surrounding 
it in a natural and logic way, starting from the findings 
close to operations that explain the occurrence – being the 
elements accident investigators are first confronted with. 
In addition, the proposed methodology provides an 
innovative visual representation of the investigation 
process. The SAFRAN method is then applied to review a 
selected set of published railway accident investigations, 
all reporting on occurrences related to over-speeding, 
possibly resulting in a (lethal) derailment. The depth and 
focus of the performed investigations is assessed and 
compared with findings that would result from an analysis 
that is applying the SAFRAN logic, demonstrating the 
need to focus accident analysis on an organisation’s 
capability of managing the variability that might put 
successful process performance at risk. 
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Abstract 
In some complex industrial systems, as the Nuclear Power 
Plants (NPP) the evaluation of the potential risks induced 
both by natural phenomena and man-made, like for 
instance railways events in their proximity, are of high 
importance. 
This trend became even more important for NPP after the 
latest accident in Fukushima. Therefore, the re-evaluation 
of the risks induced by external events to the NPP became 
very important.  
This is accompanied by a tendency to use new methods for 
external risk evaluations. One of these methods is to define 
the risk in a form of a hazard risk. The hazard risk curves 
derivations from external events in the proximity of NPP 
is, therefore, one of the current safety review activity 
performed as a result of Fukushima lessons learnt. It 
applies not only to the natural events, but also to events 
from other industries. 
The paper presents a case study on deriving hazard curves 
for the railway’s events in a proximity of an operating NPP 
and it is based on real situations. 
The results are of benefit both for the NPP risk evaluation 
and for railways event review system. 
 
 
 
 
On some issues related to the 
railways event impact on other 
industries 
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Abstract 
This paper aims at highlighting historical contradictions 
that might contribute to the occurrence of accidents in the 
railway sector. The analysis was based on the Cultural-
Historical Activity Theory. Among the hypotheses there 
are: difficulties in coordination between different 
departments, the goals they are submitted to, and the 
material, technical and professional conditions for carrying 
out the activities; and technological quality changes and an 
increase in the demand for passenger transport and the 
flow of trains, which reduce the time available for 
maintenance and adjustments. 
 
Historical contradictions in 
railway sector work accidents 
in which workers are run-over 
by trains: analysis based on the 
Cultural Historical Activity 
Theory 
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Abstract 
In this paper, we propose a systemic and historical analysis 
of the train accident that occurred on July 12, 2013 
in Bétigny-sur-Orge, south of Paris (France).  We focus on 
organizational changes driven by a difficult economic 
context, to highlight factors and dynamics that, at different 
levels of the organization, can contribute to degrading the 
security of the system. 
 
A historical and organizational 
point of view on Bretigny 
railway accident 
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Abstract 
The derailments of trains could have serious consequences 
related to service interruptions, property damage, including 
environment and possible victims, so the study of this 
occurrences through methods and models borrowed from 
other sectors of economy, may be beneficial for the 
railway sector. The paper has analysed a railway accident 
occurred through a freight train derailment on the 
Romanian railway network (the derailment of the freight 
train no.51720 occurred in the railway station Ditrău, on 
17th of November 2016) using two working instruments: 
the investigation method developed by the Accident 
Investigation Board Norway and Safety Management 
System developed by European Union Agency for 
Railway. By applying these two methods it is shown their 
ability to a thorough investigation of the occurrence by 
analysing organizational and working environment as well 
as by identifying the key factors that contributed to the 
accident. It also highlights the action directions for 
improving the safety level on which the safety 
recommendations were designed. 
A freight train derailment 
analyses using Accident 
Investigation Board Norway 
method and Safety 
Management System wheel 
tool 
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Independence and 
interdependence in safety 
investigations 
 
 
Abstract 
The European Union, paying particular attention to 
optimizing and maintaining safety standards in 
transport and making every effort to reduce 
accidents, has established at European level the 
conduct of safety investigation in the event of 
accidents and incidents occurred in air, rail and naval 
transport, apart from any other form of 
administrative or judicial investigation that seeks to 
establish liability or fault, in order to determine the 
causes and circumstances that led to their 
occurrence, their analysis and the prevention of other 
similar accidents and incidents. 
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Some Aspects of the Probabilistic 
Versus Risk Evaluations of 
Railway Events 
 
 
Abstract 
The railway events evaluations are performed with 
various methods, which are under continuous 
improvement, as defined now in this industry.  
However, it is considered that the use of methods 
already implemented in other industries, as for 
instance in nuclear, might bring a new light and 
possible future benefit for the present approaches. The 
paper proposes a new view on the existing approach 
for the railway events evaluation, based on a case 
study. The case study is based on real database 
existing in Romanian national railways events data. 
The results indicate that, there are possible positive 
effects on the interpretation of existing data if methods 
from other industries (as for instance from nuclear) are 
used. 
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Key Factors of the National 
Emergency Management System 
 
Abstract 
In the paper, it is proposed to study a method for 
assessing the systemic management of emergency 
management in case of nuclear accidents. In order to 
identify the key factors in the emergency management 
system the chosen analysis method is a systemic one 
that deals with the interaction of component parts for 
defining sensitive elements of weak links that require 
more attention to improve them.  
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Annex A – 55th ESReDA seminar program 
 
1st day, Tuesday October the 9th, 2018 
8.00 – 8.30 Coffee + registration 
8.30 – 9.20  WELCOME, OPENING 
              Luis Ferreira, ESReDA President 
   Raed ARAFAT, Ministry of Internal Affairs, State Secretary 
   Vasile BELIBOU, AGIFER General Manager 
   Eugen ISPAS, AGIFER Deputy General Manager 
   
9.20 - 9.30      LOGISTICS, WORKSHOP 
                         Ana Lisa Vetere Arellano, Tuuli Tulonen, Eric Marsden and Sever Paul 
9.30 – 10.50  SESSION 1 – Past, present, future 
             Chairs: Tuuli Tulonen and Sever Paul 
 
9.30 – 10.00  Invited Lecture I:  
  On a possible approach for the multi criteria event analysis  
  in complex systems events 
  Dan Șerbănescu 
 
10.00 – 10.25 Railway Accident Investigation in a Globalising System 
             John Stoop, Wim Beukenkamp 
10.25 – 10.50 From Sectorial to Multimodal Accident Investigation Boards – Some Lessons 
from the Development in the Nordic Countries 
             Sverre Røed-Larsen, John Stoop 
 
10.50 – 11.10 COFFEE BREAK 
 
11.10 – 12.25  SESSION 2 – Organizations and human aspects 
             Chairs: Yves Dien and Ana Lisa Vetere Arellano 
 
11.10 – 11.35 Learning from organizational dysfunctionalities 
             Frank Verschueren 
 
11.35 – 12.00 Effective communication during and after an aviation accident 
             Simona Wist 
 
12.00 – 12.25 Issues with lessons learned, seen by field experts and managers, and synergy 
between experience reporting and experience sharing 
             Florence-Marie Jégoux 
 
12.25 – 13.25 LUNCH  
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13.25 – 15.05  SESSION 3 – Methodological aspects  
             Chairs: Eric Marsden and Bastien Brocard 
13.25 – 13.50 Method and Mindset: Two basic elements for accident investigation 
             Yves Dien 
13.50 – 14.15 Events groups’ importance ranking with consistent preferences consideration 
             Zdenko Simic 
14.15 – 14.40 Reasonable recommendations 
  Tuuli Tulonen, John Stoop, Ana Lisa Vetere Arellano, Sever Paul, Milos 
Ferjencik, Matti   Peippo, Erkki Teräsmaa 
14.40 – 14.50 Arrangement for the workshop  
14.50 – 15.10  COFFEE BREAK 
15.10 – 16.50  SESSION 4 – Lessons learned and historical perspectives 
             Chairs: Sverre Roed-Larsen and John Stoop 
 
15.10 – 15.35 Learning from incidents – the interactive way 
             Zsuzsanna Gyenes 
 
15.35 – 16.00 Using the knowledge of accidents in organizational diagnosis of safety 
management: a case study  
  Nicolas Dechy, Jean-Marie Rousseau, Alexandre Largier, Stéphanie Tillement, 
Jan    Hayes, Benoît Journé 
 
16.00 – 16.25 Operating experience program at CNE Cernavodă 
            Alexandra Tudor 
 
16.25 – 16.50 Are structural weaknesses limiting the capacity to learn from incidents? 
            Anthony Garforth, John Kingston, Petra Scheffers 
16.50 – 17.00 Arrangement for the workshop 
17.00 – 17.20 BREAK 
17.20 – 18.20 WORKSHOP: Debate about the Remaining Challenges of Accident 
Investigation and Potential Innovative Breakthroughs 
18.45 -           Departure from Hotel Ramada to the restaurant by bus  
20.00 -  ESReDA 55th Seminar Dinner 
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2nd day, Wednesday October the 10th, 2018 
 
8.40 – 9.00 Coffee 
 
9.00 – 9.30  Invited lecture II 
  Critical infrastructure: the public transport network METROREX 
Raed ARAFAT, Secretary of State, Romanian Internal Affairs Ministry 
 
9.30 – 9.45     Reflection session: Discussion: ideas from the first day 
  
9.45 – 10.15  Invited lecture III:  
Cyber security in railways, threats and challenges. Results of UIC project 
ARGUS 
             Teodor Grădinariu 
 
10.15 – 10.35 COFFEE BREAK 
 
10.35 – 11.50  SESSION 5 – Methods 
            Chairs:  Paulo Maia and Zdenko Simic 
 
10.35 – 11.00 Do not repeat old mistakes in learning from accidents: It`s better to prevent a 
run away   than be ready for it 
             Milos Ferjencik, Oldrich Cizek 
 
11.00 – 11.25 Analysing the depth of railway accident investigation reports on over-speeding 
incidents, using the SAfety FRactal ANalysis method 
   Bart Accou 
 
11.25 – 11.50 On some issues related to the railways event impact on other industries 
   Dan Serbanescu 
 
12.00 – 13.00 LUNCH 
13.00 – 14.15  SESSION 6 – Case studies 
             Chairs: Frank Verschueren and Miodrag Strucic 
 
13.00 – 13.25 Historical contradictions at work accidents by trampling in railway sector: 
analysis based on the Cultural Historical Activity Theory 
  Manoela Gomes Reis Lopes, Rodolfo Andrade de Gouveia Vilela, Ildeberto 
Muniz de   Almeida, Silvana Zuccolotto 
 
13.25 – 13.50 A historical and organizational point of view on Bretigny railway accident 
            Bastien Brocard 
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13.50 – 14.15 A freight train derailment analysis using Accident Investigation Board Norway 
method and Safety Management System wheel tool 
            Mircea Nicolescu 
 
14.15 – 14.35  COFFEE BREAK 
 
14.35 – 16.15 SESSION 7 – Going across sectors  
            Chairs: Nicolas Dechy and Milos Ferjencik 
 
14.35 – 15.00 Independence and interdependence in safety investigations 
             Constantin Voicu 
15.00 – 15.25 Some Aspects of the Probabilistic Versus Risk Evaluations of Railway Events 
   Alexandru Stoian, Dan Serbanescu 
 
15.25 – 15.50 Key Factors of the National Emergency Management System 
             Petre Min  
 
15.50 – 16.15 Dose Level Evaluation in a Nuclear Power Plant Accident 
            Dominic Eugeniu Moraru, Ilie Constantin Prisecaru, Daniel Dupleac 
 
16.15 – 16.30 Closing session - "Seminar takeaways" 
            Chairs: Sever Paul and TPC members 
 
16.30 – 16.40 CLOSING SPEECHES  
             Luis FERREIRA, ESReDA President 
            Vasile Belibou, AGIFER General Manager 
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Annex B – About the seminar 
 
Scope of the Seminar 
 
Accident investigation and learning from events are fundamental processes in safety 
management, involving technical, human, organizational and societal dimensions. These 
activities are concerned by a number of challenges that limit their effectiveness and by a 
number of opportunities for improvement: 
• Safety investigations in complex systems face challenges in understanding and 
investigating inter-organizational issues (such as governance, shared responsibilities, 
limits to information flow, role of competition and other economic incentives), in 
coping with the increasing role of media pressure and presence of civil society in 
investigations, and the evolving role of regulatory authorities.  
• There are major challenges in bringing into practice a body of existing knowledge on 
accident investigation and learning to generate system change for safety improvement. 
This requires better understanding of the obstacles to practical application of good 
practices. Given differences in histories, technologies and culture, these obstacles are 
sometimes sector-specific, or peculiar to certain countries, or more generic. New 
strategies need to be identified to overcome the obstacles to sharing of good practice 
and improvement of the quality of safety investigations. 
• New opportunities for safety investigation and learning arise from technological 
progress, such as the increasing use of big data and text mining tools, and the related 
analytics.   
These questions apply to several aspects where margins for improvement are still expected:  
• paradigms, models and methods for accident/event investigation;  
• data and evidence collection, forensic techniques; 
• investigators’ competencies, learning and safety management competencies for 
specialists and generalists; 
• organisational readiness to investigate and to learn;  
• dissemination of information, lessons and integration with knowledge management 
and safety culture,  
• event databases, big data and related analytics;  
• systemic approaches integrating technical, human and organizational factors; 
• safety recommendations and engineering change;  
• lessons learning processes (single case, stories, relationships with organisational 
learning), 
• change management and integration with safety management and risk governance, 
• interfaces with regulators and stakeholders from society. 
 
The 55th ESReDA seminar will be a forum for exploring the questions mentioned above. The 
seminar goal is to discuss about the results in specific areas, and to share and explore the 
experiences of using other paradigms, approaches, methods, databases, implementation of 
safety systems across various industries. Authors are invited to present their works, proposals 
and discuss successes and failures in safety management. 
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Application domains 
 
Papers for the seminar are welcome from various stakeholders (industrialists, regulators, 
investigation and safety bodies, universities, R&D organizations, engineering contractors and 
consultants, training specialists) and could address different sectors: 
• Railway sector and other transport sectors; 
• Energy (including nuclear, conventional and renewable, production and distribution); 
• Process industry: oil and gas, chemical and petrochemical facilities; 
• Critical infrastructures; 
• Natural hazards; 
• Health, Environment; 
• Security and terrorism threats. 
 
Seminar organisation 
 
Location 
 
Ramada Plaza Bucharest 
Str. Poligrafiei nr.3-5, Sectorul 1 
București, Romania 013704 
 
Information: +40 21 549 3000 / +40 21 315 3000 
Reservations: +40 21 549 2300 
reservations@ramadaplazabucharest.ro 
 
Organization  
 
The Seminar is jointly organised by ESReDA and AGIFER. 
Chairman of the seminar 
Luis FERREIRA, (ESReDA President, Professor at University of Porto, PORTUGAL) 
The Technical Program Committee Chair: 
Sever PAUL, (Investigator - AGIFER, ROMANIA)  
The Technical Program Committee Members: 
Bastien BROCARD (EDF, FRANCE) 
Nicolas DECHY (IRSN, FRANCE) 
Yves DIEN (CHAOS, FRANCE) 
Antonio FELICIO (ESReDA, PORTUGAL) 
Milos FERJENCIK (University of Pardubicze, CZECH REPUBLIC) 
Paulo MAIA (EDP, PORTUGAL) 
Eric MARSDEN (FonCSI, FRANCE) 
Sverre RØED-LARSEN (SRL HSE, NORWAY) 
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Zdenko ŠIMIĆ (EC JRC, THE NETHERLANDS) 
Dan SERBANESCU (Romanian Academy, ROMANIA) 
Miodrag STRUCIC (EC JRC, THE NETHERLANDS) 
John STOOP (Kindunos, THE NETHERLANDS) 
Tuuli TULONEN (Tukes, FINLAND) 
Frank VERSCHUEREN (Ministry of Labor, BELGIUM) 
Ana Lisa VETERE ARELLANO (EC JRC, ITALY) 
Opening of the seminar 
Cătălin FORȚU (Secretary of State, Romanian Transport Ministry, ROMANIA) 
Vasile BELIBOU (General Manager of AGIFER, ROMANIA) 
Eugen ISPAS (Deputy General Manager of AGIFER, ROMANIA)  
Closing of the seminar 
Vasile BELIBOU (General Manager of AGIFER, ROMANIA)  
Logistics 
Vali PATRASCU (Head of Department – AGIFER, ROMANIA) 
Sever PAUL (Investigator-AGIFER, ROMANIA) 
Mircea NICOLESCU (Head of Department – AGIFER, ROMANIA) 
 
About Romanian Railway Investigation Agency - AGIFER 
 
The Romanian Railway Investigating Agency (AGIFER) is a public institution, financed 
completely from its own funds and set up in 2015. 
AGIFER is a technical specialized body for the railway and metro field, subordinated to the 
Romanian Minister of Transports, that meets with all the tasks of the body in charge with the 
investigation of accidents and incidents set up in 2007, according to the Law no.55/206, that 
transposed into Romanian legislation the EU Directive no.49/2004 for the railway safety. 
 
AGIFER has the following main tasks: 
a) Investigation of major railway accidents; 
b) Investigation of the incidents that arise during railway operations, coordinated by an 
investigator in charge, appointed from AGIFER; 
c) Investigation of those accidents and incidents that, in slightly different conditions could 
lead to serious accidents, including the technical failures of the structural sub-systems or of 
the interoperability constituents, parts of European high speed and conventional railway 
system; 
d) Other tasks specific to its activity field, entrusted through normative papers. 
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AGIFER can participate in projects in connection with the investigation or with the 
improvement of railway safety, financed through European funds, according to the legislation 
in force. 
 
AGIFER employs 42 people, including 28 investigators or investigator in charge within the 
investigation commission, specialized for different railway areas: lines, equipment, wagons, 
locomotives, traffic. AGIFER also employs 2 psychologists in charge of the investigation of 
the human factors. 
 
From its establishment in 2006 until today, AGIFER has performed 344 investigations of 
railway accidents and incidents. 
www.agifer.ro  
 
About the European Safety, Reliability & Data Association (ESReDA) 
 
ESReDA is an international non-profit association with approximately 35 member 
organizations comprising companies from different industries, research organizations and 
universities working within the safety and reliability field. 
 
ESReDA aims to promote the development and the exchange of data, information and 
knowledge through the promotion of Project Groups (PG) on subjects related to Reliability, 
Safety and Data Analysis. In these project groups, European specialists in these subjects are 
able to meet and, in a first time, to aggregate their knowledge and then to disseminate it for 
the sake of the scientific and technological communities. This dissemination can be made by 
organizing seminars twice per year and publishing the most important results of the Project 
Groups. Safety and Reliability Engineering is viewed as being an important component in the 
design of a system. However, the discipline and its tools and methods are still evolving and 
expertise and knowledge dispersed throughout Europe. There is a need to pool the resources 
and knowledge within Europe and ESReDA provides the means to achieve this. 
 
Any interested party is welcome to contribute to ESReDA Project Groups. For more 
information on ESReDA, please visit www.esreda.org. 
 
About ESReDA Project Groups connected with this seminar 
 
The ESReDA project group “Accident Investigation” was operational from 2000 to 2008 
to address accident investigation methods, practices, organizational conditions, institutional 
and regulations context. 
 
The PG organized 2 seminars and issued three deliverables: 
•The 24th ESReDA Seminar on “Safety Investigation of Accidents” in JRC, Petten, 2003 
•The 33rd ESReDA Seminar on “Future challenges of accident investigation”; in JRC, Ispra, 
2007 
• “Accident Investigation Practices – Results from a European Study” (2003 – report edited 
by DNV); 
• “Shaping Public Safety Investigations of Accidents in Europe” (2005 – ESReDA Safety 
Series – book edited by DNV); 
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• “Guidelines for safety investigation of accidents” (2008) available for free download on the 
ESReDA website. 
•Guidelines for Safety Investigation of Accidents at ESReDA website. 
 
The ESReDA project Group “Dynamic Learning as a follow-up from accident 
investigation” was in operation from 2009 to 2015. It worked on how lessons from events 
and accidents are learned. 
 
The PG organized 2 seminars and issued four deliverables: 
•The 36th ESReDA Seminar on “Lessons learned from accident investigations”, EDP, 
Coimbra, Portugal, 2009. 
•The 45th ESReDA Seminar on “Dynamic Learning from Incidents and Accidents, Bridging 
the Gap between Safety Recommendations and Learning”, EDP, Porto – Portugal, 2013 
• “Case study analysis on dynamic learning from accidents” ESReDA report, 
• “Barriers to learning from incidents and accidents” ESReDA report, 
• “Guidelines for preparing a training toolkit on event investigation and dynamic learning”, 
ESReDA report 
• “Challenges to the investigation of occurrences. Concepts and confusion, metaphors, models 
and methods”. Essay by Prof. Stoop. 
 
The 4 deliverables are available for free at the Project Group webpage on the ESReDA 
website. 
 
ESReDA Project Group on Foresight in Safety 
In autumn 2015 a project group was launched for 3 years to address Foresight in Safety. The 
project group meets twice a year. It gathers industry experts, researchers and consultants 
from: EDF-R&D (France), EDP-Gestão da Produção de Energia, S.A. (Portugal), IRSN 
(France), EC JRC (Italy and The Netherlands), Kindunos (the Netherlands), Tukes (Finland), 
FonCSI (France), SRL HSE (Norway), University of Pardubice (Czech Republic), Labor 
Ministry of Belgium, and AGIFER (Romania). It organised the 53rd Seminar in JRC at Ispra, 
Italy in November 2017.  
 
Participating Organisations 
Agenția de Investigare Feroviară Română (AGIFER), ROMANIA 
Civil Aviation Safety Investigation and Analysis Authority Bucharest, ROMANIA 
Collectif Heuristique pour l’Analyse Organisationnelle de Sécurité (CHAOS), FRANCE 
Czech Railways, Pardubice, CZECH REPUBLIC 
Division of Logic and Models Romanian Academy, ROMANIA 
Électricité de France Recherche et Développement (EDF-R&D), FRANCE 
European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC), ITALY 
European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC), THE NETHERLANDS 
European Union Agency for Railways, FRANCE 
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Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency (Tukes), FINLAND 
FOD WASO TWW ACR, BELGIUM 
Fondation pour une Culture de Sécurité Industrielle (Foncsi), FRANCE 
Freelance Human Factors specialist, FRANCE 
Institution of Chemical Engineers Safety Centre, UNITED KINGDOM 
Institut Mines-Telecom Atlantique, FRANCE 
Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN), FRANCE 
Kindunos, Gorinchen, THE NETHERLANDS 
National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control, ROMANIA 
Noordwijk Risk Initiative Foundation, THE NETHERLANDS 
Polytechnic University of Bucharest, ROMANIA 
RMIT University, AUSTRALIA 
Romanian National Nuclear Electricity Company, ROMANIA 
SRL SHE Consulting, NORWAY 
Transport and Environment Inspectorate, Utrecht, THE NETHERLANDS 
Université de Nantes, FRANCE 
University of Pardubice (UP), CZECH REPUBLIC 
University of Sao Paolo, BRAZIL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the address of the centre 
nearest you at: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this service: 
- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or 
- by electronic mail via: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa website at: 
https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publications. 
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